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With this dissertation I intend to give a contribution to the field peace and peace-
thematic. The hypothesis of the dissertation is that it is possible to read the Platonic 
corpus as a body of critique where Plato in the last resort stands forth as a voice pro 
peace. I employ a method denoted as slow reading, and I read the dialogues systematic 
from the outset of their internal dramatic dating.  
I present two main arguments. The first is that the Republic can be read as 
dramatic backdrop for the other dialogues. The readings of the Republic will show, on 
the one hand, how Socrates legitimizes the discipline of philosophy by contrasting it to 
sophistry; on the other hand, that by awakening the well-established two-city-topos 
Socrates paves the way for a profound critique of Athenian cultural and moral values. 
This, in turn, leads to a redefinition of the concepts stasis (faction) and polemos (war) 
which entails radical new thoughts that are not reducible to the contemporary war-
waging politics. The second argument is related to the dialogues, which I denote as 
dramatic historical touchdowns. I relate to the theme encountering youths and 
highlights how Socrates, in conversations with young men intends to make them turn 
toward philosophy, which is an education and a path aiming toward freedom. 
Regarding the dialogues, I argue that the readers are invited to view how the past is 
recreated in the present, and to apprehend that this recreating is a dramatic and well-
directed showing of how the past is responsible for the present conditions. In addition, 
I analyze the entrance of the Eleatic Stranger; he brings confusion at stage and through 
him, the Socratic practice of philosophy gradually fades away. The last text 
encountered is Socrates’ apology where I—through a rhetorical reading—show that he 
presented a coherent defense both as a philosopher and as a citizen.   
Overall, through the readings I intend to show that the Platonic corpus contains a 
critique of the values that led to the decay of Athens. Due to this critique and the 
dramatic staging of prominent personas not willing or able to change, the past was 
made responsible for the conditions of the present. By launching an alternative politeia 
and paideia that is not compatible to war-waging, and by showing the multiple and, 
thus individual, paths toward philosophy, Plato in the end stands forth as a powerful 
voice pro peace.  
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Introduction: The Platonic literary-philosophical universe 
 
This dissertation is a playful1 experiment. The experimental feature is that I will read 
parts of the Platonic corpus consistently and strictly from their dramatic chronology,2 
and place the Republic and the Laws as dramatic backdrops for the other dialogues. I 
aim to give a contribution to the field “peace and war thematic;” an under-
communicated field within Platonic scholarship. My hypothesis is:  
 
It is possible to read the Platonic corpus as a body of critique where Plato, in the 
end, stands forth as a spokesperson for peace or as a powerful anti-war voice. 
 
In this introduction, I will elaborate on the grounding premises for my dissertation. As 
I am first and foremost a reader, my point of departure will be to give some reflections 
on the method activated in my upcoming readings. Then I present my reflections on 
Plato the author before I turn to Socrates, the main character of the corpus. I will also 
give a brief survey of the inspirations and stepping-stones that have enlightened my 
project. Finally, I present the two main arguments for my hypothesis before I round off 
with a description of the progress of the dissertation. 
1 How to read a dialogue—a sketch for a procedure 
For all who are engaged in the works of Plato, the old phrase “standing on the 
shoulders of giants” is indeed true, due to the multitude of commentators and scholars 
who have committed themselves to the Platonic texts during two and a half millennia. 
However, some of the interpretative traditions developed I apprehend as entrapments. 
                                                          
1 Regarding the “playful” feature, I refer to Sachs (2011, 4), who argues that “[p]hilosophy in Plato’s 
dialogues is always intertwined with play,” and points to Socrates who “explicitly says in the Republic 
(536c-537c) that this is the appropriate way to begin a philosophic education.” Sachs further argues, 
with referance to Jacob Klein, A Commentary on Plato’s Meno (University of North Carolina Press, 
1965, 18), that “Plato called play and seriousness sisters.”  
2 By “dramatic chronology,” I mean the chronology worked out with reference to the hints and clues 
given in the dialogues themselves, as Nails (2002) has demonstrated. The concept “dramatic 
chronology” stands in stark contrast to what is denoted as “Platonic chronology,” which points to 
when the dialogues were composed by Plato. A profound criticism of the presumptions embedded 
here, and a comprehensive bibliography, are found in Howland (1991).  
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This entails that I take a few steps aside and leave behind “Developmentalism,”3 and 
the so-called “Platonism.”4 I stress that it is the interpretational premises embedded in 
these isms I distance myself from, not any specific readings. The only thing I can do is 
to read the texts, communicate with them, and take seriously the challenge posed by 
the radically different conception of politics, culture, and paideia.  
There is written extensively on the topic of how to read a Platonic dialogue,5 on 
how to read Plato from a pedagogical perspective,6 on how the dialogues were read in 
antiquity and on early reception.7 However, although scholars now take the dramatic 
qualities of the dialogues into account when reading8 and even when they argue that 
the significance of drama is important for understanding the philosophical content of 
the dialogues,9 it is, according, to Arlene Saxonhouse (2009, 729), still questionable 
how and to which degree the “settings and personalities and events within the 
dialogues impinge on the interpretations.”10  
I relate to this concern when I try to highlight the “activity of reading.” Reading 
viewed as a concrete activity or action is somewhat under-communicated, and the 
reader and the reader’s work are often ignored dimensions, with a few exceptions in 
                                                          
3 I find “Developmentalism” militant, and I find the notion of “early, middle, late dialogues” limiting. 
With regard to this, I will try to meet Griswold, Jr. (2002a, x), where he utters a hope that a “day may 
soon arrive when the ‘early, middle, late’ interpretative grid falls well into the background. A shift in 
that direction would quite obviously represent a very important change in our interpretation of 
Plato.” 
4 Cf. Rasmussen (2008, 7), where he states: “When scholars have sought to extract from the 
dialogues a coherent philosophical system to call ‘Platonism,’ they have found so much to disagree 
about, for their readings of the texts have generated opposing interpretations. This disagreement has 
centered not only on claims of what Plato, the man, actually thought, […] but also on efforts ‘to 
construct as good an argument as possible on the foundation that Plato lays’ toward a definitive 
statement of the Platonic philosophical position. In both enterprises scholars have had to confront 
the issue of hermeneutic methodology and to argue in defense of the way in which they use the 
dialogues to arrive at their account of Platonic thought.” 
5 Just a few examples: Tigerstedt (1977), Howland (1991), Sløk (1992), Arieti (1995), Sallis (1996), 
Szlezák (1999), Tejera (1999), Griswold Jr. (2002b), Corlett (2005). 
6 Cotton (2014), Clay (2000). On an ideal reading order from a pedagogical perspective, see: Bruell 
(1999), Altman (2010) and (2012).  
7 Tarrant (2000), Charalabopoulos (2012).  
8 See for example Gonzalez (1995b). 
9 See for example Kahn (1996).  
10 Saxonhouse maintains “that there has not yet been adequate attention to the narrative style of the 
dialogues, though there have been some forays in this direction by scholars such as Anne-Marie 
Bowery, Jill Frank, Ruby Blondell, and Dorrit Chon.” On reflections on the relationship between 
philosophy and literature, see also Cascardi (1989). 
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which scholars present themselves as readers. For example, Jacob Howland (1998a, 1) 
introduces himself as a “reflective reader,” Hayden Ausland (1997) conducts a 
“mimetic reading,” Saxonhouse (2009, 729) a “democratic reading,” Jill Gordon 
(1999) highlights a reader-response reading, and Claudia Baracchi (2002, 3) performs 
a “rigorously responsive reading.” Employing a method, I present as “close reading,”11 
or even “slow reading,” I do (necessarily) not differ very much from the ones 
mentioned regarding methodological strategy, and it is not my intention to launch a 
new way of reading. On the contrary, I simply want to highlight reading as a work in 
progress, and regarding the Platonic corpus, this progress is never-ending. I can give 
only a brief outlining of this immense subject, and in the present case, this means that I 
will take a step away from “a semantic concept of interpretation”12 and move toward 
“a semiotic concept of reading.” In this moving away, I turn to Michael Riffaterre and 
his distinction between textual and poetic analysis.13 Through textual analysis, the 
intention is to explain the uniqueness of a text. This uniqueness exists and is 
identifiable on the textual surface through the textual structure, style, rhetorical means, 
narration, and construction. A textual analysis also implies an intertextual reading (I 
will return to his theme below). The poetic analysis, or in my terms, the literary 
analysis, aims toward understanding; the point of departure is to view the text as a 
limited code recorded in writing. It is important to underline that the “text” is a process 
of realization which is happening through reading. Behind the text, the author does not 
exist; behind the text, we find only other texts: inter-texts which bear witness to how 
the texts are part of a linguistic field consisting of quotes, genre, styles, and so on.14 
The subject of the text is not a representation of an author; the condition of the text-
                                                          
11 “Close-reading” is originally associated with formalistic readings and especially within the tradition 
“new-criticism.” I use the term in a broader sense and include the concept of a “competent reader” 
as it was developed by Riffaterre (1983); the concept denotes a “semiotic reader”—and the work 
assigned to a “semiotic reader” is to decode through reading to actualize the text.  
12 I couple the “semantic concept of interpretation” to Ricoeur (1981), where “explanation” is related 
to textual analysis, and this analysis turns out to be not radically different even when done by very 
different actors; “understanding” is related to interpretation which turns out to be different from 
one interpreter to another.  
13 Cf. note 11 above. Although Riffaterre presents a poetics designed for analyzing poetry and 
literature, I will try to use his core concepts, the division between textual analysis and poetic analysis 
of texts, with minor alterations. 
14 Cf. Barthes (1977a and 1977b).  
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subject is different from that of the author-subject because these two dimensions are 
not connected. On the contrary, the text-subject is inscribed as a metaphor in a textual 
web.15 The text as a web creates an image which in turn, thematizes reading as an 
activity or action: The act of reading is for the reader to take a stand toward a vast 
code-specter in the texts. Against this background, it is obvious that if the literary 
analysis slides into an attempt to explain, the result will be generalizations and 
assumptions because, at that moment, the exclusive message of the text disappears; 
hence the reading is immediately controlled by mechanisms other than following 
textual traces. Because I take a literary reading to be a decoding of a textual web, it 
constitutes a process which establishes communication and/or contact between the text 
and the reader. That is to say, reading establishes a dialogue, which is activated 
through the reader’s continuous alternation between textual rejection, resistance, and 
acceptance, and this process will gradually provide the reader with an understanding of 
the text, and finally (or hopefully) the reader will comprehend the message of the text. 
At this level, the reader can get in touch with the literary aspects and, regarding the 
dialogues, also the philosophical aspects of the texts. What is the literary aspect of the 
dialogues? Or, what is the philosophical aspect of the dialogues? These are the aspects 
actualized by the process of reading. Because these features are not explainable, I will 
in my readings concentrate on what the characters (including the narrators) in the 
dialogues are doing, and because of their actions, I will try to analyze the impact and 
the effect of their words and deeds. I aim to combine these two levels of analysis. 
Baracchi gives an inspirational reading along these lines. She also leaves a semantic 
interpretation behind and elaborates that her “present writing is oriented less by the 
program of interpretation and construction than by the task of response, of a rigorously 
responsive reading. So that the text may speak—if not purely according to itself, then 
out of itself, in the space of this encounter—in this possible space neither its own nor, 
                                                          
15 Cf. Barthes (1981). With regard to “textual mosaic” he states: “Any text is a new tissue of past 
citations. Bits of code, formulae, rhythmic models, fragments of social languages, etc., pass into the 
text and are redistributed within it, for there is always language before and around the text. 
Intertextuality, the condition of any text whatsoever, cannot, of course, be reduced to a problem of 
sources or influences; the intertext is a general field of anonymous formulae whose origin can 




strictly speaking, mine.”16 So, in addition to activating a close/slow-reading, I perform 
a reader-response reading, and I activate the concept of intertextuality.  
1.1 Intertextuality 
Marko Juvan (2008, 43-8) has demonstrated that it is both helpful and useful to 
distinguish between levels and degrees of intertextuality and suggests a distinction 
between “general intertextuality” and “specific intertextuality.” The “general 
intertextuality” denotes intertextuality as it is generally understood. The first to 
theorize intertextuality was Julia Kristeva,17 and according to her, it signifies a 
transposition of one or more systems of sign into another. This, Juvan (2008, 42) 
argues, “introduced a dynamic, transformative, sociohistorical and relational theory,” 
which allows the readers to vary “the syntagma for a text as a ‘mosaic of quotations’.” 
I take this textual mosaic as being close to general intertextuality. It can be 
exemplified by observing how one or several words make a crossing-point on textual 
surfaces, and it is on these surfaces, the crossing-points create dialogues between 
different texts.  
We find multiple examples of such crossing-points throughout the dialogues; one 
is the phrases translated as “now we have stumbled across something.” In the 
Republic, Socrates and Glaucon “stumble across the origin of war;” in the Sophist, the 
Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetus “stumble across the sophist;” in the Laws, the 
Athenian Stranger and his interlocutors “stumble across the origin of legislation.” In 
these instances, the reader is led to believe that the interlocutors “stumble across 
something” by pure accident due to the development of the conversations; this is the 
impact of the phrase. However, the phrase also makes something happen in the text; 
each “stumbling” tells us that something important is about to take place. Thus, these 
textual crossing-points create an internal dialogue between texts in the corpus, and this 
                                                          
16 Baracchi (2002, 3). 
17 In “La Révolution du langage póetique” (1974) translated into “Revolution in Poetic Language” 
(1986, 111), Julia Kristeva was the first to define (not coin) the term “intertextuality” as “the 
transposition of one (or several) sign-system(s) into another; but since this term has often been 
understood in the banal sense of ‘study of sources’, we prefer the term transposition because it 
specifies that the passage from one signifying system to another demands a new articulation of the 
thetic—of enunciative and denotative positionality.” On intertextuality as reading-strategy, see also 
Nightingale (1995, 1-12). 
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case—the stumbling—warns about a textual break, and hence it signals a textual 
turning-point. However, phrases or words may also create an external dialogue. One 
example is the Sophist and the Eleatic Stranger’s elaboration on “hunting tame 
animals” or humans. Through the phrase “hunting humans” the Eleatic Stranger 
creates a dialogue with both Xenophon18 and Isocrates.19 This external dialogue 
exhibits that “hunting humans” was a common metaphor used by authors in the late 
fifth century B.C.E. onwards to describe the activities of a new kind of sophists; thus, 
this phrase cannot be taken as a unique way of speaking in the Sophist.  
This leads to Andrea Nightingale, who underlines the practical use of 
intertextuality. She argues that “Plato uses intertextuality as a vehicle for criticizing 
traditional genres of discourse and, what is more important, for introducing and 
defining a radically different discursive practice, which he calls philosophy” (1995, 5). 
Further, she suggests that “Plato’s use of intertextuality should be analyzed as species 
of parody” (ibid, 7) and that each dialogue can be viewed as a kind of “multi-generic 
hybrid” (ibid, 5). According to Juvan, this can be denoted as “specific intertextuality” 
which, in turn, relates to the terms “citation” or “citing.” Etymologically, “citation” 
points to the meaning of “calling upon,” or “evoking.” These terms apply “to the 
conventional marked introduction of an alien utterance into a text, its obvious presence 
and otherness” (Juvan 2008, 48). Alternatively, in Kristeva’s words, “any text is 
constructed of a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of 
another” (1980, 66). Both general and specific intertextuality will mark my readings, 
but also, I will add yet another dimension to specific intertextuality—the concept of 
topos. 
1.2 Topoi and audiences 
I take topoi to be the headings under which arguments can be classified, or one can 
define topoi as “storehouses for arguments.”20 As a rhetorical concept, a topos denotes 
the place where the orator finds specific types of arguments or patterns of 
argumentation (i.e., “commonplaces”), but the concept can also denote the arguments 
                                                          
18 Xenophon, On Hunting, chapter 13. 
19 Isocrates, Against the Sophists, 19-20. 
20 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1991, 83).  
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themselves.21 Aristotle makes a distinction between “general topoi” versus “special 
topoi.”22 The general topoi can be used indiscriminately, and therefore they do not 
depend on any specific science or art. When I later will refer to the topos of peace, the 
poetic topos, and the moral topos, these topoi point toward arguments I suppose are 
well-known for the participants in the dialogues and the readers of the dialogues (both 
ancient and modern); thus, I understand these to be general topoi.23 The special topoi 
belong to a particular science, a particular type of oratory, a particular genre, and so 
forth. When I refer to the topos of sophistry and the topos of philosophy, I understand 
them to be special topoi. Whereas the first is known and the latter unknown to most of 
the participants in the dialogues, with regard to the readers, the knowledge of both is 
relative.24 However, when I refer to Socrates’ concealed topos—which is the topos of 
philosophy—I mean that Socrates does not always make known where he warrants his 
arguments; for some of his interlocutors, his arguments seem outlandish. This Socratic 
concealing has multiple consequences that I will try to expose throughout my readings. 
Lastly, I refer to the Socratic topos. This points to the instances where Socrates claims 
that he himself knows nothing and therefore is eager to learn from others. Also, I make 
a distinction between audiences. By the “universal audience,” I mean the readers, and 
by the “particular audience,” I refer to the participants partaking in the dialogues when 
such an audience is present.25 This was an outlining of my principles for how I intend 
to read the dialogues; now I turn to their author. 
                                                          
21 Eide (1990, 115). In addition, Eide defines “topos” as being “the mathematical concept of a 
’geometrical locus’.” See also Eide (1996).   
22 Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, 1, 2: 1358a. 
23 As the concept of “general topoi” and “special topoi” are central in my readings, I will—as my 
readings develop—refer to more than those listed here.  
24 This view, I think, is in accordance with Clay (2000), who argues that the richness of the dialogues is 
an invitation to a stepwise revealing where every intellectual level of maturity is gaining; it is a 
process that gradually leads to new depths in the texts. Clay isolates four layers: In layer 1, the focal 
point is the action, conversation, statements, humor, participants, etc. In layer 2, the focal point is 
the development of concepts; the readers start to ask questions of the text; working more in depth 
and trying to make out what is at stake. In layer 3, contextualization of the dialogues is the focal 
point; the dialogues are being valued and read comparatively; it is on this level the readers start to 
understand the elements that are presupposed in different ways in different texts, and further, the 
role these elements are given. In layer 4, the entirety or the whole philosophical picture starts to 
show. 
25 When defining the audiences, my outset is Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1991). According to 
them, a universal audience “consists of the whole of mankind, or at least of all normal, adult 
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2. Plato, the architect 
By denoting Plato an architect, I view him in light of an old topos where 
transformative and restorative outlines were the main concern. Lisa Landrum (2010) 
has demonstrated that the term “architect” was coined during the second half of the 
fifth century and first brought into play and performance in 421 at the Great Dionysian 
festival in Athens through Aristophanes’ Peace. In this play, the chorus leader 
appointed the protagonist, Trygaeus, to act as the leader of the people, and he further 
begged him to architect a scheme to defeat War and rescue Peace. The same topos also 
postulates dramatic poets as the architects who managed to draw out the performative 
aspects of architecting. At first sight, this might look like a casual metaphor, but as 
Landrum points out, a closer look reveals that it “opens more profoundly onto an 
intricate web of mythic, ritual, and metaphoric associations that are as telling as they 
are troubling about the representative deeds and ethical dilemmas that architects 
perennially enact” (2010, 2). She underlines that these early architects are to be 
understood “less hierarchically as the master-builders, and more poetically and 
dramatically as agents of archai—as individuals who knowingly initiate, make and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
persons” (p. 30); they further argue that “[p]hilosophers always claim to be addressing such an 
audience […].”(p. 31). It is underlined that the agreement of the universal audience is the highest 
point reached—“not to an experimentally proven fact, but to a universality and unanimity imagined 
by the speaker” (p. 31). The “speaker” referred to here is the orator; hence in the context of the 
Republic, the orator is identical to the narrator. When Perelman (1979) describes the universal 
audience as the “ideal audience” and states that “philosophical discourse considered traditionally as 
an appeal to reason would be characterized by its adaption to an ideal audience, this audience for 
Plato […] I would call the universal audience” (p. 58). Hence, related to the context of the Republic, I 
understand the universal audience to be us; its readers. The internal audience—that is, the various 
interlocutors or the persons engaged in deliberation, and the men who listen to the diverse 
conversations/discussions—I call the particular audience. As the particular audience consists of men 
whose reactions are known to us and, in addition, have characteristics and convictions partly known 
to us—we are able to study them from the outset of their words and deeds as these are displayed in 
the dialogue. Long (1983, 108) argues that the speaker “creates a construct of a universal audience in 
order to persuade a particular one.” Contrary to Long, I argue that Socrates in the narrator’s voice is 
aiming at persuading the universal audience by showing how the particular audience is being 
persuaded through argumentation, and in accordance with Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1991, 
32), I find that argumentation “addressed to a universal audience must convince the reader that the 
reasons adduced are of a compelling character; that they are self-evident, and possesses an absolute 
and timeless validity independent of local or historical contingencies.” So, when Socrates, in the 
voice of the narrator, addresses the universal audience directly, the narrator’s comments and 
characteristics are in many instances biased, and in addition, the narrator often evaluates both the 
interlocutors and the content of the discussion; thus the impact of the narrator’s descriptions varies 
from person to person, from age to age, and from tradition to tradition. 
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make apparent for others auspicious beginnings, originating conditions and exemplary 
restorative schemes” (ibid, 3). However, Graham Pont argues (2005, with reference to 
Plato) that architecture also was perceived as “scientific building, that species of 
design and construction which is distinguished by having a logos or rationale” (ibid, 
82). Hence through Landrum’s and Pont’s outlining of a development regarding the 
concept of the “architect,” I find a movement from the poetic and dramatic agent of 
archai to the scientific builder,26 and from these reflections, I have chosen to view 
Plato as an architectural master builder. In accordance with this view, I lean on two 
assumptions. 
First, I consider Plato to be the author that to the fullest extent mastered the art of 
indication.27 In his texts, there remain many hints and clues with which readers can 
struggle. This does not mean that I am indicating what his intentions in each text might 
have been. Rather, I stress that it is the texts and their impact that are my occupation. 
This could perhaps be apprehended as a self-contradiction, so I will try to clarify right 
from the start. As a reader of my time, reading a Platonic dialogue gives the feeling of 
being thrown into a foreign territory where I am confronted with a foreign language 
and alien (often provocative) categories of thought. To paraphrase Thomas Pangle 
(1988a), these kinds of feelings are symptoms of liberation and it “is the first blaze on 
a trail that may lead us out of the cave of our contemporary culture to a vantage point 
from which we might begin freely to understand and judge the profound and hidden 
presuppositions of our age” (ibid, 375). As these texts were composed more than two 
millennia back, I am not interested in and surely not able to consider the intentions of 
the architect at the particular textual level. As a whole, I take the corpus to be a 
showing and presentation of what Pangle denotes as the “art of politics”—an “art 
whose business it is to care for souls” (ibid). 
Secondly, the dialogues are composed as retrospective mimetic games. These 
games I take to be a part of the literary aspects of the dialogues. Within the corpus, we 
                                                          
26 It is noteworthy that in The Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle also includes “those that direct activities 
by thought” (1152b2) in the concept.  
27 Thein (2015, 222), argues that Plato is especially the grand master of the “hermeneutics of self-
suspicion” which he, according to Thein, “translates into a very interesting if somehow military-like 
conception of self-knowledge as victory over oneself, a victory that presupposes an original disunity 
of human nature and its division into various parts with their own different goals and sets of value.” 
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can isolate five different literary categories: narrated dialogues with a frame story,28 
narrated dialogues with a prelude,29 narrated dialogues without preludes and frame 
stories,30 direct dialogues,31 and one monologue (or alleged reported speech).32 When 
reading the dialogues within the two first categories, the readers can identify the 
narrator. For example, when Socrates is set as narrator in Protagoras and Republic, he 
acts on two textual levels. On the first, he is a character taking part in the 
conversations on the same level as the other characters. On the second level, he acts as 
the narrator, and in that role, he represents a voice aiming directly toward the readers. 
In the Republic, the narrator addresses a universal audience; hence all readers are 
invited to partake in the unfolding drama. In the Protagoras, though, the narrator 
addresses an anonymous friend; hence the readers are reduced to eavesdroppers. When 
these two levels are considered, the reading opens new perspectives, as will be shown. 
These reflections lead me to Socrates, the main character within this textual universe.  
3 Displaying the path toward philosophy—two Socratic practices 
Regarding how Socrates is practicing philosophy, I have identified two main 
procedures which I call “Socrates’ two practices.” These will be points of return. I 
strongly stress that through this brief survey, I only touch the tip of the iceberg.  
The earliest great teachers of ancient Greece were the poets.33 People, in general, 
activated the poetic topos by warranting their opinions on the authority of the poets.34 
                                                          
28 Parmenides (450), Symposium (421/416), Theaetetus (399). 
29 Protagoras (432), Euthydemus (407), Phaedo (399). 
30 Republic, Charmides (429), Lysis (409). 
31 Laws, Alcibiades I (432), Alcibiades II (432), Timaeus (429), Critias (429), Laches (424), Cratylus 
(422), Cleitophon (421/16), Hippias Major (421/16), Hippias Minor (421/16), Phaedrus (418/16), Ion 
(413), Gorgias (405), Meno (402), Menexenus (401/400), Philebus (?), Euthyphron (399), Sophist 
(399), Statesman (399), Crito (399). 
32 Apology (399).  
33 Robb (1994, 159) states that “[…] Hellenes at all levels of society had heard Homer’s language and 
had absorbed it. […] An older generation of scholars, led by figures such as Bruno Snell, Kurt von 
Fritz, Lional Pearson, Eric Dodds, Werner Jaeger, and John Burnet, demonstrated in a series of 
brilliant studies that there is a continuity of vocabulary and concepts from Homer through the fifth-
century dramatists in conceptualizing two important areas of human experience. In conceptualizing 
the interior mental life through a psychological vocabulary and in exhorting or praising correct 
behavior through an ethical vocabulary, there is no fundamental break from ‘Homer,’ or epical 
vocabulary and concepts, until we reach the fourth century, and above all Plato.” 
34 The critique aiming toward the poetic topos sets off right from the beginning in the Republic; how 
this works is exemplified through old Cephalus, to whom I return in Chapter II: Prologue I. Father and 
son, section 2.1: Cephalus and Socrates, pp. 65-80.  
19 
 
The next groups of teachers were the sophists35 and the rhetoricians,36 and it is safe to 
assume that it is these professions Socrates refers to when he, in the Republic, 
elaborates on paideia: “Education (παιδείαν) is not what the professions of certain men 
assert it to be. They presumably assert that they put into the soul knowledge that isn’t 
in it, as though they were putting sight into blind eyes” (518b8-c2). This brings out an 
image of the soul as a kind of tabula rasa upon which they could impress knowledge. 
From this it would follow that to teach is to inculcate, and to learn is to be inculcated; 
that the students are being indoctrinated and learn nothing but keep on repeating the 
doctrines of their inculcators. These procedures are incompatible with the Socratic 
practice.  
As we learn from the Meno (402), to learn is to recollect, hence all knowledge is 
immanent.37 However, the art of turning around (i.e., the art of dialectic, cf. Republic 
518b8-d7) includes more than recollecting. Before the recollection, it is a matter of 
securing that the turn toward philosophy is done rightly in such a way that the soul is 
being enabled to “looking at what it ought to look at,” which is finding a way to 
release its thoughts and not being led by inculcated and false opinions.38 In this regard, 
the art of turning around is coupled to Socrates’ practices, one conducted openly and 
the other secretly. The first—the demiurgic art—he relates to Daedalus,39 his famous 
                                                          
35 I return to the paideia of the sophists in chapter 7: Setting the stage, section 7.6: Protagoras, the 
teacher, pp. 267 ff. 
36 What is the difference between sophistry and rhetoric? In the Gorgias, Socrates admits that there 
is a distinct difference, and throughout Gorgias is consistently referred to as a rhetorian or an orator. 
However, because the two arts are close, Socrates argues that “sophists and orators tend to be 
mixed together as people who work in the same area and concern themselves with the same things. 
They don’t know what to do with themselves, and other people don’t know what to do about them” 
(465c7-9).  
37 It is not only mathematical knowledge; he also includes knowledge of virtues.  
38 Cf. Frede ( 1992). In accordance with Frede, I argue that the aim of Socrates’ praxis is to show that 
the one questioned leans on false authority, the authority of tradition, the authority of the many, or 
the authority of self-styled experts as Frede explains further: “But the point of this questioning is not 
just to expose the ignorance of so-called authorities. If somebody, having watched Socrates, drew 
the inference that he had been following the wrong authorities and needed to look for the right ones 
who would be in a position to tell him what to believe, he would draw the wrong inference. […] For, 
at least on these questions which matter, it is crucial that one arrive at the right view by one’s own 
thought, rather than on the authority of somebody else, e.g., the questioner,” p. 217. 
39 On Daedalus, the demiurge, see McEwen (1993, 41-76). When summarizing Daedalus’ works, she 
highlights that “in Athens, at the beginning of his career, Daedalus made statues, in Crete he built the 
labyrinth and choros, and in Sicily, where the Greeks founded many colonial cities in the eight and 
seventh century, Daedalus built a city.” 
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demiurgic ancestor on his father’s side, a lineage he traces back to Zeus via 
Hephaestus.40 The latter—the art of midwifery—he relates to his mother Phaenarete 
(“She who brings virtue to light”).41  
3.1 The demiurge at work 
When Socrates is conducting his practice openly in the city, he acts like a demiurge—a 
worker for the people. As the demiurge’s labor in Aristophanes’ Peace,42 Socrates’ 
labor is also to restore and rebuild. Hermes was persuaded to act as the architect’s co-
worker to restore peace in the city; Socrates was chosen by the architect to act as a 
paternal co-worker to restore the souls in the city, consequently, the soul of the city. 
The linkage between Socrates and the demiurge is established by himself during his 
encounters with Hippias (Hippias Maior, 282a), Ion (Ion, 533a8 ff.), Meno (Meno, 
97b-98a) and Euthyphro (Euthyphro, 11b-d) where Socrates conceitedly (and 
sometimes ironically) refers to his ancestor. Socrates even claims to be in possession 
of the same kinds of skills as Daedalus, although there is a concrete feature of these 
skills Socrates refers to. This capacity is displayed in the Euthyphro (399): 
 
Socrates: […] Now, if you will, do not hide things from me but tell me again from 
the beginning what piety is, whether being loved by the gods or having some 
other quality—but be keen to tell me what the pious and the impious are. 
Euthyphro: But Socrates, I have no way of telling you what I have in mind, for 
whatever proposition we put forward goes around and refuses to stay put where 
we established it.  
Socrates: Your statements, Euthyphro, seem to belong to my ancestor, Daedalus. 
If I were stating them and putting them forward, you would perhaps be making 
fun of me and say that because of my kinship with him my conclusions in 
discussion run away and will not stay where one puts them. As these propositions 
are yours, however, we need some other jest, for they will not stay put for you, as 
you say yourself.  
Euthyphro: I think the same jest will do for our discussion, Socrates, for I am not 
the one who makes them go around and not remain in the same place; it is you 
who are the Daedalus, for as far as I am concerned they would remain as they 
were. 
Socrates: It looks as if I was cleverer than Daedalus in using my skill (τέχνην), 
my friend, in so far as he could only cause to move the things he made himself, 
but I can make other people’s move as well as my own. And the smartest part of 
my skill (τέχνης) is that I am clever (σοφός) without wanting to be, for I would 
                                                          
40 Cf. Alcibiades I, 121a3-6. 
41 Cf. Theaetetus, 149a1. Socrates also refers to his mother in Alcibiades I, 131e4-5. 
42 On the demiurges’ labor in Aristophanes’ Peace, see Landrum (2010, 17-22). 
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rather have your statements to me remain unmoved than possess the wealth of 
Tantalys as well as the cleverness (σοφία)43 of Daedalus. (Euthyphro, 11b1-e1). 
 
Before this passage, Socrates has urged Euthyphro to work out a definition of “piety” 
so that Socrates can learn from an expert what piety is (cf. the Socratic topos), but it 
turns out that this is a difficult undertaking. At this point in the dialogue, Euthyphro’s 
suggestions have been refuted once, and Socrates demands that he start all over again. 
Euthyphro complains and says it is impossible because whatever the proposition, they 
“refuse to stay put.” This, Socrates claims, could be a statement put forth by Daedalus 
because Daedalus’ statues moved (they ran away), he needed to tie them down to have 
them stay put. This analogy, Daedalus’ statues versus Euthyphro’s arguments 
(propositions) and the common features of Socrates’ and Daedalus’ skills, point 
toward an ability to control movement and fixity.44 But Daedalus was able only to set 
his own work in motion, whereas Socrates can move others as well. Also, it is the 
opinions of Euthyphro that Socrates now will try to move before he can tie down the 
true opinion, when and if it appears. However, in the case of Euthyphro, it apparently 
does not work:  
 
Socrates: So the pious is once again what is dear to the gods.  
Euthyphro: Most certainly.  
Socrates: When you say this, will you be surprised if your arguments seem to 
move about instead of staying put? And will you accuse me of being Daedalus 
who makes them move, though you are yourself much more skillful 
(τεχνικώτερος) than Daedalus and make them go round in a circle? Or do you not 
realize that our argument has moved around and come again to the same place? 
(Euthyphro, 15b4-c3) 
 
According to Socrates, Euthyphro is even more skillful than Daedalus because he can 
make the arguments move in circles repeatedly. This indicates that Euthyphro can 
                                                          
43 On epistēmē and sophia in relation to Daedalus, see McEwen (1993, 125-28). 
44 This aspect is discussed in depth by McEwen (1993, 6). She elaborates: “In the case of Daedalus’ 
xoana, the chaining of cult statues brought the divine into the realm of human experience; for Plato, 
the bindings of true opinions with the chains of recollection [anamnēsis, cf. Meno, 97d-98a] brings 
the divine into the realm of human knowledge. Plato’s evocation of the animated cult statue reveals 
a detectable shift. In both cases the binding has as its purpose to bring the divine into the human 
sphere, but there is a shift, and the shift is a shift of emphasis from the primacy of motion to the 




present the opinions he possesses, but he is not able to go further.45 Because there is 
nothing to tie down, Socrates cannot go any further. The result is that this self-
appointed expert stays put while his arguments move in stable circles. When Socrates 
offers to start the investigation all over again, Euthyphro declines and runs off. The 
analogy between Socrates and Daedalus is made even clearer in the Meno after the 
incident with the slave boy: 
 
Socrates: […] Will he who has the right opinion always succeed, as long as his 
opinion is right? 
Meno: That appears to be so of necessity, and it makes me wonder, Socrates, this 
being the case, why knowledge is prized far more highly that right opinion, and 
why they are different. 
Socrates: Do you know why you wonder, or shall I tell you?  
Meno: By all means, tell me. 
Socrates: It is because you have paid no attention to the statues (ἀγάλμασιν) of 
Daedalus, but perhaps there are none in Thessaly.  
Meno: What do you have in mind when you say this? 
Socrates: That they too run away and escape if one does not tie them down but 
remain in place if tied down.  
Meno: So what? 
Socrates: To acquire an untied work of Daedalus is not worth much, like inquiring 
a runaway slave, for it does not remain, but it is worth much if tied down, for his 
works are very beautiful. What am I thinking of when I say this? True opinions 
(δόξας τὰξ ἀληθεῖ ς). For true opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing 
and all they do is good, but they are not willing to remain long, and they escape 
from a man’s mind, so that they are not worth much until one ties them down by 
(giving) an account of the reason why. And that, Meno, my friend, is recollection 
(ἀναμνησις), as we previously agreed. After they are tied down, in the first place 
they become knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), and then they remain in place. That is why 
knowledge is prized higher than correct opinion, and knowledge differs from 
correct opinion in being tied down (Meno, 97c9-98a8). 
 
Through this passage, it is confirmed that the daedalusian art of Socrates consists of 
setting false opinions in movement. While doing his procedure, Socrates notices these 
moving false opinions and refutes them. If the man encountered can understand and 
accept the refutation, he will move toward true opinion which Socrates will help him 
to tie down. When the true opinions are tied down, they become knowledge which 
remains in place. The turning of the soul is then completed, and the soul is looking 
where it ought to look. In the cases we witness throughout the dialogues, Socrates is 
                                                          
45 I will argue that this feature (and problem) is equivalent to Glaucon. I return to this throughout 
chapter 5: Founding cities making (ποιοῦομεν) guardians. 
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hardly ever successful in his praxis; exceptions are young Hippocrates, whom we 
encounter in the Protagoras46 and Polemarchus in the Republic.47  
 When practicing his demiurgic craft, Socrates activates two proceedings or 
methods. The first is the elenchus.48 Using the term, I lean on Hugh H. Benson (1989), 
who maintains that “the elenchus is concerned not merely to establish an inconsistency 
but to establish an inconsistency in the beliefs of the interlocutor” (ibid, 599). I also 
relate to his distinction between eristic and elenchus where “the latter is concerned 
with the truth while the former is not” (ibid).49 The second procedure I designate as 
creating “an imaginary interlocutor.” It goes like this: What if someone asked us, what 
would we answer? I would probably say […], what would you say? Both methods are 
frequently used throughout. 
3.2 The midwife at work 
In the Theaetetus (399), hence late in life, Socrates reveals his secret art of 
midwifery.50 Socrates recognizes that Theaetetus is in agony and concludes that he is 
suffering from “the pains of labor;” Theaetetus’ pains are not due to him being barren, 
but due to pregnancy (149e6-7). At first, Theaetetus is not convinced about this, but 
Socrates assures him it is so; he knows this because he is the son of “a good hefty 
midwife,” and like his mother, he also practices the art of midwifery. He begs 
Theaetetus not to disclose this to the rest of the world because it is a secret and not 
known (λέληθα) to anyone (149a8), and further, “it is not one of the things you hear 
people say about me, because they don’t know” (149a10). Due to people’s ignorance, 
they say that Socrates is “a very odd person (ἀτοπώτατός,149a10), always causing 
                                                          
46 It is not clear if Socrates succeeded in his approach to Hippocrates, here the conclusion depends on 
how the last sentence in the Protagoras is interpreted or understood. I return to Hippocrates in 
Chapter 8: Saving youths, section 8.1 Hippocrates’ dream on education, pp. 282 ff. 
47 I return to Polemarchus in Chapter 2: Father and son, section 2.2: Polemarchus and Socrates, pp. 
80-90. 
48 The controversies connected to Socratic elenchus are long-lasting. This method is commonly 
understood as a pedagogical method employed by Socrates when he cross-examines his various 
interlocutors. The controversies evolve around the question of how elenchus should be defined. For 
a profound examination of this question, see Scott (2002). 
49 This distinction will be relevant for me when I read the Thrasymachus section of the Republic in 
chapter 3: Prologue II: The tide is turning for Socrates, pp. 91-134. 




people to get into difficulties.” Theaetetus has heard people talk this way, and Socrates 
does prefer that his secret behind the rumors continues to be a secret. At this point, 
Socrates offers to give the reasons for the secrecy.  
The general facts about midwifery are that women practicing the art are past 
bearing and conceiving children. For this custom Artemis is responsible. Further, it is 
“the midwives who have the power to bring on the pains and […] to relieve them; they 
do it by the use of simple drugs and by singing incantations. In difficult cases, too, 
they can bring about the birth; or, if they consider it advisable, they can promote a 
miscarriage” (149d10-e4). These general facts Theaetetus is well aware of, but he has 
never heard that the midwives also were the most cunning matchmakers; they have a 
thorough knowledge of which couples will produce the best offspring, and due to this 
knowledge, “reliable matchmaking is a matter for no one but the true midwife” 
(150a5-6). So, Socrates concludes, the art of the midwives is a highly important one, 
but not as important as his. The reason for this is that women do sometimes bring real 
children into the world and sometimes counterfeits which are hard to distinguish from 
the real ones, and “then the midwife’s greatest and noblest function would be to 
distinguish the true from the false offspring” (150b2-4). Although Socrates’ art of 
midwifery is in most respects similar to theirs, it differs and is more important because 
they attend to women while Socrates attends to men. Socrates attends to their souls 
when they are in labor, while the women attend to the bodies, and the most important 
thing about Socrates’ art is that he possesses the ability to “apply all possible tests 
(βασανίζειν, 150c1) to the offspring of young men in order to determine whether the 
young mind is being delivered of a phantom—that is an error, or a fertile truth” 
(150c1-3). The word βασανίζειν translates “to test;” literally, the term means “to rub 
gold upon the touchstone.” In this context, it means “to try the genuineness of a thing, 
to put to the test and make proof of,” and “to examine closely” or “cross-question.”51 
Through this special kind of testing, Socrates aims to deprive the young men of their 
nonsense, but some of them never quite believed that he was doing this in good faith.  
This art also enables him to detect the ones pregnant: “At first some of them may 
give the impression of being ignorant and stupid,” he says, “but as time goes on and 
                                                          
51 Cf. Liddle and Scott. 
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our association continues, all whom God permits are seen to make progress—a 
progress which is amazing both to other people and to themselves” (150d2-6). He 
stresses that it is clear that this progress “is not due to anything they have learned from 
me; it is that they discover within themselves a multitude of beautiful things, which 
they bring forth into the light” (150d6-8).  
His guidance was at times not valued as such, and this “may be seen in the many 
cases where people who did not realize this fact took all the credit to themselves and 
thought that I was no good” (150d9-e2). This utterance adds yet another dimension to 
the Athenian gossip concerning Socrates’ unpopularity.52 In addition to the old rumors 
which denoted him a sophist, he was also confronted with blame coming from young 
men who failed or who left him too soon. In this regard, we can detect two sorts of 
youths: the ones leaving him permanently and the ones leaving but who change their 
minds and come back. The former left him sooner than they should, either of their own 
accord or through the influence of others. Socrates says that after they left “they have 
resorted to harmful company with the result that what remained within them has 
miscarried; while they have neglected the children I helped them to bring forth, and 
lost them because they set more value upon lies and phantoms than upon the truth; 
finally they have been set down for ignorant fools, both by themselves and by 
everybody else” (150e2-7). For the ones leaving but coming back, the outcome of their 
decision is uncertain. When they came back and once more were seeking Socrates’ 
company, they were “ready to move heaven and earth to get it” (151a1), Socrates 
states. However, “in some cases the divine sign (δαιμόνιον) that visits me forbids me 
to associate with them; in others, it permits me, and then they begin again to make 
progress” (151a3-4). This tells us there is a second chance, but due to his inner 
daimon, Socrates is forced to dispel some and allowed to accept others. However, 
there is also a third group—those who do not seem to be pregnant at all, and, when 
Socrates comes across them, he realizes that they do not need him at all. When this is 
the case, he gives them away to other wise and inspired persons; for example, he has 
given many to Prodicus (151b5). Socrates’ two practices are detectable, and I will use 
                                                          
52 Socrates elaborates on this in the Apology (399), which I return to in chapter 10: The Apology, 
section 10.6.1: The old accusations, pp. 362-66. 
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them as a tool throughout my readings to communicate what I think Socrates is doing 
and why. I will now turn to the inspirations and stepping-stones of my project. 
4 Inspirations and stepping-stones 
It is impossible to elaborate on all who have influenced, enlightened, and inspired my 
understanding of the Platonic dialogues. Hence I am bound to discriminate. Therefore, 
in this regard, I present the readings that are directly relevant for this project. 
4.1 The dramatic chronology of the Platonic corpus 
I highly value the readings given by Catherine Zuckert (2009), Howland (1998a), and 
Laurence Lampert (2010). They have—from different perspectives and intentions—
paved the way regarding my undertaking to encounter the Platonic corpus from the 
outset of dramatic chronology. However, already in 1857, Eduard Munk suggested that 
the architect provided the dialogues with dramatic dates. According to Zuckert (2009, 
17n30), Munk argued in accordance with present criticism that “attempts to date the 
dialogues on the basis of style or word choice involve inferences from highly 
questionable assumptions.”53 Munk proposed a chronology which he argued was a 
natural order and suggested that the dialogues represent three periods in the 
development of Socrates’ philosophy.54 Zuckert, who intended to expose the 
coherence of the dialogues by emphasizing the contradictory philosophical voices 
Plato uses, renews Munk’s thoughts. By reading the whole Platonic corpus, she argues 
that the dialogues cohere and reveal a comprehensive understanding of philosophy. 
Howland and Lampert are on the same track, but contrary to Zuckert, they do not 
consider the whole corpus. 
4.1.1 Reading the whole corpus from the outset of the dramatic dates 
Zuckert approaches an imperative question (if not the imperative question) in her 
project: Given the presence of different philosophers (Parmenides, Timaeus, the 
                                                          
53 Zuckert further points out that “Plato was a consummate artist who was able to use many styles in 
depicting exchanges between different individual characters. Even if, as the stylometric studies show, 
there are six dialogues in which Plato uses similar phrases and constructions, Thesleff observes, the 
evidence that these dialogues were written ‘late is slight. Nor does it follow that Plato intended these 
conversations to be read as ‘late’ productions.” Cf. Thesleff (1982, 69-71). This is also in accordance 
with the views presented by Howland (1991, 189), in which he sets out “to awaken Plato scholarship 
from its dogmatic slumber.”  
54 For the schemata, see Appendix II: Eduard Munk, p. 396.  
27 
 
Athenian Stranger, the Eleatic Stranger, and Socrates) in the dialogues, how are we to 
locate Plato’s philosophy, or, how are we to separate Plato’s philosophy from the ones 
promoted by these characters? She suggests that Plato dramatized the insoluble 
problems which “make philosophy always a search for wisdom that will never 
culminate in certain knowledge” (ibid, 209). She argues that if the Platonic dialogues 
are ordered by their dramatic dates, then a coherent story about the development of 
Socratic philosophy comes to light, first in response to the various challenges posed by 
the pre-Socratic Athenian Stranger in the Laws, and then, subsequently, in response to 
the challenges of Plato’s three other philosophic spokesmen: Parmenides, Timaeus, 
and the Eleatic Stranger. The methodological reading of the corpus is done by 
determining the internal dramatic chronology of Plato’s portrayals of the life of 
Socrates, which Zuckert divides into five periods.55  
 Zuckert claims that two benefits surface in this reading order. First, “it enables 
us to take account of the differences in Plato’s presentation of Socrates that led most 
commentators to adopt the developmental thesis rather than maintain a unitarian 
reading of Socrates, much less of Plato, without claiming historical knowledge that we 
in fact lack about the times at which Plato wrote the individual dialogues.” Second, 
and according to Zuckert the most important, “the dramatic chronology enables us to 
see the way in which Plato uses his other philosophical spokesmen, first to set up the 
problems, philosophical and political, that were bequeathed to Plato and his teacher by 
the pre-Socratics and then to indicate the limitations of the ‘solutions’ Socrates 
proposed, both cosmological and logical.”56 It is not difficult to agree with the 
elements Zuckert sets as the first benefit of this reading strategy. For me, the problem 
comes to light in the second benefit. I am especially ambivalent to the first part, 
denoted as the “pre-Socratic period,” and I am not able to find my way around the 
arguments and justifications for dating the Laws to 460-450, and for claiming that the 
Athenian Stranger is a pre-Socratic philosopher.57 I have the same sort of ambivalence 
toward the dating of the Menexenus (387-86). Also, I am troubled by the concept 
                                                          
55 For the schemata, see Appendix IV: Catherine Zuckert, p. 397. 
56 The two quotes are from Zuckert (2009, 18-19). 
57 The arguments for the dating of the Laws is also set forth in Zuckert (2004). 
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“spokesmen of Plato,” which I associate with “mouthpiece interpretations,”58 an 
interpretative tradition I distance my project from. Despite some (major) differences, 
Zuckert’s readings are important to me mainly because she has paved the way for new 
approaches.  
4.1.2 Reading parts of the corpus from the outset of the dramatic dates 
Howland suggests that the dialogues Theaetetus, Euthyphro, Cratylus, Sophist, 
Statesman, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo stand together in dramatic time, in “the order 
in which they have been named, as memorials of Socrates’s last days.” He argues that, 
together, these eight dialogues form an octology constituting the largest single 
dramatic sequence of writings in the Platonic corpus. Thus, in “eight out of the thirty-
five dialogues listed in the traditional canon of Thrasyllus, Plato concentrates upon the 
end of Socrates’ life.” This is, according to Howland, a remarkable fact which invites 
the readers to ask “whether the dialogues of the octology are also linked internally by 
common philosophical themes and issues.” He contends they are connected, and “The 
temporal contiguity of these dialogues is merely the surface of a deeper dramatic and 
thematic integrity.” The trial motif is the Ariadne thread in Howland’s readings, 
through which he finds that “the end of Socrates’ life furnishes the occasion for an 
extended philosophical exploration of the question ‘Who, or what, is Socrates?’” Plato, 
Howland argues, indicates an answer to this question in various other ways, and thus, 
“The issue of Socrates’ identity constitutes the unspoken center of all the dialogues of 
the octology.”59 Howland’s readings of the octology have been enlightening and 
enriching for me. I highly value the way he implicitly activates intertextuality 
throughout the readings and the contextualization of the dialogues. I part from 
Howland when he sets the date of the Cratylus to 399,60 and I move one step further 
regarding contextualization of the dialogues and will actively take the context (through 
the interlocutors) into consideration in my readings. 
Lampert (2010, 1) sets out by claiming that “Plato spread his dialogues across the 
temporal span of Socrates’ life, setting some earlier, some later, inducing their 
                                                          
58 I return to “mouthpiece theories” in chapter 9: The Eleatic Stranger—a turning point, p. 326. 
59 Howland (1998a), all quotes are from p. 2. 
60 I return to this in Appendix I: The chronology of the dialogues and their participants, pp. 384-95. 
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engaged reader to wonder: Does that span map a temporal development in Socrates’ 
thought? Did Plato show Socrates becoming Socrates?” His answer to these questions 
is yes, whereupon he claims that the “dramatic dates Plato gave his dialogues invite his 
readers to follow a now little-used route into the true mansion of Socrates’ thought.” If 
the readers follow this route, they can accompany Socrates “as he breaks with the 
century-old tradition of philosophy, […] learns the proper way to shelter and transmit 
that understanding in the face of the threats to philosophy that Plato made so 
prominent.” Thus, the “plan of Plato’s dialogues” is the “one turning point and vortex” 
(2010, 15)61 of “the history of philosophy—and of the history of political philosophy, 
philosophy’s quasi-philosophical means of sheltering and advancing philosophy” 
(ibid, 1). The explicit aim of Lampert’s book is “to show how Plato’s chronological 
arrangement of his dialogues portrays the remarkable prodigy Socrates, having 
discovered all these things, learning to teach someone else how to judge them clearly 
for himself” (ibid, 9). Lampert is taking on this task, first by setting the dramatic date 
of the three dialogues, the Protagoras (432), the Charmides (429), and the Republic 
(429); then he performs a reading of these dialogues through which he treats them in 
detail.  
  I take one step aside from Lampert, especially regarding his dating of the 
Republic and his argument that the Charmides functions as a prologue to the Republic. 
The latter leads him to conclude that Socrates learned how to conduct a new public 
teaching from the conversations with Alcibiades and Critias, and further, that Socrates 
demonstrates this in the Republic by convincing Glaucon, Adeimantus, and 
Thrasymachus. These elements expose a major difference in our readings of this 
dialogue. I argue that the Republic is not equipped with a dramatic date,62 and I am not 
convinced that Socrates succeeds in turning these three men around.  
4.2 Philosophy defined 
In an extensive work on genres in the Platonic dialogues, Nightingale (1995)63 has 
demonstrated that it is not controversial to claim that Plato, a few decades after the 
                                                          
61 Lampert is here quoting Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy. 
62 I will elaborate on this in chapter 1: Preparing the stage, section 1.1: Is the Republic equipped with 
a dramatic date? pp. 47-9. 
63 See especially chapter 1: “Plato, Isocrates, and the property of philosophy,” pp. 13-59. 
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restoration of the democracy in 403, made it his project to define philosophy and make 
it a new discipline (or program) in which the philosopher contrasted the existing 
intellectuals. In an enlightening analysis, she pinpoints how “Plato appropriated the 
term ‘philosophy’ for a new and specialized discipline” which emerged as “an 
artificial construct that had to be invented and legitimized as a new and unique cultural 
practice” (ibid, 14). Through a discussion of the history of the word “philosophy”—
φιλοσοφεῖν and its cognates—she shows that the term “was used to designate 
‘intellectual cultivation’ in a broad and unspecific sense.”64 Thus, before the fourth 
century, there “was no special subgroup of intellectuals who had appropriated the title 
of ‘philosophoi’” (ibid, 15).  
I take this study to be a sophisticated developed argument, which I use as a 
stepping-stone for my dissertation in three ways. First, I view Nightingale’s study 
implicitly to give support to my view that the corpus is constructed through the lenses 
of a retrospective mimetic game. Secondly, her study demonstrates that one can view 
the whole corpus as an architectonic project; that is, as an effort undertaken to 
distinguish the philosopher and the discipline of philosophy from the author’s 
contemporary rivals, especially the sophists. Further, I am sympathetic to the 
positioning of both the philosopher and the discipline of philosophy in “relation to the 
social and political economy of fourth-century Athens” (ibid, 14). Thirdly, 
contextualization is important. As a necessary strategy for her comparative and 
intertextual analysis that aims to show how (and why) philosophy was “invented and 
legitimized as a new and unique cultural practice” (ibid), Nightingale contextualizes 
Plato, his texts, and his rivals in the fourth century. Based on the intertextual analysis 
of the defense-speeches of Isocrates’ Antidosis and Plato’s Apology of Socrates, she 
                                                          
64 The argumentation for this is the following: “While Pericles’ famous “φιλοσοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίς” 
suggests that virtually all Athenians were practicing ‘philosophy’ (Thucydides 2.40.1), the term is 
generally used to designate a smaller group of individuals, namely, people who have the time and 
the inclination to engage in intellectual pursuits as young men and adults. The narrowest application 
of the word in this period, in fact, is found in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen (DK B11.13) in which those 
people who make a practice of verbal disputation (φιλοσόφων λόγων ἀμίλλας) are distinguished 
from both astronomers and rhetoricians. Perhaps the most important indication of the valence of 
this term in late fifth-century Athens, however, is its absence from the texts of Old Comedy. Although 
the fragments of Old Comedy as well as the plays of Aristophanes contain several attacks on 
intellectuals, they have nothing to say about ‘philosophers’.” 
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reaches the following conclusions: Isocrates’ defense is constructed on the premise 
that the philosopher represents a great value for the city due to his intellectual 
property, and for that reason, he “firmly places himself and his philosophy within the 
social economy of Athens” (ibid, 59, cf. 43)—that is, Isocrates argues for an insider 
status for the philosopher. This is contrary to how Plato constructs the philosopher’s 
defense. According to Nightingale, he argues “that the philosopher occupies a 
disinterested position” (ibid, 59)65—that is, he argues for an outsider status for the 
philosopher; hence the philosopher is distinguished by his willingness to remain 
outside of the social economy of Athens. I will relate closely to Nightingale’s 
perspective on the philosopher when I argue that the corpus contains a profound 
critique aimed toward politics and paideia, through which Plato—in my terms, the 
peace-waging architect—launches philosophy as a new and unique cultural practice. 
This leads me to the theme war versus peace within the scholarly tradition. 
4.3 War and peace 
Kurt A. Raaflaub (2011, 2) states that “experts on war in the ancient world are 
numerous, those on peace harder to find.” However, he further argues that “the Greeks 
produced a rich discourse on the issue of peace,” and compared to other ancient 
civilizations, the Greeks “were not unique, but exceptional” (ibid). Raaflaub (2009) 
and (2011) present a survey of the ancient peace discourses.66 Through these surveys, 
he demonstrates that “the idea of peace” was an important part of performative arts 
such as “narrative and didactic epic, lyric poetry, tragedy, and comedy,” and as these 
“were performed in public, at various occasions but always in front of audiences that 
represented important segments of the citizens body,” the public was profoundly 
informed on the problem of war and peace. Intellectuals such as Thucydides, Plato, 
and other philosophers “primarily addressed readers or taught small groups of pupils 
[…],” but even so, “they interacted intensely with other intellectuals of all types.” 
According to Raaflaub, this “explains why echoes not only of political, geographical, 
                                                          
65 It should be underlined that this is a marginal summary of Nightingale’s analysis, and she stresses 
that these definitions are “just a top of the iceberg” (p. 18) and further that “Plato’s definition and 
defense of philosophy goes far beyond the arguments analyzed in this chapter” (p. 59). 
66 Raaflaub (2016) presents a groundbreaking comparative examination where the main topic is to 




or medical theories but also of an intense discourse on peace pervade virtually all 
extant literature of the period.”67 The period referred to is the late fifth and early fourth 
centuries. Some scholars have pointed out that “comments about the suffering caused 
by war and, correspondingly, a strong desire for peace pervades Greek literature.”68 
Despite the fact that scholars largely ignore the widespread peace discourse, Raaflaub 
emphasizes that he takes the existence of it for granted.  
 From this, it follows that with regard to secondary literature, the “bibliography 
on war in the ancient world is immense”69 while there is less to be found on peace.70 
Henrik Syse (2010) highlights not the peace theme but the ethical aspects of war as he 
points out that there “has been so little secondary literature on Plato’s treatment of 
ethical aspects of warfare and indeed of his treatment of warfare as a whole.”71 He 
points out that the lack of attention to Plato’s discussions about war “is even more 
surprising in light of the fact that most of his dialogues are set during or shortly after 
the Peloponnesian War—with interruptions—from 431 to 404” (ibid, 104). Maybe 
these “surprising” aspects can be explained through Martin Ostwald’s authoritative 
voice when he—regarding Plato and Aristotle—argues as follows:  
 
Neither of these philosophers ever articulated a coherent doctrine of war and 
peace, so that their views must be patched together from isolated statements, 
usually made incidentally and in contexts primarily concerned with other matters. 
Their vision of peace is not utopian but informed by the idea that peace exists in a 
society which, guided by law and trained by education, pursues excellence in the 
use of the goods it has, a society which knows that leisure is needed for the good 
life but also that this leisure is imperiled if men are not prepared at all times to 
defend it by military means.72   
 
I take this statement at face value, and from the same statement Raaflaub concludes 
that neither Plato nor Aristotle has very much to say on the subject of “war and 
                                                          
67 Raaflaub (2009), all quotes above are from p. 228. 
68 Ibid, 227. According to Raaflaub, evidence for this has been collected by Zampaglione (1973), 
Spiegel (1990), and Raaflaub (2007). 
69 Raaflaub (2011, 27, note iv). For a solid bibliography on “war,” see Raaflaub and Rosenstein (1999).  
70 For substantial bibliographies on “peace,” see the chapters in Raaflaub (2007) and the bibliography 
in Raaflaub (2009). Also, see Wees (2001), and Zampaglione (1973). 
71 In this regard, Syse (2010, 104n1) points to Craig (2001) and Baracchi (2002). Syse counts them as 
“some of the relatively few exceptions in treating war as much more than a passing and tangential 
topic within Plato’s philosophy.”  
72 Ostwald (1996). Quoted in Raaflaub (2009, 233). 
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peace.”73 According to him, the case is rather that they both considered war as deep-
rooted in human society, and they both reflected on how to control it and assign it a 
responsible and meaningful function. Hence “both paid considerable attention to 
limiting the use of war and especially to securing the city’s internal peace through 
legislation and moral and intellectual education” (ibid). This conclusion serves as a 
second stepping-stone for me. For even if Plato did not write a text explicitly on the 
topic of war or peace as pointed out by Raaflaub (2009, 2011), Syse (2010), and 
Ostwald (1996), the dialogues are all mapped—in retrospective—within the era of the 
Peloponnesian War. Moreover, as this war was the single most significant feature of 
the political life in Athens, it can be argued that it is plausible to consider the Platonic 
corpus from the perspective of political critique. Also, when I, from the perspective of 
the dramatic chronology of the dialogues, follow Socrates and the discussions he and 
the various interlocutors are engaged in throughout the dramatic decades, it cannot be 
controversial to claim that the issues discussed are related to the political life in the 
city. Thus, I agree with Syse (2010, 104) that a reasonable assumption in this regard 
“is that the topic of war is rarely far away, even if the link is not always made 
explicit.”  
As I see it, the general pattern is that scholars who highlight the aspect of war in 
Plato’s writings turn to the Republic, while those who highlight the aspect of peace 
turn to the Laws. For example, Leon Craig (2001) argues that war and spiritedness are 
central to the main argument of the Republic. Michael Kochin (1999) contends that 
Socrates’ three different accounts of war reflect and complete the central argument of 
the Republic.74 Syse (2002) presents a more nuanced view when he considers the war-
                                                          
73 In continuance, Frank (2007, 444), argues that “[m]ost scholars agree with Aristotle’s claim that in 
the Republic and the Laws, Plato does not attend adequately to the city’s relations with its neighbors 
(Pol. 1265a20). Plato may ‘advocate the limits of desire,’ but he does not see pleonexia as a problem 
in interpolity relations, not, specifically, in the context of war.” However, when Frank asks if this is 
true, her answer is no. Her argument is as follows: “Plato’s political dialogues do focus most explicitly 
on the internal workings of the polis, on the analogy between city and soul, and on self-sufficiency as 
the normative aim of the city. But because the city, like the soul, is never as autonomous as it aspires 
to be, the city’s relation to itself, like the soul’s relation to itself, always also involves its relation to 
others” (ibid). 
74 The three accounts of war which Kochin (1999) identifies in the Republic, are first, wars for 
expansion (Book II); second, wars against cities riven by class conflict (Book IV); and third, the 
educative qualities of exposure to warfare itself (Book V), cf. Frank (2007, 465n27). 
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peace thematic. He argues that in the Alcibiades and the Laches we find that a rightful 
conduct of war is linked to the practice of virtue, and that the proper education of the 
warrior class in the Republic is a teaching of ius in bello—just war; while in the Laws 
we find that it is peace that presents the true aim for good laws. Mino Ianne (2016), on 
the other hand, turns mainly to the Republic when viewing the Platonic concept of 
peace as a fundamental human right. Mark Munn (2013) claims that mid-forth century 
was a time in which Athens turned away from the Periclean vision of empire and 
toward the ideals of peace and wealth. On this background, he reads the Laws as a kind 
of inverted Pericleanism and argues that educated citizens are what secure peace. 
Regarding the war-waging imperialistic politics of Athens, Bruce Rosenstock (1994, 
368) argues that “in the Republic, Plato turns his back on the political ideology that 
sustains his city.” I will return to these perspectives in due course. Now, it is time to 
present the main arguments for my dissertation. 
5 Entering the Platonic literary-philosophic universe 
I enter the Platonic corpus as a reader. When I am proposing to relate to but not read 
and analyze the whole Platonic corpus and designate it the “the Platonic literary-
philosophic universe,” some scholars might dismiss such an undertaking right from the 
beginning; some may even see it as far-fetched. Ruby Blondell (2002) warns against 
such a reading and calls for cautiousness: “Despite their [i.e., the dialogues] common 
dramatic setting on the verge of Socrates’ death, these works share no formal links of a 
kind that invites us to view them as subordinate parts of one artistic whole” (ibid, 7).75 
She further argues that we “are not entitled to assume […] that Plato’s oeuvre as a 
whole presents us with a coherent set of characters or ideas” (ibid, 6). I do not claim 
that the Platonic corpus presents us with a coherent set of characters or ideas. 
Nevertheless, to argue that the corpus can be read as a profound critique where the 
author, in the end, stands forth as a spokesperson for peace, it is necessary to relate to 
the whole corpus. As I elaborated on above, recent readings have presented a ground-
breaking turn that allows new perspectives, and it is within this newly grounded 
                                                          
75 Blondell (2002) admits that “any writer’s oeuvre in a sense creates and presents us with a 
complete authorial ‘world’” (p. 7), but “it is worth recalling, in this context, that as far as we can tell, 
all Plato’s dialogues have survived. But the picture of ‘Plato’s world’ that we recover from them will 
depend on how many of them—and which ones—are deemed authentic” (p. 7n16). 
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tradition that I will try to intervene. In accordance with my working hypothesis, I also 
suggest that it is through the profound critique aiming toward existing politeia that 
radical new views emerge. I argue that politeia as launched in the Republic and the 
Laws are incompatible with war-waging politics. Thus, they strongly suggest that new 
thoughts regarding politeia and education are that which will secure peace. With this 
claim I allude to Jill Frank (2007, 445) who argues that the Republic “models […] a 
philosophy and politics that are irreducible to war and that provide an alternative to its 
motivating pleonexia by correcting the virtues taught by an education to, for, and by 
war.” This leads to Allan Bloom (1991b, 439-440n1) who states that the existing 
politeia in contemporary Athens can be “identified with the class of citizens who rule, 
for they impress their way on the city and are the source of the laws.” Pangle (1988a, 
375) maintains that in Platonic terms politeia is identified with the soul of the city, and 
the business of the art of politics is to care for souls.76 In these two opposed 
identifications, we also find implicit references to two different views on paideia, 
which on a general level denotes the shaping of character.77 The conventional shaping 
of character is severely attacked throughout the whole corpus; thus, it is one of my 
main themes all through the dissertation. My last introductory encounter is to present 
the two main arguments for the hypothesis. The first concerns the Republic and the 
Laws as backdrops; the second concerns the dramatic chronology of the other 
dialogues. 
5.1 Argument I: The Republic and the Laws as dramatic backdrops 
When I claim that the Republic and the Laws78 can be read as dramatic backdrops for 
the rest of the dialogues, my argument is two-fold. First, I will argue that these two 
dialogues constitute the corpus’ political-philosophic-thematic core. Overall, this core 
points toward an undertaking that promotes peace. In both dialogues, the new politeias 
                                                          
76 The emerging of a new politeia and paideia will be the main theme of chapters 5: Founding cities 
making (ποιοῦομεν) guardians and 6: The demiurges of freedom. 
77 Different aspects of paideia are broadly discussed. The works that have an impact on my 
understanding of the term is first and foremost the influential and ground-breaking work of Jaeger 
(1986), Havelock (1963), and Robb (1994). 
78 I will not perform a reading of the Laws. However, I will give a brief explanation of how the Laws 
functions as a backdrop in relation to the Republic and how I isolate the peace theme in this 
dialogue, see Appendix IV: The Laws, pp. 398-405. 
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displayed are aiming toward peace and prosperity. In the Laws, the aim is, through 
new laws and paideia, to make righteous citizens to prevent stasis. The paideia 
proposed in the Republic aims toward justice on both a collective and individual level. 
Further, by redefining the concept stasis and letting it include wars between Greek 
city-states, Socrates, in the Republic, launches a Pan-Hellenic peace-project which 
reduces war to defense. Following this re-definition, I suggest that the Peloponnesian 
War is denoted as stasis, while—in accordance with Guilia Sissa (2011)—the Persian 
War exemplifies a paradigmatic war due to the external threat that made the Greeks 
unite themselves. To secure peace, Socrates demands the rulers to be educated 
philosophers, a demand in accordance with the reflections on governing and partaking 
in politics as presented in the Seventh Letter (326a-b). 
The second part of the backdrop argument relates especially to the Republic. On 
one level, the audiences partake in the two-city discussions throughout books II-VII 
where it all cumulates in the final surface of the “beautiful city” wherein people live in 
peace. On another level, the two-city construct can be viewed as a pedagogical tool 
which Socrates uses for trying to make Glaucon (and the readers) turn to philosophy. 
This pedagogical tool reflects Socrates’ two practices, and in addition, Socrates 
defines and elaborates on essential philosophical concepts in the Republic. These 
elements are noteworthy, and they are all points of return when reading the other 
dialogues. This is not to say that the Republic is the only key, but rather, that it is a 
backdrop for enlightening how Socrates sets forth and distinguishes philosophy from 
other disciplines.  
5.2 Argument II: Historical touchdowns—the dialogues 
The second argument for my hypothesis is tightly connected to the subtitle of my 
dissertation: dramatic staging and political accountability. Hence in this section, I will 
elaborate on these two concepts. The overall perspective is that the dramatic time span 
of the dialogues juxtaposes the time span of the era of the Peloponnesian War.79 For 
me, this entails that the corpus is framed within the turbulent times of war—including 
polemos and stasis and the restoration of the Athenian democracy (403 ff.). Within this 
                                                          
79 The time frame of the Peloponnesian War is 431-404, while the Peloponnesian War viewed as an 
era is usually framed within the time-span 450-380; cf. Strauss (1993, 221n1). 
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time span, the architect maps the chart and presents for the readers what I have chosen 
to call specific “historical touchdowns.” These historical touchdowns, I denote as 
“dramatic staging.” By viewing each dialogue as a dramatized historical touchdown, 
each dialogue represents a still frame. These still frames can be viewed as an invitation 
to study what happens when Socrates, the philosopher, encounters various historical 
personae who, one way or another, could have had or have had, an impact on Athenian 
culture, paideia, and politics. When these fictitious touchdowns are isolated and dated, 
they expose a coherent pattern. We first meet Socrates in the Parmenides (450) as a 
young man, and we bid him farewell in the Phaedo (399) when he has reached the age 
of seventy. However, this simultaneously reveals a parallel development. On the one 
hand, the readers can witness how the philosopher is practicing philosophy through his 
words and deeds.80 This witnessing can be done without taking the historical context 
into consideration. It is sufficient to read the dialogues in the succession given by the 
dramatic chronology.81 On the other hand, the dramatic chronology creates an outline 
where it is possible to pinpoint quite definite and significant historical moments. When 
these components are considered, the readers become aware that the historical context 
is continuously creeping around backstage and the elements drawn onstage—being 
historical personae or cultural elements—preferably must have a bearing on the 
readings.82 When the historical context is considered and somehow integrated in a 
chronological reading, it is also possible to determine an approximate age of the 
participants and interlocutors. This aspect provides additional and enriching 
information when it comes to describing and determining the dramatic setting and 
place of each dialogue.83 Also, we can expand our understanding of how some of the 
                                                          
80 This view is in accordance with Zuckert (2009) and Lampert (2010). 
81 As do Zuckert (2009), cf. p. 11 where she states that “I do not think the dramatic dates can do 
anything more than indicate the order and connections among the dialogues.” 
82 Cf. Clay (2000). 
83 On the importance of establishing the “dramatic setting” and “place” of the dialogues, see 
especially: Hyland (1994) and (1995), and Gonzalez (2003). 
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characters change their attitude during a conversation with Socrates,84 while we follow 
others from their youth onward.85 
I connect the theme political accountability to my suggestion that the dialogues 
propose a cultural/political critique. I take the conversations in the dialogues to be 
fictitious, but the concrete naming of the participants and the interlocutors gives the 
readers imperative clues regarding whom Socrates encounters on stage, and how he 
encounters them. It is also possible to deduce from the interlocutors’ relative 
fragmented biographies what kinds of attitudes and convictions Socrates is 
confronting. According to Michael Frede (1992), for Socrates, it is generally a matter 
of questioning false authority, the authority of tradition, the authority of the many, or 
the authority of a self-styled expert. It is on this background I suggest that some 
features of the dialogues can be read as a profound critique of the Athenian political 
establishment. This critique especially hits the educators and their view on paideia, 
politicians, and/or military leaders. This leads me to believe that through dramatic 
staging the architect recreates the past in the present. From this perspective, the 
dialogues present a dramatized and well-directed performance of how various 
personae from the past are responsible for the degenerated conditions of the present.86 
Viewed from this perspective, contextualization of the dialogues becomes an element 
of necessity. Thus, Athens cultural history and all names and all clues given in the 
dialogues are important. I present my outlined chronology of the dialogues and their 
participants in Appendix I, pp. 384-95.  
                                                          
84 Cf. Gordon (1999), see especially chapter 4: Character (pp. 93-116), where she shows this through 
a reading of the Meno. 
85 For example, Alcibiades, whom we first meet in the Protagoras (432) at the age of ±19 years, then 
in the Alcibiades I and Alcibiades II (432) where he is at the same age, and finally in the Symposium 
(416) at the age of 35 years. Another example is Phaedrus whom we meet in the Protagoras (432) at 
the age of ±12 years, in the Phaedrus (418/16) at the age of 26/28 years, and finally in the 
Symposium (416) at the age of 28 years. The question in this regard is to detect some kind of change 
or development in the character. Do Socrates’ proceedings promote change? If not, why? This is the 
main theme in chapter 8: Saving youths. 
86 The view of “recreating the past in the present” is developed with inspiration from the concept 
“collective memory” as defined in Halbwachs (1992).  
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6 The progress of the dissertation 
The dissertation is divided into two parts. The six first chapters are placed under the 
headline Part I: Dramatic backdrop—Republic. The four last chapters are placed under 
the headline Part II: Historical touch-downs—the dialogues.  
6.1 Part I: Dramatic backdrop—the Republic 
Regardless any tradition, there is, according to John Beversluis (2000), a long 
scholarly precedent for making a fairly sharp distinction between Book I and Books II-
X. The result is that “most commentators spend little time on Book I and treat it as a 
mere preliminary” (ibid, 185). The reason is that in Books II-X “the Socratic elenchus 
is wholly absent, the dialogue form only nominally retained, and the interlocutors 
largely reduced to concurring listeners” (ibid) while Book I “reads like a typical early 
dialogue. […] The discussion ends inconclusively. No acceptable definition is 
forthcoming, and it is partly for this reason that some commentators think Book I was 
originally an early dialogue or dialogue fragment (entitled Thrasymachus […]) which 
Plato later used as an introduction” (ibid). By suggesting a new approach to this text, I 
deviate from this scholarly precedent. This alternative approach is related to the 
structure of the Republic. Traditionally, the readers use the book-divisions as their 
guidelines. However, if we instead focus on the conversations and read them in 
sequences, and in addition take into account that each conversation has impact on the 
next, then an alternative outcome is possible. Thus, I suggest the following structure: 
First, why Socrates and Glaucon decided to stay in Piraeus is displayed in the Prelude 
(327a1-328c5). After the Prelude Socrates encounters Cephalus, Polemarchus, 
Thracymachus, whereupon he is challenged by Glaucon and Adeimatus; I find these 
conversations thightly connected and therefore I view them together as the Prologue 
(331d10-369b4). Next, when Socrates encounters Glaucon and Adeimantus, he is 
engaged in five conversations with each of the brothers, respectively; of these I will 
read the three first. This gives the following progress of Part I: Dramatic backdrop—
the Republic:  
In Chapter 1: Preparing the stage, I first give reasons for my claim that the 
Republic has no dramatic date. Secondly, I aim to show  how the participants, on the 
one hand, are related to Athenian politics, and on the other, how they are intertwined 
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and thus implicitly signify momentous instances that occurred both on the Athenian 
political stage and in the historical touchdowns during the time-span of the era of 
Peloponnesian War. Thirdly, through a close reading of the Prelude (327a1-328c5) I 
evaluate the arguments that made Socrates and Glaucon stay in Piraeus. Further, I find 
that the phrase “it is so resolved” is bracketing the sections 331d10-362d2. The impact 
of this bracketing is that I define these sections as the Prologue, which I have divided 
into three chapters.   
In chapter 2: Prologue I: Father and son (331d10-336a10), my aim is two-fold. 
First, in the encounter between Socrates and Cephalus, we witness how the poetic 
topos is activated, and that old Cephalus warrants his argument here. During this 
conversation it is detectable that Socrates implicitly starts his criticism of the 
authoritative poetic topos—hence the critique of the poets is launched right from the 
beginning. This leads to my second aim. When Cephalus’ son, Polemarchus, 
interrupts, Socrates immediately starts his explicit attack on the poetic topos and in 
addition shows that the Athenian moral topos is embedded in the first. Through the 
proceedings Socrates employs in his encounter with Polemarchus, I suggest he makes 
him turn toward philosophy.  
In Chapter 3: The Prologue II. The tide is turning for Socrates (336b1-354c5), 
the theme is Socrates’ encounter with Thrasymachus. In this section I deviate from the 
scholarly tradition, and therefore I read it in detail, closely and slowly. My aim is to 
show that the main subject in this section is not the philosopher’s refutation of the 
sophist’s arguments. Rather, I argue that when listening to the conversation between 
Socrates and Polemarchus, Thrasymachus (implicitly) observed that Socrates emploied 
a concealed topos, but he did not quite understand the impact of his obervations. Thus, 
the conversation between Thrasymachus and Socrates exhibits how the two parties 
warrant their arguments, respectively, in two incompatible special topoi, sophistry and 
philosophy. The consequence is that they create an unsolvable violent discourse. I will 
also point out that in this section the narrator is not a reliable witness, and regarding 
him, the challenge is to look behind his hostile rhetoric. 
In Chapter 4: The Prologue III. The tide is turning for Thrasymachus (357a1-
369b4), Glaucon and Adeimantus interrupt and lend their support to Thrasymashus. 
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They lay specific challenges before Socrates and demand him to answer. My aim here 
is twofold. First, I aim to show that the two brothers know—at least they know of— 
Socrates’ consealed topos. The premiss is that it is not sufficient for Socrates just to 
state that Thrasymachus was wrong; Socrates must find another way in order to 
persuade them and the particular audience. In their opinion Thrasymachus honestly 
and openly warranted his arguments on politics in the opinions of the many, that is the 
Athenian political culture, and methodologially in the topos of sophistry. With regard 
to justice his warrant was the Athenian moral topos. Secondly, I aim to show that due 
to the challenges laid down by Adeimantus and Glaucon, they take on different roles. 
Adeimantus stands forth as a leader and judge in a political assembly, while Glaucon 
intends to act as the devil’s advocate. When Socrates, reluctantly, accepts their 
premisses, he asks Adeimantus: “Is it resolved that we must carry this out?” (369b2). 
Now the substantial prologue is over. However, in the Interlude starting at 449a1 ff. 
(the beginning of Book V), the men gathered arrest Socrates arguing that he is robbing 
them of a whole section (εἶδος) of the argument, and state that he will not get away 
with it. Adeimantus even confirms what Thrasymachus earlier suspected: Socrates is 
warranting his arguments in a topos out of the ordinary. Therefore, the assembly now 
resolves that Socrates will not be released until he has told them the entire story on the 
matter. This is the second time I find a section bracketed with the phrase “it is 
resolved.” This second bracketing leads me to suggest that the conversations 
developing during sections 369b5-451b8 are set as preparations. These preparations 
contain a criticism of the Athenian conventions, and the core themes that were 
presented during the conversation between Socrates and Thrasymachus.  
Hence, my aim in Chapter 5: Founding cities making (ποιοῦομεν) guardians 
(369b5-451b8) is to show how these sections are the preparatory stages that finally 
allow us to enter the realm of philosophy. Socrates is engaged in five conversations 
with each brother; and I will read relevant parts of the first three sequentially. The 
chapter ends with the Interlude starting at 449a1, hence G3, Glaucon’s third 
conversation with Socrates, continues in chapter 6. In order to meet the challenges set 
forth by the brothers, Socrates awakes the well-known two-city-topos which is 
grounded in an old discussion where the aim was to superpose one city in war and one 
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in peace; when merged the new alternative would be freed from violent conflicts. 
From this perspective Socrates and Adeimantus create a thought-experiment which 
defines “the true city,” and because Glaucon declines to be a part of this, he and 
Socrates decide to investigate “the feverish city”—a city in which men live nowadays. 
Through a purging of the empirical feverish city that restricts its growth and removes 
most of its convention, and through a parallel expansion of the true city, they are on 
their way toward creating a paradigmatic just city. Through this process it gradually 
becomes obvious that Socrates’ opinions and arguments are warranted in a place 
unknown. After the arrest and after Adeimantus presents his new demand, Socrates 
starts explicitly to reveal his concealed topos. Through the readings in this chapter, I 
intend, on the one hand, to show the preparatory steps toward the final aim that is the 
“beautiful city.” On the other hand, I intend to show that the movement between the 
thought-experiment and the feverish city is used, by Socrates, as a pedagogical tool in 
order to make Glaucon (and the readers) turn toward philosophy. Thus, these 
preparatory stages, viewed from a pedagogical perspective, are to make us (both the 
men gathered and the readers) understand that we are on our way to philosophy. 
In chapter 6: The demiurges of freedom we enter the realm of philosophy. Here 
we first encounter the three paradoxical waves. I will not discuss the controversial 
content regarding these, but rather consider the considerations following them as they 
are presented by Socrates. I argue that these are the final dismissal of the Atheninan 
values, and the contrast between philosophy and sophistry is sharpened. In this chapter 
my aim is threefold. First, I will show that the exclusion of women is due to the art of 
eristic. When employing the art of dialectic we find that there is no reasonable 
argument for allowing such an exclusion. Secondly, during the three considerations 
following the second wave, Socrates’ proposials launch radical new thoughts on war 
and warfare. Thirdly, in order to make these new controversial thoughts even think-
able, he suggests that philosophers must be appointed rulers of the new-borned regime. 
At this point my close readings end. In the summary of my readings of the Republic, I 
conclude that due to the showing of the long and hard road towards philosophy, and 
due to the exhibition of parts of the topos of philosophy, the Republic can be read as a 
backdrop for the other dialogues. This long road is simoultainously a path toward 
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peace and prosperity because the education proposed on an individual level leads to a 
politeia incompatible with war-waging politics.  
6.2 Part II: Historical touchdowns—the dialogues 
The ideal thing to do would have to been to perform a close-reading all of the 
dialogues, but for obvious reasons that is not doable. Therefore I have chosen to 
highlight the theme “encountering youths.” The dialogues I concentrate on are: the 
Parmenides, the Protagoras, the Alcibiades I, the Charmides, the Sophist, and the 
Apology. I start with the first historical touchdown, the Parmenides where the main 
action takes place in 450. From the Prologue, dated ±382, we learn that it all starts 
with a hunt for facts about Socrates. This hunt I take to be an invitation for the readers 
to follow Socrates throughout a period of fifty years, and it will be the guiding premise 
for my readings.    
 In Chapter 7: Setting the stage, my aim is twofold. First, by reading the 
Prologue of the Parmenides, I will highlight how Parmenides made Socrates turn 
toward philosophy. The proceedings employed by Parmenides in that regard are 
recognizable when Socrates later encounters youths. The dialectical procedure stands 
in stark contrast to the Protagorean method. This leads to my second aim which is to 
highlight the grounding premises of Protagoras’ paideia-program as it is launched in 
the Protagoras. In addition, both Parmenides and Protagoras were city-founders and 
legislators; hence I will briefly touch upon these features. Compared to the 
paradigmatic regime established in the Republic, Parmenides’ city and rule alludes to 
the best regime, while Protagoras’ alludes to a city in need for a purging. 
In Chapter 8: Saving youths, my aim is threefold. First, I read the Prelude and the 
Hippocrates-section of the Protagoras. I intend to show that by preparing Hippocrates 
for meeting Protagoras, Socrates makes him turn toward philosophy. In addition, based 
on Socrates’ own upsetting experience and the detectable hints regarding him acting 
out of character (atopos), I suggest that we witness his final turning. Secondly, when 
we, maybe a few days later, witness the encounter between Socrates and Alcibiades; 
Socrates is back in character when he tries to tone down Alcibiades’ political 
ambitions. I suggest that he makes Alcibiades turn toward philosophy, but the effect is 
not long lasting because when left alone he returned quickly to his former habits. This 
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entails that Alcibiades belongs to the group of students leaving and coming back, and 
which Socrates at one point is forced to dismiss.87 Thirdly, three years later, the day 
after his return from the campaign at Potidaea, Socrates meets the beautiful youth 
Charmides. However, it turns out that Charmides is barren and his beauty is shallow; 
hence he is not in need of Socrates’ help and is dismissed at the outset.  
In chapter 9: The Eleatic Stranger: A turning point, I have reached a new time; 
the year is 399 and the backdrop is preparations for Socrates’ death. When 
encountering the Eleatic Stranger, I launch confusion as a theme. What is he, and how 
are we to understand him? I argue that in the Sophist he appears to be a sophist. The 
reasons for my argument are stated through three steps. First, I disclose how the 
prologue equips the reader with pointers relevant for deciding on the Stranger’s 
identity. Secondly, I perform a close reading of the paradigm division which is 
presented as the method that will enable the Stranger and Theaetetus to hunt down the 
sophist. Thirdly, I will do a close reading of the upcoming three divisions in order to 
display how the proposed method is gradually abandoned. By paying attention to what 
the Stranger does, I suggest that due to discrepancies between deeds and arguments, he 
himself slowly but surely starts to look like a hunting sophist, and consequently 
Theaetetus starts to appear as the hunter’s prey. The impact of this unhurried turnabout 
is that the hunting-method camouflages a hunting-metaphor which in turn conceals a 
threefold hunt. As the readers are hunting the Stranger; Theaetetus thinks he is hunting 
the hunter-sophist while the Stranger in a deceptive hunt is hunting Theaetetus. With 
the Eleatic Stranger’s proceedings, the Socratic way of practicing philosophy starts to 
fade away.  
In Chapter 10: The Apology, I address Socrates’ defense speech. My point of 
departure is to give a brief sketch of the three types of civic discourse which after the 
stasis became three powerful topoi employed in forensic speeches. These are the 
homonoia-topos, the demos-topos and the reconciliation-topos. I will inquire into how 
Socrates activates and makes use of them in his apology; during this investigation, it 
will come to light that his defense as a whole is structured around these topoi. Through 
                                                          
87 Cf. Introduction, section: Displaying the path towards philosophy—Socrates’ two practices, 
especially p. 25. 
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this literary and rhetorical reading, I do not intend to conclude whether Socrates was 
guilty or not; my aim is rather to show that he presented a coherent defense both as a 
philosopher and as a citizen. Socrates argues that he is a part of the city as a law-
abiding citizen, but as a philosopher he defends his right for taking on an outsider 
status.  
7 Conclusion 
I round off with an overall summary where I conclude that through my readings I have 
showed that the corpus contains an implicit critique of the values that led to Athens 
decay. Due to this critique and the dramatic staging of prominent personas not willing 
or able to change, the past is made responsible for the conditions of the present. By 
launching an alternative politeia and paideia that is not compatible with war-waging, 
and by showing the multiple and, thus individual, paths toward philosophy, Plato in 
























Chapter 1: Preparing the stage 
 
Before I start reading the Republic, I will prepare the stage through three steps. First, I 
argue that the Republic has no dramatic date. My no-specific-date argument has a two-
fold impact. On the one hand, it is one of the main reasons for arguing that the 
Republic can be viewed as a dramatic backdrop, and on the other, it exhibits an 
alternative view on the ten participants: By holding Socrates up against them, this 
argument opens up a possibility for viewing the nine other characters present as 
representatives for three distinct generations, each symbolizing features that turn out to 
be imperative for the dramatic development. This leads to the second aim, which is to 
show—through a presentation of the participants—that they, on the one hand, are 
related to Athenian politics, and on the other, that they are intertwined and therefore 
implicitly signify momentous instances that occurred both on the Athenian political 
stage and in the historical touchdowns (i.e., the dialogues) during the time span of the 
era of the Peloponnesian War. The third aim is to evaluate the arguments that made 
Socrates and Glaucon stay in Piraeus. Through a slow reading of the Prelude (327a1-
328c5), I will show that Socrates decided to stay not because he was persuaded but 
because Glaucon, Adeimantus, and Polemarchus so resolved.  
1.1 Is the Republic equipped with a dramatic date? 
The controversies related to this question are diverse and long lasting and the 
arguments pro or con any dates are multiple. Viewed together, these controversies 
mark a kind of status quo.1 Recently, there seem to be three dates that stand out as 
main candidates: 429,2 421,3 and 411.4 The arguments in favor for 429 are grounded in 
the tradition that claims that the first celebration of the Thracian goddess Bendis took 
place this year (cf. Lampert 2010, 11). However, even if at the outset it seems a 
                                                          
1 On the long-lasting controversies regarding dramatic dates of the Republic, see Nails (2002, 324-26). 
2 Lampert (2010, 11) bases his conclusion solely on Thrasymachus’ statement that the goddess in 
question is the Thracian Bendis. With reference to Planeaux (2001), who sets the date of Bendis’ 
entrance to Attica at 429, Lampert concludes that “the dramatic date of the Republic, then, is early 
June 429.” Lampert elaborates on this conclusion at pp. 405-11. 
3 Howland (2004b, xii) states that the approximate date of the Republic is 421-20.  
4 Bloom (1991b, 440n3) argues that “[…] the supposed date of the action of this dialogue [is] 
probably around 411 B.C.” Zuckert (2009, 9) supposes the same. 
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plausible argument, it sidelines because the Republic is the only dialogue in the corpus 
also to name its silent auditors (cf. Lampert, 2010, 249n14). This is a hint requiring 
consideration, and I will elaborate on this below when I evaluate 429 as a possible 
date. In her survey of the material used for deciding on the dates 421 and 411, Debra 
Nails concludes that both dates are equally supported, and that the dialogue takes place 
“throughout the Peloponnesian War” (ibid, 324-6). Her arguments and the intense 
controversies that result from trying to establish a dramatic date convinced me that 
there is no specific dramatic date at all—but the Republic juxtaposes the time frame of 
the Peloponnesian War. By making the no-specific-date argument the grounding 
premise when viewing the men gathered, it turns out that it is possible to indicate an 
approximate age-difference between them.5 This age-difference, in turn, exhibits that 
the men can be divided into three age groups as displayed in the following schemata:  
 
Birth—Death  Participants of the Republic 
(470-399) Socrates  
 Old men: 
(†421-15) Cephalus of Syracuse  
(±500-≤420) Charmantides of Paeania  
 Middle-aged men: 
(≤ 450-404) Polemarchus of Thurii, son of Cephalus 
(±445- ˃380) Lysias of Thurii and Athens, son of 
Cephalus  
(born in the 
440s) 
Euthydemus, son of Cephalus  
(445-39 - 404) Niceratus of Cyndantidae, son of Nicias  
(born ±455) Thrasymachus of Chalcedon  
(≤452- ˃404) Clitophon of Athens  
 Young men: 
(±432- ˃382) Adeimantus of Collytus, son of Ariston 
(≤429- ˃382) Glaucon of Collytus, son of Ariston  
 
On this background, I suggest that it is possible to disclose a coherent pattern or 
structure. By sorting the men according to their birth and death dates, the three distinct 
groups (or generations) appear: the old, the middle-aged, and the young men. When 
measured against Socrates, the old men are older than he is; the middle-aged are 
                                                          
5 For the dates of birth and death of the participants, I mainly follow Nails (2002). Throughout the 
survey of the gallery of persons present in the Platonic corpus, Nails points out several controversies 
regarding the dates of birth and death of a person. Thus, most dates are marked as “give or take a 
year or two,” “not before” or “not after.” 
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approximately twenty-five years younger than him, and the young men are about fifty 
years younger. What happens if the three most supported dramatic dates (429, 421, and 
411) are viewed against the birth and death dates of the men present?  
The first date, 429, turns out to be very problematic because this is roughly the 
same year Glaucon was born, and Adeimantus would be around three years old. The 
second date, 421, is equally problematic because Glaucon then would have been 
around eight years old and, Adeimantus eleven. Also, the two brothers Polemarchus 
and Lysias had not yet returned from Thurii—they arrived in Athens around 415. So, 
for obvious reasons, those dates do not work. When considering 411, I find that both 
Charmantides and Cephalus would have been dead for nearly ten years. There is, of 
course, a possibility that Cephalus is wakened from his death to do his part in the 
Republic. According to diplomatic Nails, it could be “a stroke of literary genius to 
have a dead man speak of dying conventions” (2002, 387).6 I could accept the silent 
Charmantides and the speaking Cephalus as anachronisms, but this would be an 
awkward option because, if accepted, I would be bound to accept similar arguments in 
other instances. This short survey gives the reasons for my no-specific-date argument, 
and on that background, it is plausible to claim that three generations are displayed. 
These generations and their representatives are of great significance regarding the 
dramatic development in the Republic. However, who are they? 
1.2 The participants of the Republic: Three distinct generations 
Cephalus (“Head”)7 of Syracuse and the silent Charmantides of Paeania represent the 
first generation. We do not have much information about the latter, but being a guest 
in the house of one of the wealthiest families in Piraeus, he was probably also a rich 
man. Paeania was a rural deme and, hence, it is relatively safe to assume that 
Charmantides accumulated his wealth from agricultural holdings (cf. Nails, 2002, 89). 
Cephalus arrived in Piraeus around 450. He established a flourishing shield factory, 
which in 404 had more than one hundred slaves operating at the plant (ibid, 84). He 
lived as a wealthy metic in Piraeus for thirty years. In this period, Athens found itself 
                                                          
6 Even if Nails’ suggestion might be likeable, I would like to place the architect’s stroke of genius on 
quite another level. 
7 The translations of names are taken from Craig (2001). 
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at the peak of its might; it was prosperous and growing economically while culturally 
it developed fast in various areas. It was also in this period that the sophists emerged 
as a new kind of political counselor and teacher. Robert W. Wallace (2007, 215) states 
that they were an innovative social phenomenon and “never before had such teachers 
been seen, never such teaching.” Even if the sophistic education could have been 
available to the rich Cephalus, it is not likely that the eldest generation mingled with 
them. On the contrary, in his conversation with Socrates, it comes to light that 
Cephalus advocates a conventional way of speaking. He warrants the authority of his 
arguments in the poetic topos; hence regarding paideia the old patriarch represents 
tradition and its conventions wherein the main authorities were, in Leon C. Craig’s 
words, “renowned generals and martial poets” (2001, 3).8 This tradition and its 
conventions are later attacked and evaluated by Socrates and Adeimantus.9  
The second generation is well presented. First, we meet Cephalus’ three sons 
Polemarchus (“War Ruler”) of Thurii, Lysias of Thurii/Athens, and Euthydemus. Also, 
Thrasymachus (“Bold Fighter”) of Chalcedon, Niceratus (“Victory”) of Cyndantidae, 
and Clitophon of Athens. The latter was a well-known figure in Athens due to his 
career as an oligarchic political leader and, according to Nails, “flip-flopping political 
affiliations” (2002, 102). After the Sicilian disaster in 413, the Committee of Public 
Safety was set down to prepare proposals for a renewed set of laws. Nails points out 
that Clitophon demanded that “the committee should also investigate the patrios 
politeia, the ancestral constitution” (2002, 102-03).10 This demand brings to light that 
Clitophon was a proponent of a return to the ancestral constitution, which again was a 
decisive step toward the oligarchy of the Four Hundred in 411.11 Hence, his 
involvement in Athenian politics paved the way for the rule of the Four Hundred and 
the coup in Athens the same year. Within the oligarchy, he belonged to the moderates. 
                                                          
8 Cf. Republic 329b, 329e-331a. 
9 This will be one of the main themes in chapter 5: Founding cities making (ποιοῦομεν) guardians, 
section 5.3: Socrates and Adeimatus on education and rearing, pp. 168-70. 
10 Lampert (2010, 253) suggests that “old Cephalus stands at the beginning of the Republic for 
ancestral authority, but ancestrial authority altered.” 
11 Cf. Aristotle: Constitution of Athens (29.3). 
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In the Frogs (405), Aristophanes pairs him with Theramenes,12 which Nails (2002, 
102-03) suggests was “a context suggesting similar histories of fickle loyalties, and the 
ability to land on their feet, regardless of change,” and further that the “reestablishment 
of the ancestral constitution was still his object in 404” when he served as an 
ambassador for Lysander.13 In the dialogue Clitophon (421-16), Socrates is under 
severe attack by Clitophon, an attack and criticism Socrates does not respond to in that 
particular context. Through Clitophon, there is in the Republic an implicit presence of 
the dark side of the political establishment in Athens: from Clitophon via Cleon14 to 
Theramenes who became one of the Thirty.    
Besides being a well-known rhetorician, Thrasymachus from Chalcedon also 
acted as an ambassador of Chalcedon after the city had mounted an unsuccessful revolt 
against imperial Athens. As a diplomat, Thrasymachus traveled to Athens to negotiate 
and prevent harsh reprisals against his native city. This diplomatic meeting probably 
followed Alcibiades’ return to Athens in 407. According to Stephen A. White (1995, 
308-09), Thrasymachus was “a consistent opponent of outside aggression and a 
champion of local autonomy,”15 and according to Jonathan J. Price (2007), he was also 
concerned about the Athenian stasis.16 Price further assumes that when Thucydides 
stated that “war changes men internally, transforming their minds and emotions to 
make them capable of things which they not only would avoid in times of peace and 
prosperity, but which would not even occur to them” (2007, 25), he was probably 
referring to some of Thrasymachus’ writings. If this assumption holds, it is acceptable 
to indicate that Thrasymachus represents a pro-peace voice. In the Phaedrus (418/16), 
                                                          
12 Theramenes (≤440-404) was with the Four Hundred in 411. He partook at the naval battle of 
Arginusae in 406 and became a member of the Thirty. See Nails (2001, 284-87).  
13 Cf. Aristotle: Constitution of Athens (34.3). 
14 Cleon (†422) was an Athenian politician. “His first-known action was to attack Pericles in 431 and 
430. In 427 he proposed the decree (rescinded next day) to execute all men of Mytilene after the 
suppression of its revolt. […] In 425, after the Athenian victory at Pylos, he frustrated the Spartan 
peace proposals, and later accused the generals in charge of the siege of Sphacteria of 
incompetence. […] He doubtless approved, if he cannot be shown to have originated, the measure 
now passed greatly increasing the tribute paid by the allied states, and he was certainly responsible, 
in 425 for an increase of the dicasts’ pay from two to three obols. In 423 he proposed the decree for 
the destruction of Scione and the execution of all its citizens” (The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 1991, 
eds. N.G.L Hammond and H.H. Scullard. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, p. 251). 
15 Quoted in Nails (2002, 289).  
16 Thrasymachus DK 85, BI; cf. Price (2007, 25n35). 
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Socrates warns Phaedrus against Thrasymachus’ particular rhetorical skills (267c6-
d5).  
Niceratus of Cyndantidae was the son of the famous military leader Nicias 
(±475-413) who, in turn, was an associate of Pericles. Due to the silver mine holdings 
of Niceratus’ grandfather and father, the family was extremely rich. Nicias was very 
eager to make his son “a good man” and thus required him to “memorize both the Iliad 
and Odyssey” (Nails, 2002, 211). Aristotle links Thrasymachus and Niceratus to a 
rhapsode competition. Thrasymachus witnessed that Pratus won over Niceratus in the 
recitation, whereupon he allegedly stated, “Niceratus is like a Philoctetes beaten by 
Pratus.”17 In the Laches (424), we learn that Nicias asked Socrates more than once to 
be engaged in Niceratus’ education, but Socrates always suggested other teachers.18 
Nails demonstrates that in Athens Niceratus was “praised for his wealth and had a 
good reputation being a just and humane man,” and neither he nor his father “ever 
sought popular acclaim” (2002, 212). In 404, Niceratus was executed by the Thirty.  
The last three men are the sons of old Cephalus: Polemarchus of Thurii, Lysias of 
Thurii/Athens, and Euthydemus. Of the latter, very little is known, of the two former a 
great deal more is known. Polemarchus was most likely the guardian of Lysias (and 
maybe Euthydemus) when the brothers went to Thurii as colonists around the 430s. 
This links them to the paideia initiated by Protagoras.19 They returned to Athens 
around 415. In Phaedrus (418-16), we learn that Polemarchus at some point turned 
toward philosophy (cf. 257b4-5).20 Both he and his brother Lysias were house-owners 
in Piraeus, and Polemarchus was the legal owner of the house where the Republic 
unfolds. Nails (2002, 191) argues that Polemarchus and Lysias were “among the 
wealthiest people in Attica, sponsoring choral performances, paying war taxes, and 
ransoming citizen prisoners of war.” In 404, the Thirty claimed that the metics were in 
                                                          
17 Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, 1413a. Aristotle further states that “the simile made by 
Thrasymachus when he saw Niceratus, who had been beaten by Pratus in a recitation competition, is 
still going about unkempt and unwashed.” Cf. Nails (2002, 211). 
18 Niceratus is not the only potential student declined by Socrates. I return to this theme in chapter 8: 
Saving youths, section 8.3: Charmides, pp. 306 ff. 
19 I return to Protagoras’ educational system in chapter 7: Setting the stage, section: 7.2 Protagoras, 
the teacher p. 267-78. 
20 I return to this Polemarchus’ turning in chapter 2: Father and son, section 2.2: Polemarchus and 
Socrates, p. 80 ff.  
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opposition to the regime. Therefore, Polemarchus’ and Lysias’ properties were 
confiscated, and all the family’s assets were seized. When the Thirty executed 
Polemarchus in 404, Lysias fled the country and lived in exile for a short period. 
However, he still managed to lend financial support to exiled democrats after the 
confiscation (cf. Nails, 2002, 190).21 According to Bloom (1991b, 441n7), Lysias 
played “an important role in the overthrow of the Thirty and the restoration of the 
democracy.” He later turned out to be one of the most famous speechwriters in Athens. 
Andrew Wolpert (2002, 65-7) reports on an anecdote which tells that Lysias wrote a 
defense speech for Socrates’ trial, but he declined to use it.22 One of Lysias’ alleged 
speeches is a major theme discussed in the Phaedrus.23  
Viewed in light of the era of the Peloponnesian War, I take it that the second 
generation symbolizes maturity on different levels and the links between them are 
noteworthy. Polemarchus, Lysias, Euthydemus, and Niceratus represent very wealthy 
men. Polemarchus and Niceratus are heirs to their family’s wealth, and they both were 
executed by the Thirty in 404. Lysias, Thrasymachus, and Clitophon were close 
friends. The two latter are both presented in Aristophanes’ comedies: Thrasymachus in 
the Banqueters (427) and Clitophon in the Frogs (405) where he is paired with 
Theramenes. Clitophon and Theramenes are connected to the Four Hundred in 411 and 
later to the Thirty. Hence, there is both a direct and an indirect link to the Thirty 
present in the Republic.24 Lastly, Thrasymachus and Niceratus are linked through a 
rhapsode competition. On this background, I suggest that this generation represents a 
                                                          
21 On the executions of Niceratus and Polemarchus, Lampert (2010, 244n16), reports: “According to 
Xenophon, Polemarchus was killed, beheaded, for his money in accord with a policy toward metics 
advocated by Critias. Niceratus was also killed, and Lysias barely escaped (Lysias, Against 
Eratosthenes, 4-23; Xenophon, Hellenica 2. 3-39, 2. 4-19, 38).” 
22 I return to this in chapter 10: The Apology, p. 360. 
23 de Vries (1969, 59), suggests that this speech could be a parody of Lysias’ style due to the 
exaggerated use of eliminative ἀλλά. Howland (2004a) presents a very interesting hypothesis, and a 
thought-provoking reading regarding Lysias’ presence in the Republic. Howland argues that 
“Socrates’ conversation with Polemarchus is on one level a Platonic reply to Against Eratosthenes 
and that Plato’s implicit critisisms of Lysias in the Republic harmonize with the picture of Lysias that 
he incribes explicitly in the Phaedrus,” p. 179. 
24 In this regard, Frank (2007, 448) points out that “[b]y modeling interactions among political actors 
who do not resort to violence against the historical backdrop of an extremely violent war, the 




time of turmoil. Regarding traditional paideia and its conventions, they take a position 
in between. On the one hand, they are in touch with old tradition through their fathers. 
This becomes known in the conversation between Polemarchus and Socrates, as we 
shall see later. On the other hand, they are educated by the new professional teachers; 
hence, they all witnessed how the old conventions fade away.  
Plato’s elder brothers Adeimantus (“Dauntless”) and Glaucon (“Gleaming”) 
represent the young men, thus the last generation. Of Adeimantus, little is known, of 
Glaucon a little bit more. We learn from Xenophon’s Memorabilia (III: 6) that 
Socrates saves young Glaucon from making a fool of himself before the Ecclesia. 
Glaucon had set out to deliver a speech aiming to preside over the city. However, 
Socrates makes him aware of his ignorance concerning the actual affairs of state and 
convinces him not to speak. We learn from Alcibiades I (432) that Socrates tried to do 
the same for Alcibiades.25 We can infer from the frame story (±400) in the Symposium 
(418-16) that Glaucon26 had no contact at that point with Socrates. We learn from the 
Apology (399) that Adeimantus was present in court, but not Glaucon. Both brothers 
probably fought at Megara in 409 (cf. Republic, 368a3-4). After the outbreak of the 
war, the new professional teachers met competition from the philosophers, so 
regarding paideia, the two brothers could choose from whom they wanted to receive 
an education. There are several hints in the Republic that Adeimantus had studied 
philosophy. When it comes to the politically ambitious Glaucon, I take it that Socrates 
and Adeimantus try to make him turn toward philosophy throughout the dialogue.27 
Adeimantus stands forth as a reflected and thoughtful man. He is a sober admirer of 
Sparta, calm, and philosophically oriented. Glaucon, on the other hand, is described as 
                                                          
25 I return to this in chapter 8: Saving youths, section 8.2: Alcibiades: A lion reared in the city, p. 295 
ff. 
26 In the frame story (dramatic date ±400), the conversation takes place between Apollodorus and an 
anonymous companion. Apollodorus agrees to retell what he told Glaucon two days earlier. Nails 
(2002, 315) argues that the “lack of any further specification of Glaucon by demotic or patronymic 
makes it almost certain that the reference is to Plato’s brother.” 
27 I make a distinction between the concepts “turn toward philosophy” and “turn into philosophy.” 
The first entails a turning where the youths commit themselves to study and work (cf. Polemarchus 
whom I return to in chapter 2: The Prologue I: Father and son, section 2.2: Polemarchus and Socrates; 
Alcibiades whom I return to in chapter 8: Saving youths, section 8.2: Alcibiades: A lion reared in the 
city; Hippocrates whom I return to in chapter 8: Saving youths, section 8.1: Hippocrates’ dream). The 
second entails the final turning that will happen after many years of studying. I return to this in 
chapter 8: Saving youths, section 8.1.1: The turning toward and into philosophy.  
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courageous in everything (cf. 357a), loving victory (cf. 368a, 548d), and unskilled in 
philosophy (cf. 533a). Maybe one can say with Kateri Carmola (2003, 41) that on one 
level the Republic is driven by a concern for youths who are politically ambitious and 
spirited in the philosophical, that is, youths like Glaucon. It is in the Prelude the three 
generations are gathering for the first time, so let us enter and see how it happened. 
1.3 The Prelude (327a1-328c5) 
“Yesterday I went down to Piraeus together with Glaucon the son of Ariston, that I 
might offer up my prayers to the goddess; and also because I wanted to see in what 
manner they would celebrate the festival, which was a new thing” (327a1-4). Through 
this famous and, much commented on, opening line, the readers are informed about the 
time (‘when’), place (‘where’) for the action, and the reason why Glaucon and 
Socrates went down to Piraeus in the first place. The narrator of the Republic 
addresses his narrative to a universal audience the day after the events took place; 
hence, the only thing to say regarding “when” is “yesterday.” Regarding “where” and 
“why,” it could be both rewarding and relevant to take a small detour. 
1.3.1 Piraeus—the land beyond 
The drama unfolds in Piraeus, which according to Eva Brann (2002, 117-28) means 
“the land beyond the river.”28 In this land beyond the river, Socrates, Adeimantus, and 
Glaucon construct the “beautiful city.” Thus, if only for associative reasons, it is 
relevant to recall parts of Piraeus’ history. In the mid-fifth century, at the request of 
Pericles, the city was cut up by Hippodamus of Milet who, according to Aristotle (cf. 
Politics, 2.8.), was the first among non-politicians to speak on the subject of the best 
constitution; his new way (tropos) of town-planning was characterized by the 
orthogonal, ordered, rectangular, or regular plan (Politics 7.11). Aristotle further 
elaborates that Hippodamus “divided the land [of his ideal city] into three parts 
(zones)—sacred, public, and private” (Politics, 2.8), whereas, according to David 
Fleming, “the first was intended for the gods, the second for the warriors, and the third 
for the farmers” (2002, 17). These zones were grids of uniform blocks which made the 
Hippodamian project result in a vision of a city wherein the orthogonal plan made it 
                                                          
28 Brann argues convincingly that the opening line of the Republic ought to be translated as follows: “I 
descended yesterday to the land beyond the river.” Cf. also Lampert (2010, 245).  
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good. However, how did this make a city good? On the one hand, according to 
Fleming, the straight streets were regular and symmetrical and thus provided a 
measure of social and aesthetic order; they offered residents easy internal 
communication; they appeared to support democracy because they made city life 
transparent and were linked to the equal apportionment of land, and finally, the idea of 
straightness has connotations of correctness (orthos) and truth (2002, 15). On the other 
hand, if we, like McEwen (1993, 83), think of city-founding in terms of weaving, “the 
intentions made manifest in orthogonal streets layout becomes quite precise.” At the 
core of the topos of weaving, we find the concept of “harmony” embedded. McEwen 
(1993, 83-4) explains that “[h]armonia, close fitting, can be a feature of the tightly 
woven cloth only […] one cannot produce a ‘harmonious,’ tightly woven fabric if 
wrap and weft are not regularly spaced and are not at right angles to one another, 
perfectly orthogonal.”29 She further maintains that as a port, Piraeus had a shifty 
population, and therefore it was a place where people continually came and went, and 
they were “not known for having a ‘harmonious’ or coherent urban fabric. The 
habitués of ports do not form closely knit communities.” Hence, before Hippodamus’ 
intervention, “everything about Piraeus lacked harmonia” (McEwen 1993, 84). 
Hippodamus’ enterprise took place a generation after Themistocles30 founded the city, 
fortified it, and started the construction of the Long Walls. He had, in Thucydides’ 
words, “the audacity to suggest that the Athenians should attach themselves to the sea” 
(2.36.2). Themistocles, in short, laid the foundations of Athens’ sea power; made 
Athens a metropolis, a mother city; and the umbilical Long Walls “linked the “child” 
                                                          
29 With reference to anthropologist Anette Weiner, “Why Cloth? Wealth, Gender, and Power in 
Oceania,” in Cloth and Human Experience, eds. A. Weiner and J. Schneider (Washington: Smithsonian 
Institution Press, 1989, pp. 33-66), Rosenstock (1994, 363) reminds us that Hesiod advised women to 
“[w]eave closely; make good cloth, with many woof-threads in a short length of wrap,” and stresses 
that Hesiod’s advice is not only a metaphor for social relations, but also “a literal directive about the 
nature and complexity of […] the social and cosmological order. In addition, he points to Onians 
(1951, 349-77), who has demonstrated that Hesiod’s words are echoed in many cultures—“they 
represent explicit imperatives for all manner of fastening and constructions that sustain the social 
and cosmological order.”  
30 With regard to “lack of harmony,” McEwen (1993, 156n19) also includes Piraeus; its climate, its 
topography, and its population. The “site where Themistocles built the Piraeus practically lacked just 
about everything,” it was practically “waterless, with steep, barren hills, it also had an unhealthy 
climate due to its proximity to the Halipedon Marsh” (ibid, 84). 
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to its mother and underscored the maternal connection” (McEwen 1993, 86).31 
Compared with other Greek colonial foundations, Piraeus was exceptional. McEwen 
points out that “just as the parental relation between mother cities and their colonial 
foundations became reciprocal to become manifest in the rise of the polis, so did the 
roles of Athens and Piraeus become reversed, for by sustaining the city with imported 
goods the port became the nurturing mother of the city that had given it birth” (ibid). 
After Hippodamus’ “cutting” was completed, Pericles welcomed rich foreigners 
to settle in Piraeus for economic reasons, and among these invited metics we find 
Cephalus. Thus, in the Periclean period, Piraeus was populated by foreigners, and it 
follows that they practiced strange and extravagant Great Mother cults. Among these, 
we find the Bendeia, the festival and celebration of the Thracian goddess Bendis.32 To 
conclude, with its design, Piraeus was an impressive and modern city. Furthermore, in 
Lampert’s words, it “was the seat of the Athenian navy, the basis […] of both its 
empire and its democracy” (2010, 245-46n9). Piraeus was also the place where the 
war, the devastating stasis, and the rule of the Thirty found its end. The effort of the 
democrats in exile—the men of Piraeus—turned out to be a powerful topos regarding 
the restoration of the democracy.33 It is in this splendid seaport the ten men of the 
Republic gathered in a house somewhere; Socrates arrived, metaphorically speaking, 
through his mother city’s umbilical cord. Viewed in light of these last events, Piraeus 
can be said to symbolize a new dawn. 
1.3.2 Socrates’ prayers  
Why did Socrates go down to Piraeus? He wanted to “offer up his prayers to the 
goddess.” The Athenians perceived the Thracian moon goddess Bendis34 as the 
                                                          
31 On references to the “maternal connections,” see McEwen (1993, 156-57n22). 
32 McEwen (1993, 156n20) refers to Eric Voegelin, Order and History, vol. 3 (1956-87, 59-60), when 
claiming that “Piraeus in the Republic is a reflection both of Hades and of the cave with its shadow 
play: The empty freedom of the Piraeus, with its celebration of the chthonian divinity, becomes the 
empty freedom of Arete in Hades, and they both blend into the play of shadows in the cave.” 
33 I return to these events in chapter 10: The Apology, p. 353 ff. 
34 According to Planeaux (2001), two motives can be detected for the Athenians to import the 
Thracian goddess Bendis. 1) The political motive: During the early years of the Peloponnesian War, 
Athens possessed a considerable military force in Thrace, and this political situation provided 
compelling reasons for the importation of Bendis. This desire grew more intense after the revolt of 
Potidaea in 432. Thus, the Athenian statesmen had a political motive to have championed Bendis and 
thus granting a large group of Thracian metics in Piraeus a series of unique and unrivalled privileges 
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goddess Artemis, and according to Martin P. Nilsson (1961, 16), she was the most 
popular goddess throughout Greece. However, why did Socrates want to offer up his 
prayers to Artemis? Or, why is Artemis (through Bendis) called upon at the outset of 
the Republic? An answer to these questions calls for a speculative proposal, and my 
speculations lead me to Jean-Pierre Vernant (1992, 197-98) who demonstrates that the 
different places belonging to Artemis were in “the presence of boundaries, border 
zones, and frontiers where […] the world and the cultivated exist side by side in 
opposition […] but where they may also interpenetrate one with another.” Artemis was 
not a warrior goddess, nor a combatant, and therefore she was not called upon in what 
is considered normal conflicts. Vernant elaborates that she was called upon in what 
was viewed as “wars of total annihilation where the prize is no longer the victory of 
one city over another but the survival of an entire human community” (ibid, 246). She 
was invoked to guide (as Hegemone) and to save (as Soteira) and viewed as “a savior 
in critical situation, when a conflict threatens the city’s continued existence, at a time 
when it is threatened with total destruction” (ibid, 203). Vernant further argues that 
Artemis was “mobilized when too much violence was used during a military 
engagement, when warfare abandons the civilized codes through which rules of 
martial struggles are maintained and moves brutally into the realm of savagery” (ibid, 
203). When the survival of a city was at stake, Artemis …  
 
… goes into action when one of the combatants violates the limits set either on the 
use of violence during battle or on the treatment of the defeated party afterward. 
In such excess and all-or-nothing stakes, war goes beyond the civilized boundaries 
within which the rules of military engagement are maintained and veers abruptly 
into savagery (ibid, 246).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(p. 179-80). 2) The healing motive: The outlet is the connection between Bendis (or Artemis 
Mounikhia) and the plague in Athens/Attica (431-29). Bendis “arrived in Piraeus with Deloptes, a 
Thracian hero who […] also participated in the Festival of Bendis. We know two things about this 
Thracian hero: 1) His cult was related intimately with those of Bendis, and 2) he was portrayed in the 
iconography of Asclepius. These two observations […] do offer a foundation from which conclusions 
can be made. If Bendis is to be considered a ‘Thracian Artemis’ […] it is most plausible that Deloptes 
was a ‘Thracian Asclepius’ (p. 181).  
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According to ancient Greek historians, Artemis stood by Athens during the second 
Persian War (ibid, 248-49),35 and she lent support when the democrats, under their 
leader Thrasybulus, fought the Thirty and their followers in Piraeus and ended the civil 
war in 403.36 However, we do not hear that she intervened during the Peloponnesian 
War. Why? The following two examples of how the demands of Artemis were violated 
in this war may indicate a reason. Socrates was engaged in one of them as a soldier 
and, therefore, he had firsthand knowledge of this war’s brutality.37  
First, during the siege of Potidaea, already at the beginning of the war, the 
Hellenes were reduced to cannibalism—the worst of pollution.38 By this act, they 
crossed the borderline and stepped out of the cultivated into the realm of savagery. In 
the Charmides (429) we meet Socrates just as he and some others39 returned from the 
camp at Potidaea after “a long absence” (153a2). The friends he meets are eager to 
                                                          
35 Vernant gives two examples: First, according to Pausanias, some of the Persian commander 
Mardonios’ soldiers “wanted to rejoin their leader at Thebes. ‘But by the will of Artemis, night fell 
when they were en route; they mistook the path and plunged into the mountain’. […] The next 
morning, at daybreak, the hoplites of Megara were easily able to massacre the arches who no longer 
had any arrows. As a sign of gratitude, the Greeks had built a statue of Artemis Soteira.” Secondly, 
Artemis intervened at the Battle of Salamis. According to Plutarch, “the 16th day of Mounychion, the 
Athenians consider sacred to Artemis, because on that day the goddess shone as a full moon for the 
Greeks who were victorious at Salamis.” (Mor. 349f, quoted in ibid, 248). On this instance, Vernant 
comments, “It is this nocturnal illumination, this salvific light in the darkness, that is recalled in the 
flat cake ringed with small torches that was offered to Artemis on the 16th of Mounychion, the 
precise day on which the ephebes honored the goddess with a procession, a sacrifice, and a regatta.” 
36 This story is taken from Vernant (1993, 248). He states that, according to Xenophon, the weather 
had been fine until a sudden snowstorm that began during the night forced the Thirty to abandon 
their plans to besiege Phyle and to cut off the supply rout. “The gods are with us,” the democratic 
leader later announces. “During fair weather they provide a storm when we need it” (Xenophon, 
Hell. 2.4.14). Diodorus goes further in his description of this incident. According to him, during the 
snowfall, the soldiers of the Thirty were disturbed by noises whose origin they could not understand, 
and they thought that enemy troops were approaching. “The tumult called panic seized the camp, 
which had to be struck” (Diodorus, 14.32.3). The snow and the confusion are contrasted with the 
supernatural radiance that guides Thrasybulus’ democrats, who march away from the roads so as not 
to be discovered. “They were making their way on a moonless night in bad weather when a flame 
appeared before them and led them flawlessly to Mounychia, where it left them. In this place, the 
altar of the goddess Phosphoros still stands.” From this light bearer came salvation for the democrats 
and for Athens.  
37 Socrates and Alcibiades were together on the Potidaea campaign from summer/fall of 432 to May 
of 429, nearly three years. What started as an invading army (Thucydides, 1.57 and 1.61) became a 
besieging army (Thucydides, 2.70), then a defeated army (Thucydides, 2.79) before its return. Cf. 
Nails (2002, 311).  
38 Thucydides, 2.70.1. Cf. Wolpert (2002, 216). 
39 Cf. Charmides, 153a1: “We got back the preceding evening from the camp at Potidaea […].”  
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learn about the fighting which they have heard “was very heavy and many of our 
friends were killed” (153c1-2). Further, they want to know if Socrates took part in the 
battle (153c3). Socrates confirms that he did (153c3-4), but he is not willing to 
elaborate on details. Secondly, when the plague in Athens killed Pericles in 429, Cleon 
succeeded him as the leader of the people; both Thucydides40 and Aristophanes41 
portray Cleon as a warmonger and demagogue. In 428, he proposed a decree to 
execute all the men of Mytilene after the suppression of the city’s revolt against 
Athens. This proposal was accepted, but the next day, Diodotus set forth a protracted 
rebuttal arguing that the decree was “savage” (ὠμόν), hence it was rescinded. 
Nonetheless, approximately one thousand chief leaders and prominent men were 
executed.42 These examples show two instances where the warfare did go beyond the 
civilized boundaries regarding the rules of military engagement.43 Thucydides judged 
parts of the campaign in Potidaea to be “savage” (ὠμόν) and the worst of pollution, 
and the Athenians themselves judged the decree of Cleon to be “savage” (ὠμόν). 
These two instances are examples of how the war transgressed and led the conflicting 
Greek parties into the realm of extreme violence. I take them to be a showing of how 
the Peloponnesian war caused violations of the demands set forth by the goddess, and 
as such, they may hint of an answer to why Socrates wanted to set up his prayers and, 
hence, try to mobilize Artemis.  
Regarding borderlines and thresholds, there may be a third reason for Socrates’ 
prayers. We learn that it was Socrates and Glaucon who set out from Athens to 
Piraeus. In addition to marking the line between savage and civilized conduct in war, 
                                                          
40 Thucydides was prosecuted for military incapacity and exiled by a decree proposed by Cleon. Of all 
the persons who appear in his History of the Peloponnesian War, Cleon is treated with the least 
impartiality, cf. Zagorin (2008, 80). Cf. also Thucydides, Book III. 36: “the most violent man at 
Athens;” Book IV.21: “a popular leader of the time and very powerful with the multitude;” Book V.16: 
“Cleon and Brasidas, who had been the two principal opponents of peace on either side—the latter 
from the success and honor which war gave him, the former because he thought that, if tranquility 
were restored, his crimes would be more open to detection and his slanders less credited.” 
41 Cf. Aristophanes, chiefly The Knights (864-867): “You are like the fishers for eels; in still waters they 
catch nothing, but if they thoroughly stir up the slime, their fishing is good; in the same way it’s only 
in troublous times that you line your pockets;” and also The Waps, see especially 664-712.  
42 It is irrelevant that many of the Mytilenians were speared in the end because the original decision 
was “savage” (ὠμόν) and eloquently defended, cf. Price (2007, 210n8). 
43 That the conventional laws of warfare broke down during the Peloponnesian War is confirmed by 
Lanni (2008), 486), and Ober (1994, 18).  
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Artemis was also the Kourotrophos (“child nurturer”) par excellence securing an 
upbringing on the threshold between the savage and the civilized life (cf. Vernant 
1992, 198). Vernant argues that the goddess was “accompanying the young all along 
their route from embryo to maturity, in instituting the rites of passage that consecrate 
their leaving the margins and entering into civic space” (ibid, 200), and in her function 
as Kourotrophos, Artemis establishes “a definite line of demarcation between boys and 
girls, young and adults, beasts and men” (ibid). By establishing these borderlines, 
Artemis rules over the margins and thus “she takes charge of education of the young 
and assures their integration into civic community” (ibid, 201). By guiding the youths 
(both boys and girls) in their passing from the other to the same “she presides over this 
change of state, this leap, by which the young cease being young in order to become 
adults, but this time without entailing any confusion in status between young and 
adulthood or any effacement of the boundaries between them” (ibid, 202). If the 
goddess is taken as Kourotrophos Artemis, then Socrates’ prayers are an act hinting 
toward paideia, the upcoming conversations, and Socrates’ art of midwifery which 
also is related to Artemis. To summarize these suggestions, I propose that Socrates’ 
prayers can be interpreted as an act to awake the goddess and hence seek support from 
the saving Soteira and the guiding Hegemone in times of war, and from Kourotrophos 
regarding paideia. Next, we must observe what happened after Socrates finished his 
prayers after he had viewed the processions, and he and Glaucon started on their return 
to Athens.  
1.3.3 Socrates and Glaucon decide to stay in Piraeus  
Not long gone, Polemarchus’ slave got hold of them and asked them to stop. His 
master had ordered him to make them wait for him and his companions Adeimantus 
and Niceratus. When they catch up, Socrates and Glaucon are invited to stay. 
However, Socrates signals reluctance. As Polemarchus does not accept Socrates’ 
intention to return, the invitation turns out to be ambiguous. On the one hand, it could 
be read as a playful threat set forth by Polemarchus, “[…] do you see how many of us 
there are? […] Well, then, either prove stronger than these men or stay here” (327c6-
10). It is not obvious from Socrates’ response whether he appreciated this or not, “Isn’t 
there still one other possibility […] our persuading (πείσωμεν) you that you must let us 
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go?” (327c11-12). It seems like Polemarchus has set his mind and will force Socrates 
to come along, “Could you really persuade if we don’t listen?” he asks. Glaucon now 
takes responsibility and proclaims that there is no way to persuade someone who is not 
attentive. This is an implicit advice addressed to Socrates: Do not start an 
argumentation now—it is doomed to fail. On the other hand, the invitation could be 
taken as a temptation set forth by Adeimantus, “Is it possible you don’t know that at 
sunset there will be a torch race on horseback for the goddess?” (328a1-2). Socrates 
suddenly seems to be impressed: “On horseback? […] That is a novel. Will they hold 
torches and pass them to one another while racing the horses, or what do you mean?” 
(328a3-5). His awakening interest is noticed by Polemarchus, so he interrupts and 
follows up on Adeimantus’ temptation, “and, besides, they’ll put on an all-night 
festival that will be worth seeing” (328a6-7). After having set forth a promise (they 
will go and see it after dinner), and after yet another temptation (at his house they will 
be together and talk [διαλεξόμεθα, 328a9] with many of the young men), his final 
words are a demand, “So stay and do as I tell you” (328a9-b1).  
This demand is powerful. It picks up on the initial playful threat, but now the 
threat has lost its playful value. At this point, Glaucon states, “It seems we must stay” 
(328b2). Socrates gives in and replies, “Well, if it is so resolved […] that’s how we 
must act” (328b3). This phrase translates “ἀλλ’ εἰ δοκεῖ […] οὓτω χρὴ ποιεῖν.” 
According to Bloom (1991b, 441n6), due to this phrase, the end of this section is “a 
dramatic prefiguration of the whole political problem, Socrates uses this word [i.e., 
δοκεῖ] as it was used in the political assembly to announce that the sovereign authority 
had passed a law or decree. It is the expression with which the laws begin, ‘It is 
resolved by [literally, ‘it seems to’] the Athenian people […]’.”44 If we now imagine 
the four men standing on a road somewhere in Piraeus discussing back and forth on 
the subject “what do we do now?” what is the impact of Socrates’ words? First, he 
indicates that he does not give in due to the threats and temptations, but due to 
Glaucon’s statement “it seems we must stay.” Isolated, Glaucon’s words seem like an 
imperative, that is, Glaucon signals that Polemarchus and Adeimantus have persuaded 
him. When he realized that there was no reason to argue anymore, he agreed to stay 
                                                          
44 This point is also underlined by Howland (2004b, 36-7) and mentioned by Lampert (2010, 248). 
63 
 
and closed the subject. However, it is also possible to comprehend the statement as not 
being so conclusive. Toward Polemarchus and Adeimantus it can be taken as a 
confirmation that Glaucon—at least—wants to stay and has no urgency in returning to 
Athens. Toward Socrates, on the other hand, it can be taken as an invitation for 
Socrates to decide for himself. If the latter is the case, then Glaucon signals that, if it is 
to Socrates’ liking, they will go to Polemarchus’ house for food and talks and attend 
the spectacular torch show later that evening, but if Socrates wants an immediate 
return to the city—Glaucon will join him. In Socrates’ response, nothing indicates that 
he has apprehended this two-fold suggestion. Instead, he alludes to the lawgivers as if 
Glaucon is the one forcing him to stay. By this defiance, Socrates signals that he 
concedes Glaucon to be the authority in this situation and thus, at this point, making 
Glaucon responsible for them staying at all. Second, if the impact of the formula is 
viewed in a broader perspective, Socrates’ use of the phrase sets the tone for the 
upcoming events in the Prologue. From this viewpoint, Polemarchus, Adeimantus, and 
Glaucon are given specific roles and are to be perceived as the authorizing political 
assembly enacting laws. This entails that Socrates’ role is to abide by the laws.  
Now that I have argued that the Republic has no specific date and from that 
argument presented the men gathered as belonging to three distinct generations and 
evaluated the argument that made Socrates and Glaucon stay in Piraeus, I am prepared 
to start my reading of the Prologue. However, it is necessary first to present the 
grounding premise for how I understand this Prologue.  
The phrase “if it is so resolved […] that’s how we must act” was uttered by 
Socrates at 328b3. However, when it occurs for the second time, its concluding form is 
transformed into a question. This happens when Socrates later asks Adeimantus: “Is it 
resolved that we must try to carry this out?” (369b2), and the situation is now altered. 
The question is posed after Socrates’ conversation with Cephalus, Polemarchus, and 
Thrasymachus, and after Glaucon and Adeimantus have put forth their challenges and 
together with the whole gathering urge Socrates to answer as they see fit. At this point, 
all the men have situated themselves as a political assembly, and Adeimantus is 
appointed their leader. So, by posing the question and by once more alluding to the 
lawgivers and addressing Adeimantus directly, Socrates seeks verification from the 
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assembly to continue: Are you sure this is what you want? Socrates now sets 
Adeimantus as the authority and thus makes him responsible for the upcoming 
development. However, Socrates signals reluctance. It is almost as if he is afraid to 
open a sort of Pandora’s box. 
Because the first occurrence of the formula “it is so resolved” appears at 328b3 
and the second at 369b2, it follows that this phrase bracketed sections 328c6-369b4; 
therefore, I have chosen to denote and read these sections as a Prologue. Subsequently, 
this bracketing has an imperative impact on how I understand the evolution of the 
dramatic development in the Republic, and it paves the way toward an alternative 
understanding of the upcoming sections. I have divided the substantial Prologue into 
three chapters, each of which reflects Socrates’ encounter with representatives for each 
of the three distinct generations, respectively. I suggest that the proposed critique 







Chapter 2: Prologue I: Father and son (328c6-336a10) 
 
In this chapter, I aim to show mainly two things. First, I argue that through Socrates’ 
encounter with the eldest generation we learn how the poetic topos is activated and 
how old Cephalus is using it. The impact is that Cephalus illustrates a character able to 
move only on a shallow surface and exemplify his lifelong experiences through poetic 
sayings and proverbs. Thus, he belongs to fading conventions. It is through Socrates’ 
approach that an implicit critique of these conventions starts to surface.1 This leads to 
my second aim. When Polemarchus interrupts and lends support to his father, Socrates 
immediately opens an explicit attack on the poetic topos and gradually shows that the 
Athenian moral topos is embedded here. He demonstrates that the moral topos is a 
poetic construct; hence, it represents false authority which Socrates, through his 
demiurgic art, helps Polemarchus to leave behind and makes him turn toward 
philosophy. Socrates does not expose his own topos; nevertheless, the readers 
recognize it through Socrates’ practice. To reach my two-fold aim, I will first perform 
a slow reading of the Cephalus section (328c6-331d3)2 and then of the Polemarchus 
section (331e1-336a10).      
2.1 Cephalus and Socrates (328c6-331d3) 
When Socrates and Glaucon arrived at Polemarchus’ house, they met his brothers 
Lysias and Euthydemus in company with Thrasymachus, Clitophon, Niceratus, 
Charmantides, and Cephalus. Socrates had not seen old Cephalus for a long time and 
thought that he had aged. The narrator reports that the old man sat on a cushioned 
chair. He had a garland on his head for he had been sacrificing. In the courtyard, the 
chairs were arranged in a circle, and the guests sat down beside Cephalus. When 
seated, the stage is set. 
                                                          
1 The core themes of the Republic are launched in the Cephalus section: themes such as justice, Eros, 
fear of death, wealth versus poverty, which Socrates approaches later, although through new 
perspectives. Thus, this section can somehow be read as a table of contents. Also, Blondell (2002, 
203) notices that the themes discussed in Book I become subjects discussed later. 
2 For a survey of how Cephalus, the character, is apprehended in the scholarly tradition, see 
Beversluis (2000, 189-90).  
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From the sympathetic picture the narrator draws of old Cephalus, we—the 
universal audience—are led to apprehend Cephalus as a character whom Socrates 
appreciates, respects, and has met on previous occasions. When welcoming Socrates 
with hospitality and joy, Cephalus seems to confirm that these are shared sentiments; 
he even indicates that Socrates has been missed, “Socrates, you don’t come down 
(καταβαίνων) to us in the Piraeus very often, yet you ought to” (328c7). Cephalus’ 
first greeting is a paraphrase of the narrator’s opening lines (cf. 327a1-4), but, when 
uttered by Cephalus, these words give quite different allusions. Cephalus confirms that 
Socrates has arrived down; Socrates is down. Also, Cephalus’ confirmative greeting 
alludes to the prisoner of the cave who, when freed, is not “willing to go down” 
(καταβαίνειν, 519d5-6). However, because the philosopher is “better and more perfect 
educated and more able to participate in both lives,” he is obligated to go down 
(καταβατέον, 520c2). This implies that Socrates—as an educated philosopher—at this 
point was forced to go “into the common dwelling of the others and get habituated 
with them to seeing the dark things” (520b7-c4). Hence, this allusion also awakens a 
restoration theme related to war (cf. 521a), and simultaneously it foreshadows the cave 
allegory and the discussions that follow from there. 
From the outset, there is one thing Cephalus would like Socrates to know (ἴσθι): 
“As the other pleasures, those connected to the body (τὸ σῶμα ἡδοναὶ) wither away in 
me, my yearning for conversation (τοὺς λόγους ἐπιθυμίαι) and the pleasure (ἡδοναί) 
given by it increases (αὔξονται)” (328c7-d1). Socrates responds neither to Cephalus’ 
testimonial on the loss of mobility nor his firm underlining of how the bodily desires 
have faded away proportionally with a growing desire for the pleasures given by 
conversations.3 Instead, he replies, “For my part, I am really delighted to discuss with 
men of age” (328d8-e1) because the men of high age have “traveled the road first” 
(328e2). Hence, Socrates is eager to learn (πυνθάνεσθαι, 328e2) from the old man 
“what sort of road it is, whether it is rough and hard or easy and smooth” (328e2-4). 
This word exchange could be taken just to be customary polite remarks, but I think 
                                                          
3 Socrates’ silence (or lack of response) is an established pattern of significance throughout the 
Republic. The silence is a pointing forward. It entails that when he does not respond, the theme will 
be picked up later and discussed with one of the other interlocutors and thus from a different 
perspective in a slightly altered context.   
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there is more to it. There is something hidden behind these courtesies which can be 
viewed as markers for upcoming conversations. 
First, we notice that what Cephalus wants Socrates to know, is not the same as 
what Socrates wants to learn. Moreover, while Cephalus accentuates that he 
appreciates conversations (τοὺς λόγους), Socrates emphasizes that his interest is 
discussions (διαλεγόμενος). This difference will turn out to be significant, and further, 
even if Socrates addresses Cephalus directly, we bear in mind that the whole gathering 
is sitting in a circle, listening. Therefore, Socrates’ reply also functions as an aide-
mémoire to them because the difference between conversation and discussion, as 
indicated here, points toward the upcoming word exchange between Polemarchus and 
Socrates and, the opening section of Socrates’ discussion with Thrasymachus, where 
this difference will be more deeply reflected. 
Secondly, through Cephalus’ statements, we get in touch with the vanishing 
conventions. That is the old or the traditional way of speaking and reflecting. Even if 
Socrates is the first to awake the poets (328e7), we shall see that Cephalus picks most 
of his arguments from a collection of anecdotes, proverbs, and poetry, or—more 
precisely—sentences created within a long-lasting poetic tradition. In other words, he 
warrants his opinions in a huge poetic sample-body that I already have named the 
poetic topos. By this warranting, Cephalus enables himself to generate distance toward 
his own words and deeds. Peter J. Euben (1990, 241) has demonstrated that the impact 
of this maneuver is that Cephalus is displacing the responsibility for his words, and 
thus is bouncing off criticism for his deeds. This foreshadows Glaucon’s remark to 
Socrates when he points out that during his conversation with Thrasymachus a 
discrepancy between Socrates’ deeds and words (cf. 357a5-b4) was detectable.4 
                                                          
4 I return to this in chapter 4: Prologue III: The tide is turning for Thrasymachus, p. 135. Regarding 
how logos (words, speech, thought) and ergon (fact, reality) were understood in fifth-century 
terms—as a disruption or irregularity between them, contrary to the standard logos-ergon 
opposition—I have adopted the views of Price (2007, 45-50). The standard categories of logos/ergon 
“were routinely paired in either a complementary or an antithetical relationship; context determined 
the author’s intention. As complements, the two elements represented differing but positive 
constituents of human experience: word is joined to deed. […] One example: Thucydides says of 
Phrynichus: ‘As he advised, so he acted’ (8.27.5). […] When logos and ergon are antithetical, logos 
represents either misconception or deliberate falsehood, while ergon represents reality: language 
and belief are inexact, slippery and deceptive, reality is firm and knowable. ‘My parents loved me 
only in word, not in deed’, laments Admetus in Euripides’ Alcestis (399). […] As antithesis, the 
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At the outset, Socrates signals friendliness toward Cephalus when he proclaims, 
“For my part, I am really delighted to discuss with men of age.” But how are we to 
understand the phrase “delight (χαίρω) in discussing (διαλεγόμενος)?” The meaning of 
the word χαίρω expands between two opposites where we, at one pole, find the 
meaning “to rejoice, be glad, be delighted,” and at the other the meaning “to dismiss 
from one’s mind, put away from one, renounce.”5 The term διαλεγόμενος belongs to 
the Socratic vocabulary and is usually understood as “practice of dialectics” or “to 
elicit conclusions by discussions.”6 Hence, the phrase “delight in discussion” stands 
forth as being notoriously ambiguous. Let us start with the term διαλεγόμενος. 
Regarding the meaning “practice of dialectic,” we know of Socrates’ ways from the 
dialogues, and we know that he employs his practices especially when encountering 
young men. For instance, in the Protagoras (432), we are told by the narrator that 
young Hippocrates and Socrates were engaged in a “dialectical conversation” (λόγου 
διελεγόμεθα, 314c4). The narrator there neither implied the content of this 
conversation nor what it was all about or what they discussed, but we are led to believe 
that it must have been something of great importance because they did not enter the 
house of Callias until they finished this dialogical conversation.7 In the Socrates-
Cephalus context, we must look closer into the meaning “to elicit conclusions by 
discussions,” and I suggest that it is possible to isolate the feature I have already 
marked as Socrates’ concealed topos, but this is not to say that Socrates employs his 
secret art of midwifery. Cephalus is too old. Nevertheless, Socrates is given an 
excellent opportunity to reveal—for both the universal and the particular audience—
the ethical values Cephalus’ conventions hold, conventions pointing toward the Greek 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
opposition is often found in political contexts. […] These standard categories of the logos/ergon 
opposition collapse […]” and one example is shown through the utterance of “Creon’s son in the 
Antigone, ‘Learning from others who speak well is an honorable thing.’ This is not empty moralizing 
but an expression of what was considered normal political process. Yet in parodic contrast, 
Thucydides writes that, during stasis, fair proposals are answered with ‘protective measures,’ i.e., an 
unreasonable and unfitting response, and an indication of the depth to which violence penetrates 
people’s thoughts and instinctive reactions during stasis. This strikingly unconventional relationship 
between logos and ergon is not a standard complementary or antithetical relationship but a 
disjunction between the two, illustrating how political procedures become dysfunctional in stasis.” 
5 Cf. Liddell and Scott. 
6 Cf. Adam, note on Rep. 328d. 
7 Cf. Protagoras, 314c3-8. See also chapter 8: Saving youths, section 8.1.1: The turning toward and 
into philosophy, pp. 283-84. 
69 
 
moral topos (do good to your friends and harm your enemies) which we will learn is 
embedded in the poetic topos. How?  
For example, when Socrates toward the end of this conversation deduces a 
concept of justice from Cephalus’ statements, he infers that justice is “to say the truth 
and pay back to others what is due.” It is not Cephalus who outlines this, but it will 
become known (through Socrates’ conversation with Polemarchus) that this concept of 
justice relates to the moral topos. Thus, Socrates’ implicit agenda in this context is to 
lift forth the moral topos and, further, show how it is passed down from one generation 
to another and given authority.8 If we now pick up the word χαίρω once again, I 
assume that Socrates is activating the whole register of its meanings. Then Socrates’ 
“delight in discussing” can be taken to mean that he finds delight in eliciting 
conclusions by discussion and, when elicited, he aims to dismiss the wrong ones from 
the interlocutor’s mind.9 In continuation of this, what about the relationship between 
Socrates words and deeds? At this point, the words-deeds opposition is antithetical10 
because his words are ambiguous and therefore represent misconception or are 
obfuscating, his deed—to be engaged in a conversation—is, for now, firm.  
Thirdly, Socrates wants to learn (πυνθάνεσθαι) from Cephalus about the road he 
has traveled, and as an old man he has almost traveled it to the end. By this request, 
Socrates implicitly refers to what I have called the Socratic topos (I want to learn 
because I do not know anything). The life-traveling theme is now awakened, and it 
will run throughout the whole Republic and culminate in the myth of Er. When 
Adeimantus later challenges Socrates, he states, regarding justice and injustice, that 
Socrates has spent his whole life considering nothing but this (367d8-e1). Thus, he 
urges Socrates to exhibit parts of his own life travel. In due course, Socrates grounds 
                                                          
8 According to Nagy (1990, 67-8), this tradition can be traced back to Solon. Nagy argues: “Assuming 
the stance of a lawgiver, Solon says in his poetry that he “wrote down” his thesmoí ‘laws’ after 
having adjusted “a díkē that is straight” for the noble and the base alike (F 36.18-20 W). However, 
besides this written law code, we must also keep in mind the poetic traditions attributed to Solon, 
and in these traditions the figure of Solon functions not only as lawgiver […] but also as a personal 
exponent of díkē by virtue of his life as dramatized through his poetry. In one poem, for example, 
Solon prays to the Muses that they will give him wealth and fame (F 13.1-4 W), and that they should 
allow him to help his friends and hurt his enemies.” 
9 Cf. Introduction, section 3.1: The demiurge at work, pp. 20-23 above. Cf. also Euthyphro (11b1-e1). 
10 Cf. p. 67n4 above. 
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this theme in a new paideia. So, to challenge the conventional paideia, Socrates needs 
to start by challenging the views held by Cephalus, and he needs to show how the 
traditional wisdom is warranted in the poetic topos. In this way the “old quarrel 
between poetry and philosophy” (607b5-6) is announced. The conversation between 
Cephalus and Socrates develops further through five subjects set forth by the latter: 1) 
The “threshold of old age.” 2) The opinion of the many. 3) Is the wealth inherited or 
earned? 4) What is the greatest good enjoyed from possessing great wealth? 5) What is 
justice? I will read these sections respectively.  
2.1.1 The “threshold of old age” (328e4-329d6) 
Socrates assumedly knows that to get Cephalus to display his views, the easiest way is 
to awake the poetic topos. Politely,11 he establishes the tone and atmosphere when he 
wants to learn what Cephalus has “to report (ἐξαγγέλλεις)” about what “the poets call 
the ‘threshold of old age’” (ἐπι γήραος οὐδῷ, 328e6-7). Socrates’ specific request at 
this point has given way for several interpretations, and some of these are worth a 
closer look. First, this is usually taken to be a reference to Homer who later will be 
called “the most poetic and first of the tragic poets” (607a3) and to Hesiod who 
supposedly has “told the biggest lie about the biggest things” (377e7-8). Secondly, the 
scholarly tradition mainly holds that Socrates points to the last threshold of a human’s 
life, that is, the threshold of life and death.12 Thirdly, however, Thomas M. Falkner 
(1995, 27) claims that “[f]ew formulas from the Homeric epics are as well-known and 
yet as unclear as those that describe ‘the threshold of old age.’” After presenting a 
limited survey of some of the occurrences of the phrase,13 Falkner concludes that “the 
                                                          
11 I disagree with Zuckert (2009, 144), when she claims that Socrates in his initial responses to 
Cephalus behaves “rather rudely.” If any rudeness is detectable toward Cephalus, I think it may be in 
last section of the conversation when Socrates turns it into a discussion.  
12 Among Platonic commentators, it is—to my knowledge—precedence that the relevant issue here is 
the threshold between life and death.  
13 Falkner (1995, 27-8) argues: “In the Iliad XXII, Priam pleads with Hector from the walls of Troy, 
describing the destruction Zeus will visit on him “on the threshold of old age” ([…] 60). In Book XXIV, 
he uses the same formula […] when he begs Achilles to be mindful of his father who is old like him 
(487). In the Odyssey, Odysseus uses the formula when he asks Eumaeus about Laertes, whom he left 
behind twenty years ago “on the threshold of old age” (15.348). Penelope uses a similar phrase ([…] 
23.212) in telling Odysseus how the gods begrudged them of the opportunity to enjoy their youth 
and arrive at old age together.” Adam, note on Rep. 328e, argues that the phrase ἐπι γήραος οὐδῷ 
occurs first in the Iliad XXII: 60 and XXIV: 487 where it denotes the natural limit of the life of man. 
The same meaning suits also Odyssey XV: 348 and XXIII: 212 and Hesiod, Work and Days, 331. Old 
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range of formulas used and the various contexts in which they appear suggest that 
they, and the metaphor they employ, were not original to Homer but were a ready 
resource in the formulary repertoire of heroic poetry,” and further, that any “precise 
meaning of the formulas is less certain” (ibid, 28). He suggests that Socrates’ use of 
the formula implies that he conceives Cephalus as having reached advanced old age; 
hence, it admits me to interpret the phrase in question as old age itself. Further, viewed 
in this context, I suggest that this Socratic reference points toward the threshold 
between prime- and old life. I also suggest that this is what Cephalus apprehends and 
intends to talk about. Let me elaborate on this. 
Socrates wants to learn what Cephalus “has to report (ἐξαγγέλλεις)” about this 
threshold. The word ἐξαγγέλλεις (meaning: “tell out,” “proclaim,” “make known”) 
refers to ἐξάγγελος which denotes a messenger who brings out news from within, an 
informer, or one who betrays a secret. On stage, in tragedy, the term denoted a 
messenger who told what was going on in the house, or behind the scenes, as opposed 
to the ἄγγελος who told news from a distance.14 By using the word ἐξαγγέλλεις, 
Socrates first alludes to tragedy and Sophocles and hence anticipates Cephalus who 
will pick up on Sophocles a little bit later. Secondly, he alludes to Cephalus himself. 
Cephalus is encouraged by Socrates to be the bearer of news (ἐξάγγελος) from within, 
or what is hidden behind the scenes for the younger generations. That is to say, the 
concept of “old age” frames the period in life from the time a person steps down from 
the scenes of active everyday life until death. The person of old age can report only on 
what is happening on the outside of the active everyday life. Cephalus cannot report on 
what is behind the scenes regarding the threshold between life and death, for this 
specific report we must await the myth of Er. Compared to the young and the adult 
(middle aged) generations present in the gathering, the old ones (Cephalus and 
Charmantides) have taken a step back and are now living their lives behind the scenes. 
They can only observe how the men in their prime and the younger generations unfold 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
age is itself the threshold by which we leave the House of Life. We enter, as it were, by one door and 
pass out by another. 
14 Cf. Adam’s note on Rep. 328e and, Liddle and Scott. It is also noteworthy that in the Laws (964e) it 
is the “young among the guardians” who serve as the ἐξάγγελους and “report everything in the city 
to the elders; the old men.” 
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on stage. I think this is what Socrates calls for. Related to thresholds, the “prime-old” 
threshold is somehow the “youth-adult” threshold in reverse. According to Falkner, it 
is permissible to view old age as a threshold because it “is in keeping with the 
significance of thresholds cross-culturally and their prominence in Greek culture” 
(ibid, 28).  
Regarding news concerning the prime-old threshold, Socrates further wonders if 
this is “a hard time of life” (328e8). Even if Cephalus does not respond directly to 
Socrates’ question, he relates to the prime-old threshold when he tells what old people 
do: “Some of us who are about the same age often meet together and keep up the old 
proverb ‘like to like’” (329a1).15 By this utterance, he signposts that old people are 
perceived or they perceive themselves as being one homogeneous group—the old 
ones. Cephalus opposes this sort of conformity. He disagrees with those who make 
high age the main cause of their sorrows, with those who complain about having lost 
the pleasures of youth and love, and those who whine over “the abuse that old age 
receives from relatives, and in this key, they sing a refrain about all the evils old age 
has caused them” (329b1-2). To underline his disagreement, he refers to Sophocles, 
who once was asked, “Sophocles, how are you in sex? Can you still have intercourse 
with a woman? ‘Silence, man,’ he said. ‘Most joyfully did I escape it, as though I had 
run away from a sort of frenzied and savage master’” (329c1-5). Sophocles’ words 
“comes to pass in every day,” and as time went by Cephalus himself experienced the 
truth in these words. The peace and freedom of old age are to have been “rid of very 
many mad masters” (329d1). Cephalus does not present the forces of Eros in a positive 
manner; on the contrary, and according to Stanley Rosen (2005, 25), this “is the first of 
a number of negative remarks in the dialogue about eros, which concludes as they 
begin, namely, by identifying eros as a tyrant.” The consequence here is that both 
peace and freedom in old age are defined negatively, as freedom from something—or 
put in Howland’s words, as the release “from bondage to corporeal eros” (2004b, 59). 
Further, by renouncing eros from tragedy’s point of view and by the authority of 
Sophocles, Euben (1990, 242-43) proposes that Cephalus himself indicates that “he is 
                                                          
15 The old proverb is given the meaning “like to like” by Bloom (1991b, 441n13). Jowett says “old men 
flock together as they are birds of a feather.”  
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philosophically impotent and that he lives an impoverished and one-sided life.” Maybe 
this is underlined when Cephalus conducts a short reflection and concludes that it is 
“men’s characters (ὁ τρόπος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, 329d3-4)” which is decisive, for he who 
is “moderate (κόσμιοι) and easily satisfied (εὔκολοι) will measure (μετρίως) high age 
moderately painful (ἐπίπονον), but to him who is not, both age and youth alike turn out 
to be hard” (329d3-6). It is interesting to observe that Cephalus does not argue that 
men’s character is crucial regarding the way they endure the burdens of life in general, 
it is crucial regarding how they measure the painfulness of either youth or high age—
he does not consider the period in-between—that is, the prime period of life.  
At this point, the narrator intervenes and evaluates the conversation so far, “I was 
full of wonder at what he had said” (329d8), he says. By addressing his evaluation to 
the universal audience, a two-fold outcome is effectuated. Its impact is, on the one 
hand, an appeal for us to decide whether we agree with the narrator’s evaluation and, 
on the other, we also have to consider whether we believe that the narrator—indeed—
was “full of wonder.” The following indicates the opposite because the narrator 
continues by stating that Socrates wanted Cephalus to “say still more,” so he “stirred 
him up” (329d8). The phrase “stirred him up” translates ἐκίνουν, which is an 
expression belonging to the Socratic vocabulary: a technical term denoting “the 
stimulation of the intellect by interrogation.”16 This is a rare moment because the 
narrator now reveals Socrates’ strategy and, this creates anticipation in the reader. 
What will happen when Cephalus is stirred up? This point is noteworthy for yet 
another reason: It explicitly shows that Socrates uses different techniques when 
encountering different interlocutors. In this case, Socrates’ questions at first aim 
toward stimulating the old man’s intellect and, when stimulated, he gradually turns the 
conversation into a discussion. So, at this moment Socrates’ hidden agenda is partly 
revealed, and we understand that he has higher aims than a simple word exchange with 
an old man.  
                                                          
16 Cf. Adam’s note on Rep. 329d.  
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2.1.2 The opinion of the many (329d7-330a6) 
Socrates now tells Cephalus that he suspects that “the many”17 are not convinced 
because they “believe rather that it is not due to character (τρόπον) that you bear old 
age so easily but due to possessing great substance; they say that for the rich there are 
many consolations” (329e2-4). By this entreaty, Socrates has introduced the opposition 
public (δημόσιος) versus private (ἴδιος), a theme that both Thrasymachus and Glaucon 
will bring forth and which will be discussed much later (cf. 505e ff.). Also, Socrates 
has touched upon the distinction “wealthy versus poor.” This theme turns out to be of 
importance when Adeimantus and Socrates later discuss corruption of men and claim 
that it is wealth or poverty that make men bad (cf. 421d). When Cephalus now agrees 
that “the many” will not be convinced by his arguments, and when he acknowledges 
that there are some truths in their opinion—though not “quite as much as they think” 
(329e6), this could be taken as criticism of “the many” from a wealthy metic’s point of 
view. However, this potential criticism turns out to be just an intermezzo, for Cephalus 
continues with a new reference. This time he brings forth Themistocles whose 
reputation Cephalus must have known very well. He thinks Themistocles was right in 
his answer to a Seriphian18 who was abusing him, “saying that he was illustrious not 
thanks to himself but thanks to the city; he answered him that if he himself had been a 
Seriphian he would not have made a name, nor would that man have made one had he 
been an Athenian” (330a2-5). Without elaborating, Cephalus argues that this argument 
still holds; he even thinks that the same answer could be given to poor individuals who 
are burdened by high age: “The decent man would not bear old age with poverty very 
easily, nor would the one who is not a decent sort ever be content with himself even if 
he were wealthy” (330a4-6). Compared with his earlier statements about the burdens 
                                                          
17 “the many” translate τοὺς πολλούς, and Bloom (1991b, 442n16), emphasizes: “Politically the 
expression is used in contrast to the one and the few. Ultimately, it reflects the theoretical problem 
of ‘the one and the many’. Every time it is used, it is meant to call up a cluster of meanings. […] Here 
the temptation to translate it by ‘most people’ must be resisted, for such a translation would obscure 
the fact that Socrates is referring to a class of men, a politically relevant class. This passage presents 
one element in the definition of that class which is so important for political life. It is dominated by 
opinions which give too much weight to money. ‘The many’ have a distorted sense of the importance 
of the equipment necessary for a good life; they identify the condition of happiness with happiness 
itself.” 




of high age, we notice a clarification: earlier the key to carrying the burden of life in 
both youth and high age was the “character of men,” now the key is “the decent man 
(ἐπιεικὴς).” According to what Cephalus is stating now, it is hard for a morally 
reasonable old man to bear poverty and, the consolation for him is that the wealthy and 
morally unreasonable man will never be content with himself. From here on, this 
theme is a point of new returns. 
2.1.3 Is Cephalus’ wealth inherited or earned? (330a7-330c9) 
When Socrates poses his next question and asks whether Cephalus’ wealth, for the 
most part, is inherited or earned by him, he alters the wealth subject by turning it from 
being a consideration of wealth in general to a particular wealth. “What do you mean, 
earned, Socrates?” (330b1), Cephalus wonders. By this reply, a slightly irritated tone is 
detected, and this shows that Cephalus is not comfortable when he is the subject of 
discussion. Yet, he explains that as a money-maker he has not done as well as his 
grandfather but better than his father. Therefore, he is satisfied by leaving his sons a 
little more than he received (cf. 330b1-8). Maybe Socrates sensed this irritation 
because he continues by justifying why he asked that very question. It was because 
Cephalus did not seem overly fond of money, contrary to those who make money 
themselves:  
 
Those who do make it are twice as attached to it as the others. For just as poets are 
fond of their poems and fathers of their children, so moneymakers too are serious 
about money as their own products; and they also are serious about it for the same 
reason other men are for its use. They are; therefore, hard even to be with because 
they are willing to praise nothing but wealth (330c2-8).  
 
Socrates’ justification is interesting because of the analogy made between the poets 
and the moneymakers. The poets are attached to their products like fathers are to their 
children,19 and the moneymakers are attached to money the same way, and both are 
                                                          
19 According to Adam, note on Rep. 330c, the “present passage is through Aristotle (Et. Nic. IV: 
2.1120b14, cf. ib. IX: 7. 1168a1-3) the source of the proverb about ‘parents and poets.’” In this I 
disagree; Sappho wrote about her “immortal daughters” more than a century earlier, thus the 
Republic cannot be the source of the proverb about “parents and poets.” Within the corpus, this 
theme also is touched upon in the Phaedrus where it is said: “[…] once been written down, every 
discourse roams about everywhere, reaching indiscriminately those with understanding no less than 
those to who have no business with it, and it doesn’t know to whom it should speak and to whom it 
should not. And when it is faulted and attacked unfairly, it always needs its father’s support; alone, it 
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twice as attached to their product as others. We will learn later that the poets and the 
moneymakers are defined as the two “classes” most dangerous. So, in his justification, 
Socrates, apparently quite accidentally, introduced another major upcoming topic. 
Before moving on, I must mention that Cephalus did agree with Socrates. 
2.1.4 What is the greatest good of possessing wealth? (330d1-331b8) 
Socrates now wants to know what Cephalus considers to be the greatest good he 
enjoys from his great wealth (330d1-3). At this point, it is Cephalus who emphasizes 
that he is not in agreement with “the many,” and further, he stresses that what he is 
about to say will not persuade them (330d4-5). He elaborates, “When a man comes 
near to the realization that he will be making an end, fear and care enter him for things 
which he gave no thought before” (330d5-7). It is the tales (μῦθοι) told about Hades 
that troubles him the most, especially the ones saying “that the one who has done 
unjust deeds (ἀδικήσανττα) here must pay the penalty there” (330d8-9). When 
younger, he did not bother to pay the stories any attention and jeered at them 
(καταγελώμενοι), but now the same stories “make his soul twist and turn because he 
fears they might true” (330e1). Cephalus contemplates the causes of his anxieties. Is it 
“due to the debility of old age,” or is it because he can distinguish what is going to 
happen in Hades because at this point in life he is nearer to the events? Either way, he 
is …  
 
… now full of suspicion and terror, and he reckons up his accounts and considers 
whether he has done anything unjust to anyone. Now, the man who finds many 
unjust deeds in his life often even wakes from his sleep in a fright, as children do, 
and lives in anticipation of evil; to the man who is conscious in himself of no 
unjust deed, sweet and good hope is ever beside him (330e3-7).  
 
At this point, Cephalus stands as a confirmation on Adeimantus’ forthcoming concern 
about what the stories told of Hades do to the souls of the children listening to them 
(cf. 365a4-7). Also, Cephalus also anticipates Socrates’ statement that what is 
inculcated in a child’s soul will stay there throughout life. In the case of Cephalus, it 
has resulted in terror. The only comfort he finds is in the words of the great poet 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
can neither defend itself nor come to its own support” (375e1-6). In the Parmenides, we learn that 
Zeno experienced this. Someone published an unauthorized copy of his book, so Zeno now travels to 
defend his writings (cf. Parm. 128d6-e1).   
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Pindar, who endorses that good hope is “a nurse of his old age” (331a1-2) and that 
“whoever lives out a just and holy life sweet hope accompanies” (331a4). Through 
these quotes, Cephalus reaches his conclusion, but he underlines that this does not go 
for any man, only for “the decent” (ἐπιεικεῖ, 331b1). He states that possession of 
money contributes a great deal to: a) not cheating or lying to any man against one’s 
will; and b) not departing for Hades frightened because one owes some sacrifices to a 
god or money to a human being. There are also many other uses, Cephalus says, 
without elaborating further. His concluding remark is that “still, one thing reckoned 
against another, I wouldn’t count this as the least thing, Socrates, for which wealth is 
very useful to an intelligent man” (ἀνδρὶ νοῦν ἔχοντι, 331b6-8).  
During this elaboration, Cephalus paves the way for problems and questions 
belonging to the core of the Republic. First, his reflections on the difference between 
the wealthy and the poor related to high age turned out to be a question of whether one 
is “easily satisfied” or not. As such, it could be taken as an appeal from Cephalus to 
the poor. The poor man must be content and accept the destiny he is given. Once 
again, we get a foreshadowing of the myth of Er, and it will turn out that Cephalus was 
wrong about the given destiny. According to Er, each individual chooses destiny. 
Further, the pleasure of wealth goes only for the “decent” or the morally reasonable 
man. The intelligent, wealthy man is the only one able to take the necessary 
precautions to secure his afterlife. The inference from this is that for Cephalus the 
main thing is to have the books balanced before departing to Hades. This is a 
conviction that can be traced to the “beggar priests” and the “diviners” which 
Adeimantus discards later (cf. 364b6-c1). Secondly, Cephalus gives the first allusion 
to the main subject of the Republic: justice (δίκη) and injustice (ἀδικία). However, 
while he has developed his understanding of these concepts from the poets, his 
understanding seems a little odd. He who does not render justice in deeds must render 
justice in punishment, for the tales of justice must be made balanced.20 If at this point, 
Cephalus is taken literally, then he again foreshadows the myth of Er, but at the same 
time, this inference opens up and draws the attention in two directions. It is possible 
that when it comes to the concept of justice, Cephalus does not—or cannot—
                                                          
20 Cf. Adam’s note on Rep. 330d. 
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distinguish between δίκαιος which is justice sanctioned by divine law, and ὄσιος 
which is justice sanctioned by human law.21 Even if they are not synonymous, they are 
close. This we witness when, in the Protagoras (331a-e) and the Euthyphro (11c-12c), 
Socrates explores the connection between the two concepts, and even if both 
investigations are inconclusive, it is, according to Price (2007, 109n47), “nonetheless 
clear that he [i.e., Socrates] assumed an intimate connection if not complete identity 
between them.”  
When continuing the conversation, Socrates does not pay any attention to this 
potential mix-up. Another possibility concerning Cephalus’ view of justice can be due 
to the fact that different poets say different things about the same subjects, a theme 
which will be highlighted and discussed by Polemarchus and Socrates later. Because it 
is poetry that teaches and stands as the authority for traditional wisdom, Cephalus also 
gives relevance to the critique of poetry which Adeimantus and Socrates will set forth. 
Regarding the definitions we are going to encounter throughout the Republic, a 
definition of justice and injustice derived from preoccupation with money makes 
Cephalus a dangerous man who cares most for material things (cf. Euben 1990, 242).22 
2.1.5 What is justice? (331c1-d10) 
So far, Socrates has patiently been stimulating the intellect (ἐκίνουν) of Cephalus, but 
now his patient mode disappears and the word exchange turns into a discussion 
(διαλεγόμενος; cf. 328d8). As we remember, Cephalus appreciated conversations 
while Socrates’ liking was discussions. “What you say is very fine (παγκάλως),” 
Socrates first states. At this point, Bloom (1991b, 442-43n19) is helpful and explains 
that the word παγκάλως is “a crucial and ambiguous term in moral thought altogether.” 
Bloom maintains that it first and foremost means “fair or beautiful and expresses 
                                                          
21 Cf. Liddell and Scott. Price (2007, 109), gives an interesting example: In Thucydides (5.104) the 
Melians view themselves as ὄσιοι πρὸς οὐ δικαίους which modern translators have rendered by 
using the same word for each; “just men fighting against unjust” (Crawley), or “we are righteous and 
you against whom we contend are unrighteous” (Jowett). On this, Price concludes that “the words 
are not of course synonymous, but they were close enough in common Greek understanding and 
frequently combined in speech.” 
22 Cf. Euben (ibid) also emphasizes that in “the Republic each definition of justice is the issue of a life, 
which they, in turn, justify. Each definition is also an implicit claim for the superiority of that life, 
proposing that the traits of character embodied in it should be the most admired and powerful. In 
this sense, every concept of justice is a claim to rule and power, and injustice is a claim to more 
power or respect than is warranted.” 
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nobility when qualifying speech or deed.” In this particular context, however, the word 
points to “a subtlety in Socrates’ style, a subtlety based on a forgotten moral 
viewpoint.” As Socrates now starts to challenge Cephalus’ statements, I take it that the 
latter (and Polemarchus) recognizes this. The start of Cephalus’ withdrawal is when 
Socrates continues: “[…] but as to this very thing, justice (δικαιοσύνην), shall we so 
simply assert that it is the truth and giving back what a man has taken from another, or 
is to do these things sometimes just and sometimes unjust” (331c1-3) ? This question 
is a result of Socrates’ deducing a definition from Cephalus’ earlier arguments, and 
maybe he intended Cephalus to recognize the deduction. However, Cephalus does not. 
So, Socrates now ponders whether it is possible to acknowledge these things as being 
just on some occasions and unjust on others. To deepen his point, he presents a case, 
which is meant to exemplify an exception to Cephalus’ norm: Imagine that a man 
borrows a weapon from a friend who at the time of the borrowing is of sound mind, 
but the friend goes mad and then demands the weapon back. Would it be just to give 
the weapon back to a man in such a state, or would it be just to tell him the truth? 
Cephalus agrees that it would not be just to give him the weapon back. Hence, 
Socrates promptly concludes that “this isn’t the definition of justice” (331d2). Now 
Polemarchus interrupts and lends support to his father.  
The definition is most certainly right, Polemarchus declares, “at least if 
Simonides should be believed at all” (331d4-5). This intervention gives Cephalus an 
opportunity to depart without being exposed and insulted, “Well, then, I hand down 
the argument to you, for its already time for me to look after the sacrifices” (331d6-7), 
whereupon Polemarchus asks, “Am I not the heir of what belongs to you?” The 
narrator reports what happened: “Certainly, Cephalus said and laughed” (γελάσας, 
331d10). It is telling that when Socrates poses his conclusion and states that this was 
not the right definition of justice, Cephalus hands the argument over to his son and 
leaves—laughing scornfully. Why the mocking laughs?23 Is it because Socrates starts 
                                                          
23 Singh (2004) shows that “of the 53 instances of gelan (to laugh) in Plato’s entire corpus, 7 are in 
the Republic. Of the 36 appearances of gelôs (laughter), 9 are in the Republic. 1 of Plato’s 4 uses of 
epigelao (laugh approvingly) is in the Republic. For every 12 times Plato employed the verb katagelao 
(laugh, jeer at, deride), 1 of them was in his Republic. This great political dialogue also contains the 
only instances of ekgelan (burst out laughing), prosgelan (smile upon), philogelôs (prone to laughter), 
and anakankazein (laugh out) in Plato’s writings. The absurd and comic also occur disproportionately 
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to confuse him or is it because he feels insulted? Does the laughter conceal a sort of 
bitterness in that he understands that his wisdom is irrelevant?24 Is the correct deed of 
Cephalus to withdraw when the younger generation enters the stage? I think it is 
possible to say yes to all these questions, but in view of the Republic as a whole, there 
is more to it than this. We have witnessed, or Socrates has shown us, how Cephalus 
advocates traditional wisdom. By doing so, Cephalus was not able to give an account 
of “the road he has traveled,” which was Socrates’ initial interest—that is, due to his 
way (τρόπος), Cephalus was neither able to give an account of his life nor to discuss 
the content of his views. So, with him, the old generation leaves the stage. However, 
the old tradition does not vanish quite yet because Polemarchus is not only the heir of 
his father’s wealth, he is also the heir of the argument. Hence, he sets out with 
reference to the famous poet Simonides and, by doing so, he is also warranting his 
argument in the poetic topos. Also, as I claim the Republic to be a critique of this 
tradition, it is simultaneously the old conventions that frame the Republic and the 
upcoming events. Nonetheless, when the eldest generation now leaves, the next is put 
on stage, and the first explicit confrontation with the established conventions can 
begin. 
2.2 Polemarchus and Socrates (331e1-336a10) 
When Socrates encounters Polemarchus, his sympathetic and patient attitude is gone. 
The change of atmosphere is noticeable when he confronts Polemarchus and demands, 
“Tell me, you, the heir of the argument. […] What was it Simonides said about justice 
that you assert he said correctly?” (331e1-3). Socrates’ almost unfriendly approach to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
often in the Republic: 34 out of 132 appearances of geloios (laughable, absurd) can be found there; 1 
of 2 uses of pangeloios (entirely laughable); 7 out of 47 uses of katagelastos (ridiculous); the only 
appearance of gelôtopoios (jester); 3 out of 4 uses of gelôtopoiein (buffoon); 1 of 5 uses of skômma 
(a jest, joke); 1 of 4 uses of ereschêlein (mock); 1 of 2 uses of tôthazein (jeer) —and of 18 instances of 
words built on the base kômôd- (e.g., kômôdos, a comic), 5 appear in the Republic.” She argues that 
“one of the main reasons that there is so much laughter in the Republic is because there is so much 
absurdity within the discussions there.” Contrary to Singh, I think the laughing—in all its various 
utterances—has a much more profound meaning and thus the instances of laughing are significant 
pointers toward the laugher’s state of mind.  
24 Euben (1990, 242), suggests that both Cephalus and his wisdom are irrelevant, a fact that “is 
suggested by the separation of generations. While the old man attends to the religion of heart and 
home, his son, Polemarchus, is down in the Piraeus watching a new, more spectacular religion 
imported from Thrace.” 
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Polemarchus has an identifiable direction. It is the reference to Simonides and the 
poetic topos Socrates now starts to confront with polemical bravura. However, there is 
also something else going on. As I mentioned above, we learned from the Phaedrus 
(418-16) that Polemarchus at some point turned toward philosophy (cf. 257b4-5), and I 
suggest that it is Polemarchus’ turning we now are about to witness. If this assumption 
holds, it is not Socrates’ aim at this point to belittle Polemarchus but to make him 
understand that the arguments he is defending belong to a false authority.25 The poetic 
topos exemplified by Simonides is also under attack in the Protagoras, but in that 
context, Socrates’ agenda was a different one. In the confrontation with Protagoras, 
Socrates tried to display what the sophist is; now he tries to display the source of 
Polemarchus’ convictions. So, what did Simonides say? “That it is just to give to each 
other what is owed. […] In saying this, he said a fine thing (καλῶς λέγε), at least in my 
opinion” (331e4-5), is Polemarchus’ response. Socrates now starts to activate his 
demiurgic art.  
2.2.1 What did Simonides mean? (331e6-332c4)  
In a slightly ironical tone, Socrates states that “[…] it certainly isn’t easy to disbelieve 
Simonides. […] He is a wise (σοφὸς) and divine (θεῖος) man” (331e6-7). Still, 
Socrates is not quite sure that he understands what Simonides meant by these words, 
so maybe Polemarchus can enlighten him?26 Socrates picks up the “weapon-mad-man” 
example that Cephalus agreed upon just before he left and uses this to challenge 
Polemarchus: “For plainly he [i.e., Simonides] doesn’t mean what we were just 
saying—giving back to any man whatsoever something he has deposited when, of 
unsound mind, he demands it. And yet, what he deposited is surely owed to him, isn’t 
it?” (331e8-332a2). Like his father, Polemarchus agrees. By activating the Socratic 
topos (I do not know anything), Socrates has now made the distinction sound-unsound 
mind regarding the justice of always giving back what you owe. Therefore, when 
Polemarchus agrees that this distinction is noteworthy and, that it should be taken into 
consideration, Socrates’ next move is to show Polemarchus that this must be wrong. 
                                                          
25 Cf. Frede (1992), see also Introduction,p. 19n39 above. 
26 The request to be enlightened by his interlocutors is a common Socratic approach, which I denote 
as activating the Socratic topos (I do not know anything). This will be of vital importance when 
Thrasymachus takes the floor. 
82 
 
He states that Simonides “means something different from this sort of thing when he 
says that it is just to give back what is owed” (332a7-8). Polemarchus swears and 
acknowledges that “of course it’s different, by Zeus, […] for he supposes that friends 
owe it to friends to do some good and nothing bad” (332a9-10). They have so far 
implicitly established that behind Simonides’s “meaning” we find the moral topos (do 
good to your friends and harm your enemies), which, in turn, shows that the poetic 
topos concealed the moral topos. By choice of words (“he supposes”) Polemarchus 
slightly alters the situation; he turns the discussion from being an investigation of what 
Simonides meant, to what Simonides assumed. By this, he exhibits that the phrase “to 
give back what is owed” is a sub-division of the moral topos, and he is simultaneously 
grasping Simonides’ assumption: You owe it to friends to do good to them. Socrates 
does not explicitly give Polemarchus credit for this exposure, but maybe his utterance 
“I understand (μανθάνω, 332a11)” and the fact that he leaves the “weapon-mad-man” 
example, could be taken as an indirect appreciation. It is probably so because when 
Socrates now gives Polemarchus two new problems to consider, he makes a turn. This 
problem-solving culminates when Socrates concludes that “[…] it seems that 
Simonides made a riddle, after the fashion of poets, when he said what the just is. For 
it looks as if he thought that it is just to give everyone what is fitting, and to this, he 
gave the name what is owed” (332c1-3). In this conclusion, Socrates points out why 
and how Simonides’s definition of justice cannot be right. Why, because it stands forth 
like a poetic riddle. How, because it seems that “what is fitting” means the same thing 
as “what is owed.” Polemarchus’ response is to launch a rhetorical question.  
2.2.2 First method: Imaginary interlocutors (332c5-334b8) 
When replying through the rhetorical question: “What else do you think?” (332c4), 
Polemarchus gives Socrates the opportunity to continue as he sees fit. Socrates grasps 
this invitation, and his first words are, “In the name of Zeus” (332c5). Why the 
swearing? The impression is that he has discovered something new, which 
Polemarchus also can discover with some guidance. Hence, Socrates chooses to 
employ a well-known procedure: he creates “an imaginary interlocutor.”27 This 
method is employed in various ways throughout the dialogues, and in the case of 
                                                          
27 Cf. Introduction, section 3.1: The demiurge at work, pp. 20-3. 
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Polemarchus, Socrates chooses to challenge him by urging him to visualize a 
conversation between Simonides and “someone.” He says, “[…] if someone were to 
ask him, Simonides, the art called medicine (τέχνη ἰατρικὴ) gives what that is owed 
and fitting to which things? What do you suppose he would answer us?” (332c5-8). 
Polemarchus finds the task easy and answers, “drugs, foods, and drinks to bodies” 
(332c9-10). The next question concerns the art of cooking (τέχνη μαγειρικὴ) which 
Polemarchus also finds unproblematic to answer, “Seasonings to meats” (332d1). By 
these two analogies, Socrates has introduced the use of special topoi related to specific 
arts, and these topoi and arts seems to be well known to Polemarchus—but this is not 
necessarily the case regarding the third analogy proposed: “All right. Now then, the art 
that gives what to which things would be called justice? (τέχνη δικαιοσύνη, 332d2-3).”  
Polemarchus now signals reluctance because his first response is to present a 
reservation, “If the answer has to be consistent with what preceded […]” (332d4-5). 
What does this reservation mean? On the one hand, it could be that by “consistent with 
what preceded” Polemarchus refers to the two former analogies and thus, the special 
topoi and the arts related to them. However, he does not find that the “art of justice” 
fits. On the other hand, he may just refer to the moral topos because he finds it 
equivalent to his apprehension of the concept of justice. If this is the case, then it must 
be plausible to infer that it is not common to speak about an “art of justice” as Socrates 
does here. Hence, this is the first explicit hint suggesting that Socrates warrants his 
arguments and questions in a concealed topos, unknown to the particular audience at 
this point; but Socrates will start to reveal it later.28 For now, it turns out that 
Polemarchus is referring to the moral topos when he concludes, “[…] the one that 
gives benefits and harms to friends and enemies” (332d4-6). The method “imaginary 
interlocutors” did not turn out effective, thus Socrates leaves it and turns once more to 
the question “what did Simonides mean?” He asks, “Does he mean that justice is doing 
good to friends and harm to enemies?” (332d7-8). Polemarchus answers that in his 
opinion this is the case. Even if the method did not result in a positive outcome on 
behalf of Polemarchus, they have now worked out a new definition of justice ascribed 
to Simonides. This definition is identical to the moral topos. It is obvious that Socrates 
                                                          
28 This starts with Glaucon’s interruption at 357b4. 
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is not satisfied, because now he starts to employ another well-known procedure—the 
elenchus. By this method, he refutes the soundness of the definition and, hence, the 
moral topos altogether. 
2.2.3 Second method: Elenchus (332d10-333e2) 
Socrates sets out with two new analogies relevant for the definition ascribed to 
Simonides. In relation to the doctor and pilot analogies, Polemarchus answers 
satisfactorily. The problems become visible when the just man is introduced, “What 
about the just man, in what action and with respect to what work is he most able to 
help friends and harm enemies?” (332e3-4). Polemarchus’ answer is somewhat 
surprising when he states that in his opinion “it is in making war (προσπολεμεῖν) and 
being an ally in battle” (ξυμμαχεῖν, 332e5). However, my surprise turns into a lesson 
learned because I ought to have observed that Polemarchus’ earlier answers all turned 
out to be an advantage for Socrates. Now, Socrates can put forth daunting implications 
of the analogies: For the healthy people a doctor is useless, and for the people not at 
sea a pilot is useless, then it must follow that in time of peace the just man is useless. 
Polemarchus finds the last inference problematic. Therefore, Socrates makes him 
stress that justice is useful in peacetime (333a1) before he continues by presenting new 
analogies “farming—acquisition” and “shoemaking—acquisition.” The problem arises 
once more when justice is introduced, “What about justice then? For the use or 
acquisition of what would you say it is useful in peacetime?” (333a11-12). 
Polemarchus’ solution is “contracts (ξυμβόλαια, 333a13)” and he is quick to specify 
that it has to do with partnerships. Through further analogies and questions, they end 
up with the inference that when money is useless, justice is useful (cf. 333c12-d1). 
Polemarchus is obviously not happy with this conclusion, “I’m afraid this is the case” 
(333d2). It gets worse as they work their way from particular cases to general, and 
Socrates finally asks, “And with respect to everything else as well, is justice useless in 
the use of each and useful in its uselessness?” (333d11-12). “I’m afraid so,” 
Polemarchus states, whereupon Socrates quickly concludes, “Then justice, my friend, 
wouldn’t be anything very serious, it is useful for useless things” (333e1-2). This 
cannot stand, so Socrates tries to look at the whole problem from a different point of 
view. “Let’s look at it this way” (333e3), he says, and presents a new set of analogies 
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where the just man in the last resort is displayed as a robber. Now, Polemarchus seems 
surprised, but he is forced to acknowledge the inference is due to what the argument 
was indicating. Socrates concludes,  
 
I’m afraid you learned this from Homer. For he admires Autolycus, Odysseus’ 
grandfather on his mother’s side, and says he surpassed all men in stealing and in 
swearing oaths. Justice, then, seems according to you and Homer and Simonides, 
to be a certain art of stealing, for the benefit, to be sure, of friends and the harm of 
enemies. Isn’t that what you meant? (334a10-b5).  
 
By this inference, Socrates is on his way to refute the moral topos, and instantaneously 
make Polemarchus understand that this topos represents a false authority. That 
Polemarchus disagrees with the conclusion is apparent when he responds “No, by 
Zeus” (334b6). The claim that according to Homer and Simonides “justice is a certain 
art of stealing” is an interpretation made by Socrates, and as such, it is bound to have a 
provocative effect toward the particular audience, therefore, at this point, I think 
Socrates is apprehended as a pure provocative polemic.29 Next, Polemarchus signals 
confusion when stating “But I no longer know what I did mean” (334b6). This 
confusion indicates that he now finds himself in an aporetic state;30 hence, the 
elenchus has so far been efficient. Nevertheless, Polemarchus is still certain that his 
opinion on justice relates to the saying “helping friends and harming enemies” (334b7-
8). Socrates senses that Polemarchus is uncomfortable and takes on a new turn by 
asking what Polemarchus understands by friends.  
2.2.4 A new turn (334c1-334e7) 
“Do you mean by friends those who seem to be good to an individual, or those who 
are, even if they don’t seem to be, and similarly with enemies?” (334c1-3). This is a 
tricky question. Some seem to be good toward others, but are actually bad, while some 
seem to be bad toward others, but are actually good. How are we to decide on this? 
Polemarchus’ suggestion is reasonable, because he places the responsibility for 
judgment with the observer: “The men one believes to be good one loves, while those 
                                                          
29 As this topos was the guiding moral principle in the Greek culture, Socrates’ refutation of it 
implicitly set forth a severe critique. This is, of course, noticed by Thrasymachus who is present; 
hence this is one hint toward his outburst later.  
30 To bring his interlocutors to an aporetic state of mind is a part of Socrates’ proceedings. Cf. chapter 
8: Saving youths. 
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he considers bad one hates” (334c4-5). As Socrates points out, there is then, of course, 
always a possibility that our judgment is wrong, and those we think are the good ones 
are in fact the enemies, and those we think are the bad ones are in fact friends 
(334c10). After this contribution, Socrates alters the perspective. Now the viewing is 
placed with the ones misjudged. He says: “But nevertheless it’s still just for them to 
help the bad and harm the good? […] Yet the good are just and such as not to do 
injustice?” (334c12-d3). Polemarchus does not notice the change in perspective and 
agrees. This agreement gives Socrates the opportunity to conclude: “Then, according 
to your argument, it’s just to treat badly men who have done nothing unjust?” (334d5-
6). “Not at all,” Polemarchus replies, “for the argument seems to be bad” (334d7-8). 
He does not give any reason why the argument is bad, but Socrates accepts 
Polemarchus’ objection: “Then, after all […] it’s just to harm the unjust and help the 
just” (334d9-10). Polemarchus is more satisfied with this than what they said 
previously. However, it does not look like Socrates is willing to give in, for he 
continues on the same track and tries to conclude yet once more: “Then for many […] 
all human beings who make mistakes it will turn out to be just to harm friends, for 
their friends are bad; and just to help enemies, for they are good. So, we shall say the 
very opposite of what we asserted Simonides means” (334d12-e4). Yes, they have 
reached the opposite of what they asserted Simonides meant. However, they did not 
get there due to sound argumentation, but rather, due to Socrates’ little twist in 
perspective, and Polemarchus is not satisfied with this development. “It does really 
turn out that way,” he says. Nonetheless, Polemarchus is now determined to go on, 
because he figures that something went wrong right from the start. He therefore 
suggests that they should change what they set down at the beginning for “I’m afraid 
we didn’t set down the definition of friend and enemy correctly” (334e5-6). Socrates 
does not reject this suggestion, on the contrary, he gives him the opportunity to set 
things right and asks, “How did we do that?” (334e7). 
2.2.5 A new start (334e8-335d11) 
Polemarchus explains that the initial premise was wrong because they “set down that 
the man who seems good is a friend” (334e8); that was not sufficient. He wants to 
change it to “the man who seems to be, and is, good, is a friend […] while the man 
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who seems good and is not, seems to be but is not a friend. And we’ll take the same 
position about the enemy” (334e10-335a2). It now looks like Polemarchus has grasped 
the nuances in perspective, and to secure his premise, he demands that they include 
both “who seems to be” and “who is.” However, this stand involves a profound 
problem. I would have expected that Socrates somehow demanded Polemarchus to 
clarify this, but instead he chooses to turn the argumentation in a new direction: “Then 
the good man, as it seems, will by this argument be a friend, and the good-for-nothing 
man an enemy?” (335a3-4). When Polemarchus answers confirmatively, Socrates 
continues by placing justice into Polemarchus’ equation: “You order us to add 
something to what we said at first about the just” (335a6-7). Did Polemarchus order 
this? Was not Polemarchus’ suggestion all about the difference between “friend” and 
“enemy” and, thus, a suggestion to specify these concepts in order to reach a 
conclusion? Because Polemarchus does not object, Socrates is once again given the 
opportunity to continue as he sees fit. “Then we said that it is just to do good to the 
friend and bad to the enemy, while now we are to say in addition that it is just to do 
good to the friend, if he is good, and harm to the enemy, if he is bad” (335a6-10). Even 
if this summary does not quite capture what they said in the start, Polemarchus states 
that “said in that way it would be fine in my opinion” (335b1). Socrates’ next step is 
puzzling: “Is it, then […] the part of a just man to harm any human being 
whatsoever?” (335b2-3). By this question, has he not left the distinction “friend” and 
“enemy” altogether? They have not discussed the possibility of “harming any human 
being whatsoever,” so if this is meant to be a test, Socrates has activated his art of 
midwifery, and Polemarchus stands the challenge because he upholds the distinction 
and answers: “Certainly […] bad men and enemies ought to be harmed” (335b4).  
Polemarchus’ answer makes Socrates alter the premises of the conversation, once 
more. He now starts a new elenchus from the outset of the consequences of harming 
someone. Through new analogies, they agree that harming both dogs and horses makes 
them worse with respect to their virtue, respectively. From these analogies, Socrates 
concludes in agreement with Polemarchus that the same must be asserted of human 
beings, “when they are harmed, they become worse with respect to human virtue” 
(335c1-2). Earlier, Socrates urged Polemarchus to make an inference concerning the 
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“art of justice” (332d2-3), but in this new move, which is grounded in the analogy 
dogs-horses-human virtue, he introduces justice as a human virtue: “But isn’t justice 
human virtue?” (335c4). By this altering, Socrates has left “justice as an art” behind 
and introduced the relationship between justice and virtue which will later become one 
of the core themes in the Republic.  
After having posed this question and, by having Polemarchus accept that justice 
is a human virtue, the rest of the conversation develops on Socrates’ terms alone. Also, 
the narrative tempo is rapidly increasing due to short questions and answers—a turn 
which indicates that Socrates, the questioner, knows exactly where he is going. He 
carries on by first concluding that “human beings who have been harmed necessarily 
become more unjust” (335c6-7). Then he introduces two new analogies based on 
similarities: musicians cannot make men unmusical by music (335c9-10) and, men 
skilled in horsemanship are not able to make men incompetent riders by horsemanship 
(335c12). On this ground, he makes Polemarchus accept that good men are not able to 
make other men bad by virtue (335c14-d1). His next step is to introduce three new 
analogies based on opposites: “I suppose that cooling is not the work of heat, but of its 
opposite” (335d3-4), “Nor wetting the work of dryness but of its opposite” (335d6), 
“Nor is harming, in fact, the work of the good but of its opposite” (335d8). Then he 
makes Polemarchus agree that it is the just man who is good (335d10). This last 
settlement makes Socrates conclude: “Then it is not the work of the just man to harm 
either a friend or anyone else, Polemarchus, but of his opposite, the unjust man” 
(335d12-13). Whether Polemarchus is impressed or not is not easy to determine, but 
his reply to this conclusion could indicate that he is. “In my opinion, Socrates […] 
what you say is entirely true” (335e1). With that consent, the only remaining issue for 
Socrates is to make clear that they now have shown that the moral topos does not hold. 
Hence, he will reveal the origin of this topos for Polemarchus and make Polemarchus 
conduct the final refutation. 
2.2.6 Polemarchus becomes an ally in battle (335d12-336a10) 
Socrates starts by recapitulating, “If someone asserts that it’s just to give what is owed 
to each man—and if he understands by this that harm is owed to enemies by the just 
man and help to friends—the man who said this is not wise” (335e2-5). This 
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“someone” is Simonides, the poet Socrates at the outset ironically called “wise and 
divine.” Socrates now gives us the reason for his ironic outburst: Simonides “wasn’t 
telling the truth” (335e5-6). From this, it follows that the difference between Socrates 
and Simonides is that the former tells the truth while the latter does not.31 “For,” as 
Socrates infers, “it has become apparent to us that it is never just to harm anyone” 
(335e6-7). If we now consider the particular audience, is this apparent? On what 
ground should the particular audience accept that Socrates is telling the truth while the 
poets are telling lies? To grasp the truth that Socrates is proclaiming to speak, where 
are they to look? These questions will be highly relevant when Thrasymachus 
interrupts, and later, when Glaucon is intervening after Socrates has had his encounter 
with Thrasymachus. However, at this point, no questions are asked, and Polemarchus 
accepts Socrates’ conclusion. Socrates then invites him to become his partner in battle 
against the poets who assert similar assumptions, “We shall do battle (μαχούμεθα) 
then as partners (κοινῇ), you and I […] if someone asserts that Simonides, or Bias, or 
Pittacus or any other wise and blessed man said it” (335e9-11). Polemarchus is more 
than happy to take on the task: “I, for one […] am ready to be your partner in the 
battle” (335e12). This moment is imperative and noteworthy because Polemarchus 
becomes an ally in battle due to Socrates’ invitation. When Glaucon later offers to be 
an ally, he is self-appointed, and Socrates declines Glaucon’s proposal (cf. 474a-b). 
This happening is the main argument for Polemarchus’ turning, and at the same time, 
it questions whether Glaucon ever made his turning. I will return to this. 
After this momentum, Socrates is ready to exhibit where the moral topos has its 
origin, “I suppose it belongs to Periander,32 or Perdiccas,33 or Xerxes,34 or Ismenias the 
                                                          
31 I take this to be pointing forward to 496a-e where Socrates explains the philosophic disposition to 
Adeimantus.  
32 The tyrant Periander ruled in Corinth. Under his ruling, Corinth was wealthy and prosperous. He is 
claimed to be one of the seven sages of Greece, but as Adam points out, it is noticeable that he does 
not appear in the list of the seven wise men displayed in Protagoras, 343a.  
33 Through Perdiccas, we find, according to Adam (note on Rep. 336a), the allusion is to Perdiccas II, 
father of Archelaus (cf. Gorgias, 471b) who died late in 414 or early in 413 after proving himself “a 
fickle friend and foe” of the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War. 
34 Xerxes, the Persian king, is famed due to the Persian invasion of Greece and for being defeated by 
the Greeks at Salamis (480). The expedition of Xerxes against Greece is cited by Callicles (Gorgias, 
483d) in connection with the theory “might is right.” Cf. Adam, note on Rep. 336a. 
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Theban,35 or some other rich (πλουσίου) man who has a high opinion of what he can 
do” (336a5-7). While Periander, Xerxes, and Perdiccas are taken as types of tyrants, 
this naming points toward the evaluation of regimes in Book VIII, and further, in Book 
IX, where it is stated that “no tyrants are wise” (cf. 587d). There, Ismenias represents a 
rich man with “high opinion of what he can do,” but the power of the tyrants is fancied 
and, thus, not real. They cannot even do the thing they want, as we shall learn later—
especially throughout Book IV. As Socrates now indicates that rich tyrants launched 
the moral topos as a kind of political propaganda, this section also anticipates 
Socrates’ presentation of “the noble lie” (cf. 414b).  
As they have exposed the moral topos, refuted it, and Polemarchus acknowledges 
that he had trusted a false authority and from there developed false opinions, Socrates 
prepares to elaborate on this theme, “All right, […] since it has become apparent that 
neither justice nor the just is this, what else would one say they are?” (336a9-10). At 
this point, one would have expected that the discussion was put to an end and that the 
methodological proceedings “imaginary interlocutor” and “elenchus” should culminate 
in a “dialectical conversation,” or at least that Socrates would have made a comment 
on this.36 Sadly enough, however, we are not allowed to hear how this could have 
developed because now the narrator takes over and reports on Thrasymachus. He had 
wanted for some time to interrupt, but the others present had restrained him because 
they wanted to hear how the argument developed. When Socrates paused and signaled 
a new elaboration, Thrasymachus could no longer keep quiet. The narrator tells that he 
“hunched up like a wild beast, he flung himself at us as if to tear us to pieces” (336a5-
6). Both Polemarchus and Socrates got all in a flutter from fright. 
                                                          
35 The Theban politician Ismenias is acknowledged to have pursued an anti-Spartan policy and for 
having harbored exiles fleeing Athens during the rule of the Thirty Tyrants. In Meno 90a, he is 
portrayed as man who made much money in a short period of time.  
36 This is similar to what happened in Socrates’ encounter with Hippocrates in the Protagoras; see 
chapter 8: Saving youths, section 8.1: Hippocrates’ dream, p. 282 ff. In this context, Socrates and 
Hippocrates worked their way toward a “dialectical conversation” through the proceedings of “an 
imaginary interlocutor” and “elenchus.” Here, the narrator points out by that they did not enter the 
house of Callicles before the dialectic conversation had come to an end, but the narrator does not 
reveal the content of this conversation.  
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Chapter 3: Prologue II. The tide is turning for Socrates (336b1-354c5) 
 
The practices Socrates employed during his encounters with Cephalus and 
Polemarchus are the main reason for Thrasymachus’ outrageous outburst. 
Thrasymachus witnessed how Cephalus, in the conventional way, warranted his 
arguments in the poetic topos, which Socrates implicitly criticized. He also witnessed 
how Cephalus—stranded when Socrates started to problematize the concept of 
justice—left the stage and handed the argument over to his son. He also observed that 
Socrates’ open attack on the poetic topos resulted in a refutation of the Athenian moral 
topos, and he heard that Polemarchus was invited to become an ally in battle. My 
argument in this chapter is that Thrasymachus did not understand the depth of what he 
was observing. His flare-up signals a blind spot or lack of knowledge regarding 
Socrates’ words and deeds. Therefore, his outburst is a momentous happening that 
constitutes a subtext in the Republic. This subtext lives its own life until it surfaces at 
498d1-4 when Socrates declares that he and Thrasymachus have become friends and 
underlines that they were not enemies in the first place.  
Traditionally, scholars have read the Thrasymachus section as an exemplification 
on Socratic refutation. For example, Zuckert (2009, 343) argues that “Thrasymachus 
concedes Socrates’s superior argumentative skill,” while Lampert (2010, 257) states 
that “Socrates’ treatment of Thrasymachus resembles his treatment of Protagoras and 
that Socrates succeeds in a way that he failed with Protagoras.” Rosen (2005, 38) 
indicates that “it is at least an open question whether Socrates can persuade 
Thrasymachus;” nevertheless, “Socrates begins his refutation of Thrasymachus by 
accusing him of self-contradiction” (ibid, 93). Also, he argues that “Thrasymachus’ 
surrender is more likely due to shame that to persuasion” (ibid, 38). Regarding 
Thrasymachus, the character, he is often referred to as unsympathetic.1 In this chapter, 
I will try to view the encounter between Thrasymachus and Socrates from an 
alternative perspective. At the outset, my approach to Thrasymachus is in accordance 
with Lampert (2010, 257) who states that in the Republic he “is not a singularity; he’s 
                                                          
1 Beversluis (2000, 221), states that “Thrasymachus is one of the most unsympathetically 
interlocutors in the early dialogues.” For a survey on the reception of Thrasymachus, see (ibid, 222).  
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a representative of the sophistic enlightenment founded by Protagoras, a radical, 
outspoken representant.”2 Then it follows that this is an encounter between the topos 
of sophistry, exemplified through Thrasymachus, and the topos of philosophy, 
exemplified by Socrates’ use of a concealed topos. The first and foremost aim is to 
show that—as evidenced by his observations so far—Thrasymachus is not able to 
grasp exactly what Socrates is doing. Consequently, he interprets Socrates as being 
possessed with nonsense. What we are about to witness is two men relating to two 
incompatible topoi; hence, they develop a violent discourse. Their verbal combat 
comes to an end when Thrasymachus gives in and Socrates, after he apparently has 
refuted Thrasymachus, admits that the whole conversation went wrong from the start. 
Overall, I relate this to the theme “defining philosophy.” As a new specialized 
discipline, philosophy first emerged as an artificial construct, and then it had to be 
legitimized as a new and unique cultural practice (cf. Nightingale 1995, 14).3 Related 
to my backdrop argument, I suggest that from here on Socrates takes on the task of 
legitimizing philosophy, and he does so by implicitly contrasting it with sophistry. 
This entails that he does not expose his new topos through these sections.   
3.1 Displayed and concealed topoi (336b1-c2) 
According to Leo Strauss (1964, 77), it is safe to assume that Thrasymachus and 
Socrates were acquainted before the gathering in Piraeus. This acquaintance can 
contribute to explaining the irritation brewing in Thrasymachus and the reason why he 
sprang into the midst of the group, addressed Socrates, and shouted, “What is this 
nonsense that has possessed you for so long (ὑμᾶς πάλαι φλυαρία), Socrates?” (336b8-
c1). The word πάλαι denotes two aspects of past time: first, “a long time ago” as in 
time goes by and secondly, “not long ago, just now.”4 Hence, through the use of πάλαι, 
Thrasymachus confirms that he has observed a change: “Long ago” Socrates behaved 
                                                          
2 Was Thrasymachus a sophist? Beversluis (2000, 222) discusses this question and points out that 
commentators pro refer to 337d6-7 where Thrasymachus refuses to debate with Socrates unless he 
pays a fee; for a survey, see Beversluis, 222n3. The ground for commentators contra is that “Plato 
usually goes out of his way to identify sophists and never numbers Thrasymachus among them.” For 
a survey, see Beversluis, 222n4.   
3 Cf. Introduction, section 4.2: Philosophy defined, pp. 29-31. See especially Nightingale (1995), pp. 1-
12 and chapter 1: “Plato, Isocrates, and the property of philosophy,” pp. 13-59. 
4 Cf. Liddle and Scott. 
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differently than he did “just now.” Does this imply that long ago Socrates was 
apprehended as a sophist, and therefore, Thrasymachus expects him to act 
accordingly?5 The word φλυαρία translates “nonsense” and is related to both words 
and deeds.6 I assume that Thrasymachus was educated or trained in the art of 
sophistry, a particular science or art, which, in turn, implies a special topos. If he 
couples Socrates to this art, then Thrasymachus’ outburst is not of a rude, polemic 
nature, but rather a demand for an explanation or, in turn, an implicit quest for 
Socrates’ topos. During the upcoming confrontation, we will detect confusion, a 
profound attentiveness, and a deep interest in getting Socrates to elaborate. 
Nonetheless, Socrates ignores it all. This creates an unstable ground. On the one hand, 
the universal audience knows Socrates’ new topos; we call it philosophy, and we 
explain Socrates’ deeds and words accordingly. On the other hand, Thrasymachus and 
the rest of the particular audience do not know it; at this point, none of them can 
perceive what Socrates is doing.7  
Next, Thrasymachus addresses Socrates and Polemarchus: “And why do you act 
like fools making way for one another?” (336c1-2). Throughout that encounter, this is 
what Thrasymachus witnessed. From his perspective, a subject displayed is a sort of 
combat or agon where the aim is to win the argument.8 However, the philosopher 
aimed to guide Polemarchus and make him turn. When Socrates activated his new arts 
(demiurge and midwifery) and, employed his procedures (“creating an imaginary 
interlocutor” and “the elenchus”), Thrasymachus perceived them as fools making 
“ways for one another.” Thus, I again claim that he did not quite understand what he 
was observing. When Socrates later summarizes, he indicates that they were talking 
                                                          
5 That Socrates was apprehended as a sophist by some is confirmed by Aeschines who more than 
fifty years after the execution of Socrates (346/5) asked in the court of law, “Did you put to death 
Socrates the sophist, fellow citizens, because he was shown to have been the teacher of Critias, one 
of the Thirty who put down the democracy?” (1. 173); cf. Wolpert (2002, 63). In the Aplogy, Socrates 
finds it necessay to distance himself, explicitly, from the sophists and their teachings. This could 
indicate that his practices also were apprehended as sophistry among people in general. I return to 
this in chapter 10: The Apologies. 
6 Cf. Liddle and Scott. 
7 The exceptions are Adeimantus and Glaucon. The first knows it, and the latter at least knows of it. 
8 Cf. the two brothers we learn to know in Euthydemus (≥407), and arguments set forth by 
Protagoras. I briefly return to these encounters in chapter 9: The Eleatic Stranger: A turning point, 
section 9.1: The prologue, pp. 300-31.  
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past one another, but I will argue that the differences and discords go much deeper. 
When two parties talk from dissimilar and incompatible topoi, the conversation can 
turn out to be violent—and a violent discourse is what develops over the next 
passages.  
3.1.1 A violent discourse (336c2-337d9) 
The incompatibility between their advocated topoi starts to be traceable through 
Thrasymachus’ next address to Socrates: “If you truly want to know what the just is, 
don’t only ask and gratify your love of honor (φιλοτιμοῦ) by refuting whatever 
someone answers—you know that it is easier to ask than to answer” (336c2-5). Here 
two things are noteworthy. First, he takes for granted that Socrates knows the eristic 
practice wherein it is easier to ask than to answer; and through the term φιλοτιμοῦ, 
which among other things, dispels “being ambitious in a bad sense,”9 he implies that 
Socrates was showing off by taking the easy part when he conversed with Cephalus 
and Polemarchus. Viewed in this light, his statement is a sort of defense for them both, 
who from his point of view, have fallen for Socrates’ trickeries. Secondly, he 
dismisses the Socratic topos; he does not believe that Socrates enters discussions due 
to his longing for learning (cf. toward Cephalus Socrates wanted to know four things; 
toward Polemarchus he wanted to be enlightened). Thus, at this point, he implies that 
there is a discrepancy between Socrates’ words and deeds. This is a serious 
accusation10 and leads to a challenge: “[…] answer yourself and say what you assert 
the just to be […] tell me clearly and precisely what you mean, for I won’t accept it if 
you say such inanities” (336c5-d5). This challenge exposes that Thrasymachus directly 
demands Socrates to clarify his topos. He puts forth a reasonable demand. It is obvious 
that the narrator is not in agreement, because he now reports how Socrates responded 
to the accusations. He was astounded when he heard him, and, looking at him, he was 
frightened (336d6-7). The narrator tells that Socrates’ first impression was that 
Thrasymachus acted like “a wild beast.” Then he adds, “I think that if I had not seen 
                                                          
9 Cf. Liddle and Scott. 
10 I will return to this in chapter 4: Prologue III: The tide is turning for Thrasymachus, p. 135, where 
Glaucon at 357b4 confronts Socrates with the same accusation. 
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him before he saw me, I would have been speechless” (336d7-8).11 Fortunately, 
Socrates laid eyes on Thrasymachus first and thus was able to answer him “with just a 
trace of tremor” (336e3). So, what did he manage to say? Before he elaborates, he 
makes an appeal to Thrasymachus, by pleading with him not to be hard on 
Polemarchus and himself. Socrates’ elaborative arguments are as follows:  
 
(1) “If we are making any mistake in the consideration of the arguments […] know 
well that we’re making an unwilling mistake” (336e4-5).  
(2) “If we were searching for gold, we would never willingly make way for one 
another in the search and ruin our chances of finding it” (336e5-8). 
 
Instead of exposing his concealed topos, Socrates first (cf. 1) alludes to the Socratic 
topos, pleading that because he and Polemarchus are not wise, they may have made 
some unwilling mistakes. This is not a convincing argument, but due to Socrates’ art 
of midwifery and his inner guiding daimon, maybe in this situation, he is obligated not 
to tell.12 Secondly, (cf. 2) he activated his concealed topos by a double allusion. First, 
he alludes to the turning of Polemarchus and, then, to his art of midwifery.  
At this point, we can remind ourselves about the distinctions concerning 
conversations which were indicated first in the Prelude and then at the beginning of the 
conversation between Socrates and Cephalus. I said then that it could be an aide-
mémoire for the particular audience if they paid attention: In the Prelude, Polemarchus 
tempted Socrates with the possibility of partaking in a “conversation” (διαλεγόμενος).” 
Then the distinction between “conversations” (τοὺς λόγους) and “stimulating the 
intellect” (ἐκίνουν) was put forth through Socrates’ encounter with Cephalus. Finally, 
there was the “conversation” (διαλεγόμενος) that Socrates and Polemarchus were 
engaged in, versus “discussion or verbal combat” which is what Thrasymachus heard 
and saw. So, are we to think that Thrasymachus has been inattentive and not grasped 
the distinctions? Alternatively, could it be that he did not understand the distinctions 
because it was something new that he had never heard of? If the latter is plausible, 
                                                          
11 Here the narrator alludes to an old proverb saying that if a wolf laid eyes on a man before the man 
laid his eyes on the wolf, the man goes mute, cf. Platon, Staten (2001, 400n19), and Lampert (2010, 
259). 
12 According to Socrates’ art of midwifery, he sometimes is prohibited from speaking, Cf. Theaetetus 
149e6-7 and, Introduction, section 3.2: The midwife at work, pp. 20-3. I will return to this silence in 
chapter 8: Saving youths, section 8.2.1: Alcibiades encountering Socrates, p. 296-97. 
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then Thrasymachus’ rage can be taken as confusion. For the readers, who are 
acquainted with Socrates’ ways of speaking throughout the other dialogues and who 
know how the Republic develops, Thrasymachus’ request makes sense. However, this 
is not the case for the characters in the Republic.  
The narrator now says that Thrasymachus listened before he “burst out laughing 
very scornfully (μάλα σαρδάνιον)” (337a3). This laughter13 I take to be a sign of 
Thrasymachus’ pain caused by a desire to understand; his laughter also signals that he 
is resigned, and this is indirectly confirmed in his next outburst, “Heracles! Here is that 
habitual irony (εἰρωνέα) of Socrates. I knew it, and I predicted to these fellows that 
you wouldn’t be willing to answer, that you would be ironic (εἰρωνεύσοιο) and do 
anything rather than answer if someone asked you something” (337a4-8). By his 
reference to Socrates’ “habitual εἰρωνέα,”14 Thrasymachus pictures Socrates as soap—
that is, when someone asks he slips away and turns the discussion in unpredictable 
directions. The only thing predictable is that this will happen. That he has experienced 
this previously, he validates by predicting exactly this outcome. Maybe Socrates 
recognizes and admits that Thrasymachus has a point, but he does not explicitly 
acknowledge it. Instead, he gives an ambiguous reply: “That’s because you are wise, 
Thrasymachus” (337a9). These words could be interpreted as an ironic outburst, as 
many commentators have done, but there is yet another possibility. Socrates could 
refer to “wise,” meaning a man who has procreated.15 This kind of wise man has 
produced textual offspring or scientific discoveries,16 a description that fits 
                                                          
13 The phrase μάλα σαρδάνιον is used in accordance with Homer’s use of it: a sinister smile that 
bodes pain to others; the context is Odysseus among the suitors (Od. XX: 301. Simonides also uses 
the phrase (Frg. 202 A Bergk.). Later, the phrase mostly denotes the forced smile that disguises the 
sufferer’s own pain. Cf. Adam, note on Rep. 337a. See also Singh (2004), cf. p. 79n23 above. 
14 On εἰρωνέα, see Lane (2006, 49-51). Lane argues that “eirōneia and its cognates should nowhere in 
Plato be translated as ‘irony’ (defining ‘irony’ as saying something with the intent that the message is 
understood as conveying the opposite or an otherwise different meaning). […] The assumption that 
Plato’s application of eirōneia to Socrates licenses or underwrites discussions of ‘Socratic irony’—an 
assumption made by most such discussion—is correspondingly unsound. […] The concept of ‘Socratic 
irony’ has no basis in Plato’s use of eirōneia with respect to Socrates. That the occurrence of eirōneia 
in Plato gives not support to the edifice of ‘Socratic irony’ is, in brief, because the (purported) 
purpose of someone called eirōn is to conceal what is not said; the (purported) purpose of someone 
called an ironist is to convey what is not said (to at least one person), though not necessarily the 
person who is addressed in ironic tones.” 
15 Cf. Theaetetus 150b ff. 
16 Cf. Theaetetus 150c8-d2. 
97 
 
Thrasymachus. If the latter is conceivable, then Socrates actually signals respect 
toward him. Nevertheless, he does not tell Thrasymachus what he wants to know. 
Hence, at this point, he mirrors Cephalus, who did not tell him what he wanted to learn 
but what he wanted Socrates to know.  
Socrates next move is to present an example, which is yet an act of concealment. 
The form it is presented in resembles the method “imaginary interlocutor,” but the 
example used has nothing to do with the theme discussed so far. Also, Thrasymachus 
is challenged to talk with himself. As this is an unusual application of the method, I 
take it to be a patronizing act. It goes like this:  
 
[…] you knew quite well that if you asked someone how much twelve is and in 
asking told him beforehand, ‘See to it you don’t tell me, you human being, that 
it is two times six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three; I 
won’t accept such nonsense from you’—it was plain to you, I suppose, that no 
one would answer a man who asks in this way. And if he asked, 
“Thrasymachus, what do you mean?” Shall I answer none of those you 
mentioned before? Even if it happens to be one of these, shall I say something 
other than the truth, you surprising man? Or what do you mean?’—what would 
you say to him in response? (337a9-c1)  
 
Socrates has now created an impression. We are to believe that when Thrasymachus 
takes on the role as questioner, he sets out by presenting some assumptions and 
implicitly forbids the answering party to state his mind (see also 337e1-3). At this 
moment, it is almost as if the universal audience can hear Thrasymachus’ pain. We can 
almost hear his resigned exhaling, and we can almost see his articulate body language 
when he states that “as if this case were similar to the other” (337c2). Socrates 
continues along the same lines, and the two start to look like two athletes trying 
verbally to wear each other down before even entering the arena.17 However, after a 
short word exchange, Thrasymachus sets forth a proposal, “What if I could show you 
another answer about justice besides all these and better than they are?” (337d1-2). 
This is the first reference to the content of the Polemarchus conversation, and it is 
difficult to decide whether he is serious when he presents this offer—through an 
implicit imitation of the Socratic topos (offering to teach Socrates). Furthermore, by 
                                                          
17 Cf. the two brothers in Euthydemus (≥407). As said above, I return to them briefly in chapter 9: The 
Eleatic Stranger: A turning point, section 9.1: The prologue, pp. 330-31. 
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alluding to the Athenian court, he—at this point—resembles its leader18 who, after the 
accused is found guilty, addresses the same question to the guilty one as 
Thrasymachus now addresses Socrates, “What punishment do you think you would 
deserve to suffer?” (337d2-3). Through these allusions, the trial theme is launched. At 
the outset, Socrates chooses the path of irony when he states that, as a man “who does 
not know,” a fitting punishment for him will be “to learn (μαθεῖν) from the man who 
knows” (337d5).19 Thrasymachus compliments Socrates for this reply but adds that in 
addition to learning he must also pay a fine in money (337d7-8). I take this to be an 
example of Thrasymachus answering irony with irony. 
3.2 First interlude: On payment (337d10-338c1) 
When Glaucon interrupts at this point, he states that regarding money Thrasymachus 
should not worry, because “we shall all contribute for Socrates” (337d11).20 Glaucon’s 
words signal that Thrasymachus now is on his own. It is him against the others. 
Thrasymachus stresses this when he replies that “I certainly believe it, so that Socrates 
can get away with his usual trick; he’ll not answer himself, and when someone else has 
answered he gets hold of the argument and refutes it” (337e1-3). Glaucon and 
Thrasymachus have now given Socrates the ammunition he needed, and confidently he 
again leans on the Socratic topos and states, “It’s more fitting for you to speak, for you 
are the one who says he knows and can tell” (337e7-338a1). He concludes by ordering 
Thrasymachus to do as he says and to “gratify me by answering and don’t begrudge 
your teaching to Glaucon here and the others” (338a3-4).  
The narrator now addresses the universal audience and reports that Glaucon and 
the others begged Thrasymachus to follow up on Socrates’ demand (cf. 338a5-6). The 
narrator continues by trying to belittle Thrasymachus when asserting that he “evidently 
desired to speak so that he could win a good reputation since he believed he had a very 
fine answer” (338a6-8). Thrasymachus insists on taking the role as the questioner and 
                                                          
18 Cf. Bloom (1991b, 400n20), and Adam note on Rep. 337d. See also the Apology 36a-e. 
19 This reply alludes to the Apology when Socrates—after having been found guilty and after Meletus 
asked for the penalty of death—proposed a counter assessment and found it suitable to be fed in the 
Prytaneum (cf. 36b-d).  
20 This also alludes to the Apology when Socrates argues that he is not able to pay the fee required. 
However, he has friends who will guarantee the payment. The friends named are Plato, Crito, 
Critobulus, and Apollodorus (cf. 38b). 
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demands that Socrates shall be the one answering. On the one hand, Thrasymachus’ 
utterances indicate that he neither accepts the Socratic topos nor that Socrates is 
atopos. On the other hand, Socrates is not willing to reveal his concealed topos. 
Therefore, this moment marks a status quo, so to be able to continue, one of them must 
give in. The narrator says that, finally, it was Thrasymachus who conceded. His 
submissive utterance is addressed to the particular audience, “Here is the wisdom of 
Socrates (Σωκράτους σοφία, 338b1-2); unwilling himself to teach, he goes around 
learning from others and does not even give thanks to them” (338b1-3). In response to 
this, Socrates stresses that it is true that he learns from others, but it is a lie that he does 
not make full payment—his payment is to praise (ἐπαινεῖν, 338b6). Socrates then 
allegedly plays the ball into Thrasymachus’ hands: “How eagerly I do so when I think 
someone speaks well, you will well know as soon as you have answered; for I suppose 
you will speak well” (338b7-c1).  
This short section (338a6-c1) is a sort of interlude within the interlude, and 
noteworthy for more than one reason. First, if taken literally, it seems like Socrates’ 
attitude toward Thrasymachus is about to change; it is Thrasymachus who introduces 
the “wisdom of Socrates,” but he does not have it quite right. It is right that Socrates 
learns from others, but it is not right that he does not pay. Socrates’ payment is 
ἐπαινεῖν, to praise in the sense to approve, applaud, or commend, but not always—just 
in the cases where he thinks someone has spoken well. This praise Thrasymachus will 
receive because, when understood literally, Socrates assumes that Thrasymachus will 
do so. Secondly, if Socrates’ statement is to be taken ironically, then at this point he 
indicates that Thrasymachus will be an easy match—hence he signals a hubristic 
attitude, which according to tradition will bring him down. Thirdly, the particular 
audience—through Glaucon—signals strong support for Socrates. If the narrator 
reports correctly, they apprehend Thrasymachus, at this point, as a scoundrel whom 
they expect Socrates will manage to take down.  
Over the next three sections, this intense discourse continues: Thrasymachus tries 
to pinpoint what Socrates is doing, and for this reason, he continues by setting forth 
three allegations: 1) Socrates does not play by the rules, 2) Socrates is a sycophant, 3) 
Socrates needs a wet nurse. Socrates presents counterreplies to each indictment, but he 
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continues to conceal his topos. It looks like he tries to refute the indictments, but when 
it comes to Socrates, not everything is what it seems to be.  
3.3 First indictment: Socrates does not play by the rules (338c2-339b8) 
The point of departure is Thrasymachus’ opinion of “the just” which he states, “is 
nothing other than the advantage of the stronger” (338c2-4). “I don’t yet understand,” 
Socrates responds, and continues in a rather polemical manner:  
 
You say the just is the advantage of the stronger. Whatever do you mean by that, 
Thrasymachus? You surely don’t assert such a thing as this: if Polydamas, the 
pancratiast, is stronger than we are and beef is advantageous for his body, then 
this food is also advantageous and just for us who are weaker than he is (338c5-
d2).  
 
Does this analogy seem relevant to the claim set forth by Thrasymachus? I do not 
think so. I am even inclined to agree with Thrasymachus’ next outburst, “You are 
disgusting (βδελυρὸς), Socrates, you take hold of the argument in the way you can 
work it the most harm (κακουργήσαις μάλιστα)” (338d3-4). The word κακουργήσαις 
usually denotes “knavish tricks and fallacies which may be employed in rhetorical and 
dialectical reasoning.”21 Hence, Thrasymachus points out that Socrates is not playing 
by the rules. Assumedly, he refers to the methodical rules set down regarding what is 
expected of the questioner and the answering part respectively, and further, he assumes 
that these rules are well-known to Socrates. However, Socrates does not admit 
breaking any rules. He does not even comment on it, nor does he acknowledge that the 
analogy is outlandish. Instead, he continues by urging Thrasymachus to say more 
clearly what he means (cf. 338d5-6)—and it seems reasonable to ask why Socrates is 
doing this. If Socrates did this unintentionally, we are bound to assume that the 
Socratic topos holds. If Socrates did this intentionally, then it is either a kind of testing 
or an arrogant way of once again trying to belittle Thrasymachus. Alternatively, it 
could be taken as a last attempt to convince Thrasymachus that the Socratic topos 
holds and make him accept that Socrates’ truthful intention is to learn from the best of 
men. At this point, I think all three alternatives are reasonable, but I am also motivated 
to view Socrates’ irrelevant analogy as bait thrown to Thrasymachus. However, 
                                                          
21 Adam, note on Rep. 338d; and the Gorgias 483a. 
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Thrasymachus does not take it. Instead he asks, “Do you mean to say you don’t know 
that some cities are ruled tyrannically, some democratically, and some aristocratically? 
And in each city, isn’t the ruling group master (ἄρχον)?" (338d7-10).22 Of course, 
Socrates knows this—he even admits that he knows, so Thrasymachus elaborates,  
 
Each ruling group sets down laws for its own advantage; a democracy sets down 
democratic laws; a tyranny, tyrannical laws; and the others do the same. And they 
declare that what they have set down—their own advantage—is just for the ruled, 
and the man who departs from it they punish as a breaker of the law and a doer of 
unjust deeds. This, best of men, is what I mean: In every city the same thing is 
just, the advantage of the established ruling body. It surely is master; so, the man 
who reasons rightly concludes that everywhere justice is the same thing, the 
advantage of the stronger (338e1-339a4). 
 
By directly addressing the particular audience, Thrasymachus launches his view23 
which holds that both law (νόμος) and justice (δίκαιον) are identified as being the 
advantage of the stronger—that is, advantageous for the ruling group. When it comes 
to law and justice, it does not matter whether the regime is a democracy or a tyranny. 
Socrates understands this, he even claims that Thrasymachus forbade him earlier to 
say the same thing—that the just is the advantageous—but he is quick to stress that 
Thrasymachus now added, “for the stronger” (339a5-b2). This utterance makes me 
wonder if Thrasymachus’ next reply—“A small addition, perhaps” (339b3)—is to be 
taken as yet another ironical comment. He knows that Socrates’ remark is not to the 
point, and he also knows that the reason why he and Socrates have different views on 
justice is not due to this “small addition.” However, Thrasymachus does not know that 
these differences are to be identified on a much deeper level, but Socrates knows as 
well as the readers.24 Socrates confirms this when he comments on the “small 
addition.” “It isn’t plain yet whether it’s a big one” (339b4), he says—in accordance 
                                                          
22 This question anticipates the discussion coming up during Book VIII. 
23 This view is also discussed in the Laws where the Athenian elaborates, “Do you understand, now, 
that some assert there are as many forms of laws as there are regimes, and that the forms of regimes 
spoken of by the many are those we have just enumerated? And do not suppose that this present 
disagreement is about something paltry; it concerns something very great. For once again we are 
involved in the dispute over the aim of the just and the unjust. They are claiming that laws ought not 
to look to war or to virtue as a whole, but ought to look to what is in the interest of the regime, to 
whatever will allow that regime to rule forever and avoid dissolution. They claim that the finest way 
to formulate the definition of justice that is according is this—that it is the interest of the stronger” 
(Laws, 714b-c). 
24 Cf. my argument that they are employing different and incompatible topoi.  
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with the Athenian Stranger who in the Laws calls the same thing not being “about 
something paltry; it concerns something very great.”25 Socrates modifies his claim and 
states that “while I too agree that the just is something of advantage, you add to it and 
assert that it’s the advantage of the stronger, and I don’t know whether it’s so” (339b5-
7). This discussion concerning the “addition” added to Thrasymachus’ definition also 
resembles the analogous discussion in which Polemarchus made an addition to his 
initial definition (cf. 334e10-335a2); it was at that point Socrates started to turn the 
tables until Polemarchus’ mind was changed. I think the same thing goes on here, but 
Thrasymachus is a different kind of opponent. So, by making Thrasymachus’ 
definition the point of departure, Socrates intends to reflect upon (σκεπτέον, 339b7) 
whether Thrasymachus’ proposal is true or not. However, true in relation to what? 
3.3.1 Socrates’ first counterreply (339b9-339e8) 
Is it true that the just is the same as the advantage of the stronger? When Socrates 
starts to consider this, he changes the perspective and begins his investigation from the 
view of the ruled, “Don’t you say though that it’s also just to obey the rulers?” (339b9-
10). As Thrasymachus agrees, Socrates continues by looking into what the rulers do. 
They sometimes make mistakes; when setting down laws some are correct and thus 
advantageous for them, and some are incorrect and thus disadvantageous. Then, 
according to Thrasymachus’ argument, Socrates claims, “It’s just to do not only what 
is advantageous for the stronger but also the opposite, what is disadvantageous” 
(339d1-3). So far, Socrates has not answered the initial question. Instead, he has turned 
the attention toward the consequences of the ruler’s words and deeds. He has pointed 
out the discrepancy that due to the words—the laws—the consequences of their 
deeds—enacting the laws—might not be what they intended. In other words, one can 
assume that the rulers have their advantage in mind—but they sometimes err and enact 
laws that turn out to be a disadvantage to them. Therefore, as it is just for the ruled to 
obey all their laws, the just will consist in doing what is not advantageous for them. 
This inference is embedded in the concealed topos. So, by this reasoning, Socrates has 
confused Thrasymachus. Hence his reply is, “What do you mean?” (339d4). This 
                                                          
25 Cf. p. 101n23 above. 
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question translates the phrase “τί λέγεις σύ” which is a favorite eristic formula;26 thus 
he has now confirmed that he follows the rules of verbal combat—while Socrates does 
not. Maybe Socrates conceived this, because he now states that he and Thrasymachus 
must “consider (σκοπῶμεν) it better” (339d5). Nonetheless, he maintains that what he 
has argued is what Thrasymachus meant. Is this what Thrasymachus meant? Is this a 
reasonable interpretation of Thrasymachus’ arguments? I do not think so, and my 
suspicion is strengthened when Socrates goes on, “Wasn’t it agreed that the rulers, 
when they command the ruled to do something, sometimes completely mistake what is 
best for themselves, while it is just for the ruled to do whatever the rulers command? 
Weren’t these things agreed upon?” (339d5-9). Thrasymachus confirms his 
contemporary confusion when he answers, “I suppose so” (339d10). Socrates takes 
advantage of his confused state of mind and urges him, “Also suppose that you’re 
agreed that it is just to do what is disadvantageous for those who are the rulers and the 
stronger, when the rulers unwillingly command what is bad for themselves” (339e1-3) 
and further that Thrasymachus asserted that “it is just to do what they have 
commanded. In this case, most wise Thrasymachus, doesn’t it necessarily follow that it 
is just for the others to do the opposite of what you say for the weaker are commanded 
to do what doubtless is disadvantageous for the stronger?” (339e5-8). On this, Socrates 
is wrong; this is not what Thrasymachus asserted. However, we are not to know what 
Thrasymachus’ immediate response to this would have been because at this point 
Socrates’ ally Polemarchus and Thrasymachus’ friend Cleitophon interrupt.  
3.4 Second interlude: Who said what? (340a1-c2) 
This short interlude is of interest because it underlines a universal phenomenon nearly 
always present in discussions: Even if the audiences hear the same words, they do not 
hear the same message and start to discuss what actually has been said. At this point 
Polemarchus, the ally in the battle (cf. 335e12), is awakened, and he lends his support 
to Socrates, “Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, most clearly” (340 a1), whereupon Cleitophon 
                                                          
26 Cf. Adam, note on Rep. 339b. See also Aristophanes’ Clouds, 1174. The contrast between eristic 
(Thrasymachus’ “method”) and dialectic (Socrates’ “method”) will be made explicit later—at 454a8. 
Bloom (1991b, 458n14), points out that “eristic” means “contentiousness,” and entails that an 
argument is set forth for the sake of winning. Formally, this looks like “dialectic,” which is a friendly 




argues, “What need is there of a witness? Thrasymachus himself agreed that the rulers 
sometimes command what is bad for themselves and that it is just for the others to do 
these things” (340a3-7). Did Thrasymachus agree on this? Was not this Socrates’ 
inference after he required that Thrasymachus “also suppose” at 339e12? Or did 
Thrasymachus agree, but on different grounds, as Cleitophon tries to elaborate, “That’s 
because Thrasymachus set down that to do what the rulers bid is just” (340a5-7). 
Polemarchus does not consider this argument, but as Socrates’ ally, he is eager to show 
that Socrates is right. In addition to Cleitophon’s underlining, Polemarchus adds that it 
was also because Thrasymachus … 
 
… set down that the advantage of the stronger is just. Once he had set both of 
these principles down, he further agreed that sometimes the stronger order those 
who are weaker and are ruled to do what is to the disadvantage of the stronger; 
on the basis of these agreements, the advantage of the stronger would be no 
more just than the disadvantage (340a8-b5).  
 
Cleitophon disagrees and tries once more to defend his friend, “But he said that the 
advantage of the stronger is what the stronger believes to be his advantage. This is 
what must be done by the weaker, and this is what he sat down as the just” (340b6-8). 
Whether Polemarchus is annoyed or not is not easy to decide, but he concludes, 
“That’s not what was said” (340b9). The word exchange between Polemarchus and 
Cleitophon signals confusion and disagreement within the particular audience, but 
Socrates does not seem to be interested in solving it. He does not comment on it at all. 
Instead, he addresses Polemarchus with an ambiguous kind of comfort, “It doesn’t 
make any difference, Polemarchus; if Thrasymachus says it that way now, let’s accept 
it from him” (340c1-2). Implicitly, this ambiguity also contains a reassurance from 
Socrates: Regardless what Thrasymachus states now, let us accept it—he will 
eventually change his mind.  
3.5 Second indictment: Socrates, the sycophant (340c3-341c4) 
When they start again, Socrates picks up Cleitophon’s suggestion that “the advantage 
of the stronger is what the stronger believes to be his advantage.” By this deed, it looks 
like Socrates implicitly acknowledges Cleitophon’s suggestion. Hence, he gives 
Thrasymachus indirect support. In this manner, he also elegantly settles the score 
between Polemarchus and Cleitophon without explicit uttering his opinion regarding 
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the disagreement that made them interrupt. The impact on the reader is irritation. Why 
does not Socrates state his opinion? Why does he choose to go on without addressing 
the particular audience? His next move could indicate that he at least tries to calm 
down the situation. He asks, “Now tell me, Thrasymachus, was this what you wanted 
to say the just is, what seems to the stronger to be the advantage of the stronger, 
whether it is advantageous or not? Shall we assert that this is the way you mean it?” 
(340c3-6). On its surface, this question has a diplomatic ring to it. However, 
Thrasymachus, who now has had a short break and the opportunity to think, is 
determined when he answers and points out that Socrates is wrong, “Not in the least” 
he says, “do you suppose that I call a man who makes mistakes ‘stronger’ at the 
moment when he is making mistakes?” (340c7-8). Socrates admits that he supposed 
this to be what Thrasymachus meant, whereupon Thrasymachus replies, “That’s 
because you’re a sycophant27 in arguments, Socrates” (340d3). He further explains that 
no ruler makes mistakes when he rules. Thus he cannot err. He supports this by an 
argument from the analogy of medical practitioners, calculators, and grammarians. He 
argues that his earlier concession was just a popular way of expressing the fact that 
rulers seem to err. Then he concludes,  
 
[…] what follows is the most precise way: the ruler, insofar as he is a ruler, does 
not make mistakes; and not making mistakes, he sets down what is best for 
himself. And this must be done by the man who is ruled. So, I say the just is 
exactly what I have been saying from the beginning, to do the advantage of the 
stronger (340d8-341a5).  
 
Socrates does not comment upon Thrasymachus’ clarifying explanation at all. Instead, 
he turns to the claim that he acts as a sycophant in arguments, “All right […] so, in 
your opinion, I play the sycophant? […] Do you suppose I ask as I asked because I am 
                                                          
27 “[…] The sycophants were men who made accusations against Athenian citizens, acting, as it were, 
as public prosecutors. They were blackmailers; any charge they might make could cause difficulty 
and, at the least, would be expensive. They distorted the meaning of men’s acts and statements, and 
Socrates, accused of making the worse argument appear the better, could be compared to them, he 
was trying to cause trouble and make his interlocutors bad before the public. The sycophants were 
flatterers of the tyrant public opinion, since their charges usually had to do with alleged crimes 




plotting to do harm28 to you in the argument?” (341a6-10). Thrasymachus stresses that 
he does not suppose anything; he knows this to be the case (341a11-b2). Could 
Socrates be playing the role of the sycophant? The claim seems to have struck a nerve 
in him since, for a moment, he forgets the argument and turns his attention solemnly to 
the sycophant accusation. Has Socrates been distorting the meaning of Thrasymachus’ 
acts and statements, and—both in arguments and through the voice of the narrator—
tried to make Thrasymachus look bad before the universal audience? At this point, I 
am once more inclined to agree with Thrasymachus, not that Socrates is a sycophant, 
but he appears so due to his concealment. Thrasymachus continues, “It won’t profit 
you. You won’t get away with doing harm unnoticed, and failing to get away 
unnoticed, you won’t be able to overpower me in the argument” (341a11-b2). Socrates 
gives some credit to Thrasymachus on this point, saying, “nor would I even try, you 
blessed man (ὦ μακάριε, 341b3).” Socrates wants only to make sure “that the same 
sort of thing doesn’t happen to us again” (341b3-4). Hence, he wants Thrasymachus to 
make it clear whether he meant by the ruler and the stronger, the man who is such only 
in common parlance, or the man who is such in precise speech; whose advantage 
Thrasymachus claimed would be just for the weaker to serve because he is stronger 
(cf. 341b4-7). Thrasymachus now sees it fit to define “the ruler in the most precise 
sense” (341b8). Maybe it is due to Socrates’ somewhat vague way of giving credit to 
Thrasymachus regarding the sycophant claim that he now invites Socrates to “do harm 
to that and play the sycophant, if you can—I ask for no favors—but you won’t be able 
to” (341b8-c1). Socrates clearly wants to go on and asks if “you suppose me to be so 
mad as to try to shave a lion and play the sycophant with Thrasymachus?” (341c2-3). 
However, Thrasymachus does not suppose Socrates to be mad—just possessed with 
nonsense (cf. 336b8-c1). Thus, he concludes and claims that Socrates tried to play the 
sycophant and that he “was a nonentity at that too” (341c4). 
3.5.1 Socrates’ second counterreply (341c5-342e12) 
Socrates puts the sycophant-claim to an end by stating, “Enough of this” (341c5). By 
taking Thrasymachus’ definition of the ruler as his point of departure, he very 
                                                          
28 The phrase “to do harm” translates κακουργοῦντά; a legal term which implies any sort of crime 
regarding malicious damage and fraud, cf. Bloom (1991b, 445n35). 
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carefully works his way toward an agreement by arguments from analogy: the doctor 
and the pilot (cf. 341c5-d5). The advantageous thing for both is their arts, respectively, 
and their arts aim to be as perfect as possible (341d12-13). Thrasymachus questions 
the last point, and again he asks, “What do you mean?” Socrates responds by using 
what seems to be the procedure of “creating an imagery interlocutor”—seems to 
because he now goes into a dialogue with himself:  
 
[…] if you should ask me whether it’s enough for a body to be a body or 
whether it needs something else, I would say: “By all means, it needs something 
else. And the art of medicine has now been discovered because a body is 
defective (πονηρὸν), and it won’t do for it to be like that. The art was devised for 
the purpose of providing what is advantageous for a body,” would I seem to you 
to speak correctly in saying that or not? (341e2-8).  
 
Thrasymachus concludes that Socrates speaks correctly. Socrates further wants to 
know whether medicine or any other art, when it is defective, will need some 
supplementary virtue (ἀρετῆς, 342a3). Does an art need another art to consider what is 
advantageous for its defect, and is the art that considers this in need of another of the 
same kind, and so on endlessly? Socrates demands Thrasymachus to consider this in 
the precise sense and tell if he thinks it is so or otherwise. Thrasymachus’ answer is, 
“That’s the way it looks.” I take it that he agrees that there is no error present in any art 
and that an art is correct if it is what it is precisely and wholly. From this, it follows 
that he declines the art-of-art-of-art-suggestion. Socrates now states that medicine 
considers the advantage of the body, not of medicine (342c1-2). The same goes for 
horsemanship, which considers the advantage of the horses, not of the art itself 
(342c4). He concludes that no art considers its own advantage, only the advantage of 
that of which it is the art (342c5-6). Hence, Socrates has turned the tables and 
concludes, “[…] the arts (τέχναι) rule and are masters of that of which they are arts” 
(342c8-9).  
The narrator informs the reader that Thrasymachus at this point conceded but 
with a great deal of resistance (cf. 342c10). After this information, Socrates continues, 
“Then, there is no kind of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) that considers or commands the 
advantage of the stronger, but rather of what is weaker and ruled by it” (342c11-d2). 
Again, the narrator reports that although Thrasymachus agreed to this, he tried to put 
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up a fight about it (342d3-4). This reluctant agreement gives way to Socrates’ 
conclusion, “Then, isn’t it the case that the doctor, insofar as he is a doctor, considers 
or commands not the doctor’s advantage, but that of the sick man? For the doctor in 
the precise sense was agreed to be a ruler of bodies and not a moneymaker. Wasn’t it 
so agreed?” (342d4-8). When he then transfers this logic to the ruler, it seems to be the 
last argument needed before he has refuted Thrasymachus:  
 
Therefore, Thrasymachus, there isn’t ever anyone who holds any position of rule, 
insofar as he is ruler, who considers or commands his own advantage rather than 
that of what is ruled and of which he himself is the craftsman, and it is looking to 
this and what is advantageous and fitting for it that he says everything he says and 
does everything he does (342e7-12).  
 
What happened here? Did Socrates win this combat? In the best-case scenario, it is a 
step toward victory, but it is not a refutation, and I do not believe the narrator who 
informs us that it was evident to everyone that Thrasymachus went down (342e12). 
Even if this is evident to the particular audience, it is not evident to the universal 
audience. The thing Socrates managed was to turn the argument about the just in the 
opposite direction. From Socrates’ final remark we recognize that, so far, 
Thrasymachus has been setting forth his argument on the grounds of experience and 
real life (or on the grounds of people in general) whereas Socrates gradually regarded 
them from what seems to be an idealistic point of view—what should be. By this 
recognition is the first seed of suspicion planted. Thrasymachus has already from his 
first outburst continued to argue that Socrates is concealing what he thinks, his topos, 
and from now on, I am beginning to side more and more with Thrasymachus. 
3.6 Third indictment: Is Socrates in need of a wet nurse? (343a1-347a6) 
By now, Socrates appears to be sure that he has convinced the particular audience, but 
Thrasymachus quickly breaks down his contentment by asking: “Tell me, Socrates, do 
you have a wet nurse?” (343a3-4). Socrates seems surprised by this new outburst, 
“Why this? Shouldn’t you answer instead of asking such things?” Thrasymachus 
deepens, “Because you know she neglects your sniveling nose and doesn’t give it the 
wiping you need” (343a7-9). Suggesting that Socrates has a “sniveling nose,” he 
indicates that Socrates is sniffling and to “sniffle” is a common metaphor for 
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ignorance or stupidity. Thus, Thrasymachus implicitly suggests that Socrates needs 
help, and for the third time, he refers to the nonsense that possesses Socrates. Due to 
his sniveling nose and the wet nurse who ignores him, Socrates is not to blame for 
being unable to recognize the difference between sheep or shepherd (cf. 343b1), 
Thrasymachus states. 
Socrates does not understand, so Thrasymachus goes into detail. He claims that 
Socrates is wrong on two matters, and his wrongdoings are due to what he supposes, 
and his suppositions, in turn, make him unaware of what justice and the just really are. 
Socrates now faces the same accusation from Thrasymachus that Socrates himself 
hinted toward in his conversation with Cephalus. Contrary to Socrates, though, 
Thrasymachus is not able to reveal exactly what he perceives as Socrates’ false 
assumptions; he can only point out that there is something wrong. It is from this outset 
Thrasymachus now confronts Socrates. He chooses to present his arguments in the 
form of a speech, and not by answering Socrates’ questions. This is a move in 
accordance with the sophistic way of teaching.29 Hence, it is Thrasymachus, the 
inculcating teacher, who now stands forth. The arguments he presents are in 
accordance with “the many,” which will be confirmed by Glaucon later. 
First, Thrasymachus claims that Socrates is wrong because he supposes that 
shepherds or cowherds consider the good of their herds. The truth is that the only 
things that occupies them are their own and their masters’ good. According to 
Thrasymachus, Socrates assumes that the same goes for the rulers in the cities. He 
assumes that those who truly rule (ἀληθῶς ἄρχουσιν, 343b5) think about the ruled 
differently from the way a man would with regard to sheep. Also, Socrates is far off 
about the just and justice, and the unjust and injustice. He is unaware that justice and 
the just are really the advantage of the man who is stronger and rules, and a personal 
harm to the man who obeys and serves. Injustice is the opposite, and it rules the truly 
                                                          
29 This claim I support by turning to the Protagoras. There Socrates and Protagoras more than once 
have a debate on whether to speak in brief through the style of questions and answers, or to speak in 
length. The latter signals an inculcating teacher—which is the mark of Protagoras. He states the 
following when Socrates urges him to partake in the former style of speaking: “Socrates, I’ve gotten 
into competitions in speeches with a lot of human beings by now, and if I had done what you’re 
telling me to, that I should hold the conversation in the way the rival speaker told me to hold it, I 
would not have made a better appearance than anyone, and the name of Protagoras would not have 
come into prominence among the Greeks” (335a3-8). 
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simple (ἀληθῶς εὐηθικῶν, 343c6) and just. Those who are ruled do what is 
advantageous for him who is stronger, and they make the man they serve happy, but 
not themselves at all. This must be considered, most simple Socrates (ὦ εὐηθέστατε 
Ζώκρατες, 343d1-2), he says. He has now demonstrated that he does not accept the 
way Socrates turned the argument, that is, he does not accept that Socrates allowed 
justice to be advantageous. In this way, he confirms that he has not changed his mind 
regarding his initial statement. Further, by claiming that injustice rules “the truly 
simple,” and by addressing Socrates as “most simple,” he implicitly states that 
Socrates does not understand the reality of the world he is a part of. So, according to 
Thrasymachus, what Socrates really ought to consider is that the just man always and 
everywhere has less than the unjust man. For this claim, he gives four examples30 and 
then argues that the unjust man’s situation is the opposite in all these respects. In this 
regard, he speaks of the man who is always able to get more (πλεονεκτεῖν, 344a1)31 in 
a big way. According to Thrasymachus, it is the unjust man we need to consider if we 
want to investigate private advantages. This will be learned most easily if we turn to 
the perfect injustice, which is tyranny (344a6).32 Thrasymachus describes the criminal 
deeds of the perfectly unjust man, who, instead of being accused of crimes gets to be 
called happy and blessed.33 Why is it so? Those who blame injustice do so, not 
because they fear doing unjust deeds, but because they fear suffering them.34 Socrates 
                                                          
30 (1) In contracts, when the just man is a partner of the unjust man, you will always find that at the 
dissolution of the partnership the just man does not have more than the unjust man, but less. (2) In 
matters pertaining to the city, when there are taxes, the just man pays more on the basis of equal 
property, the unjust man less; and when there are distributions, the one makes no profit, the other 
much. (3) When each holds some ruling office, even if the just man suffers no other penalty, it is his 
lot to see his domestic affairs deteriorate from neglect, while he gets no advantage from the public 
store, thanks to his being just. (4)The just man incurs the ill will of his relatives and his acquaintances 
when he is unwilling to serve them against what is just.  
31 Socrates will later argue that πλεονεκτεῖν is a cause to war; I return to this in chapter 5: Founding 
cities making (ποιοῦομεν) guardians, section 5.2: G1: Socrates, Glaucon, and the feverish city, p. 162 
ff. The term πλεονεκτέω means to have or claim more than one's due, to get or have too much, to be 
greedy, grasping, arrogant, and also to gain or have some advantage, without any bad sense, cf. 
Liddle and Scott. See also Bloom (1991b, 445n37).  
32 This claim will be confirmed by Socrates in Book VIII. 
33 This view will later be stated by Glaucon as a part of his challenge to Socrates. Cf. chapter 4: The 
prologue III: The tide is turning for Thrasymachus, section 4.1: Glaucon and Socrates, p. 136 ff. 
34 This line of argumentation will be reconstructed by Glaucon later, and he agrees with 




has not taken this into his equation; hence, Thrasymachus’ upcoming conclusion is 
bound to trigger Socrates: “So, Socrates, injustice, when it comes into being on a 
sufficient scale, is mightier, freer, and more masterful than justice, and, as I have said 
from the beginning, the just is the advantage of the stronger, and the unjust is what is 
profitable and advantageous for oneself” (344c4-9).35 
Socrates does not respond to Thrasymachus’ speech, but the narrator informs us 
that when Thrasymachus had finished, he had in mind to leave36 just like a bathman37 
after having “poured a great shower of speech into our ears all at once” (344d2-3). 
What is the narrator doing by comparing Thrasymachus with a vulgar bathman? Is it 
Thrasymachus’ intention to leave that is vulgar, or is it a reference to Thrasymachus’ 
speech? Or is he just being sarcastic as a pay-back for the wet-nurse suggestion? When 
the narrator states that Thrasymachus has “poured a great shower of speech into our 
ears all at once,” he thereby addresses the universal audience with an appeal which 
takes the form of a complaint on behalf of the particular audience. This is the only 
example of such addressing. However, the narrator’s comments on Thrasymachus 
have all along been leading and loaded. Hence, I think the narrator has been trying to 
force the universal audience to capture Thrasymachus as a dynamic and dangerous 
man.38 The bathman analogy was the last straw. It is noteworthy that at this point the 
narrator’s harsh tone will soon vanish. Another point worth noticing is that henceforth 
how Thrasymachus and Socrates address each other is changed.  
Nobody wants Thrasymachus to leave, and when Socrates now pleads for 
clarification, he is referring to us. Thus, he makes the impression that the particular 
audience is homogenous. This is the second time he makes a hint that it is them against 
Thrasymachus. This is the outset when Socrates demands a new session of questions 
and answers. Socrates’ next statement has deeper implications, “[…] do you suppose 
you are trying to determine a small matter and not a course of life by which each of us 
                                                          
35 Glaucon will elaborate on this argument when he presents his challenge to Socrates, cf. 358e5-
361d7. 
36 Threatening to leave is a ritual that signposts “I do not have more to say.” Cf. the Protagoras, 335c, 
when Socrates threatens to leave and “everyone” begs him to stay. 
37 On the term “bathman,” see Bloom (1991b, 445n39). 
38 Annas (1981, 35) argues that Plato “detested” Thrasymachus and “intends us to dislike and despise 
him,” quoted in Beversluis (2000, 222). 
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would have the most profitable existence?” (344d8-e2). Socrates does not accept that a 
determination of what justice and injustice are can be done on the grounds of the 
experience of people (and Thrasymachus). He implies that justice is the foundation of 
happiness for all humans—and this foreshadows the core question which the main part 
of the Republic evolves around. 
Thrasymachus’ response signals surprise, “What?” he asks. “Do I suppose it is 
otherwise?” (344e3) Now, if Thrasymachus was insulting Socrates by calling him 
ignorant and simple earlier, Socrates now pays back by stating that Thrasymachus 
seemed to suppose it was otherwise (344e4). If this is not the case, Socrates maintains 
with an appeal to the particular audience, then Thrasymachus has “no care for us and 
isn’t a bit concerned whether we shall live worse or better as a result of our ignorance 
of what you say you know” (344e4-6). By this, Socrates accuses Thrasymachus of not 
caring about how their lives will turn out, and further, that Thrasymachus is concealing 
his knowledge and intends to leave them in ignorance. This is an example of the 
mirroring-the-opponent strategy. Up to this point, it is Thrasymachus who has accused 
Socrates of not stating his opinions—that is, concealing the topos wherein he warrants 
his arguments. We have gradually become inclined to agree with that claim and be 
somehow sympathetic to Thrasymachus’ frustration. Socrates now continues by 
challenging Thrasymachus in the same way as he will be challenged by Glaucon and 
Adeimantus later.  
Socrates presents his challenge in a rather interesting manner, which also turns 
out to be a challenge to the universal audience. First, we notice that he addresses 
Thrasymachus twice as “my good man (ὠγαθέ).” “But, my good man (ὠγαθέ, 344e6), 
make an effort to show it to us—it wouldn’t be a bad investment for you to do a good 
deed for so many as we are” (344e6-345a2). This is an appeal for Thrasymachus to 
make his knowledge known to the men gathered. Further, Socrates states that he is 
compelled to tell him that he is not persuaded, nor does he think that injustice is more 
profitable than justice, not even if one gives it free rein and does not hinder it from 
doing what it wants. Then comes the second addressing, “But, my good man (ὠγαθέ, 
345a5), let there be an unjust man, and let him be able to do injustice, either by stealth 
or by fighting out in the open.” Socrates’ plea for an example Glaucon meets later 
113 
 
when he presents the myth of Gyges’ ring. Regarding Thrasymachus, Socrates 
concludes before the example is even presented. “Nevertheless,” he says, if such a man 
is to be found “he does not persuade me that this is more profitable than justice” 
(345a7). The two occurrences of ὠγαθέ we find here and the two incidences where 
Thrasymachus is addressed as “my good man” is Socrates’ way of belittling him. First, 
he asks for the view Thrasymachus already has presented, a view that has been 
consistent. This gives the impression that Socrates has not listened at all, an 
impression that is not right. Alternatively, it gives the impression that Thrasymachus’ 
view is not worth discussing because it is wrong. Secondly, he traps Thrasymachus by 
asking for an example and then concludes without giving him an opportunity to 
elaborate. In his final appeal, Socrates is a little bit more moderate when he says that 
“perhaps, someone else among us—and not only I—also has this sentiment” (345b2). 
When he repeats his challenge, he also changes the way he addresses Thrasymachus, 
“So, persuade us adequately, you blessed man (ὦ μακάριε, 345b2), so that we don’t 
deliberate correctly in having a higher regard for justice than injustice” (345b2-3). The 
phrase ὦ μακάριε occurs ten times in the Republic,39 and they are all related to 
Thrasymachus, one way or another. The four first occurrences are addressed directly to 
Thrasymachus, but later when Socrates addresses Glaucon and Adeimantus the same 
way, the themes discussed relates to Thrasymachus’ views. This way the phrase 
functions as a pointer or marker for the universal audience with regard to how vital it 
is for Socrates to persuade Thrasymachus when it comes to justice and education.  
Having received this challenge, Thrasymachus’ pain and despair shine through 
his response, “And how shall I persuade you? If you’re not persuaded by what I’ve just 
now said, what more shall I do for you? Shall I take the argument and give your soul a 
forced feeding (ἐνθῶ)” (345b4-6)? The reaction from Socrates on this proposition is: 
“By Zeus, don’t you do it.” The expression ἐνθῶ refers to a child being force-fed, and 
this theme is easily read as a metaphor for the inculcating teacher. As we shall learn 
later, these teachers and their ways of teachings destroy and break down the immanent 
                                                          
39 341b3; 345b2; 346a3; 354a8—These four occurrences are addressed to Thrasymachus; at 499a4 




knowledge already in the soul.40 So, no wonder Socrates shudders at the prospect of 
having Thrasymachus as his (intellectual) nurse. Moreover, maybe this explains why 
Socrates continues to insist that he will be the questioner, and thus prevent 
Thrasymachus from presenting long speeches that he at this point considers dangerous 
for the souls of the men present.  
3.6.1 Socrates’ third counterreply (345a7-347a6) 
As mentioned above, Socrates now changes his approach. The alteration is detectable 
both in the structure of his arguments and in his attitude toward Thrasymachus. He 
now urges Thrasymachus to stick to what he has said so far, and if he at any point has 
changed what he initially set down—he must be clear about it and not deceive the 
particular audience. Socrates’ new rhetorical strategy is to present arguments of some 
length, containing assumptions from what he infers to be Thrasymachus’ thoughts. In 
other words, Socrates creates a straw man. How does he do this? First, he underlines 
what seems to be a discrepancy in one of Thrasymachus’ earlier arguments. He points 
out that Thrasymachus first defined the true doctor (ἀληθῶς ἰατρὸν), but later thought 
it not necessary to keep a precise guard over the true shepherd (ἀληθῶς ποιμένα). 
From this, he infers that Thrasymachus thinks that the true shepherd has sale of the 
sheep—not what is best for the sheep—in mind (cf. 345c5-7). He concludes that this 
makes the shepherd look like a moneymaker (χρηματιστήν) and not a shepherd 
(ποιμένα). Socrates thereby refutes the whole argument and concludes that “the 
shepherd’s art (ποιμενικῆ) cares for nothing but providing the best for what it has been 
set over” (345d2-3). However, Socrates has not refuted Thrasymachus’ argument, but 
instead the assumption he inferred from it. Due to this, Socrates indicates his new turn: 
“It was thus that I came to think just now that it is necessary for us to agree […]” 
(345d5-6). After having emphasized that he now speaks his own mind, Socrates 
proceeds by turning the attention toward the rules belonging to the various arts. He 
argues that it is necessary for them to agree “that every kind of rule, insofar as it is 
rule, considers what is best for nothing other than for what is ruled and cared for, both 
in political (πολιτικῇ) and private (ἰδιωτικῇ) rule” (345d6-e1). He then poses an 
                                                          
40 Cf. 518b8-c2. See also Introduction, section 3: Displaying the path toward philosophy—two 
Socratic practices, pp. 18-26. 
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imperative question: “Do you think that the rulers in the cities, those who truly rule, 
rule willingly?” (345e2-3). Through this question, Socrates starts to create a 
foundation grounded on perspectives which must be new for both Thrasymachus and 
the particular audience. Thrasymachus is convinced, due to his experience that the 
rulers in the cities rule willingly. However, in his reply, it seems that he does not 
notice Socrates’ precise phrase, “those who truly rules (τοὺς ἀληθῶς ἄρχοντας, 
345e3).” The choice of words anticipates the “true rules”—the philosopher kings—
which we are going to learn about much later. Thus, this is the first explicit example of 
how Socrates employs his concealed topos and thereby begins to hint at the process of 
exposing the topos of philosophy. Socrates continues: “Don’t you notice that no one 
wishes to rule voluntarily, but they demand wages as though the benefit from ruling 
were not for them but for those who are ruled?” (345e5-7). The only way for his 
audiences to understand where he wants to go is to let Socrates continue and define 
“wage” and “benefit,” and in due course, he does so.  
Socrates’ next move is to perform an elenchus, and now the narrator becomes 
very active. He comments on each of Thrasymachus’ answers. We learn that the 
agreement was reached after some resistance from Thrasymachus—but not what the 
resistance consisted of. Socrates presents a summary in which he states that the 
benefit, understood as getting wages, “is for each not a result of his own art” (346d1). 
More precisely, this means that the medical art produces health; the housebuilder’s art 
produces a house whereas the wage-earner’s art produces wages. The common feature 
of all arts is that “each accomplishes its own work and benefits that which it has been 
set over” (346d5-6). We now have a definition of wage and benefit, and we can 
understand Socrates when he asks, “If pay were not attached to it, would the craftsman 
derive benefit from the art?” (346d7-8). “It doesn’t look like it,” is the answer. The 
final agreement in this section is that when the craftsman works for nothing, he 
produces no benefit for himself. Thus, Socrates states that by now it is plain that no art 
or kind of rule provides for its own benefit. Is it plain? I do not think so. Through the 
elenchus, Socrates concentrated on the relation between arts and wages/benefits, and 
he did not explicitly discuss various “kind of rule.” So, what is he doing here? It looks 
like he makes an implicit inference and then states that what goes for the arts also goes 
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for any kind of rule. Is this true? This question is not going to be answered because 
Socrates goes on, 
  
but, as we have been saying all along, it provides for and commands the one who 
is ruled, considering his advantage—that of the weaker—and not that of the 
stronger. It is for just this reason, my dear Thrasymachus, that I said a moment 
ago that no one willingly chooses to rule and get mixed up in straightening out 
other people's troubles; but he asks for wages, because the man who is to do 
anything fine by art never does what is best for himself nor does he command it, 
insofar as he is commanding by art, but rather what is best for the man who is 
ruled. It is for just this reason, as it seems, that there must be wages for those who 
are going to be willing to rule—either money, or honor, or a penalty if he should 
not rule (346e4-347a6). 
 
At this point, I find it difficult to understand what Socrates means by penalty. Then I 
find it comforting that my lack of understanding not only goes for me, I find myself in 
company with both Glaucon and a learned scholar.41 
3.7 Third interlude (347a7-348b7) 
Glaucon interrupts and demands that Socrates elaborate because he does not 
understand that a penalty is a kind of wage (347a7-9). According to Socrates, Glaucon 
does not understand because he has not grasped the meaning of “the wages of the best 
men (τῶν βελίστων, 347a10) on account of which the most decent men (οἱ 
ἐπιεικέστατοι, 347b1) rule, when they are willing to rule.” By his elaboration, Socrates 
is again foreshadowing the philosopher-kings, and their attitude toward ruling, but 
how is Thrasymachus supposed to acknowledge this?42 That Glaucon has some 
knowledge of Socrates’ concealed topos, the readers start to suspect when he answers 
in the affirmative to Socrates’ next question: “don’t you know that love of honor 
(φιλότιμόν) and love of money (φιλάργυρον) are said to be, and are, reproaches 
(ὄνειδος, 347b2)?” That φιλότιμόν and φιλάργυρον are reproaches is a theme 
developed later in the Republic. However, that Glaucon at this point simply accepts 
that love for honor and money are disgraces is unexpected. This makes me more aware 
of him. This acceptance contradicts the common attitudes that existed in the strongly 
                                                          
41 Beversluis (2000, 236) states: “I am glad he [i.e., Glaucon] asked because I did not understand what 
penalty Socrates was talking about either.” 




competitive society of Athens. Thus, this little intermezzo can be understood as an 
implicit criticism of the values established by “the many,” and it looks like also 
Glaucon knows more than he is admitting. Perhaps Socrates reminds Glaucon of 
something he has forgotten; maybe Socrates simply appeals to Glaucon’s memory, so 
that he can recollect some earlier teachings.43 Socrates now maintains that it is “For 
this reason the good (οἱ ἀγαθοὶ) aren’t willing to rule for the sake of money or honor” 
(347b5-6). So far, the men best fitted to rule are denoted as τῶν βελίστων and οἱ 
ἐπιεικέστατοι, and when the οἱ ἀγαθοὶ are ruling, they face a dilemma. If they openly 
demand wages for ruling, they fear being called hirelings. If they secretly take profit 
from their ruling, they fear to be called thieves. This fear is grounded in the fact that 
they are neither lovers of money nor lovers of honor. Hence, Socrates explains,  
 
… necessity (ἀνάγκην, 347c1) and a penalty must be there in addition for them, if 
they are going to be willing to rule—it is likely that this is the source of its being 
held to be shameful to seek to rule and not to await necessity—and the greatest of 
penalties is being ruled by a worse man if one is not willing to rule oneself.  
 
We have now learned that the greatest penalty is to be ruled by a man of substandard 
character. This leads to his next argument where Socrates foreshadows “the beautiful 
city.” He states that “it is likely that if a city of good men (πόλις ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, 
347d1-2) came to be, there would be a fight over not ruling, just as there is now over 
ruling, and there it would become manifest that a true ruler really does not naturally 
consider his own advantage but rather that of the one who is ruled” (347d1-5). We 
notice here that he admits quietly, in passing, that in contemporary societies there are 
fights over ruling. Considering Thrasymachus’ position, how can he be expected to 
grasp the depth of Socrates’ counterclaims? Socrates talks to Glaucon about “the city 
of good men;” how is Thrasymachus supposed to consider this line of reasoning? 
Socrates confirms to Glaucon that Thrasymachus’ claim that fights over ruling are the 
case now; that is, those who want to rule now rule voluntarily. What is Thrasymachus 
to make of this distinction? We are beginning to understand the initial nonsense 
                                                          
43 Glaucon’s forgetfulness and inattentiveness is a repeated theme throughout. When Glaucon sets 
forth his challenge to Socrates (cf. 357b3-362d2), he relates to the conventional opinion on justice 
and injustice. In this regard he revealed a remarkable memory concerning myths and a variety of 
details. However, when he later encounters conversations with Socrates, he needs several 
reminders—which all hint toward him being inattentive.   
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outburst, and how Socrates’ arguments must seem contradictory to him. Socrates 
continues by presenting a conclusion for his reasoning: “Everyone who knows would 
choose to be benefited by another rather than to take the trouble of benefiting another” 
(347d5-7). Who is “everyone who knows?” How are we to understand “everyone?” 
On this subtle ground, Socrates concludes that “I can in no way agree with 
Thrasymachus that the just is the advantage of the stronger” (347d7-e2). Through his 
discussion with Glaucon, it becomes clear that Socrates has tried to refute 
Thrasymachus on the grounds that the latter cannot understand. Socrates needed his 
concealed topos in order to claim that Thrasymachus was refuted. There is yet another 
clue in this regard when Socrates addresses Glaucon and says, “This we shall consider 
again at another time” (347e2-3). That is, Socrates implies to Glaucon that the “city of 
good men,” those “who truly rule,” and their attitudes are themes for their 
consideration on another occasion.  
The problem Socrates wants to consider next is Thrasymachus’ assertion “that 
the life of the unjust man is stronger than that of the just man” (347e4-5). According to 
Socrates’ opinion, this is “a far bigger thing” (347e4). Socrates now leaves the 
decision to Glaucon: “Which speech is truer in your opinion?” (347e6). At this point, it 
is noteworthy that Thrasymachus earlier had accused Socrates of not speaking his 
mind, and of not declaring his opinion. In this section, Socrates has twice stressed the 
importance of Thrasymachus speaking his mind. Simultaneously, Socrates starts to 
underline that what he states is his opinion, and when he probes Glaucon to choose, 
Socrates asks for Glaucon’s opinion. Therefore, it is now evident that everyone speaks 
their mind from their respective topoi. Glaucon and Socrates have a topos in common 
while Thrasymachus stands on his own without quite understanding. This entails that it 
is the difference between sophistry and philosophy we are urged to grasp, but the 
distinctions are still obscured.  
Glaucon chooses to support Socrates’ opinion of “the life of the just man as more 
profitable” (347e4-5). He explicitly states that he is not persuaded by Thrasymachus’ 
arguments, despite all the good things Thrasymachus has “listed […] as belonging to 
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the life of the unjust man” (348a1-2).44 Socrates is pleased with Glaucon’s support and 
asks if he wants them to persuade Thrasymachus “if we’re able to find a way, that 
what he says isn’t true?” (348a4-6).45 This turns out to be the third time Socrates 
marks an explicit distance toward Thrasymachus by signaling “us” against “him.” I 
bear in mind that Thrasymachus is present and listening to this word exchange. This is 
bound to have an impact on him. I also notice that he does not interrupt with anger and 
violent outbursts anymore. Instead, he listens in silence to how Socrates and Glaucon 
make an alliance against him. He even remains silent when Socrates and Glaucon now 
start to discuss the strategy for crushing his arguments.  
Socrates suggests two different strategies, and for the third time, he leaves it to 
Glaucon to decide. First, they could “speak at length against him, setting speech 
against speech (ἀντικατατείναντες, 348a7), telling how many good things belong to 
being just, and then he should speak in return, and we again, there’ll be need of 
counting the good things and measuring how many each of us has in each speech” 
(348a7-9). The disadvantage of this strategy is that “we’ll be in need of some sort of 
judges (δικαστῶν, 348b2) who will decide.” The second strategy is “coming to 
agreement with one another (ἀνομολογούμενοι, 348b3).” The advantage of this is that 
“we’ll ourselves be both judges (δικασταὶ) and pleaders (ῥήτορες) at once” (348b4). 
The strategies suggested indicate that both Socrates and Glaucon acknowledge that 
Thrasymachus’ accusations toward Socrates are to be taken very seriously. It starts to 
look like Socrates takes the task before him to be like a trial, and both strategies 
suggested give association to the Athenian courtroom. The first, ἀντικατατείναντες, 
alludes—at a general level—to the lawsuits, where it was common for each party to 
deliver two speeches each and then the judges decided the outcome of the trial. For the 
readers, this is also an allusion toward the Apology and thus not a recommendable 
strategy for obvious reasons. The second, ἀνομολογούμενοι, seems to be more 
                                                          
44 This statement will be central for both Glaucon and Adeimantus when they set forth their 
challenges to Socrates. 
45 Socrates’ urging to make Glaucon choose and his pleas for support pick up on the Prelude where 
Socrates chose to stay because “it was so resolved.” Hence, he now lifts forth Glaucon’s 
responsibility in that regard and sets him as the authority.  
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promising because now Socrates and Glaucon can act as both judges and rhetors.46 
This is also the strategy Glaucon prefers. Contrary to the first, the second gives 
Socrates the opportunity to advocate another kind of rhetoric which, according to 
Bloom (1991b, 446n43), in this case, gives him better chances to “triumph over his 
accuser and do away with his dependence on popular judgment.” That Socrates is not 
willing to choose his own strategy regarding his upcoming encounter with 
Thrasymachus and urges Glaucon to choose on his behalf, in addition to the strong 
allusion to the Athenian courtroom, signals that it is Thrasymachus who now is on 
trial. This impression will be confirmed later. At this point, Socrates starts to prepare, 
and he does so by making a quest for terminology.  
3.8 A quest for terminology (348b8-d4) 
Socrates’ quest for terminology is an important clue regarding the two incompatible 
topoi. When Socrates now turns to Thrasymachus, he once again underlines that 
Thrasymachus stands alone: “Answer us from the beginning” (348b8-9). Thematically, 
he is back on track when he wants to know if Thrasymachus still asserts “that perfect 
injustice is more profitable than justice when it is perfect” (348b9-10). Thrasymachus 
confirms and claims that he already has given his reasons for this. Socrates continues 
with a specific quest for terminology: “How do you speak about them in this respect? 
[…] Do you call justice virtue and injustice vice?” (348c2-6). Thrasymachus responds 
in an ironical tone: “That’s likely, you agreeable man” (ὧ ἥδιστε, 348c7). The irony is 
detectable through ὧ ἥδιστε, which indicates that Socrates is sweet, simple, and 
innocent.47 When Thrasymachus adds “that injustice is profitable, and justice isn’t,” he 
is in accordance with Callicles’ view on virtue in the Gorgias (cf. 491e). This is yet 
another reminder on Thrasymachus’ position; he is in accord with the general view. 
Socrates now infers that Thrasymachus denotes justice to be vice. No, justice is not 
called vice, Thrasymachus corrects; it is called “very high-minded innocence (πάνυ 
γενναίαν εὐήθειαν, 348d1). This phrase can also be understood as “sublime simplicity” 
and, as such, Thrasymachus’ terminology resembles Thucydides’ when he is 
                                                          
46 This discussion of strategies is similar to the one we find in the Protagoras after Socrates has 
threatened to leave and before the great encounter between Socrates and Protagoras. The 
difference is that in the Protagoras the discussion involves more than two parties; cf. 337a-338e.  
47 Cf. Liddle and Scott; and Adam, note on Rep.348c. 
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describing contemporary morality;48 hence, the topos of war is awakened. This makes 
Socrates infer that Thrasymachus talks about injustice as corruption (κακήθειαν, 
348d2). However, Thrasymachus does not. He rather calls it “good judgment” 
(εὐβουλίαν, 348d3).49 Socrates does not comment upon injustice as “good judgment.” 
Instead, he stresses, again, that Thrasymachus must tell what his opinion is, this time 
on whether the unjust men are good (ἀγαθοὶ, 348d5) as well as prudent (φρόνιμοί, 
348d4), while the just men are neither. Thrasymachus approves. His starting point was 
that injustice was good judgment, and when Socrates replies and wants Thrasymachus 
to confirm that the unjust men are good as well as prudent, Socrates speaks as though 
εὐβουλία and φρόνιμος are synonyms, or at least that they have the same meaning. 
Maybe this is also how Thrasymachus understood it, as he approved. Socrates now, 
elegantly, substitutes φρόνιμος with εὐβουλία and simultaneously transports the 
meaning of the latter into the first. Due to the asymmetries between the two concepts, 
Thrasymachus’ approval on this point will cause him big problems as the conversation 
develops. This asymmetry is present beneath the surface of this section from now on. 
In his study on εὐβουλία, Paul Woodruff (2013) investigates different patterns 
and uses of the concept throughout different genres. He finds that on all views the 
result is the same: “A city governed by leaders with good judgment makes decisions 
that are best for the whole, and such a city is not likely to be torn apart by factual 
disputes” (ibid, 182). Hence, εὐβουλία generally denotes “management that is a) 
profitable for the manager, or b) beneficial for the home or the city” (ibid, 180), thus 
“’good judgment’ is the virtue that helps us to deliberate well in the absence of 
knowledge” (ibid, 185). Although Socrates later50 defines εὐβουλία as “a kind of 
knowledge,” Woodruff points out that the “tendency of ancient culture runs the other 
way: Good judgment is a virtue we are called upon to experience precisely in those 
cases in which we do not have complete knowledge” (ibid, 184). The definition 
                                                          
48 Cf. Thucydides, III, 83; and Adam, note on Rep. 348d. 
49 Bloom (1991b) translates εὐβουλία as “good council” and φρόνιμος as “prudence.” Woodruff 
(2013, 185) uses “good judgment” for εὐβουλία throughout his essay but points out that “εὐβουλία 
is often rightly, translated “prudence,” meaning the ability to see where one’s own interests lie.” 
Thus, I chose to translate εὐβουλία as “good judgment” (following Woodruff) and φρόνιμος as 
“prudence” (following Bloom). 
50 Socrates will later define εὐβουλία as “as a kind of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) […] for it’s surely not by 
lack of learning but by knowledge that men counsel well” (428b7-9). 
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Socrates sets forth contains a kind of knowledge which is “available only to the leaders 
of the Kallipolis, but it would not be available to anyone in Athens” (ibid, 183).51 The 
same goes for φρόνιμος; usually understood as “practical wisdom or prudence.”52 
When Socrates later discusses the leadership of the Kallipolis, he asks Glaucon: “Who 
else will you compel to go to the guarding of the city than the men who are most 
prudent (φρονιμώτατοι, 521b8) in those things through which a city is best governed 
and who have no other honors and a better life than the political life?” (521b7-10). In 
the course of the paideia program launched for the philosophers, the virtues of the 
prudent (φρόνιμος) are cultivated by letting them study astronomy. Then “we are 
going to convert the prudence (φρόνιμον, 530c2) by nature in the soul from 
uselessness to usefulness” (530c1-3). Thus, when Thrasymachus, on the one hand, 
denotes the virtue of the just men as high-minded innocence and the virtue of the 
unjust men as good judgment and further understands the latter in accordance with 
tradition as a management that is profitable for the manager and/or beneficial for home 
and city, it turns out that his initial definition is in accordance with opinions held by 
“the many.” Socrates, on the other hand, suspects that Thrasymachus understood the 
concept of injustice as corruption, but when corrected and told that the virtue in 
question is good judgment, he starts to talk about prudence, which has quite another 
resonance.53 Against this background, what are we to make of Socrates’ quest for 
terminology? Generally, when two persons are engaged in a debate, the clarifying of 
terminology intends to secure that the two are talking about the same issues. The case 
here seems to be the opposite: It becomes clear for the reader that Socrates and 
Thrasymachus are speaking of different matters, and this goes deeper than innocent 
misunderstandings, as Socrates later will define this discussion. Thus, a reasonable 
                                                          
51 Woodruff further points out that “Not even Socrates claims to have knowledge of the sort 
required. So, if good judgment is knowledge of this sort […], we will have to be content with merely 
seeking it. We cannot use it, because there will be no true good judgment outside of the ideal state.” 
In Aristotle εὐβουλία “is a virtue of good judgment as carried out by people who are phronimoi (E.N. 
6.9.). As a virtue of deliberation, which is a kind of seeking, eubolia is not a form of knowledge 
(episteme), according to Aristotle. It is, however, a form of correctness. 
52 Cf. Liddle and Scott. 
53 By this deed, Socrates is acting in accordance with the philosophical tradition as well, because 
εὐβουλία “names a virtue which Plato and most other philosophers treat lightly or ignore”   
(Woodruff, 2013, 179).  
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inference so far is that Thrasymachus speaks of the virtue “good judgment” as it is 
commonly understood within the Athenian culture, and he seems to comprehend 
prudence as being practical wisdom. Hence, he collects his arguments and opinions 
from a topos recognizable for the particular audience. When it comes to Socrates, he is 
of an opinion which stands in contrast. Therefore, by now, it is safe to assume that his 
arguments are warranted in a topos concealed.  
3. 9 Preparing the refutation I: Thrasymachus stands alone (348d4-349b1) 
Thrasymachus responds by repeating Socrates’ earlier precision (at 348b9-10) and 
states that “those who can do injustice perfectly […] are able to subjugate cities and 
tribes of men to themselves” (348d6-7). He then removes the possibility for Socrates 
to assume that he is speaking about “cutpurses” or thieves, who Thrasymachus 
considers not being “worth mentioning compared to those I was just talking about” 
(348d6-10). As to Thrasymachus’ last point, Socrates states that he is not unaware of 
what Thrasymachus wants to say on this (348e1), whereupon he bends the line of 
reasoning in a new direction. Socrates now wants to return to the point where 
Thrasymachus was putting “injustice in the camp of virtue and wisdom, and justice 
among their opposites” (348e2-3). This form of categorization creates a problem for 
Socrates, while Thrasymachus maintains that he “indeed set them down as such” 
(348e4).  
By this confirmation, Socrates signals that he has something more solid to work 
on, but at the same time, it is “no longer easy to know what one should say” (348e5-6). 
Why is that? The problem turns out to be that if Thrasymachus—when he set down 
injustice as profitable—had simultaneously agreed that injustice was to be denoted as 
“viciousness (κακίαν) or shameful (αἰσχρὸν)” (348e7), then they “would have 
something to say” because this is claimed by “some others” who are “speaking 
according to customary usage,” Socrates claims. Hence, Socrates now points out that 
Thrasymachus’ view is not in accordance with the customary usage—an underlining 
that simply is not true. Therefore, it looks like Socrates is trying to make the 
impression that Thrasymachus does not relate to any topos at all; hence, we are 
supposed to believe that it is Thrasymachus who is atopos and further that his opinions 
are totally his own—or private. However, as the situation now stands, Socrates argues, 
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“Plainly you’ll say that injustice is fair (καλὸν) and mighty (ἰσχυρὸν), and, since you 
also dared to set it down in the camp of virtue and wisdom, you’ll set down to its 
account all the other things which we used to set down as belonging to the just” 
(348e9-349a2). By this outburst, Socrates argues that not only does Thrasymachus’ 
view contrast the customary view, but he is not in accordance with Socrates and 
Glaucon (cf. “we”) either. He now stands totally on his own. Thus, Thrasymachus’ 
response, “Your divination (μαντεύει, 349a3) is very true,” is ambiguous, and its 
impact is of importance. On the one hand, it can be taken as a compliment to 
Socrates—Thrasymachus is applauding Socrates’ abilities to see things clearly—but 
this interpretation is not likely. On the other hand, it can be taken as an outpouring, 
meaning that Socrates now has surpassed his “usual ironical habit” (cf. 337a4) by 
bending arguments and turning the discussion into the direction Socrates wanted. In 
this way, Thrasymachus’ earlier prediction is fulfilled, and this alternative makes more 
sense. “But nonetheless,” is Socrates response before he states that “one oughtn’t to 
hesitate to pursue the consideration of the argument as long as I understand you to say 
what you think. For, Thrasymachus, you seem really not to be joking now, but to be 
speaking the truth as it seems to you” (349a4-8). So, Socrates’ first step in preparing 
for the final refutation is to argue that Thrasymachus’ opinions find support 
nowhere—they are essentially of a private character. Then he sets down the premise 
for the refutation: for pursuing Thrasymachus’ argument, it is vital to understand what 
Thrasymachus thinks; at least he concludes that he is convinced that Thrasymachus 
speaks the truth, as it seems to him. “And what difference does it make to you […] 
whether it seems so to me or not, and why don’t you refute the argument?” (349a9-
10), Thrasymachus ponders. It makes no difference whether it seems so to 
Thrasymachus or not, Socrates states, but he does not respond to why he does not 
refute the argument.  
3.10 Preparing the refutation II: One is what one resembles (349b1-350c11) 
The ambiguous end of the section above creates the ground for the questioning in this 
section, and the opposition εὐβουλία (good judgment) versus φρόνιμος (prudence) is 
still present. As argued above, Thrasymachus does not apprehend the profound 
difference between the meanings of the concepts as Socrates does. The concepts are 
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not discussed further, but we notice that Socrates consequently uses his former 
substitution. Thrasymachus is now questioned about what the just man is willing to do, 
what he deserves, what he claims to deserve, and what he wants. By this, Socrates 
constructs a foundation which allows him to present the opposition like/unlike, and it 
is at this point we enter the discussion.  
Socrates now proposes: “Let us say it, then, as follows, the just man does not get 
the better of what is like (ὁμοίου) but of what is unlike (ἀνομοίου), while the unjust 
man gets the better of like and unlike?” (349c11-d1). Thrasymachus approves and is 
also content with the next question: “is the unjust man both prudent (φρόνιμός) and 
good (ἀγαθος) while the just man is neither” (349d3-4)? At this point, Socrates infers 
that “the unjust man is also like the prudent and the good, while the just man is not like 
them” (349d6-7), and further, that both the just and unjust men are such as those 
whom they are alike. This seems to be exactly what Thrasymachus claimed earlier, 
and his agreement now becomes Socrates’ steppingstone for introducing one of his 
well-known analogies: “All right, Thrasymachus. Do you say that one man is musical 
and that another is unmusical” (349d10-11)? As Thrasymachus agrees to this, he has 
no problem also to acknowledge, and state, that “the musical man is prudent 
(φρόμινον) and the unmusical man thoughtless” (ἄφρονα, 349e4-5). They go through 
the same procedure regarding the medical man. Based on these analogies, Socrates can 
infer that in the things about which a man is prudent he is also good, and in things 
about which he is thoughtless he is bad. After this inference, the line of reasoning 
alters again. His line of questioning from here forward finds its basis in the opposition 
like/unlike: The ignorant man (ἀνεπιστήμων, 350a11) gets the better of both the man 
who knows and the man who does not; the man who knows is wise, and the wise man 
is good. This results in the inference “then the man who is both good and wise will not 
want to get the better of the like, but of the unlike and opposite” (350b7-8). However, 
Socrates again says, “The bad and unlearned will want to get the better of both the like 
and the opposite;” so, therefore, “does our unjust man get the better of both like and 
unlike.” Before Socrates goes on, Thrasymachus must admit that he had been claiming 
the latter. However, when Thrasymachus launched the idea of “the unjust man getting 
the better,” he was not talking of getting the better understood as knowledge. This 
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nuance is not taken into consideration when Socrates goes on and argues that 
according to the argument “the unjust man gets the better of both like and unlike” it 
follows that “the just man will not get the better of like but of unlike,” and then “the 
just man is like the wise and good, but the unjust man like the bad and unlearned.” 
Thrasymachus does not present any kind of counterclaim. Instead, he once again gives 
his approval: “I’m afraid so,” he says. Socrates does not stop but starts to wonder: 
“But we also agreed that each is such as the one he is like.” When Thrasymachus also 
agrees on this, he gives way for Socrates’ conclusion: “Then the just man has revealed 
himself to us as good and wise, and the unjust man unlearned and bad” (350c10-11). 
Although Socrates reached a conclusion, there is a problem. As Adam54 points 
out, there is a “pervading fallacy” in this section. In addition to what I have already 
pointed out, there is also a problem connected to the concepts “like” and “unlike.” 
They are “used absolutely, and each of them is equated with itself.”55 The line of 
reasoning goes like this: a) the wise man is good; b) a man is good in that in which he 
is wise. The overall conclusion in this section is that one is what one resembles, and 
because Thrasymachus does not resemble Socrates and Glaucon, Socrates has 
managed once again to indicate that Thrasymachus stands alone. 
3.11 Preparing the refutation III: Silencing Thrasymachus (350c12-352b5) 
The narrator now reports that “Thrasymachus did not agree to all of this so easily as I 
tell it now, but he dragged his feet and resisted, and he produced a wonderful quantity 
of sweat, for it was summer” (350c12-d2). From this report, we learn that 
Thrasymachus’ body language signals resistance, but we are not told anything about 
his counterarguments or if he presented such at all. Instead, the narrator sees it fit to 
inform us that “I saw what I had not yet seen before—Thrasymachus blushing 
(ἐρυθριῶντα, 350d3).” This is an interesting piece of information. When Socrates 
engaged young Hippocrates in the Protagoras, the narrator also informed us that 
Hippocrates was blushing (312a2-4). In that context, Hippocrates’ blushing happened 
when he suddenly realized the consequences of his opinions, and in that instance, he 
promptly understood why they were wrong. Is there a parallel between the blushing of 
                                                          




these two characters? If so, we can infer that Thrasymachus also gained a kind of 
sudden insight, which in turn indicates that we are led to believe that Socrates, at this 
point, has “tamed the wild animal.” However, the question is whether the “taming” 
actually happened, or if the situation now is that Thrasymachus has realized that his 
disagreement with Socrates will never be settled. If so, the situation is aporetic. This 
aporetic situation has some similarities to the one we find toward the end of the 
Protagoras. After bringing the discussion with Protagoras to an end, Socrates stated 
that in the current situation they have no alternative than to start their discussion all 
over again, a proposal Protagoras declined. When Thrasymachus now finds himself 
trapped, he has no other choice than to give in and leave, or to continue. Thrasymachus 
chooses the latter. As for the universal audience, we are convinced that something 
happened. That we are kept in the dark on this “something,” I think the narrator 
confirms in his next statement: “At all events, […] we had come to complete 
agreement about justice being virtue and wisdom, and injustice both vice and lack of 
learning” (350d4-5). I do not have the impression that they “had come to a complete 
agreement,” on the contrary. When the discussion was interrupted by the narrator, the 
best-case scenario was that they maybe were on their way to an agreement. However, 
as things now have turned out, it is an illusion of a complete agreement which is the 
point of departure for the next step.  
“All right, let that be settled for us (i.e., “complete agreement”); but we did say 
that injustice is mighty as well. Or don’t you remember, Thrasymachus?” (350d6-8), 
Socrates asks. Why this reminder? Is it supposed to be comforting? Comfort 
understood as “now that you have no support for your initial claim, we have at least 
given support to the assertion that injustice is mighty.” That is, they have both given 
some and lost some approval. Is this what it means? Thrasymachus’ reply can indicate 
something of the sort, “I remember,” he says. “But even what you’re saying now 
doesn’t satisfy me” (ἀρέσκει, 350d9). So, Thrasymachus now confirms that he is not 
satisfied. He wants to say something about this, but he is convinced that if he does, 
Socrates will argue that he is “making a public harangue” (350e2). Instead of just 
starting to speak, he proposes a choice. Socrates can either let Thrasymachus say as 
much as he wants, or he can keep on questioning. If Socrates chooses the latter, 
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Thrasymachus threatens to act like the old wives telling tales: He will just reply “all 
right” and nod or shake his head. Socrates obviously does not want Thrasymachus to 
speak, but through the questioning, he wants Thrasymachus not to say anything 
contrary to his own opinion. However, Socrates already has led us to believe that 
Thrasymachus’ opinions are of a private character, which means that he cannot 
contribute. In this way, Thrasymachus is trapped. Still, he promises to do as Socrates 
urges, emphasizing that it is just to satisfy him “since you won’t let me speak. What 
else do you want?” (350e7-8). “Nothing, by Zeus […], but if that’s what you are going 
to do, go ahead and do it. And I’ll ask questions” (350e9-10). Socrates’ swearing at 
this point resembles the situation earlier when Thrasymachus acknowledged that he 
could not convince Socrates and, as a last desperate outburst, asked, “If you are not 
persuaded by now, what am I supposed to do? Shall I take the argument and give your 
soul a forced feeding?” (345b4-6). The difference between now and then is that 
Thrasymachus at this moment no longer has the ambition to persuade Socrates of 
anything, now he goes on just to satisfy Socrates.  
Socrates indicates that he understands Thrasymachus’ state of mind (frustration), 
so he elaborates, “I ask what I asked a moment ago so that we can, in an orderly 
fashion, make a thorough consideration of the argument about the character of justice 
as compared to injustice” (350e12-351a2). Socrates has now introduced the subject for 
the last theme, to compare the characters of justice and injustice, and again he 
anticipates one core theme of the Republic. As he now implicitly starts to expose parts 
of his topos, this whole section serves to be yet a new aide-mémoire, this time for both 
the particular and the universal audiences. Even if Socrates at one point or another 
indicates that injustice is more powerful and mightier than justice, this is not the 
subject anymore.56 Because now, when they have agreed that justice is both wisdom 
and virtue, Socrates believes “it will easily come to light that it is also mightier than 
injustice, since injustice is lack of learning—no one could still be ignorant of that” 
(351a34-5). However, according to Socrates, this is a simple and general 
consideration. Hence, he wants to go another way and asks, “Would you say that a city 
is unjust that tries to enslave other cities unjustly and has reduced them to slavery and 
                                                          
56 This turning creates the problem Socrates addresses in his summary (354b1 ff.). 
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keeps many enslaved to itself?” (351b1-3). Thrasymachus holds on to his earlier 
distinction between the “perfect just” and the “perfect unjust” and replies that, of 
course, it is so, and “it’s this the best city will most do, the one that is most perfectly 
unjust” (351b4-5). Socrates underlines he is aware that this is still Thrasymachus’ 
opinion, but this is not the way he wants to go. He is more interested in a distinct 
aspect: “Will the city that becomes stronger than another have this power without 
justice, or is it necessary for it to have this power with justice?” (351b7-9). It seems 
like Thrasymachus’ interest in discussion is awakened again because he not only takes 
the comparison theme literally, he also marks that through the proposed theme the 
difference between him and Socrates also comes to light. If it is as Socrates claims—
that justice is wisdom—the city will become stronger than another with justice, but if 
Thrasymachus is right, it will become stronger with injustice. It would have been 
interesting to see how a discussion on these terms would have turned out if Socrates 
had chosen to enter it, but he does not. Instead, he says, “I am full of wonder, 
Thrasymachus, because you not only nod and shake your head but also give very fine 
(καλῶς) answers” (351c4-5). In Socrates’ reply there is again a detectable ambiguity 
through the word καλῶς (cf. Bloom 1991b, 442-43n149). Either Thrasymachus does 
not recognize the ambiguous reply from Socrates, or he chooses to ignore it. I think he 
recognizes it because of his answer “It’s because I am gratifying (χαρίζομαι) you” 
(351c6). Socrates wants more of Thrasymachus’ gratifying; hence, he demands 
Thrasymachus to tell him if he believes “that either a city, or an army, or pirates, or 
robbers, or any other tribe which has some common unjust enterprise would be able to 
accomplish anything if its members acted unjustly to one another? […] And what if 
they didn’t act unjustly? Wouldn’t they be more able to accomplish something?” 
(351c7-d2). Thrasymachus agrees, but this agreement does not have a sound 
grounding because of the difference in perspectives. Without knowing what Socrates is 
going to say on this subject later, it is not easy to establish quite clearly what he at this 
point understands by “injustice” and “unjust actions.” Nevertheless, there is a clear 
indication of a strong connection between the injustice in a city and an individual. 
However, it seems like Thrasymachus speaks of a city, armies, and so on as a unit, and 
argues that this unit will achieve the greatest advantages if it acts unjustly externally. 
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Internally, it looks like he demands and depends on loyalty; thus “acting unjustly to 
one another” will be understood as the disappearance of loyalty.  
We remember that Thrasymachus earlier stated that the virtue of injustice was 
“good advice” (εὐβουλία) and that cities governed by leaders possessing εὐβουλία 
were able to decide what was best for the whole, and such cities were not likely to be 
torn apart by factional disputes (cf. Woodruff 2013, 182). Socrates now argues the 
opposite when he states, “For surely, Thrasymachus, it’s injustice that produces 
factions (στάσεις), hatreds, and quarrels among themselves, and justice (δικαιοσύνη)57 
that produces unanimity and friendship. Isn’t it so?” (351d4-6).58 So, when 
Thrasymachus’ viewpoint is the city as a whole, and from that perspective, he implies 
how the city ought to act outwards, Socrates’ viewpoint is internal, on the level of 
individuals, and from this perspective, injustice produces factions and justice 
friendships. At this point, I think Thrasymachus gives in and resigns, “Let it be so, so 
as not to differ with you” (351d7). “And it’s good of you to do so, you best of men” 
(351d8), Socrates replies. After having introduced the origin of stasis, a tireless 
Socrates goes on, and Thrasymachus keeps his promise—he agrees to everything, and 
when given alternatives he chooses politely. From here on the discussion develops on 
Socrates’ terms only.  
Socrates’ argument goes like this: When injustice comes into being (both among 
free men and slaves), it will cause them to hate each other and to form factions and 
thus make them unable to accomplish anything in common. This is because the work 
of injustice is to implant hatred. When injustice comes into being between two 
individuals, they will differ and hate and finally become enemies, and the just men will 
also suffer. However, what happens if injustice should come into being within one 
                                                          
57 The question and conception of δικαιοσύνη will be discussed in depth in Book IV 433a-434e.  
58 From here onward, the results of Book IV are being foreshadowed more clearly. The notion that 
justice when present in the individual keeps the individual at peace with himself is discussed in depth 
in 441d. Further, in Book IV, Socrates first describes justice in the polis, and afterwards justice in the 
individual, using the larger aggregate to assist him to find it in the smaller. We can observe the same 
method here in Socrates’ description of injustice. In Books VIII and IX, we find views on varieties of 
injustice in states and individuals. According to Adam, note on Rep. 351e, “The present passage 
(351a-352a), in fact, contains the undeveloped germ of the whole method and doctrine of the 




man only, will it then lose its power, or will it remain undiminished? Socrates asks. 
“Let it remain undiminished” (351e9), Thrasymachus answers unengaged. That he, in 
his answer signals indifference, does not seems to bother Socrates at all, on the 
contrary. Through Thrasymachus’ last reply, Socrates argues that something new 
comes to light: When someone or something possesses such a power, no matter where 
the power comes into being (a city, a clan, an army, and so on), the power—according 
to its nature—first “makes that thing unable to accomplish anything together with 
itself due to faction and difference, and then it makes that thing an enemy both to itself 
and to everything opposite and to the just” (352a1-4). Further, when the power is in 
one man, the same thing happens. First the power “will make him unable to act, 
because he is at faction and is not of one mind with himself, and, second, an enemy 
both to himself and to just men” (352a7-9). From this, Socrates works his way toward 
a conclusion by first asking if the gods are just and then stating that “the unjust man 
will also be an enemy to the gods […] and the just man a friend” (352b2-3). The 
impression of Thrasymachus’ reply on this conclusion is that he wants to object, but he 
chooses not to due to the men gathered: “Feast yourself boldly on the argument […] 
for I won’t oppose you, so as not to irritate these men here” (352b4-5).  
3.12 Socrates’ alleged refutation (352b6-354b1) 
“Come, then […] fill out the rest of the banquet for me by answering just as you have 
been doing” (352b6-7), is the way Socrates marks his last turn. In this section, he 
allegedly refutes Thrasymachus’ initial definition on the ground he has prepared for 
some time during three steps. Does he, through his opening-line, confirm 
Thrasymachus’ last reply, which indicates that the men gathered are signaling 
impatience? Socrates, for his part, signals that the “rest of the banquet” is now coming 
up. He starts by presenting a survey of what they have been discussing so far. He 
settles that through the discussion it has come to light that the just man is wiser and 
better “and more able to accomplish something” (352b8); the unjust man is not. He 
admits that this is not the complete truth about the unjust men, for even they can 
accomplish “some common object with one another” (352c2). However, if they were 
completely unjust, “they could never have restrained themselves with one another” 
(352c3-4). This must mean that Thrasymachus and Socrates did not discuss the 
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“perfect unjust” thoroughly. Further, it must mean that what I took to be 
Thrasymachus’ concept of “loyalty,” Socrates now calls justice. Hence, he argues that 
“it is plain that there was a certain justice in them (i.e., the unjust men) which caused 
them at least not to do injustice to one another at the same time that they were seeking 
to do it to others” (352c4-5). Socrates further stresses that this is how he understands 
these things to be. They are not as Thrasymachus set them down. This is not quite a 
summary of what they have discussed, but more a summary of Socrates’ opinions on 
the subjects they have discussed. According to Socrates, they also proposed to 
consider whether the just man lived a better and happier life than the unjust man. On 
the basis of what they have said, it is Socrates’ opinion that the just man lives better. 
However, they must consider (σκεπτέον, 352d4) this question more thoroughly 
because this “argument is not about just any question, but about the way one should 
live” (352d6-7). “Consider (σκόπει, 352d8),” Thrasymachus replies.  
As he starts his consideration, Socrates simultaneously starts the direct refutation 
of the view that injustice is more beneficial than justice. He does so by arguing that the 
life of the just man is better than that of the unjust. Socrates begins with a series of 
analogy arguments, but Thrasymachus does not quite understand the relevance of these 
arguments, so Socrates presents a few examples, for instance: Because we cannot see 
with anything else than our eyes, the work of the eyes is to see. The purpose of this 
line of questioning is to make Thrasymachus understand that “the work of each thing 
is what it alone can do” (353a10). Thrasymachus now confirms that he understands 
and that this is in accordance with his opinion. Socrates turns to virtue: “Does there 
seem to you also to be a virtue for each thing to which some work is assigned?” 
(353b2-3). He returns to the former examples; the virtue of the eyes is sight; the virtue 
of the ears is hearing. But could eyes do their proper work without their proper virtue? 
That is, with blindness (vice) instead of sight (virtue)? Does not the same go for ears? 
From these examples, Socrates turns to the soul. The work of the soul is living, and its 
virtue is justice. Deprived of its virtue, the soul will perform its work badly, while the 
virtuous soul will be able to do things like managing, ruling, and deliberating well. 
From these considerations, it follows that “the just soul and the just man will have a 
good life and the unjust man a bad one” (353e10-11). It seems like Thrasymachus is 
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still quite unengaged when he replies: “It looks like it […] according to your 
argument.” Further, according to Socrates’ argumentation, it follows that “the man 
who lives well is blessed and happy, and the man who does not is the opposite” (354a). 
From the agreement on this, Socrates can present a two-step conclusion. First, he 
concludes that “the just man is happy” because “it is not profitable to be wretched; 
rather it is profitable to be happy.” The final conclusion is that “injustice is never more 
profitable than justice.” 
Now that Socrates seemingly has refuted Thrasymachus and apparently has 
reached the preferable conclusion, he surely must be content; at least Thrasymachus 
seems to make that inference when saying: “Let that […] be the fill of your banquet at 
the festival of Bendis, Socrates” (354a10-11). Nonetheless, Socrates turns out to be 
ambivalent. On the one hand, he is pleased because Thrasymachus has grown gentle 
and stopped being hard on him; on the other hand, however, he stresses that “I have 
not had a fine banquet, but it’s my own fault, not yours” (354a13-b1). Why is Socrates 
not content?  
3.13 Socrates’ summary (354b1-354c5) 
In his summary, Socrates compares the discussion with Thrasymachus with a meal 
consisting of several courses. Throughout the meal, he admits to having acted like a 
greedy glutton; gluttonous he ate ravenously without tasting and digesting course by 
course. What exactly went wrong? According to Socrates, it all went wrong right from 
the start. He admits that the major error was that he did not pay attention to the initial 
question “What is justice?” Instead, he started to consider whether it is vice and lack of 
learning, or wisdom and virtue. The next mistake was that he started to pursue another 
argument: Is injustice more profitable than justice? The result of the discussion, 
according to him, is that he “knows nothing.” By ending his summary with yet another 
reference to the Socratic topos, he also—in addition to reproaching himself and taking 
the blame—implicitly states that he learned nothing of substance from Thrasymachus 
and thereby implies that the same goes for the particular audience. They learned 
nothing either. This confession marks an imperative turning point in the text. 
 In the introduction to this chapter, I argued that the theme in the conversation 
between Thrasymachus and Socrates was discussed via two incompatible topoi. In my 
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reading, I have tried to show how this theme was displayed and that it marks a first 
step to distinguish between sophistry and philosophy. Also, I have suggested that 
during these sections, the narrator is not always reliable due to his tendentious 
language, some of his evaluations must be apprehended as exaggerations. These 
instances I take to be urgent requests to the readers for starting to take a stance 
themselves. Socrates admits an error, and from this, he concludes that he and 
Thrasymachus talked past one another. I have observed and claimed that the difference 
between the two parties goes much deeper, and in the next chapter we will learn that 

























Chapter 4: Prologue III. The tide is turning for Thrasymachus 
(357a1-369b4) 
 
The challenges Socrates now is forced to meet are essential to understand the dramatic 
development in the rest of the Republic. Therefore, my aim in this chapter is to lift 
them forward as Glaucon and Adeimantus present them, and thereby confirm that the 
narrator was not always reliable throughout the previous sections.     
In the continuation of Socrates’ concluding argument, the narrator informs us 
that Socrates now thought he was “freed from argument,” but the three conversations 
so far turned out to be “only a prelude (προοίμιον).” For Glaucon, we are told, “is 
always most courageous (ἀνδρειότατος) in everything, and so now he didn’t accept 
Thrasymachus’ giving up” (357a2-4). The close reading in chapter 3 suggested several 
other reasons for Thrasymachus’ “giving up” than the one given by the narrator now. 
He simply states that Thrasymachus gave up because he was refuted, while I have 
argued that Thrasymachus resigned due to the two incompatible topoi employed. I 
argued that Thrasymachus realized that any agreement would be impossible due to the 
difference in terms and perspective. I further suggest that my suspicion is confirmed 
by Glaucon when he asks: “Socrates, do you want to seem to have persuaded us or 
truly to persuade us that it is in every way better to be just than unjust?” (357a5-b2). 
At first, Glaucon’s question seems surprising. It may seem surprising to the particular 
audience due to its polemic feature. If the men gathered have signaled a kind of 
boredom, as Thrasymachus indicated earlier, Glaucon has surely awakened them. This 
also goes for the universal audience, and the readers should at this point prepare to 
reconsider their inferences and start anew.  
As Socrates confirms that he wants to persuade them (and us), Glaucon harshly 
replies: “Well, then you’re not doing what you want” (357b4). This brief word 
exchange is imperative because Glaucon here points out that Socrates, through his 
conducts, has exposed a discrepancy between his words and deeds. To my knowledge, 
this is the only occurrence in the corpus where we find an explicit underlining of such 
a discrepancy addressed directly to Socrates. Glaucon acknowledges that what 
Socrates has been doing so far is not sufficient. He finds it necessary to give him a 
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profound challenge, through which Socrates gradually is forced to display the place or 
perspective he is speaking from. That is, Socrates needs to show the particular 
audience how and from where he warrants his arguments, and thereby exhibit a new 
kind of knowledge which in turn legitimizes the new discipline, philosophy. Glaucon 
strongly signals that the well-known Socratic topos (I do not know anything) will not 
do in this context. How does he force Socrates, the philosopher, to step up? He does so 
by setting forth a set of arguments that need to be answered. Thus, it is the 
conversation between Thrasymachus and Socrates that provoked Glaucon, and it is the 
conversation between Glaucon and Socrates that, in turn, will trigger Adeimantus. 
However, it is Thrasymachus’ alleged fall that makes Glaucon take on the 
responsibility. Socrates is given two choices to consider. He can choose to decline and 
leave, or, he can stand up and accept the challenge. Socrates chooses the latter.  
4.1 Glaucon and Socrates (357b3-362d2) 
Glaucon sets out by performing a sort of test on Socrates, and by that particular 
testing, it seems like he aims to drive Socrates, the philosopher, out. He intends to 
“scope him out” as Socrates did toward Hippocrates in the Protagoras,1 or he will 
stimulate his intellect like Socrates did toward Cephalus (cf. 329d8). His strategy is 
first to make Socrates agree upon the existence of three kinds of goods (εἶδος ἀγαθόν). 
By introducing the key term εἶδος, and by performing a test, he indicates for the first 
time that he knows of Socrates’ concealed topos. He demands Socrates to place justice 
within the category he sees fit. Socrates plays along and states that justice “belongs in 
the finest kind, which the man who is going to be blessed should like both for itself 
and for what comes out of it” (358a1-3).  
Did Glaucon foresee this answer? I suspect he did, because Socrates is now 
confronted with the same argument he himself stated to Cephalus (cf. 329e1): “Well, 
that’s not the opinion of the many (τοῖς πολλοῖς, 358a4),” Glaucon argues, before he 
paraphrases Thrasymachus and states that the opinion of the many, rather, “seems to 
belong to the form of drudgery, which should be practiced for the sake of wages and 
the reputation that comes from opinion (δόξαν), but all by itself, it should be fled from 
as something hard” (358a4-6). Regardless of whether the phrase “the many (τοῖς 
                                                          
1 I return to this in chapter 8: Saving youths, section 8.1: Hippocrates’ dream, p. 282 ff. 
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πολλοῖς)” is to be understood as “people in general” or “the political class,” Glaucon 
has, by his introduction to the challenge, managed to exhibit that Socrates and his 
opinion on justice is to be found outside, or at another place than, “the reputation that 
comes from opinion” existing among his fellow citizens. This entails that Socrates’ 
opinions do not find support in any well-known topos and hints again to the 
recognition of a concealed topos. Socrates admits that he knows that it is the general 
opinion and, he also acknowledges that it was this Thrasymachus put forth when he 
blamed justice and praised injustice. Socrates could also have admitted that this was 
the reason why they did not reach any real agreement, but instead, he indicates that 
they “talked past one another,” and this was the reason why they developed a violent 
discourse. When Socrates now concludes by yet another hint toward the Socratic 
topos, saying that it “seems I am a poor learner” (δυσμαθής, 358a9), his reluctant 
attitude has explicitly surfaced. Even if this can be taken as an implicit apology to 
Thrasymachus, Socrates signals that he is still unwilling to enter the realm where he 
and his arguments belong.  
4.1.1 Introductory remarks to Glaucon’s challenge (358b1-e4) 
Glaucon does not respond to Socrates’ admission, nor to his statement of being a poor 
learner. Instead, he presents an appeal: “Come, now […] hear me too and see if you 
still have the same opinion” (δοκῇ, 358b2). This appeal could indicate that he is not 
yet sure if Socrates wants to walk the road Glaucon intends him to, hence, for his 
request to be heard he gives Socrates an opportunity to decide for himself. “For it 
looks to me,” he says, “as though Thrasymachus, like a snake, has been charmed more 
quickly than he should have been; yet to my way of thinking (νοῦν), there was still no 
proof about either” (358b2-4). What does this utterance mean? This is unreserved 
support for Thrasymachus. By stating these words, it becomes clear that Glaucon is 
familiar with Socrates’ modus operandi. According to Glaucon, Thrasymachus was not 
disarmed by sound arguments—on the contrary, there were no proofs. Instead, he 
argues that Thrasymachus was “charmed” (κηληθῆναι)2 too quickly. By comparing 
                                                          
2 “Charmed” translates κηληθῆναι (from κηλέω) which also means to bewitch, enchant, beguile, 
fascinate, esp. by music, cf. Liddle and Scott. On the vocabulary of magic in Plato, see Belfiore (1980).  
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Thrasymachus with a snake being hypnotized (or bewitched or enchanted),3 and by 
picturing Socrates as the hypnotizer, Glaucon confirms that he knows of the potential 
effects Socrates has on people, and he apparently also knows why. Thrasymachus’ 
irritation, his confusion, and his feeling of powerlessness were due to Socrates’ 
twisting and bending. This Glaucon wants the others gathered to understand. So, he 
presents a task for Socrates, and also, he makes it clear how he intends to act during 
the Socratic problem-solving. He desires (ἐπιθυμῶ) to hear what justice is, and “what 
power (δύναμιν) it has all alone by itself when it is in the soul—dismissing its wages 
and its consequences” (358b4-7). If Socrates gives his consent, Glaucon will first 
restore Thrasymachus’ argument, and then tell what kind of thing the many or people 
in general say justice is and its origin. Secondly, he will claim that all those who 
practice justice do so unwillingly. Thirdly, he will show that it is fitting that they do 
so, for the life of the unjust man is, after all, far better than that of the just man, as 
people in general say.  
He stresses that this is not at all his own opinion, but he is at loss because he has 
“been talked deaf by Thrasymachus and countless others, while the argument on 
behalf of justice—that it is better than injustice—I’ve yet to hear from anyone as I 
want it” (358c7-d3). Here, Glaucon confirms that he is at a crossroads. He is familiar 
with the general opinion—as Thrasymachus presented it—but he has never heard a 
satisfactory explanation on what justice is. Hence, he now wants to “hear it extolled all 
by itself,” and he supposes that it would be most likely to learn that from Socrates. To 
learn the nature of justice and injustice from Socrates, who assumedly will present it 
from a philosophical perspective, Glaucon will take the role of “devil’s advocate” and 
demands Socrates to act accordingly. He underlines the “reason why I’ll speak in 
vehement praise of the unjust life, and in speaking, I’ll point out to you how I want to 
hear you, in your turn, blame injustice and praise justice” (358c4-6).  
                                                          
3 In the Protagoras, people are charmed or enchanted by Protagoras; first there are the young men 
following Protagoras around, Protagoras “enchants (κεκηλημένοι) with his voice like Orpheus, and 
they follow the sound of his voice in a trance” (315b); then it is Socrates who, after listening to 
Protagoras, states that he “was entranced (κεκηλημένος, 328d) and just looked at him for a long time 
as if he was going to say more” (328d).  
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By this decision, Glaucon has insured himself that Socrates will reveal a new 
understanding of what justice is, and he expects this to be contrary to the view 
accepted by the many or people in general. In this way, Glaucon implicitly demands 
Socrates to reveal parts of his concealed topos. There is still a possibility that Socrates 
will decline, so Glaucon ends his proposal by addressing Socrates: “See if what I’m 
saying is what you want” (358d7). Socrates responds positively and seems content 
when stating: “[…] What would an intelligent (νοῦν) man enjoy talking and hearing 
about more again and again?” (358e1-2). Thus, Glaucon’s stage is set.  
4.1.2 Glaucon’s three-fold challenge (358e5-361d7) 
As Socrates accepted Glaucon’s suggestion, their respective roles are also clarified. 
Also, this agreement signals the start of dissolving the discrepancies between Socrates’ 
words and deeds. However, for Socrates to reveal his understanding of justice and 
injustice, we need to know what it is an alternative to. This knowledge Glaucon gives 
us when he elaborates on the three points he initially set forth in his proposal.  
4.1.2.1 Genesis and being of justice according to people in general 
According to Glaucon, the argument of people, in general, goes like this:  
 
They say that doing injustice is naturally good, and suffering injustice bad, but 
that the bad in suffering injustice far exceeds the good in doing it;4 so that, 
when they do injustice to one another and suffer it and taste of both, it seems 
profitable—to those who are not able to escape the one and choose the other—
to set down a compact among themselves neither to do injustice nor to suffer it 
(358e5-359a2).  
 
The story tells that from this reasoning they began to set down their laws (νόμους) and 
conventional agreements or contracts (συνθήκας); then they continued by naming what 
the law commands lawful and just. This, Glaucon concludes, “is the genesis (γένεσίν) 
and being (οὐσίαν) of justice” (359a2-6). According to this elaboration, there seems to 
be a huge irregularity between the conventional opinions, where injustice is 
acknowledged as a “natural good” and the laws which are supposed to command the 
“lawful and just.” In this context, I am in accordance with Bloom (1991b), and think 
we ought to render the laws as the unwritten laws or conventional agreements 
                                                          
4 A similar theory is set forth by Callicles in the Gorgias, cf. 483a, 492c. 
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understood as “ancestral practice which governs a group of men” (ibid, 446n3).5 
According to this logic, the laws (νόμους) become the opposite of what comes 
naturally. Thus, given this agreement on the laws, one cannot act badly toward fellow 
citizens if one acts within the limits of the law. This means, Glaucon continues, that 
justice is only “a mean between what is best—doing injustice without paying the 
penalty—and what is worst—suffering injustice without being able to avenge oneself. 
The just is in the middle (μέσῳ) between these two, cared for not because it is good 
but because it is honored due to a want of vigor in doing injustice” (359a6-b2).  
In this context, it is likely that Cephalus’ opinion—pay back what one owes—
was grounded in the laws; while Polemarchus’ understanding of justice—do good to 
your friends and bad to your enemies—was grounded in the general opinion which in 
turn points toward the moral topos. Thrasymachus’ argument was nuanced and 
grounded in both, as Glaucon shows.  
4.1.2.2 No one acts voluntarily for the sake of the just  
Glaucon’s second claim is that those who practice justice do not do so willingly, but 
from “incapacity to do injustice” (358b7-8). To give a reason for the claim, Glaucon 
presents a challenging question: What happens if both the just and unjust man are 
given license to do whatever they want? He asserts that the just will follow the same 
path as the unjust due to greed (πλεονεξίαν, 359c5) and contends that “this is what any 
nature (φύσις) naturally pursues as good, while it is law (νόμῳ) which by force 
perverts (βία παράγεται) it to honor (τιμήν) equality” (359c5-7). Further, he asserts 
that the story of the ancestor of Gyges6 and his ring will be of help for us to perceive 
                                                          
5 Bloom underlines that “a law is not necessarily what is passed by an assembly.” This can also be an 
ancestral practice.  
6 Bloom (1991b, 447n4) encourages the readers to compare Glaucon’s account of the Gyges story 
with Herodotus’ story on Gyges (History, I, 8-13). Such a comparison is done by Howland (2005). 
Contrary to the scholarly convention which holds that logos and muthos are fundamentally opposed, 
whereas the former being the medium of philosophy and the latter of poetry, Howland argues that 
muthos, in the broad sense of story or narrative, plays an indispensable philosophical role in the 
Republic. In particular, any account of the nature and power of justice and injustice must begin with 
powers of the soul that can come to light only through the telling and interpretation of stories. 
Howland argues that this is implicit in Glaucon’s Gygean tale, and when reading the earlier tale of 
Gyges in Herodotus in connection with Glaucon’s muthos, Howland concludes that the latter shows 
itself to be a story about storytelling and interpretation, knowledge of self and others, and the 




this. In Glaucon’s story, there are two rings, so that the just and unjust man can have 
one each; in this way, they are both in possession of the same power as Gyges’s 
ancestor and licensed to do whatever they want. “[…] no one,” says Glaucon, “as it 
would seem, would be so adamant as to stick by justice and bring himself to keep 
away from what belongs to others and not lay hold of it […]. And in so doing, one 
would act no differently from the other, but both would go the same way” (360b4-c5). 
I find it remarkable that when two men are given license to “do whatever they want,” 
they will choose to steal (to take what he wanted from the market without fear), to rape 
(to go into houses and have intercourse with whomever he wanted), and to kill (to slay 
or release from bonds whomever he wanted), and to do other things as an equal to a 
god among humans. Nevertheless, Glaucon emphasizes that this is the case. When he 
further says that “all men suppose” injustice to be far more profitable privately than 
justice, then a reasonable inference will be that there are no just men—only a double 
standard ruled by fear. If, on the one hand, others knew that a man had a license to do 
whatever he wanted and obviously could get away with whatever he did, he would be 
considered most foolish if he did not lay his hands on what belonged to others. So, 
within this scenario, a potential just man acts unjustly due to fear of being called 
foolish in public. On the other hand, would those aware of it praise him and thus 
deceive each other due to fear of suffering injustice. In this way Thrasymachus’ 
reasoning was correct, viewed from the perspective of the many.   
4.1.2.3 The life of the unjust man is far better than that of the just man  
So, how are we to make a judgment about the life of these two men who got this 
license? According to Glaucon, the only way to do this is to view them in opposition 
to each other. Only then will we be able to make a correct judgment. This viewing 
entails a new thought experiment, conducted as follows: “We shall take away nothing 
from the injustice of the unjust man nor from the justice of the just man, but we shall 
take each as perfect in his own pursuit” (360e4-7). In this experiment the unjust man is 
supposed to take on a mask and stand forth as being a well-skilled craftsman, a clever 
doctor or pilot who knows very well what is possible or impossible within his craft 
and, as such, is competent always to set himself right. He will perform his deeds in the 
approved manner and, if he is perfectly unjust, he will get away with it. The man 
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caught is not perfectly unjust; him we consider to be a common person (φαῦλον, 
361a5).7 In this way, the extreme injustice will seem to be just when it is not. 
Therefore “the perfectly unjust man must be given the most perfect injustice, and 
nothing must be taken away; he must be allowed to do the greatest injustices while 
having provided himself with the greatest reputation for justice” (361a6-b1). This was 
the unjust man, so now we turn to the just man. The just man is “simple and noble” 
(361b6-7). He is good, and not one who wishes to seem to be good. I think it is 
noteworthy that regarding the just man and “what seems to be […]” Glaucon refers 
explicitly to Aeschylus. By this reference, he also awakens the poetic topos, but there 
is a little twist when Glaucon paraphrases a quote from the Seven Against Thebes. In 
that play, the man described wishes to be “best” (ἄριστος, 592) while Glaucon says 
“does not wish to seem, but rather to be, good” (ἀγαθὸν, 361b7). The words “best 
(ἄριστος)” and “good (ἀγαθὸν)” have different connotations. I take it that the first 
gives associations toward the competitive culture of Athens, while the latter allows for 
assertion toward the upcoming discussions in the Republic. Although it is not this 
dissimilarity Glaucon seeks, the terms are stated and give food for thoughts as we 
follow Glaucon onward. He argues that it is “to seem” that must be taken away 
because, if he merely seems to be just, there would be no difference between him and 
the unjust man. Therefore, the just man “must be stripped of everything except justice, 
and his situation must be made the opposite of the first man’s” (361c3-5). He shall 
have “the greatest reputation for injustice, so that his justice may be put to the test 
(βεβασανισμένος, 361c6) to see if it is softened by a bad reputation and its 
consequences” (361c5-7). When Glaucon now demands that in this experiment justice 
should be tested, he picks up on the term βασανίζειν which alludes to the “gold-
mining” theme. This further alludes to Polemarchus’ turning. By these allusions, 
Glaucon signals that he has been attentive and that he recognizes what Socrates has 
                                                          
7 φαῦλον translates “a common person,” in this context “one who does not get away.” Cf. Protagoras 
when he speaks of the many (people in general) who do not understand anything and therefore are 
obedient to the rulers: ”Now, for a runaway not to succeed in running away but to be caught in the 
open is sheer folly from the start and inevitably makes men even more hostile than they were 
before, for on top of everything else they perceive him as a real rogue” (317b). Cf. also Adam, note 




been doing. Toward the universal audience, Glaucon is building trust and making us 
more attentive.  
From Glaucon’s arguments, it looks like the “perfectly just man” has been given 
the hardest life to live. He must live this life unchanged until death and seeming 
throughout his whole life to be unjust although he is just. So, only when both justice 
and injustice have reached the extreme, is it possible for us to judge and tell which one 
of the two is the happiest. Socrates’ response to this speech is: “My, my, my dear 
Glaucon, how vigorously you polish up each of the two men—just like a statue 
(ἀνδριάντα)—for their judgment” (361d5-7). Glaucon replies that he has done his best. 
But he is not done yet. He must complete his speech by telling what kind of life awaits 
the two, and with two such extremes, he supposes this will be an easy task. Before he 
starts, he stresses for the third time that these are not his own words; he is only 
repeating the words from those who praise injustice over of justice. This statue or this 
image of a man that Glaucon has placed before us is somewhat frightening, and the 
image will not improve when he tells about his fate.  
4.1.3 Glaucon’s summary (361d8-362c7) 
According to Glaucon, those who praise injustice will say that “the just man who has 
such a disposition will be whipped; he’ll be racked; he’ll be bound; he’ll have both his 
eyes burned out, and at the end, when he has undergone every sort of evil, he’ll be 
crucified and know that one shouldn’t wish to be, but to seem to be, just” (361e3-
362a3). If this is the fate of a good man, who is good and not only seems to be good, it 
is not a life anyone would choose willingly. Although we know that Glaucon’s 
wording is short and apt, the future for the just and good man is horrific. Glaucon’s 
summary of the benefits of being unjust is similar to Thrasymachus’ earlier claims. He 
stated that the unjust gets to rule because he seems to be just; he “takes in marriage 
from whatever station he wants and gives in marriage to whomever he wants;” he can 
get into contracts and partnerships with whomever he wants, and “besides benefiting 
himself in all this, he gains because he has no qualms about doing injustice. So, then, 
when he enters contests, both private and public, he wins and gets the better 
(πλεονεκτεῖν, 362b7) of his enemies. In getting the better, he is wealthy and does good 
to friends and harm to enemies” (cf. 343d-e; 349b ff.). These benefits listed also allude 
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to Simonides (cf. 334b) where justice was masquerading injustice. However, here it is 
the opposite: injustice masquerading justice that is claimed to benefit friends and 
injure enemies.8 The unjust man also makes sacrifices and sets up votive offerings for 
the gods which are adequate and magnificent. The unjust man cares for the gods and 
those human beings he wants to care for far better than the just man because it is more 
appropriate for him to be dearer to the gods than is the just man. These last 
descriptions recall Cephalus’ offerings and the reasons he gave for caring for the gods. 
Hence Glaucon’s words here can be taken as an implicit (general) critique toward the 
outlooks he and his generation represent. Glaucon rounds off by concluding that this is 
what people in general hold, and therefore “with gods and with humans, a better life is 
provided for the unjust man than for the just man” (362c6-7). 
During Glaucon’s elaboration, Adeimantus paid attention and must have noticed 
that Socrates was prepared to comment on what had been stated, because the narrator 
addresses the universal audience and says, “When Glaucon had said this, I had it in 
mind to say something to it, but his brother Adeimantus” interrupted (362d1-3).  
4.2 Adeimantus and Socrates (362d3-369b4) 
“You surely don’t believe, Socrates, that the argument has been adequately stated?” 
(362d3-4) Adeimantus asks and stresses that the things most needed to be said have 
not been said. Socrates does not seem to be surprised, and he wants Adeimantus to fill 
in the gaps Glaucon left open. “And yet,” Socrates says, “what he [i.e., Glaucon] said 
was already enough to bring me to my knees and make it impossible to help out 
justice” (362d8-10). This is Socrates’ third hint toward the Socratic topos, but while 
Glaucon earlier rejected Socrates’ hinting with silence, Adeimantus bluntly rejects his 
rhetoric by calling Socrates’ proclamation “nonsense” (362e1). Instead, he demands 
that Socrates listen to what he has to say: “We must also go through the arguments 
opposed to those of which he spoke, those that praise justice and blame injustice” 
(362e2-3). According to Adeimantus, Glaucon’s intention will then be clearer. He sets 
out by presenting two clusters of arguments.  
                                                          
8 Cf. Adam, note on Rep. 362b. 
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4.2.1 Cluster I: Arguments related to reputation (362e4-363e4) 
The first cluster is related to good reputation, and Adeimantus’ point of departure is 
the fathers and all those who have care for anyone, that is, the ones who in one way or 
another have to do with paideia. He asserts that they all urge that one must be just, 
though “they don’t praise justice by itself but the good reputations that come from it” 
(363a2-3). When they exhort their charges to be just, they gain some benefits as a 
result. Adeimantus’ first argument is in accordance with Thrasymachus and Glaucon: 
Ruling offices and marriages will come to the one who seems to be just. His second 
argument relates to general thoughts on practicing religion. Here he recalls Cephalus’ 
statements, but in a somewhat ironical way: “by throwing in good reputation with the 
gods, they can tell of an inexhaustible store of goods that they say gods give to the 
holy” (363a6-8). This “inexhaustible store” Adeimantus exemplifies through the 
features of afterlife set forth by the poets. When they speak about what the gods give 
to the holy, the source for people, in general, is the poetical topos. The first ones 
presented are Hesiod and Homer who say pretty much the same things about what the 
gods make for the just. Secondly, it is Musaeus and his son9 who “give the just even 
headier goods than these from the gods” (363c3-4). Through their speeches, they make 
people believe that “the finest wage of virtue is an eternal drunk” (363d2-3). Thirdly, 
Adeimantus presents others who extend the wages from the gods yet further than 
these; “[…] they extol justice. In turn, they bury the unholy and unjust in mud10 in 
Hades and compel them to carry waters in a sieve; and they bring them into bad 
reputation while they are still alive” (363d5-e1). “Thus,” Adeimantus concludes, 
“those penalties that Glaucon described as the lot of the just men who are reputed to be 
unjust, these people say are the lot of the unjust. However, they have nothing else to 
say. This then is the praise and blame attached to each” (363d8-e4). From 
Adeimantus’ elaboration we learn that when justice and injustice are considered from 
                                                          
9 Bloom (1991b, 447n10) explains that by the son of Musaeus, Adeimantus may refer to “Eumolpus 
who, among other things, was reputed to have instituted the Eleusinian Mysteries, one of the central 
Athenian religious observances. His descendants were the Eleusinian priests. If it is indeed Eumolpus 
who is meant, Adeimantus is implicitly criticizing the official Athenian understanding of the future 
life.”  
10 Adam, note on Rep. 363d, says “something which they call mud” and explains that this mud is 
Orphic. The employment of the Danaid legend in Orphic teaching is illustrated in the Gorgias 493b; 
cf. also the Phaedo 69c and the Republic 533d.   
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the perspective of the afterlife, things are turned upside down. According to Glaucon, 
the just man is punished in the life here and now, but according to Adeimantus, the 
unjust man is punished in the afterlife. The conviction of how and where these 
punishments are received results in a discrepancy which is bound to create a double 
standard: In fear of the afterlife, the unjust man wants a reputation of being just; and in 
fear of being perceived as foolish and being punished, the just man cannot exist in the 
public sphere. In this light, Cephalus’ definition of justice (to pay back what one owes) 
makes sense; this is not to say that Cephalus was an unjust man, but that he—due to 
fear of the afterlife—wanted to make sure that the books were balanced before he 
departed. So, if Glaucon sets forth a critique against the double standards in 
contemporary Athens, Adeimantus directs his against how some present a spurious 
depiction of the Orphic conception of the afterlife, the official understanding of the 
afterlife and Greek religion in general.11   
4.2.2 Cluster II: Arguments in speeches (363e5-365a3) 
In his second cluster of arguments, Adeimantus wants Socrates to “consider still 
another form of speeches about justice and injustice, spoken in prose (ἰδίᾳ, 363e6) and 
by poets” (363e5-364a1). “Prose,” which translates ἰδίᾳ, has commonly been 
understood as writing in prose, but the reference is only to the representations of 
private persons (i.e., parents).12 Bloom (1991b, 447n11) points out that “[t]he 
expression for prose is composed of words meaning “to speak privately” and could 
also mean what one says in private.” Words spoken in prose refers to representations 
of private persons, while words spoken by the poets (who also in a sense were the 
professional teachers of Greece) include public speeches written in verse and poetry 
addressed to men in large groups (cf. ibid).13 By this distinction, Adeimantus 
                                                          
11 Cf. Bloom (1991b, 447n10), and Adam, note on Rep. 363b and 363c. On the critique related to the 
Orphic conception of the afterlife, Adeimantus says that the “beggar priests” and “diviners” present 
“a babble of books by Musaeus and Orpheus, offspring of the Moon and the Muses, as they say, 
according to whose prescriptions they busy themselves about their sacrifices” (364e3-5).  
12 Cf. Adam, note on Rep. 363e. 
13 Bloom (1991b, 447n11) presents an appeal on this ground: “Prose has a naturalness and frankness 
connected with its private character, and this should provide a basis for reflection on Plato’s choice 
of prose for the presentation of his own thought.” This appeal is addressed by quite a few scholars; 
see, for example, Hyland (1968). 
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foreshadows the discussion developing at 366e ff., and which is discussed from an 
alternative perspective at 606c ff.14  
When it comes to speeches about justice and injustice, the speeches in prose and 
those by the poets are spoken with one tongue. They all “chant that moderation 
(σωφροσύνη, 364a2) and justice (δικαιοσύνη, 364a2) are fair, but hard and full of 
drudgery, while intemperance (ἀκολασία, 364a3) and injustice (ἀδικία, 364a3) are 
sweet and easy to acquire, and shameful (αἰσχρόν, 364a5) only by opinion and law” 
(364a1-5). In accordance with Thrasymachus, Adeimantus states that both in public 
and in private they say that the unjust is, for the most part, more profitable than the 
just. They are even “ready and willing to call happy and to honor bad men who have 
wealth or some other power, and to dishonor and overlook those who happen in some 
way to be weak or poor, although they agree that the latter are better than the former” 
(364a5-b2). Although this argument is not directly transferable to Cephalus’ statement 
that the pleasure of wealth goes only for the “decent” or the morally reasonable man, 
Adeimantus’ argument here can be viewed as a second criticism toward the attitude of 
the elder generation.  
 “The most wonderful (θαυμασιώτατοι, 364b3) of all these speeches are those 
they give about gods and virtue” (364b2-4), Adeimantus ironically claims. He relates 
these speeches to “beggar priests” and “diviners.” They claim that the gods themselves 
are sometimes kind to the wicked; they proclaim that the gods sometimes allocate 
misfortune and a bad life to many good men, and an opposite fate to opposite men. 
They wander “to the doors of the rich man and persuade him that the gods have 
provided them with a power based on sacrifices and incantations” (364b6-c1). If then, 
the rich man himself, or his ancestors, once has committed some injustice, they 
promise to heal the deed with pleasures and feasts. Even if he should wish “to ruin 
some enemies at small expense, he will injure just and unjust alike with certain 
evocations and spells. They, as they say, persuade the gods to serve them” (364c3-5). 
Had Cephalus been exposed to such men? Could this be the reason for his vague 
utterance about the pleasures of wealth? It could very well be so, and Cephalus did 
find support for his opinions by quoting the poets, as Adeimantus stresses. These 
                                                          
14 The same distinction (private versus poets) is also present in the Laws (890a).  
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beggar-priests and diviners do not only persuade private persons but cities as well. 
They present a babble of books by Orpheus and people are led to believe that … 
 
… through sacrifices and pleasurable games there are, after all, deliverances and 
purifications from unjust deeds for those still living. And there are also rites for 
those who are dead (τελευτήσασιν, 365a1). These, which they call initiations 
(τελετὰς, 365a2) deliver us from the evils in the other place; while, for those who 
did not sacrifice, terrible things are waiting (364e6-365a3). 
 
What Adeimantus describes here is a perverted twist on the Orphic tradition, where the 
words τελευτάω (ending life) and τελετή are connected, because they seem to mean 
that the sensations of dying resembled those of initiation into the Great Mysteries.15 
Thus the beggar-priests and diviners are delivering solutions which are perverting and 
poisoning the religious life in Athens and the common opinions of the gods by making 
people believe that “anything goes” if they pay the fee for the rites and make the 
prescribed offerings.  
4.2.3 Arguments threatening the souls of the young (365a4-c6) 
It now turns out that Adeimantus has presented all these examples because he is 
concerned and worried on behalf of the youths: “My dear Socrates,” he says, “with all 
these things being said—of this sort and in this quantity—about virtue and vice and 
how human beings and gods honor them, what do we suppose they do to the souls of 
the young men who hear them?” (365a4-7). Adeimantus ponders what will become of 
the youths with good natures (εὐφυεῖς, 365a7) and the capacity (ἱκανοὶ, 365a7) to 
search the path that will give them the best life? The ones with good nature are the 
ones with the capacity to fly (ἐπυττόμενοι, 365a8) around like bees collecting honey. 
When this seeker has collected his “honey,” he will most likely listen to Pindar who 
asks, “Will I ‘with justice or with crooked deceits scale the higher wall’ where I can 
fortify myself all around and live out my life?” (365b2-5). Adeimantus is convinced 
that in all the things said so far—by Thrasymachus, Glaucon, and himself—there is 
nothing which indicates that being just is an advantage, and “the labors and penalties 
involved are evident” (365b6-7).  
                                                          
15 Cf. Schleiermacher and Kurz (1990, 115n16); Bloom (1991b,447n14); and Adam, note on Rep. 365a. 
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At this point, Adeimantus changes his use of pronouns; he switches from the 
third person “he” to first person “I.” This could indicate that he identifies with the 
seeker mentioned above: “But if I’m unjust, but have provided myself with a 
reputation for justice, a divine life is promised” (365b7-c1). Because he would have 
chosen to listen to the wise ones, he would have lent his ear to the saying “the seeming 
overpowers even the truth” (365c2),16 and because “seeming” seems to be the master 
of happiness, he would surely have turned to it. What would such a life be like? 
Adeimantus’ answer to this is worth listening to: “As façade and exterior I must draw 
a shadow painting17 of virtue all around me, while behind it I must trail the wily and 
subtle fox of the most wise Archilochus” (365c3-6). This textual “I” now develops a 
thought experiment, and then continues as a collective “we” in the next section. Using 
a variant of the method creating “an imaginary interlocutor,” Adeimantus presents a 
severe critique against the general opinion in Athens.  
4.2.4 Adeimantus creates “an imaginary interlocutor” (365c6-366b3) 
Like Socrates did, when discussing with Polemarchus and Thrasymachus, Adeimantus 
now creates an imaginary interlocutor called “someone,” whereas the collective “we” 
provides the answers. In using one part of the well-known “Socratic method,” 
Adeimantus discloses that he is familiar with the concept of “doing philosophy.” This 
implies that Adeimantus now sets out to investigate (ἐξετάζω) the dominant opinions 
in contemporary Athens, a society he identifies with through his use of the collective 
“we.”     
 
“But,” says someone, “it’s not always easy to do bad and get away with it 
unnoticed.”  
 
“Nothing great is easy,” we’ll say. “But at all events, if we are going to be 
happy we must go where the tracks of the arguments lead. For, as to getting 
away with it, we’ll organize secret societies and clubs; and there are teachers of 
persuasion who offer the wisdom of the public assembly and the court. On this 
basis, in some things we’ll persuade and in others use force; thus, we’ll get the 
better and not pay the penalty” (365c6-d6). 
 
                                                          
16 This saying is attributed to Simonides. Cf. also the Laws, 950c. 
17 σκιαγραφίαν (365c4) translates “shadow painting” which also denotes “perspective drawing;” cf. 
523b and 602d. σκιαγραφίαν with its cognate words is continually used to denote things unreal, 
counterfeit, or illusory. cf. Adam, note on Rep. 365c, cf. also Theaetetus 208e. 
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In this imaginary word exchange, there are strong allusions to the political life of 
Athens,18 and the statement given by “someone” also alludes to the Spartan ideal in 
which boys were not punished for doing a crime, but for being caught doing so.19 The 
“we” proposes that happiness is secured by following the tracks of the argument set 
forth by “someone.” If we want to do bad and get away with it, we organize secret 
societies and clubs where we foster conspiracies.20 Such conspirators are always a 
threat to the political establishment; and when the teachers of persuasion (sophists and 
rhetoricians) also, offer to help one get around the public assembly and courts, it is 
possible to get away unpunished. Consequently, it is possible to plan a strategy for 
getting away when it comes to people and society, but is it possible to lure the gods?  
 
“But, says someone, “it surely isn’t possible to get away from the gods or 
overpower them.”  
 
“But, if there are no gods, or if they have no care for human things, why should 
we care at all about getting away?” we’ll say. “And if there are gods and they 
care, we know of them or have heard of them from nowhere else than the 
speeches21 and the poets who have given genealogies; and these are the very 
sources of our being told that they are such as to be persuaded and perverted by 
sacrifices, soothing vows, and votive offerings.22 (365d6-365e6).  
 
This is a clever answer from “we,” presented as what seems to be a material 
implication (“if p then q” or “p only if q”). The first variant of the implication invites 
to two versions: “If there are no gods, then we do not have to care,” and “if the gods 
do not care for human things, then we do not have to care.” So, if we do not believe 
that there are gods, then we are safe and can do whatever we want without fear. It 
seems to me that we here find an allusion to Protagoras, who was charged with impiety 
in Athens for suggesting that there are no gods, and to the natural philosophers who 
                                                          
18 Cf. Adam, note on Rep. 365d. cf. also Apology, 36b; Theaetetus, 173d; and Thucydides, VIII: 54.  
19 Cf. p. 142n7 above. 
20 One example of such a conspiracy is the coup of 411 where the Four Hundred overthrew the 
democracy. These secret societies and clubs are prohibited by the Athenian Stranger in the Laws 
(856b ff.).  
21 Bloom (1991b, 447-48n18) points out that at this point there are discrepancies in the manuscripts; 
the version I relate to (Émile Chambry) reads logoi (speeches), while Bloom is following Burnet and 
reads nomoi (laws). I choose to follow Chambry.  
22 Cf. the Laws 885b. These three classes of heretics are severally refuted in the passages 886a-907b.  
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claimed the same.23 Thus, I take this to be an implicit critique regarding these 
positions. The second variant of the implication casts doubt into the equation: “We do 
not have to care only if there are no gods.” This implies that we can never be quite 
sure, so what if there are gods after all? Again, “we” argue well: If there are gods, we 
have learned about them from the poets, and the poets tell that we can persuade the 
gods through offerings.  
Adeimantus concludes his argument by stating that “Either both things must be 
believed or neither” (365e6-7). By his next reflection, he foreshadows the conversation 
between him and Socrates (A1) which is developing from 376d5, where they start their 
construction of the “true city.” According to Adeimantus, the alleged dilemma can be 
sorted out quite easily: If these things “are to be believed, injustice must be done, and 
sacrifice offered from the unjust acquisitions” (365e7-366a1). There is no reason to 
fear because if we are just, we will not be punished by the gods. That is all, he claims. 
Within this scenario, we will also refuse all the benefits of injustice. However, “if we 
are unjust, we shall gain and get off unpunished as well, by persuading the gods with 
prayers when we transgress and make mistakes” (366a2-4). Still, the last theme is the 
afterlife, what will happen there? 
 
“But, someone will say, “in Hades we’ll pay the penalty for our injustices here, 
either we ourselves or our children’s children.”  
 
“But, my dear,” will the man who calculates say, “the initiations and the 
delivering gods have great power, as say the greatest cities and those children of 
gods who have become poets and spokesmen of the gods and reveal that this is the 
case.” (366a5-b3) 
 
From the claim presented by “someone” in this scenario, it seems like the fear of 
Hades is present either way, and in this case “we” does not answer, but “the man who 
calculates.” This is a man who finds it in his best interest that the people believe in the 
gods, as they are presented by certain poets who claim to be spokesmen for the gods; 
for example, the beggar-priests and likes who Adeimantus attacked earlier. Against 
this backdrop he addresses Socrates, “Then, by what further argument could we 
choose justice before the greatest injustice?” he asks (366b4-5). His conclusion in this 
                                                          
23 Cf. Apology 18c. 
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section is somewhat resigned: “For, if we possess it with a counterfeited seemly 
exterior, we’ll fare as we are minded with gods and human beings both while we are 
living and when we are dead, so goes the speech of both the many and the eminent” 
(366b4-8).  
4.2.5 Adeimantus’ summary (366b8-367a4) 
From what is said so far, he claims, it follows that someone must show us that what is 
said is false, and this someone must have adequate knowledge and be able to argue 
that justice is best. If there is such a person, he will undoubtedly have great sympathy 
for the unjust, and he is not angry with them. On the contrary, this person “knows that, 
except for someone who from a divine nature cannot stand doing injustice or who has 
gained knowledge and keeps away from injustice, no one else is willingly just, but 
because of a lack of courage or old age or some other weakness, men blame injustice 
because they are unable to do it” (366c6-d2). This is the case, and it is plain, 
Adeimantus argues. The person he is searching for is, of course, Socrates. Also, by this 
appeal, Adeimantus is also probing for a new kind of paideia and thus a profound 
turnaround of the established opinions regarding religion and afterlife. He pinpoints 
the main problem when he rounds off his summary: There is no one who ever has, 
neither in poetry nor prose, adequately developed the argument that when a soul 
possesses injustice, and when the injustice is not noticed by gods and men, that it is the 
greatest of evils embedded in a soul that a man can have, and justice the greatest good. 
If youths were told from the beginning and persuaded that the result would be that they 
“would not keep guard over each other for fear injustice be done, but each would be 
his own best guard (φύλαξ, 367a3), afraid that in doing injustice he would dwell with 
the greatest evil” (367a2-4). When Socrates and Adeimantus later (369a ff.) decide on 
the method for the great investigation, they will first look for justice in the city and 
then in the individual. Hence, the city’s justice is supposed to be mirrored in the 
individual’s justice. It is the guardian (φύλαξ) who is given the task to guard the 
justice in the city, and as Adeimantus says here—each one of us is the best guard of 
justice in each individual soul. Thus, Adeimantus is foreshadowing the mirroring 
regarding justice in the city versus the individual. Also, he is anticipating the definition 
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of justice as it is formulated at 433b3-5 (justice is the practice of minding one’s own 
business). 
4.2.6 Adeimantus’ challenges to Socrates (367a5-e5) 
When Adeimantus explicitly presents his challenge to Socrates, he emphasizes that he 
speaks his own opinion (contrary to Glaucon who stressed the opposite and took on the 
role as “the devil’s advocate”). Adeimantus also stresses that Thrasymachus’ opinions 
were in accordance with people in general, and what he and possibly several others say 
about justice and injustice are “vulgarly turning their powers upside down” (367a7-8). 
Adeimantus wants to be frank and hides nothing from Socrates, and because he desires 
to hear the opposite opinion from Socrates, he will speak as vehemently as he can. 
His first challenge is that Socrates shall not only show by argument that justice is 
stronger than injustice, but also show what justice in itself—as well as its counterpart, 
injustice—does to a man who possesses it and how it makes one man bad and the other 
man good.  In accordance with Glaucon, Adeimantus also stresses that reputation is 
not relevant. He is also implicitly in agreement with Glaucon regarding the 
discrepancy between Socrates’ words and deeds, but Adeimantus puts it forth as a 
threating appeal: 
 
For if you don’t take the true reputation from each and attach the false one to it, 
we’ll say that you aren’t praising the just but the seeming, nor blaming being 
unjust but the seeming; and that you’re exhorting one to be unjust and to get away 
with it; and that you agree with Thrasymachus that the just is someone else’s 
good, the advantage of the stronger, while the unjust is one’s own advantage and 
profitable, but disadvantageous to the weaker (367b6-c6). 
 
Adeimantus’ second challenge is for Socrates to show what profit justice in itself is to 
the man who possesses it, and what harm injustice does to the man who possesses it. 
On this point he demands that Socrates leaves out both wages and reputation—that is 
for others to praise. Adeimantus will expect no less from Socrates because he has 
spent his whole life considering nothing but this. This statement recalls Cephalus and 
the life-traveling theme introduced by Socrates earlier; Cephalus was not able to 
elaborate on the road he had traveled, but Socrates’ road is well known—at least to 
Adeimantus who concludes: “So, don’t only show us by the argument that justice is 
stronger than injustice, but show what each in itself does to the man who has it—
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whether it is noticed by gods and human beings or not—that makes the one good and 
the other bad” (367e1-5). 
The narrator now informs us that Socrates had always been full of wonder at the 
nature of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but at this point, he was particularly delighted. 
Socrates’ first response to their enactment is to congratulate them with a reference to 
their two fathers; first with reference to Thrasymachus, their spiritual father, “you 
children of that man (ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός, 368a2)”24 and then a reference to 
their physical father, Ariston. Are these two paternal references meant to be just a 
joke? I think they are set forth with a smile, but there is a degree of seriousness behind 
them. It is by now obvious that the conversation between Thrasymachus and Socrates 
triggered the brothers. Through Thrasymachus, they recognized that his opinions 
concerning justice and injustice were in accordance with people in general and with 
the political establishment in particular. They are not willing to accept the way 
Socrates met Thrasymachus’ claims. Thrasymachus did not present his “private 
opinion” as Socrates implied; quite the contrary. Thrasymachus presented a common 
view, and the two brothers now want to hear explicit arguments supporting justice. 
Thus, they force Socrates to start displaying his concealed topos. In this way, 
Thrasymachus is the one who sets the main conversations of the Republic in motion, 
and in this way, Thrasymachus is to be viewed as the brother’s spiritual father. The 
reference to Ariston is somewhat more playful. Socrates refers to a poem made by 
Glaucon’s lover, about how the two brothers distinguished themselves in the battle at 
Megara: “Sons of Ariston, divine offspring of a famous man” (368a5). By this 
reference, Socrates couples the negative forces of Eros to Glaucon, and when this, in 
turn, is coupled to Glaucon’s role as ‘the devil’s advocate,’ I assume that Socrates 
anticipates that Glaucon will be the hardest one to convince. Socrates concludes that 
something quite divine (θεῖον, 368a5) must have happened to them since they remain 
unpersuaded that injustice is better than justice; and he compliments them for being 
able to speak so well on behalf of justice. This mirrors Glaucon’s response to Socrates 
                                                          
24 Cf. Schleiermacher and Kurz (1990, 123n2); Adam, note on Rep. 368a; and Bloom (1991b, 448n21). 
They all suggest that τοῦ ἀνδρός (that man) points to Thrasymachus. 
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when he said that Thrasymachus was being enchanted by Socrates like a snake; the 
two brothers show that neither Thrasymachus nor Socrates managed to enchant them.  
4.3 The case is settled (367e6-369b4) 
Despite the compliments, Socrates seems to be a little uncomfortable. He says that 
Glaucon and Adeimantus both seem—truly—not to have been persuaded. 
Nevertheless, he distrusts them if they claim that this has to do with the arguments set 
forth. Rather, he infers that it is due to their character (τρόπου, 368b2). This creates a 
dilemma because the more Socrates trusts (πιστεύω, 368b3) them, the more he is at a 
loss as to what he should do. On the one hand, he cannot help out: In his opinion, he is 
not capable of it because they did not accept his arguments. In Socrates’ opinion, he 
ascertained his case when he showed Thrasymachus that justice is better than injustice. 
At this point, Socrates is not willing to admit his failure further than what he already 
confessed in his summary regarding the conversation with Thrasymachus. On the other 
hand, he cannot help out, because he is afraid it might be impious to be present when 
“justice is being spoken badly of and give up and not bring help while I am still 
breathing and able to make a sound. So, the best thing is to succor her as I am able” 
(368c). The narrator now reports that Glaucon and the others begged Socrates “in 
every way to help out and not to give up the argument, but rather to seek out what each 
is and the truth about the benefit of both” (368c4-d1). After the well-known “leaving 
threat and begging-to-stay ceremony”25 is done with, Socrates again takes the floor, 
speaks his opinion and presents a proposal for further investigation: 
 
It looks to me as though the investigation (ζήτημα, 368c7) we are undertaking is 
no ordinary thing, but one for a man who sees sharply. Since we’re not clever men 
(δεινοί, 368d1) […], in my opinion we should make this kind of investigation 
(ζήτησιν, 368d2) of it: If someone had, for example, ordered men who don’t see 
very sharply to read little letters from afar and then someone had the thought that 
the same letters are somewhere else also, but bigger and in a bigger place, I 
suppose it would look like a godsend to be able to consider the littler ones after 
having read these first, if, of course, they do happen to be the same (368c7-d7). 
 
                                                          
25 This “leaving threat and begging-to-stay ceremony” is very common and presents a turning in the 
texts where it is used. For example, in the Republic, we have already witnessed that Thrasymachus 
threatened to leave but the others all begged him to stay; in the Parmenides, Parmenides threatens 
to leave but is begged to stay; in the Protagoras, Socrates threatens to leave and is begged to stay. 
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Socrates has now turned the tables and presented his famous “big-small-letter” 
metaphor. This undertaking is not an ordinary thing, he says. It is a task for a man who 
sees sharply (the philosopher) because the weak-sighted (ordinary) men can recognize 
only small letters at a distance if they have studied the same letters on a larger scale. 
They (the philosophers) shall advocate this as the method for the inquiry: First study 
justice on a larger scale and then in a smaller. Adeimantus understands this example, 
but he does not understand what it is in the investigation of justice that is like this. 
Socrates does not explain; instead, he proposes that they will first investigate 
(ζητήσωμεν, 369a2) what justice is like in the cities; then they will consider 
(ἐπισκεψώμεθα, 369a3) justice in the individuals before they will consider the likeness 
of the bigger in the idea (ἰδέᾳ, 369a4) of the littler. How are they to conduct this 
project? Through a thought experiment,26 and Socrates elaborates: “If we should watch 
a city coming into being in speech (εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ, 369a6-7), 
would we also see its justice coming into being and its injustice?” (369a6-8). After the 
thought experiment is completed, Socrates argues, they will be able to see (ἰδεῖν, 
369a10) what they are searching for (ζητοῦμεν, 369a11). Adeimantus gives his 
consent to this procedure. Socrates responds by asking: “Is it resolved that we must try 
to carry this out? I suppose it’s no small job, so consider it” (369b2-3). Despite 
Socrates’ warning, Adeimantus replies: “It’s been considered, don’t do anything else” 
(369b4).  
The Prologue is now over. We have found it bracketed by the phrase “it is 
resolved.” The phrase alludes to the political assembly in Athens where it was used to 
announce that the sovereign authority had passed a law or a decree. Socrates used it 
first in a conclusive way when he and Glaucon decided to stay in Piraeus (cf. 328b3). 
                                                          
26 It is central for me that the construction of the upcoming states is apprehended as thought 
experiments, and as I use the translation of Bloom (1991) I do not think this point comes forth due to 
the word Θεασαίμεθα, which is undermined in Bloom’s translation. θεασαίμεθα translates to look 
on, gaze at, view, behold, and it is coupled to viewing as in to view like spectators and to the 
spectators in a theatre. I will, therefore, give three other examples where this word is highlighted: 1) 
Jowett: “And if we imagine the State in process of creation, we shall see the justice and injustice of 
the State in process of creation also.” 2) Schleiermacher/Kurz: “Wenn wir in Gedanken eine Stadt 
enstehen sehen, so würden wir dann auch ihre Gerechtigkeit und Ungerechtigkeit mit entstehen 
sehen?“ 3) Mørland: “Hvis vi nå i tankene ser for oss hvordan en stat oppstår, vil vi vel også kunne se 
hvordan rettferdighet og urettferdighet oppstår?“  
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Toward Adeimantus the phrase was formulated as a question and answered 
confirmatively. Socrates used it twice to state implicitly that the authorities were 
Glaucon and Adeimantus, respectively. Also, there was an element of force involved, 
first, when Socrates concluded it was so resolved that they had to stay in Piraeus, after 
giving in to a threat from Polemarchus and a decision uttered by Glaucon and 
secondly, after the challenges set forth by the two brothers, Socrates asked if it was 
resolved that the investigation had to be carried out—he even warned them about the 
work involved. Adeimantus said that it had been considered and demanded Socrates to 
start the investigation (don’t you do anything else).  
However, it now turns out that there is a second bracketing. In the upcoming 
Interlude stretching over the passages 449a1-451b8, Socrates is arrested by the 
particular audience and accused of not telling them all he knows. Adeimantus argues 
that by holding back in this manner, Socrates is robbing them of a whole section 
(εἶδος) of the argument. The reason for this robbery is that Socrates takes it all too 
easy and is not willing to go through it all (cf. 449c2-3). Adeimantus states that they 
have now resolved that Socrates is not to be released until he has gone through the rest 
of what he has heard (cf. 450a). Hence, the third time the phrase “it is so resolved” is 
uttered, it is voiced by Adeimantus, who at this point confirms that he has heard these 
arguments previously. It is also imperative for the further development that 
Adeimantus now actually confirms that Socrates warrants his claims and arguments in 
a topos outside of the ordinary. The consequence of Adeimantus’ demand in this 
context is that we also find the sections 369b5-445e4 bracketed by the phrase “it is so 
resolved.” The impact of the second bracketing is, I suggest, that these upcoming 
sections serve as a preparation27 that eventually will allow us to enter the realm of 
philosophy. The whole situation as it now develops can be viewed as a trial: Socrates 
must defend Justice by his own terms; the accuser is Glaucon, who has taken on the 
role of “the devil’s advocate” and is defending Injustice; Adeimantus is taking on the 
                                                          
27 During my readings, I will give reasons for denoting the upcoming sections’ “preparations.” Here I 
will underline that some scholars have indicated the same thing, although not so sharply. Craig 
(2001, 270-71) argues that to become a philosopher depends on the warrior’s virtues, and he states 
that the turning toward philosophy happens in Books VI-VII. I argue that this turning happen when 
we enter Book V. Kochin (1999, 403) argues that the education on warfare in Book V “inculcates the 
orientation to philosophy necessary to achieve a just polity” (Frank 2007, 464n10). 
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role of a judge watching out for the consequences of possessing justice and injustice. 
The raison d`etre for the whole trial is Thrasymachus, who now belongs to the jurors 





















Chapter 5: Founding cities—making (ποιοῦομεν) guardians (369b5-
451c3) 
 
As stated above, the sections 369b5-445e4 are bracketed by the phrase “it is so 
resolved.” I take this second bracketing to be a significant textual hint or clue, and it 
will be the leading guide for the close readings I execute in this chapter. In total, 
Socrates is engaged in five conversations with each brother, and in this chapter, I will 
read the first three in sequences.1 When we arrive at the third conversation with 
Glaucon, G3, at 449a1, the particular audience interrupts. In this interlude, Socrates is 
arrested, and he will not be released until he has presented the whole argument for 
them or all that he has heard on this matter. The arrest marks the end of this chapter. 
Thus, G3 continues in chapter 6: The demiurges of freedom. My aim in chapter 5 is to 
show that it is possible to read these sections as preparations which will guide us into 
the realm of philosophy and eventually make us turn toward philosophy. By “us,” I 
now mean readers, in addition to Glaucon and Adeimantus, that is, both the particular 
and the universal audiences. My point of departure is the claim that Socrates has not 
yet revealed his topos, but during the upcoming sections, it slowly but surely becomes 
clear that his opinions on politics and paideia are outlandish compared to those held by 
his contemporaries. I also suggest that it is through these preparatory stages that 
philosophy emerges as a new cultural practice. This entails that Socrates shows how a 
philosopher’s view on politeia contrasts the existing ones and in this way is the first 
imperative step toward defining philosophy. That Socrates’ arguments are out of the 
ordinary is confirmed by Adeimantus, who also will demand that he tell all that he has 
heard (cf. 449c-450b). For Socrates, the challenges and demands set forth by Glaucon 
and Adeimantus are the point of departure, and the relevant question is how he meets 
them.  
As a construct for the search for justice in the city and man, Socrates chooses to 
set up two contrasting cities, in close collaboration with each brother. Such an idea 
                                                          
1 I have defined the sequences as follows: A1 is Adeimantus and Socrates’ first conversation, and it 
develops within the sections 369b5-372c2. G1 is Glaucon and Socrates’ first conversation, and it 
develops within the sections 372c3-376d4. The next sequences are: A2 (376d5-398c6); G2 (398c6-
417b10); A3 (419a1-427d8); G3 (427d8-487a8). 
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was, according to Karel Thein (2015, 221), not a new undertaking, but “an ancient 
philosophical discussion.” The characteristic of this discussion was to superpose “two 
cities and merging them into one, with a hope that some new quality will arise, and 
violent conflict will be made absent from the city” (ibid). When Socrates, at this point, 
awakens the two-city topos, he also, in turn, evokes the poetic topos, especially 
Homer,2 Hesiod,3 and Aristophanes.4 In addition, he evokes the war-peace topos.5 
Related to the latter, I lean on Raaflaub (2011, 7-8), who has validated how both tragic 
and comic playwrights in the fifth century “openly criticized the brutality and 
senselessness of war and, undercutting the warmongering politicians and the Athenian 
ideology of war, emphasized the desirability of peace.” I argue that these three topoi 
function as imperative subtexts in and backdrops for the following sections. From this 
perspective, I further suggest that Socrates is primarily doing two things. First, he and 
Adeimantus found a city in speech, or they construct a thought experiment; this is a 
city in peaceful harmony, which from the beginning Socrates denotes as the “true 
                                                          
2 In the Iliad, Homer contrasts the modes of war and peace through the description of Achilles’ shield 
where one side pictured a city in peace, the other a city at war, cf. lines 490-540.  
3 In Hesiod’s Works and Days, during lines 320-34, “we are shown a wicked city whose denizens “like 
harsh violence and cruel acts,” and where “Justice is dragged perforce” by “bribe-eating men” who 
“judge their cases with crooked decisions”—no doubt like those judges that Hesiod charges with 
having taken bribes to favor Perses’ side in his legal dispute with Hesiod. On the other hand, Hesiod 
presents a virtuous city where judges “issue straight decisions to their own people and to strangers.” 
The cities’ destinies are likewise different: Those in the just city fare well: “Their city flourishes” 
under the reign of “Peace, who brings boys to manhood;” as for those in the unjust city, Zeus 
“ordains their punishment,” for Justice “brings a curse upon all those who drive her out.” Thus, 
“Justice wins over violence … in the end.” This summary is taken from Long (2015). I return to this 
theme below, in section 5.4.5: The “noble lie,” pp. 190-96, and in chapter 6: The demiurges of 
freedom, section 6.2: Second wave, pp. 218-19. 
4 In the Birds, (414) we meet the old Athenian Peisetaerus (“Persuader of His Comrades”) who leaves 
Athens together with his friend Euelpides (“Confident”) in order to escape debts and because they 
are fed up with Athenian politics. They head out in search of “a peaceable place (τόπον ἀπράγμονα, 
44)” which they hope to find somewhere far away from Athens. In due time, Peisetaerus infers that 
they are unlikely to find this “peaceable place” anywhere on earth, so he convinces himself and 
Tereus that this place is to be found among the birds in the sky (162 ff.). He proposes to “encircle the 
whole atmosphere, all the area between earth and sky, with a wall of big baked bricks, like Babylon” 
(551-53). The new polis is named “Cloudcuckooland” (819), and when performing the founding 
sacrifices, “a parade of pests and profiteers, most of them satirizing familiar Athenian types, arrive 
seeking admission to the new polis: but none is admitted.” Henderson (2000, 5).  
5 With regard to war, Frank (2007, 444) points out that “[t]aking seriously the many references to and 
images of warfare in the Republic, a rich recent scholarship has demonstrated that there can be not 
adequate account of the philosophy of the Republic without a due consideration of the dialogue’s 
treatment of war.” Cf. Kochin (1999), Craig (2001), Baracchi (2002, 133-76). 
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city.” Glaucon is not interested in the thought experiment. He wants to investigate a 
city where men live nowadays. His city is modeled after contemporary Athens, a polis 
characterized by violent conflicts. Glaucon’s city is then purged until it superposes on 
the true city and finally surfaces as the “beautiful city.” These conversations create a 
mirroring movement in the text: The features described in the first are transported into 
the second and so on. This pattern is consistent, and Socrates underlines it by referring 
to “our city,” “your city,” “our guardians,” “your citizens,” and so forth. I will not 
comment upon all instances, but I will highlight them through italicizing. Secondly, I 
argue that Socrates uses this two-city construct as a pedagogical tool to make us turn 
toward philosophy, because, put in Howland’s words, “the Republic is, among other 
things, a pedagogical drama” (1998b, 638). Regarding the particular audience, I take it 
that they are somehow bewildered due to what they have witnessed so far, but with 
three exceptions. We have already seen that Polemarchus6 and Adeimantus7 are on 
their way. Glaucon is more of a puzzle. He obviously knows of philosophy, 
nevertheless, at this point, he still appears to be an empirical thinker8 who—perhaps 
due to political ambitions—stands at a crossroads where he can choose between the 
paths of sophistry or philosophy. An important question is whether Socrates will 
succeed in making him take the right choice, and it is by paying close attention to 
Glaucon that the universal audience understands the complexity and implications of a 
turning. 
5.1 A1: Socrates, Adeimantus, and the true city (369b5-372c2) 
Socrates assumes that a city “comes into being because each of us isn’t self-sufficient 
[…]” (369b5-7), and from that outset, he invites Adeimantus to partake in a thought 
experiment where they will “make a city in speech from the beginning” (369c9). In 
speech, they found a healthy city based on the primary and necessary needs of its 
                                                          
6 Cf. chapter 2: Prologue II: Father and son, pp. 80-90, where Polemarchus made his turning. 
7 Cf. Chapter 4: Prologue III: The tide is turning for Thrasymachus, pp. 149-52, where Adeimantus 
performed the method “creating an imaginary interlocutor” that is a part of practicing philosophy. 
8 By “empirical thinker” I mean that Glaucon relates to the world he lives in and makes his inferences 
from experiences—somehow he resembles his “spiritual father,” Thrasymachus (cf. 368a2), cf. 
chapter 4: Prologue III: The tide is turning for Thrasymachus, p. 154n24. This is in accordance with the 
presentation of Glaucon in chapter 1: Preparing the stage, p. 54-5, where he was described as being 




inhabitants and make sure that the city is self-sufficient. Socrates denotes this 
construct the true city (372e6). The division of labor is “one man, one job,” or one 
man does the job he is most apt for, according to nature (i.e., his inherent talent). On 
this basis, Socrates asks, “Has our city already grown to completeness?” (371e8-9). 
Adeimantus is not sure, nor can he identify justice and injustice in the city unless “it’s 
somewhere in some need these men have of one another” (372a2). Socrates does not 
respond directly to Adeimantus’ suggestion.9 Instead, he summarizes by describing the 
manner of life in this community. The inhabitants will live simple lives; they worship 
earth and the gods through dancing and singing. Socrates describes their nutrition, 
their pleasures, and claims that they “will live out their lives in peace (εἰρήνῃ) and 
health (ὑγιείας) […] dying as old men, they will hand down other similar lives to their 
offspring” (372d2-3).10 Nevertheless, he urges that they must be aware of a potential 
danger; they must “keep an eye out against poverty (πενίαν) and war (πόλεμον)” 
(372c2).11 At this point, a fiery Glaucon interrupts. He does not like the food in the 
true city. This is a “city of sows” (372d4), he proclaims.  
5.2 G1: Socrates, Glaucon, and the feverish city (372c3-376d4) 
When Glaucon dismisses the “true city” with reference to food and lack of relishes, he 
signals that he is not interested in partaking in a thought experiment; he prefers to 
investigate a conventional city where men live nowadays (cf. 372d7-e2). Socrates is 
willing to join, because in a feverish city—or a luxurious city—they “could probably 
see in what way justice and injustice naturally grow in cities” (372e5-6). Socrates 
draws a picture of the life the inhabitants lead in such a city (cf. 372e-373d).12 From 
                                                          
9 On Socrates’ silence, see p. 66n3 above. His silence here, I take to be a pointing forward to the 
definition of justice proposed in G3 at 441d-e. 
10 Socrates’ description of the healthy city is in accordance with the Athenian Stranger’s description 
of the men who were “inexperienced in the many beautiful things that go with urban life […]” (678b); 
during that time, “civil war and war were destroyed” (678e). The men “weren’t compelled by poverty 
to differ with one another,” and “since they lacked gold and silver, they didn’t ever become rich” 
thus “the most well-bred dispositions [i.e., human beings] usually spring up in a home [i.e., society] 
when neither wealth nor poverty dwell there; for neither insolence nor injustice, nor again jealousies 
and ill will come into being there” (Laws, 679b-c). 
11 This is the first time the link between poverty and war is stated.  
12 The inhabitants of the feverish city demand much more than those in the true city: couches, tables 
and other furniture, relishes, perfume, incense, courtesans, all sorts of cakes, painting, embroidery, 
gold, ivory. There will also be hunters, imitators (concerned with figures, colors and music), poets 
and their helpers, rhapsodes, actors, choral dancers, contractors, craftsmen of all sorts of equipment, 
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this he infers that the consequence of this lifestyle is war. Compared to the healthy city 
based on necessity (cf. 372a-b), the feverish city is like dough rising uncontrolled.13 
The politically ambitious Athenian Glaucon obviously does not find this disturbing. 
The problem of war and peace14 is carefully lifted to the forefront through Socrates’ 
next response: “[…] let’s not yet say whether war works evil or good,15 but only this 
much, that we have in its turn found the origin of war (πολέμου αὖ γένεσιν 
ηὑρήκαμεν)—in those things whose presence in cities most of all produces evils both 
private and public” (373e6-9).16 As Glaucon does not comment on this, Socrates goes 
on and states that “the city must be still bigger,17 and not by a small number but by a 
whole army, which will go out and do battle (στρατοπέδῳ) with invaders (ὃ ἐξελθὸν 
ὑπὲρ), for all the wealth and all the things we were just now talking about” (373e11-
374a2). Glaucon is surprised when it dawns on him that the inhabitants of the feverish 
city are not self-sufficient, which was the case in the “city of sows.” Socrates reminds 
him that both he himself and the others already agreed on the principle “one man one 
art.” Hence, Glaucon exhibits that he was not satisfactorily attentive when he listened 
to Adeimantus and Socrates’ former conversation. Despite this reminding, Glaucon 
apparently does not pull himself together— yet. He will get more reminders of the 
same kind later, and by this forgetfulness and inattentiveness he signals a nature 
opposite to the philosopher, who is a man of good memory (cf. 413c-d). For now, 
Glaucon does not have any objections regarding the consequences of the lifestyle in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
for feminine adornment, as well as other things. They will need more servants, teachers, wet nurses, 
governesses, beauticians, barbers, relish-makers, cooks, swineherds, and a greater need for doctors.  
13 Rosen, (1965, 465) argues that “Glaucon objects to this city that it is fit only for pigs because of the 
absence of meat and relish, and so he forces Socrates to enlarge the city […].” I cannot agree that 
Glaucon “forces” Socrates to enlarge the “healthy city,” on the contrary, I argue that from the outset 
we are presented with two distinct models.  
14 I call it the problem of war and peace in accordance with Bazaluk (2017). 
15 Whether “war works evil or good” is not explicitly discussed further in the Republic; however, if we 
turn to the Theaetetus and the section where Socrates explains the implications of the difference 
between a philosopher and the non-philosopher to Theodorus (174a-e), Theodorus concludes: 
“Socrates, if your words convinced everyone as they do me, there would be more peace and less evil 
on earth” (176a2-3). Here, it is confirmed that peace is good and war evil, and in this context 
Socrates continues by outlining why it is impossible to destroy evil.  
16 This argument on war, Socrates also set forth in the Phaedo, cf. 66c. It is also in accordance with 
the Athenian Stranger in the Laws, cf. p. 162n10 above. 
17 The perspective of the city in continuously growth is pointing forward to A3 (403c) where they set 
down a law that restricts growth. 
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the feverish city; hence no objections to war. Because he does not signpost any 
willingness even to reflect on the matter, he at this point resembles the prominent 
politicians of Athens, who, according to Price (2007, 68), considered “war a part of 
nature, as unavoidable as the weather, not bad in itself, even possibly good as a 
creative force or process, and in any case, a fixture in human experience.”18  
In the feverish city it is pleonexia that is the origin of war; put in Frank’s words: 
“the desire for more—more territory, more goods, and more power” (2007, 443).19 So 
far, Socrates has implicitly launched two different perspectives on warfare. On the one 
hand is war as attack. From this perspective, war is unavoidable due to the 
uncontrolled expansion; that is, the city is forced to attack the land of its neighbors to 
supply its inhabitants’ endless craving. This feature alludes to the Peloponnesian War 
and aggressive war-waging imperialistic politics of Athens,20 which in turn awakens 
the topos of autochthony, wherein the topos of same-mindedness is embedded.21 At 
this point, I consider these topoi to be sub-narratives, which will gradually surface and 
give reasons to claim that during these preparatory sections we witness a profound—
but implicit—criticism of the established Athenian political regime. On the other hand 
is war as defense. Socrates stresses that they will need an army to fight invaders, that 
is, to defend the city. I take this to be an allusion to the narratives describing the wars 
fought against the Persian invaders. According to Sissa (2011, 5), the Persian war was 
                                                          
18 That war is “a part of nature,” is also exposed by Kleinias in the Laws: “For what most humans call 
peace he [i.e., the lawgiver] held to be only a name; in fact, for everyone there always excists by 
nature an undecleared war among all cities” (626a2-5). This view is refuted by the Athenian Stranger. 
19 Frank further underlines: “With both an aggressive and defensive aspect, pleonexia generates the 
rule “take from another before another takes from you,” a rule characteristic of “apprehensive” 
states of war of all kinds.” Thucydides also indicates that pleonexia was the cause of the war: “The 
truest explanation was the growth of the Athenians to greatness, which brought fear to the 
Lacadaemonians and forced them to war” (1: 36). On the corrupting effects of pleonexia in Athens, 
see Balot (2001).  
20 I pointed out in chapter 1: Preparing the stage, throughout section 1.3.2: Socrates’ prayers, pp. 57-
61, that some aspects of this war transgressed the conventional rules of war. I will also return to this 
in chapter 6: The demiurges of freedom, section 6.2: Second wave, p. 218-19. However, as this is not 
the place to elaborate on the conventional laws of war; I at this point give my main references from 
where I have developed my understanding on this topic: Thuchydides; Price (2007), Lendon (2010), 
Strauss (1993), Wolpert (2002), Ober (1994), and Lanni (2008). 
21 The topos of autochthony and the topos of same-mindedness will be discussed below in section 
5.4.5: The noble lie, pp. 190-96. The topos of same-mindedness will also be discussed in chapter 10: 
The Apology, p. 354-56.  
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“the paradigmatic war: defensive, intrepid, and altruistic.”22 I suggest that this allusion 
surfaces at 470a5-471c2.23 At this point in the text, the distinction attack versus 
defense is stated, but neither Socrates nor Glaucon comment further on it here. 
However, when Socrates later introduces the guardians (φυλάκων, 374d8), I argue that 
it is the latter form of warfare that is their ultimate aim. In this regard, we are 
enlightened by Socrates when he later states that the aim is “making (ποιοῦομεν) true 
guardians, men least likely to do harm to the city” (421a9-b1). This “making of true 
guardians” points explicitly toward guarding and protection. Therefore, the guardian 
they set out to make is of a new kind, a breed not previously seen. Socrates emphasizes 
the importance of this new breed when he states that “to the extent that the work of the 
guardians is more important, it would require more leisure time than the other task as 
well as greater art and diligence” (374d8-e2). If he and Glaucon are able, their job now 
is to choose “which are the natures, and of what kind they are, fit for guarding the 
city” (374e4-5). Without deliberation, Glaucon gives his consent to partake, but 
Socrates signals reluctance toward the forthcoming task when he suddenly swears: 
“By Zeus […] it’s no mean thing we’ve taken upon ourselves. But nevertheless, we 
mustn’t be cowardly, at least as far as it’s in our power” (374e11-12).  
5.2.1 The nature of the guardians (374d8-376c7) 
When Socrates swears, it usually is a warning sign pointing toward a textual turn, this 
time to leave the reflections on the “feverish city” behind and instead pay attention to 
the guardians. I assume that the outset is the conventional concept of the “guardian,”24 
                                                          
22 Cf. chapter 1: Preparing the stage, section 1.3.2: Socrates’ prayers, p. 57-61, where I outlined how 
the goddess Artemis lent support to the Greeks during the Persian Wars and was absent during the 
Peloponnesian War. 
23 The theme attack versus defense and the difference between the Persian Wars (polemos) and the 
Peloponnesian War (stasis) will be a theme discussed at 470a5-471c2. I return to this in chapter 6: 
The demiurges of freedom, section 6.2.2.3: Third consideration: War and faction, p. 229-34. 
24 The conventional guardianship and the outlet of the redefinitions, I understand as the following: 
“The development of the law of guardianship in Greece was influenced by the change in the 
conception of guardianship itself, which began as a right of preserving and protecting the ward’s 
property in the interest of the whole kin (as contingent heir of the ward), but became gradually a 
duty of the guardian in the interest of the ward himself. This explains the restrictions imposed upon 
the guardian with regard to his control over the child’s property, and the increasing supervision of 
public authorities over his activity as guardian. The Greek guardian was either ἐπίτροπς of boys and 
girls until their majority—18 years in the case of the boys—and registration in the citizen list, or κύρις 
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hence, when Socrates now sets his redefining process25 in motion, he starts with 
something Glaucon knows very well. When it comes to guarding, Socrates argues, 
there is no significant difference between “a noble puppy and that of a well-born 
(εὐγενοῦς) young man” (375a2-3).26 I think this much-discussed analogy27 is laid 
before Glaucon with a specific purpose. As Glaucon relates to the empirical world, and 
as he is a dog breeder (cf. 459a2-3), Socrates invites him to make an inference on 
similar natures from something well known to him—a noble puppy and well-born 
men. However, he is not able to; “What do you mean?” Socrates elaborates (with a 
twinkle in his eye, I think), “As for the body’s characteristics, it’s plain how the 
guardian must be” (375b5-6). The guardians must have sharp senses, speed, and 
strength—just like a horse or a dog, and their soul must be courageous and spirited. 
Still, there is a problem to be solved: A gentle nature is the opposite of a spirited one, 
so the risk is that the nature of the guardian so far described could turn out to be a 
savage to the citizens. Socrates ponders: “Where will we find a disposition at the same 
time gentle and great-spirited?” (375c6-7); whereupon he pronounces that a good 
guardian is impossible to find. “I’m afraid so,” Glaucon agrees. Even the narrator 
confirms this, “I too was at loss (ἀπορήσας),” he says. This implies that they have 
already worked their way into an aporia. However, by looking back over the argument, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
of women for lifetime or until marriage.” (The Oxford Classical Dictionary 1991, eds. N.G.L Hammond 
and H.H. Scullard. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, p. 483). 
25 The conventional concept of the guardian will be redefined two times. First, the guardian by nature 
must be “be philosophic, spirited, swift, and strong” (376c4-6). Second, “the young, whom we were 
calling guardians up to now, we shall call auxiliaries and helpers of the rulers’ convictions” (414b4-6); 
cf. p. 191 below.  
26 The terms noble (γενναίου) and well-born (εὐγενοῦς) allude forward to the presentation of the 
“noble lie” at 414d1-e6, hence the topos of autochthony is subtly hinted at.  
27 For example, Saxonhouse (1978), who in an elusive and interesting study analyzes the use of 
animal imagery throughout the Republic. Her findings give way to quite a different conclusion than 
the one I will reach. She argues: “Through a study of the language and metaphor which Socrates uses 
during his discussion of his supposed utopia, particularly the animal imagery which is used 
throughout, we find that Socrates’ Kallipolis imitates the comic art. This ugly city does not reveal how 
best to organize men and women into political units. It does not clarify the justice of a political 
system, even the best political system in words, but rather its necessary injustices. Socrates’ city is 
founded on a series of injustices, according to this own definition as it occurs in the Republic. Her 
demands injustice to the city’s rulers, injustice to its women, and injustice to its neighbors,” p. 888. 
Regarding the analogy “a noble puppy” and “a well-born young man,” my argument is less 
sophisticated. I simply suggest that this analogy is used as a pedagogical devise to make Glaucon, the 
dog-breeder (cf. 459a), understand the required nature of the guardians they are about to make. 
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the narrator reports that Socrates suddenly worked his way out. The reason for the 
aporia in the first place was that the premises laid down were recognizable in “a noble 
dog,” because “when it sees someone it doesn’t know, it’s angry, although it never had 
any bad experience with him. And when it sees someone it knows, it greets him 
warmly, even if it never had a good experience with him” (376a6-8).28 Thus, the nature 
they are in search of is possible and not against nature after all (cf. 375e), and the 
apparent aporia is resolved. In addition to being spirited as a noble dog, the guardian 
must “be a philosopher in nature” (375e10-11). Again, Glaucon does not understand. 
This deepened explanation of the analogy is aimed to make Glaucon acknowledge 
what the concept “according to nature” entails. As a dog-breeder, he ought to be able 
to recognize the nature of a noble puppy, and from that recognition infer what concrete 
tasks the puppy is apt to, according to its nature. Nonetheless, Glaucon does not grasp 
the impact of the analogy, nor does he respond to it. Socrates continues by 
summarizing and states that the nature of a fine and good guardian of the city must “be 
philosophic, spirited, swift, and strong” (376c4-6). I suspect this summary to be also a 
description of Glaucon’s (potential) nature. If this notion is right, it entails that 
(according to Socrates) he has presented the nature required for becoming a guardian-
philosopher and indicated that Glaucon’s inherent nature is of this kind.29 
Socrates leaves the analogy and launches rearing and education as a new theme. 
How will they rear and educate these new guardians? Also, will a consideration of this 
in any way contribute to the overall aim, that is, to discover how justice and injustice 
come into being in a city? Adeimantus now interrupts. When he states rather ironically 
that “I most certainly expect that this present consideration will contribute to that goal” 
(376d5-7), he implicitly confirms that Glaucon did not understand that the noble-dog-
                                                          
28 On this point, see the comments set forth by Rosen (1965, 469) where he argues: “In this case, the 
knowledge of the dog is equivalent to its good breeding; in the guardian, good breeding is the result 
of the laws of the city, which, in turn, are established by philosopher-kings like Socrates. Spiritedness 
and gentleness in themselves are opposites (cf. 375c6-8); they can be mediated or harmonized only 
by philosophy.” This description of a spirited “noble dog” actually resembles the description of the 
fierce and guarding dogs used in ancient warfare, cf. Forster (1941). The theme will be re-emphasized 
by Socrates later; first, when he defends the idea of the community of women and children at 466d 
ff., and secondly at 473c11 when he introduces the philosopher-kings.  
29 At this point, it is unclear if the guardian and the philosopher are of identical natures. This 
ambivalence is the first hint toward the interruption at 449a when Socrates is accused for not telling 
all he has heard. The solution will be stated when Socrates launches the third wave at 473c. 
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philosopher analogy was a simile on recognizing inherent natures. However, as 
Glaucon did not take it, and because Adeimantus interrupted, the analogy now 
becomes a hanging metaphor, which Socrates will hint at throughout the upcoming 
sections.  
Through these two encounters, two distinct features of two distinct cities have 
been outlined. In A1, the “true city” was launched as a thought experiment; this city is 
self-sufficient, a peaceful harmony, and functions according to nature due to the 
division of labor (one man, one job according to his inherent potential). Glaucon was 
not interested in this thought experiment. Therefore, he and Socrates decided to 
investigate the “feverish city” as described in G1. Due to the inhabitants’ endless 
craving, pleonexia, the origin of war was identified, and two perspectives on war came 
to light. Socrates presented the dog-philosopher analogy and, on that basis, he tried to 
make Glaucon infer how the nature of men fit for guarding ought to be; but Glaucon 
failed. G1 ended with Socrates’ conclusion that the guardians’ natures ought to “be 
philosophic, spirited, swift, and strong” (376c4-6). The definition of the nature of the 
guardians is transported into the equation when Adeimantus and Socrates now set out 
to educate the guardians in speech. This is where Adeimantus and Socrates aim to 
decide how such a nature can be preserved through paideia. They pick up on 
Adeimantus’ former challenges, and their approach is an evaluation of the 
conventional paideia; the impact of their course of action is the start of the purging of 
the feverish city. The running theme in A2 is lies and lying. 
5.3 A2: Socrates and Adeimantus on education and rearing (376d5-398c6) 
We now return to the thought experiment. “Come, then, like men telling tales in a tale 
and at their leisure, let’s educate the men in speech (376d11-e1),” Socrates suggests. 
The point of departure is the convention “gymnastic for the bodies and music for the 
soul” (376e4-5),30 hence, when educating the men in speech, they implicitly start to 
purge Glaucon’s feverish city. Therefore, the new paideia surfaces negatively by 
highlighting the conventions which are to be prohibited in the true city. They start with 
                                                          
30 The final alteration of the conventional view “gymnastic for the bodies and music for the soul” 
ends when Glaucon and Socrates discuss the subject “gymnastic” in G2 (403c ff.), p. 184n78 below. 
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the beginning—the children.31 Setting themselves down as lawgivers, it becomes their 
duty to supervise the makers of tales and the tellers of stories (cf. 377b11-c1).32 Homer 
and Hesiod “ought to be blamed first and foremost” (377d4) and the lies they told 
about the gods and the heroes “mustn’t be spoken in our city” (378b1-2). When 
Socrates stresses that above all “it mustn’t be said that gods make war on gods, and 
plot against them and have battles with them” (378b8-c1), this may be the first act to 
prevent war. The stories discussed are not true and must be prohibited if those “who 
are going to guard (φυλάξειν) the city for us” should consider “it most shameful 
(αἴσχιστον) to be easily angry with one another” (378c1-3).33 This entails that if youths 
learn that gods make war on gods and that the gods plot against each other, then war-
waging among humans can be argued to be a God-given matter and, as such, not to be 
disputed.34 Also, if the stories of war among the gods are told to children and 
presented on woven embroideries and friezes, then war is apprehended as being a 
familiar necessity.35 The conclusion is that if the children are to be reared with respect 
to virtue, they must hear the finest tales first (cf. 378e).  
Nevertheless, a problem arises. Such fine tales are not on the market, Adeimantus 
infers, so if someone should ask what these tales are, what is the answer? Socrates now 
                                                          
31 Their outlining of rearing and education stand in stark contrast to Protagoras’ outlining of the same 
subject. I return to this in chapter 7: Preparing the stage, section 7.6: Protagoras, the teacher, p. 267 
ff. 
32 They will start to “persuade nurses and mothers to tell the approved tales to their children and to 
shape their souls with tales more than their bodies with hands” (377c2-5). The consequence of this 
supervising is that most of the stories that at present are told to children must be thrown out. 
Examples are Hesiod and Homer (and other poets) who have “surely composed false tales for human 
beings and used to tell them and still do tell them” (377d5-6). 
33 This implies that the inhabitants of the true city are bound to take the danger of war seriously, but 
only from a defensive point of view. On shame and aggression, see Roisman (2005), especially 
chapter 3: “Manly Shame,” pp. 64-78, where he argues that aggression and “physical violence 
unconnected to war and sport could also tarnish manliness in ancient Athens.” (72). 
34 This is a view that opposes the claim that war is natural and/or god-given. Cf. the Laws 628c ff. Cf. 
also Scodel (2008) who points out that within the anti-Trojan War tradition, the Trojan War was 
characterized as “frivolous, unnecessary, and stupid,” quoted in Raaflaub (2009, 227) who also 
underlines that this view is best known from Herodotus’ detailed argument on the matter (2.115-6; 
cf. 1.4). 
35 In addition, Socrates will prohibit stories where the poets tell about sons punishing their fathers 
(cf. 378b) and fathers beating mothers (cf. 378d). The main reason for these bans is that the stories 
are sometimes told in a hidden sense, and sometimes not (cf. 378d), and the children are not yet 
competent interpreters. Socrates stresses this when he states that “a young thing can’t judge what is 
hidden sense and what is not; but what he takes into his opinions at that age has a tendency to 
become hard to eradicate and unchangeable” (cf. 378d-e). 
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underlines that this is not their responsibility: “Adeimantus, you and I aren’t poets 
right now but founders of a city. It’s appropriate for founders to know the models 
(τύποι) according to which the poets must tell their tales. If what the poets produce 
goes counter to these models, founders must not give way; however, they must not 
themselves make up tales” (378e8-379a4). So, because it is not suitable for founders of 
a city to act as poets, Adeimantus and Socrates must restrict themselves to providing 
models for the poets—sorts of guidelines for the poets allowed in the true city. They 
give these models and, set them down as laws (cf. 383c).36 The arguments that these 
laws are founded on are controversial compared to conventions, and hence worth a 
closer look. 
5.3.1 Models and restrictions for the poets (379a5-383c7) 
At the outset, Adeimantus asks what the models (τύποι) for speech about the gods 
(θεολογίας) will be (cf. 379a5-6). Here he asks for the science of things divine 
(theology), which has a wider meaning than simply how the poets are to make 
speeches on the gods. “The god must surely always be described such as he is,” 
Socrates demands, “whether one presents him in epics, lyrics, or tragedies” (379a7-
9).37 Socrates makes us understand that for the good things we can safely assume that 
the cause is the god, but when it comes to the bad things, we must look elsewhere. 
Therefore, poets who are foolishly making the mistake that both good and evil things 
come from the god, cannot be accepted. This includes parts of Homer and other 
unnamed poets. Also, because the voices of the traditional poets are taken to be 
authorities,38 their listeners are left (unwillingly) in ignorance about the gods. Socrates 
lists several examples. I will highlight one which is of special interest for my line of 
argumentation. Socrates says that Homer tells that “Zeus is the dispenser to us ‘of 
                                                          
36 Later, in G2 at 403d7-e2, Socrates changes his procedures. Here Adeimantus and Socrates first 
describe the models and then set them down as laws; Glaucon and Socrates will only show the way 
to the models, cf. p. 184 ff. 
37 How the god is (ὤν) is not elaborated on, instead Socrates provides us with some general 
indications: “[…] the god, since he’s good, wouldn’t be the cause of everything, as the many say, but 
the cause of a few things for human beings and not responsible for most. For the things that are 
good for us are far fewer than those that are bad; and of the good things, no one else must be said to 
be the cause; of the bad things, some other causes must be sought and not the god” (379c2-7).  
38 Cf. Cephalus who depended on the poetic topos in all his reflections. On poets as authorities, see 
Robb (1994), cf. also p. 18n34 above.  
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good and evil alike.’” However, in the Iliad, we hear that ‘Zeus is the dispenser of 
war.’39 This Socratic reformulation alludes back to the passage when Socrates and 
Glaucon stumbled over the origin of war, and Socrates stated that they should not say 
yet if war works evil or good (cf. 373e). Viewed from this perspective, the impact of 
Socrates’ reformulation is double: on the one hand, he claims straightforward that this 
is a lie about the god, on the other, he indirectly (for those who know their Homer) 
denies that war is either natural or God-given. Adeimantus solemnly agrees and even 
uses a formula of the political assembly40 when replying: “I give my vote to you in 
support of this law […] and it pleases me” (380c5-6). Socrates concludes his reasoning 
by stating that “this would be one of the laws and models concerning the gods […]: the 
god is not the cause of all things, but of the good” (380c7-9).  
The argumentation regarding the second law is broader. Socrates’ preliminary 
questions concern the features of the gods regarding their ability to change. Is the god 
to be detained as a wizard, able deceitfully to reveal himself at different times in 
different ideas? Will the god at one time be himself and then change and pass from his 
own form into many shapes? Will the god deceive us and make us think such things 
about him?41 Or is he simple and does he least of all depart from his own idea? (cf. 
380d). Adeimantus confirms the latter and argues that the god “remains forever simply 
in his own shape” (381c8-9).  
The next passage indicates that Adeimantus also has somehow been exposed to 
inculcation through these stories about the gods—but he is not fully aware of this. 
Hence, Socrates is given a puzzle to solve.42 It starts as a test, where the first argument 
is that the gods themselves cannot be transformed. This premise they have already 
agreed upon. However, despite their agreement, Adeimantus signals uncertainty when 
                                                          
39 See Bloom (1991b, 450n47). Bloom refers to Iliad IV: 84 and points out the resemblance between 
Homer’s and Socrates’ account. 
40 Cf. Ibid, p. 450n51. 
41 These three questions are briefly problematized at the start of the Sophist (cf. 216a-d). I return to 
this in chapter 9: The Eleatic Stranger: A turning point, section 9.2: The prologue, pp. 327-32.  
42 I call this incident a puzzle for Socrates to solve because he employs different approaches toward 
the two brothers. Earlier, when Glaucon was not able to grasp the analogy on natures (cf. 376c4-6), 
Socrates left the problem by changing the theme; and when Socrates silently leaves a problem, he 
returns to it later (cf. p. 66n3 above). Here, when Adeimantus does not recognize that he—as all 
Athenians—has been indoctrinated, Socrates continues and aims to make Adeimantus understand 
without having to tell him explicitly. The puzzle is to find the best way to do this. 
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Socrates asks if the gods “make us think they appear in all sorts of ways, deceiving 
and bewitching us?” (381e9-10).43 He seems to be surprised or even shocked when 
Adeimantus answers “perhaps.” His first response is: “What?” The follow-up 
questioning proceeds like this (382a1-11): 
  
Socrates: “Would a god want to lie, either in speech or deed by presenting an 
illusion?”  
Adeimantus: “I don’t know.”  
Socrates: “Don’t you know that all gods and human beings hate the true lie 
(ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος) if that expression can be used?” 
Adeimantus: “What do you mean?”  
Socrates: “That surely no one voluntarily wishes to lie about the most sovereign 
things to what is most sovereign in himself. Rather, he fears holding a lie there 
more than anything.” 
Adeimantus: “I still don’t understand.” 
 
That Adeimantus is not able to follow Socrates’ reasoning now strongly signposts that 
Socrates is presenting new and controversial thoughts in this matter; henceforth, he 
modifies and elaborates. First, he says that surely Adeimantus supposes that Socrates 
means “something exalted” (382b1), but such a supposition is wrong. He stresses that 
what he meant was “that to lie and to have lied to the soul about the things that are, 
and to be unlearned, and to have and to hold a lie there is what everyone would least 
accept; and that everyone hates a lie in that place most of all” (382b2-5). Socrates 
further argues that it is correct to call this truly a lie (ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος) because it 
denotes “the ignorance in the soul of the man who has been lied to” (382b8-9). He 
explains that the “lie in speeches is a kind of imitation of the affection in the soul, a 
phantom of it that comes into being after it, and not quite an unadulterated lie 
(ἄκρατον ψεῦδος)” (382b9-c2). Thus, he concludes, “the real lie (ὄντι ψεῦδος) is hated 
not only by gods but also by human beings” (382c4-5).44 Socrates solved the puzzle, 
and as Adeimantus understood this elaboration, and agreed, I take it that he passed the 
test. However, it now turns out that not all lies in speeches deserve to be hated; from 
time to time they can be useful (χρήσιμον)—but when and for whom? They can serve 
like a drug (φάρμακον) and be preventive against enemies. It is worth remembering 
                                                          
43 The theme of bewitching will be of importance in G2 at 413b f. On the vocabulary on magic, see 
Belfiore (1980).  
44 Cf. also the Laws 916d-917a. 
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that in connection with the discussion of the second law, this line of argumentation 
presents us with three kinds of lies: the “real lie (ὄντι ψεῦδος)” and the “true lie 
(ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος)” will not be mentioned further; but the “useful lie,” which is 
acceptable in certain instances, is a point returned to. From here on “lies” is a recurrent 
theme. 
After a short discussion, they conclude and formulate the second law: “The 
demonic and the divine are wholly free from lie” (382e8). This law is given a 
confirmative appendix: “the god is altogether simple and true in deed and speech, and 
he doesn’t himself change or deceive others by illusions, speeches, or the sending of 
signs either in waking or dreaming” (382e10-13). It is noteworthy that the “demonic” 
is an included element in the second law. This is equivalent to Socrates’ inner voice 
that is “a kind of demonic thing” (Bloom 1991b, 450n55).45 This feature makes 
Socrates a kind of intermediary character between gods and humans, a point explained 
later (cf. 496c f.). For now, Socrates concludes that about gods there are things that 
should and should not be heard from childhood on “[…] and we’ll not let the teachers 
use them for the education of the young, if our guardians are to be god-revering and 
divine as human being can possibly be” (383c2-5). Adeimantus supposes that this 
impression is right (cf. 386a). They are now in agreement on what the poets in the true 
city are prohibited to say, and they have laid down two laws in this regard. This is now 
the grounding premise when they change the perspective and ask: How are we to 
secure that the guardians become courageous? 
 
5.3.2 Courageous guardians (386a1-388a3) 
Again, Socrates turns to the stories told children and argues that they must “be told 
things that will make them fear death least” (386a7-b1). Is it impossible to believe that 
anyone who fears death will ever become courageous, or does Adeimantus suppose 
that “anyone who believes Hades’ domain exists and is full of terror will be fearless in 
the face of death and choose death in battles above defeat and slavery?” (386b4-6).46 
                                                          
45 The theme of the demonic I take to be the second hint toward the interruption at 449a when 
Socrates is accused for not telling it all (cf. p. 167n29 above). It will be touched upon—with reference 
to Hesiod—at 469a, and explained in A4 at 496c f. See also Apology 27d-e and 31d.  
46 This alludes back to Cephalus. He had heard these stories of Hades and the afterlife there from 
childhood on. However, it was as an old man he first started to reflect on the message—and it 
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The seven examples Socrates lists are presented in a parodic mode and I suggest they 
can be read as an ironic outburst toward Cephalus’ and the poetic topos. Nonetheless, 
many liked to hear these Homeric lines, but Socrates stresses that “the more poetic 
they are, the less they should be heard by men who must be free and accustomed to 
fearing slavery more than death” (387b3-4). Also, he indicates that such lines can be 
useful, but for other purposes. This indication is foreshadowing the concepts of 
pleasure and pain that will be introduced as an important feature regarding the testing 
of the guardians (cf. 413e, 429c). What occupies him at this point, is the fear “that our 
guardians, because of such shivers, will get hotter and softer than they ought” (387c3-
4). Therefore, Socrates will apply a model opposite to the examples listed, because 
“the men we say we are rearing for the guardianship of the country (χώρας) won’t be 
able to stand doing things similar to those such people do” (388a1-3). It is imperative 
that Socrates now expands the rearing of the guardians not only to apply to the city, 
but for the country,47 and it is interesting that this expansion is not commented on. 
 
5.3.3 Requirements for the content of stories (388a4-392c5) 
Their next challenge is to give guidelines for how the guardians are allowed to speak 
about human beings, the gods, demons and heroes, and Hades’ domain. Because the 
aim is that the guardians are to fear slavery more than death (cf. 386a1-387c11), all the 
descriptions where death is depicted in manners that potentially can make the 
guardians fearful are to be banned. From this, it follows that they must get rid of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
frightened him. Secondly, it is foreshadowing the myth of Er. The afterlife described there is a 
corrective to the conventional descriptions of Hades. Thirdly, it foreshadows the introduction of the 
third wave where Socrates suggests that philosophers are the ideal guardians and thus the only ones 
fit to rule. This creates a line to the Phaedo where we learn that “the one aim of those who practice 
philosophy in the proper manner is to practice for dying and death” (64a3-4) and further that 
philosophy itself is a kind of “training for dying” (67e). Fourthly, it alludes to the Apology where 
Socrates demonstrates that as a philosopher he does not fear death. This indicates that if fear of 
death is removed, then courage is possible. So, courage understood within the frames of philosophy, 
is a virtue that contradicts the conventional perception. Consequently, they must supervise those 
who compose stories of Hades “because what they say is neither true nor beneficial for men who are 
to be fighters (μαχίμοις)” (Rep. 386b10-c2). 
47 This picks up on the distinction made on the two kinds of warfare (attack versus defense) alluded 
to in G1, pp. 164-65 above. The expansion from the city to the country is foreshadowing the passages 
on war versus faction that will be elaborated on in G3 (470b ff.). This uncommented expansion I take 
to be the third hint toward the interruption at 449a when Socrates is accused for not telling it all (cf. 
p. 167n29, and p. 173n45 above). I return to this in chapter 6: The demiurges of freedom, p. 232n4. 
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terrible names applied to Hades. Gods and heroes are not to be portrayed as lamenting 
and wailing (cf. 387d1-389b2), or as imprudent and not truthful (cf. 389b3-392a2). 
When it comes to how human beings are depicted, it is, among other things, prohibited 
to tell that happy men are unjust (cf. 392a3-c5).48 Further, the guardians are not to be 
lovers of laughter (cf. 388e-389b), and they must take the truth seriously (cf. 389b-d). 
The latter is essential, because if what they have said so far is correct, and “a lie is 
really useless to gods and useful to human beings as a form of remedy, it’s plain that 
anything of the sort must be assigned to doctors while private men (ἰδιώταις)49 must 
not put their hands to it” (389b4-7). The useful lie is now explicitly restricted to 
doctors, and to be avoided by ordinary men. However, Socrates is quick to modify this 
restriction and says that it is “appropriate for rulers to lie for the benefit of the city in 
cases involving enemies or citizens” (389b9-11)50 and underlines once again that “all 
the rest must not put their hands to anything of the sort” (389b11-c1). Socrates now 
abruptly introduces a guard who guards against lying51 and demands that if “he catches 
anyone else in the city lying […] he’ll punish him for introducing a practice as 
subversive and destructive of a city as of a ship” (389d4-5). This special guardian is 
not mentioned further, and that makes me infer that his function is limited to this 
passage only because of the diversity of possible lies cataloged above. It is only the 
“useful lie” Socrates allows, but its use is strongly restricted. Therefore, this specific 
guardian serves as a reminder and a point of reference connected to the “useful lie.”52  
Adeimantus and Socrates further demand that the young guardians are not 
allowed to be receivers of gifts or be lovers of money (cf. 390d); hence, they need 
                                                          
48 This statement is presumably addressed directly to Thrasymachus and Glaucon’s challenge to 
Socrates.  
49 On ἰδιώταις, and on the opposition between the ‘private’ and the ‘public/common,’ see Bloom 
(1991b, 445-46n41). Here, though, with regard to “the useful lie,” the doctor is compared to the 
ruler, the public man, whose art, or knowledge, gives the title to rule; the private man, in principle, is 
the man who does not know and these individuals are not permitted to make use of the “useful lie,” 
cf. Bloom (1991b, 451n17). 
50 This statement is foreshadowing, on the one hand, the presentation of the “noble lie” in G2. I 
return to this below, in section 5.4.4: The noble lie, p. 190 ff. On the other, it points to 459c8-d3 
where Socrates explains how “useful lies” are used for the benefit of the rulers. I return to this in 
chapter 6: The demiurges of freedom, section 6.2.1: The benefits of the second law, p. 219 ff. 
51 Cf. Bloom (1991b, 451n19). 
52 The “useful lie” used as a remedy by the rulers is picked up again in G3 at 459c8-d3.  
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moderation (σωφροσύνης, 389d7).53 The most important elements of moderation for 
the multitude though, are being obedient to the rulers and being themselves rulers of 
the pleasures of drink, sex, and eating (cf. 389d-e).54 The effects of the new models 
now start to be thinkable for the reader. If the guardians (our youngsters) are to be 
reared and educated as Socrates and Adeimantus suggest, they will develop a cultural 
mindset that contrasts starkly the conventional. That is, they will have assimilated 
different cultural references, which in turn signal cultural change. This changed 
mindset is still in its making, and we have to witness yet some discussions before the 
guardians are fully made. Regarding the ongoing investigation, Socrates and 
Adeimantus have now decided on what must be said and how it must be said, but the 
deliberation is not complete before they also reflect on style (λέξις, cf. 392c). Why is 
this necessary?  
5.3.4 The style of the speeches (392c6-398c6) 
Adeimantus does not understand the relevance (cf. 392d), so Socrates elaborates. All 
stories told are narratives on the past, the present, or the future; and they are 
accomplished with either a simple narrative or produced by imitators or both together 
(cf. 392d). Adeimantus still does not understand. Socrates than states that he seems to 
be both a ridiculous and an unclear teacher “just like men who are incompetent at 
speaking, instead of speaking about the whole in general I’ll cut off a part and with it 
attempt to make plain to you what I want (392d-e).55 Adeimantus comes back on track, 
and after the amplification on imitation, he is asked to “reflect on whether our 
guardians ought to imitate or not” (394e1-2). The result of his reflection is a 
restriction,56 and they stress that if “we are to preserve the first argument—that our 
                                                          
53 The primary sense of σωφροσύνη is “the control over the bodily pleasures.” However, throughout 
the conversations in the Republic, the concept gains a broader sense and gradually comes to apply to 
a control of certain pleasures of the soul, cf. Bloom (1991b, 451-52n21).  
54 This alludes back to 367a3 where Adeimantus argued that each individual is the best guard when it 
comes to his own affairs.  
55 This is the first time Socrates refers to himself a teacher. In G2 at 413b f. when Glaucon does not 
understand that an opinion departs unwillingly from our minds, he apologizes to Glaucon for being 
an unclear speaker, but does not denote himself as a teacher. As far as I know, these are the only 
instances that Socrates explicitly talks about himself in this manner. This could be taken as a concrete 
hint with regard to Socrates’ approach to the two brothers: He is Adeimantus’ teacher, but not 
Glaucon’s because he has not made his turning yet. 
56 Their guardians can imitate “what’s appropriate to them from childhood: men who are 
courageous, moderate, holy, free, and everything of the sort; and what is slavish, or anything else 
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guardians must give up all other crafts and very precisely be craftsmen (δημιουργοὺς) 
of the city’s freedom and practice nothing other then what tends to it, they mustn’t 
imitate nothing else” (395b9-c1). As they further undertake also “to educate the 
soldiers (στρατιώτας, 398b4),”57 they must also exhibit songs and melodies. In this 
sequence, Socrates uses the concepts “guardians” and “soldiers” as synonyms; hence, I 
assume that the soldiers also are educated in the art of defense, and that at this point 
the guardians are equivalent to soldiers.58 From this, it follows that they are not only 
making a new breed of guardians, but also a new breed of soldiers.59 The education of 
soldiers versus guardians is not a theme discussed further, therefore Socrates maintains 
that by now everyone could “discover what we have to say about how they (i.e., songs 
and melodies) must be if we’re going to remain in accord with what has already been 
said” (398c4-6). Glaucon laughs when he now interrupts and states that he is no longer 
included in “everyone,” but, even if he, at present, is not able to say what ought to be 
said about songs and melodies, he has his suspicions.  
Through A2 Socrates met Adeimantus’ challenges by getting rid of the causes for 
his initial frustration. This was done through a cleansing of poetry, and the restrictions 
became visible when the lies voiced by some of the celebrated poets were highlighted 
and prohibited. They decided on two laws containing concrete models for the poets: a) 
the god is the cause of the good, b) the demonic and divine is free from lie.60 Further, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
shameful, they must neither do nor be clever at imitating, so that they won’t get a taste for the being 
from its imitation” (395c2-d3). Examples on things not to be imitated are: Since the guardians are 
men, they should not imitate women, either young or older ones, or a woman who abuses her 
husband or a woman who strives with gods and boasts because she supposes herself to be happy. 
Further, not slaves, women or men doing slavish things, bad men who are cowards and doing the 
opposite of what Socrates and Adeimantus have stated, madmen (both in speeches and deeds), men 
exercising any other crafts, and horses neighing. 
57 Liddle and Scott: Generally, a στρατιώτης denotes a professional soldier; a citizen bound to military 
service; also a soldier in general.  
58 The distinction “guardians” versus “soldiers” is not discussed further; hence I take it that my 
assumption at this point holds. In G2 at 414b4-6 this changes because Socrates here presents the 
second alteration of the concept “guardian,” and states that “the young, whom we were calling 
guardians up to now, we shall call auxiliaries and helpers of the rulers’ convictions. I return to this 
below, p. 191. 
59 In these reflections on the education of soldiers, Syse (2010) finds the origin on thoughts of the 
just-war-doctrine. 
60 It is noticeable that Socrates and Adeimantus did not ban Homer and Hesiod totally, they ruled out 
what Socrates denoted as lies about the gods and some passages that presented heroes and humans 
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we learned that the gods and humans hated both the “real lie (ὄντι ψεῦδος)” and the 
“true lie (ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος)” and that the “useful lie” could function as a remedy used 
by doctors and rulers. However, as the doctors belong to the multitude, this entails that 
lying is prohibited for the rest of the inhabitants. Also, we learned that there are 
different demands laid upon the guardians versus the multitude; a pointing forward to 
434c ff. where the three-class conception is almost fully explained. According to the 
argument, they should now turn to songs and melodies, but as Glaucon interrupted, 
this theme is the point of departure in G2. 
5.4 G2: Purging the feverish city (398c7-417b10) 
We now return to the investigation of the empirical feverish city, and Socrates urges 
Glaucon to consider how the harmonic mode and the rhythm must follow the speech 
(cf. 398d). He is required to consider that the speeches must be spoken in accordance 
with the models (τύποι) set down by Adeimantus; hence the work executed in A2 will 
be paradigmatic for G2. Glaucon, who is familiar with musical conventions, is now 
forced to admit that the modes he knows off are not suitable for the guardians. After 
Glaucon has agreed to prohibit most of these modes, the only thing left is those suited 
for war-making men (πολεμικῶν ἀνδρῶν, 399a1). He is further requested to leave out 
the mode that appropriately imitates the sounds and accents of a man who is 
courageous in warlike deeds (πολεμικῇ πράξει) and every violent work (βιαίῳ 
ἐργασίᾳ), and also the mode for a man who performs a peaceful (εἰρηνικῇ) deed 
(πράξει) that is voluntary (ἑκουσίᾳ). When Glaucon also rules these out, he is left with 
nothing. All the modes known to him are banned. Socrates then swears and 
summarizes, “And, by the dog, […] Unawares we’ve again purged the city that a while 
ago was luxurious” (399e5-6), and Glaucon concludes that this is a sign of their 
moderation (399e7).61 Socrates’ underlining of “unawares we’ve again purged” 
implies that the first unaware purging was done in A2, and the second by making 
Glaucon acknowledge that none of the conventional modes and rhythms were suitable 
for the guardians. Therefore, when he now suggests, “Come, then […] let’s purge the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
in an unfavorable light. Therefore, I cannot agree with the scholars who at this stage argue for “the 
expulsion of poetry,” cf. Rosen (1965, 467). 
61 Regarding moderation, the question is if Glaucon at this point understands this concept as Socrates 
does. This will be answered in section 5.4.2: Glaucon is tested (402d1-403c8), pp. 181-84. 
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rest” (399e8), he indicates that he and Glaucon start the third purging in awareness. 
The next thing to consider is if Glaucon apprehends moderation in the same manner as 
Socrates.  
 
5.4.1 The true rule for modes and rhythms (399e8-402c9) 
The hypothesis is that if they follow the harmonic modes, they will be able to find the 
true rule about rhythms and thus find the rhythms of an orderly and courageous life 
(cf. 399e). Glaucon is now supposed to tell what these rhythms might be, just as he did 
with the harmonic modes. However, he is not able to decide “which sorts are 
imitations of which sort of life” (400a8-9). Because Socrates rather quickly decides 
that these things are to be turned over to the music theorist Damon62 (cf. 400a-c), it 
could indicate that he again recognizes Glaucon’s lack of ability to reflect beyond 
conventions. That Socrates made the right choice regarding music and rhythms, will be 
confirmed in A3, 424c.  
Socrates now permits that Glaucon attends to conventions. He makes an indirect 
reference to Thrasymachus’ concept of a “good disposition”63 and states that “good 
speech, good harmony, good grace, and good rhythm accompany good disposition 
(εὐηθείᾳ), not the folly that we endearingly call ‘good disposition,’ but that 
understanding truly trained to good and fair disposition” (400d12-e2). From the 
discussion of being truly trained, it follows that it is no longer sufficient to supervise 
the poets; they must also supervise the craftsmen and prevent them from impressing 
“bad disposition, a licentious, illiberal, and graceless one, either on images of animals 
or on houses or on anything else that their craft produces” (401b4-7). These craftsmen 
and their craft are prohibited because “our guardians won’t be reared on images of 
vice […] and unawares put together some one big bad thing in their soul” (401c1-4). 
To form a good disposition, they need to make the guardians musical men, hence, they 
must search for “craftsmen who are able to track down the nature of what is fine and 
                                                          
62 On Damon, see Wallace (2015), especially chapter 2: “Êthos theories of music and poetic metre.” 
See also Nails (2002, 121-22) who claims “that the Athenians found Damon’s influence too dangerous 
and ostracized him” in 428, p. 122. 
63 When Thrasymachus used the term “good disposition (εὐηθείᾳ)” at 348c, he described the just 
man and it was rendered as “innocence.” According to Bloom (1991b, 454n53), Socrates now uses it 
in its literal and etymologically precise sense.  
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graceful, so that the young, dwelling as it were in a healthy place (ὑγιεινῷ τόπῳ), will 
be benefited by everything” (401c4-6). These craftsmen can recognize the nature of 
the guardians, and this ability points toward the philosophers (maybe toward Socrates 
himself and his demiurgic craft).64 I take the healthy dwelling place to be the 
unawakened soul that receives visions and hearings, unaware, from childhood 
onwards. This is foreshadowing the discussion in G4 (518b ff.) regarding the craft of 
the philosopher and the awakening of the soul.65 Because at this point we are at a 
preparatory stage, the task for Glaucon is to understand why and how the rearing in 
music is most sovereign (cf. 401d54-5).  
Socrates gives two accounts. First, rhythm and harmony are what “most of all 
insinuate themselves into the inmost part of the soul and most vigorously lay hold of it 
in bringing grace with them” (401d5-7). If a youth is correctly reared, rhythm and 
harmony make him graceful, if not—the opposite happens.66 Second, the man 
“properly reared on rhythm and harmony would have the sharpest sense for what’s 
been left out and what isn’t a fine product of craft or what isn’t a fine product of 
nature” (401e2-5). The effect of his ability to discriminate is that he would always 
praise the good things; he takes pleasure in them and receives them in his soul. 
However, there is more to it, Socrates proclaims:  
 
So, in the name of the gods, is it as I say: we’ll never be musical—either ourselves 
or those whom we say we must educate to be guardians—before we recognize the 
forms (εἴδη) of moderation (σωφροσύνης), courage (ἀνδρείας), liberality 
(ἐλευθεριότητος), magnificence (μεγαλοπρεπείας), and all their kin, and, again, 
their opposites, everywhere they turn up, and notice that they are in whatever they 
are in, both themselves and their images, despising them neither in little nor big 
things, but believing that they all belong to the same art and discipline? (402b10-
c8). 
 
                                                          
64 This alludes to the theme of recognizing different natures as Glaucon was not able to do in G1 
during the sections 374d-376c, thus, it is a new test of Glaucon’s attentiveness. In the Euthyphro 
(11b-d), Socrates claims that he possesses the same kinds of skills as Daedalus, his ancestor and 
famous demiurge; see Introduction, section 3.1: The demiurge at work, p. 20-3. 
65 In chapter 8: Saving youths, section 8.1.1: Turning toward and into philosophy, pp. 283-84, I 
suggest that Socrates is awakened from his dwelling place.  
66 The latter is what happened to Charmides, whom we will meet in chapter 8: Saving youths, section 
8.3: Charmides, pp. 306 23. 
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These are the premises Socrates lays down to become a musical man at all, and the 
demands set forth signal a thorough philosophical investigation of the virtues.67 The 
statement claiming that neither they nor the guardians will be musical men unless they 
recognize the forms (εἴδη) of the virtue and their opposites, now explicitly confirms 
that Socrates is warranting his argument in a concealed topos. And from here on, parts 
of Socrates’ concealment start to surface.68 But before he starts on that journey, he 
performs an interesting test on Glaucon’s attentiveness and his ability to levitate his 
reasoning. This element is imperative for this line of philosophical investigation.69 The 
outlet of this test is the fine disposition, moderation, and the musical man. We are now 
entering the erotic field and its forces, which also is a theme well-known to Glaucon.  
5.4.2 Glaucon is tested (402d1-403c8) 
The premise for this elenchus is that the musical man will first and foremost love 
harmonious human beings; he will not love those who lack harmony. Thus, the fairest 
is the most lovable (ἐρασμιώτατον, 402d6).70 Glaucon agrees, but with a reservation. 
He would not love a man with a defect in his soul, but if “there were some bodily 
                                                          
67 Socrates’ demand for a procedure on how they are to investigate the virtues is similar to the 
method for inquiry suggested by Parmenides when he taught Socrates. This we are introduced to in 
the Parmenides which I return to in chapter 7: Setting the stage, section 7.1.2: Parmenides, the 
teacher, p. 250 ff. 
68 Adeimantus later confirms that Socrates’ arguments are out of the ordinary (cf. 449c ff.), and I take 
this to be the fourth hint toward the interruption at 449a when Socrates is accused for not telling it 
all (cf. pp. 167n29, 173n45, and 174n47 above). 
69 This point is exposed in the Parmenides during the five steps Parmenides leads Socrates through. 
However, it was easier for Parmenides to make Socrates elevate his reasoning than it is for Socrates 
to make Glaucon do the same. 
70 According to Prauscello (2014, 41-2), ἐράσμιος means originally ”at home” particularly in the 
”sphere of erotic.“ “The use of the adjective (‘desirable/lovable') in this context is quite interesting. 
Before Plato, it is attested only three times (Semon. 7.52 W2, Anacr. PMG 375 and Aesch. Ag. 605) 
and always with an overtly erotic meaning. Within Plato’s corpus, the adjective occurs (only in the 
superlative form) three times: apart from this passage of the Republic, it also appears in Phaedrus 
250e1 and Timaeus 87d7–8. In all three instances, ἐρασμιώτατος is used with reference to the erotic 
desire provoked by human embodied beauty. The verbal and thematic echoes between the passage 
of the Republic quoted previously and the passages of the Phaedrus and Timaeus are remarkable. In 
Tim. 87d7–8 the human being whose soul and body are both beautiful and well-proportioned is “the 
most beautiful and desirable spectacle of all for who has eyes to see it.” Although it is the Timaeus 
that comes closest to the Republic in terms of intertextual resonances, the overall context of 
Phaedrus 250b1-e1 seems to provide the underlying explanation (only hinted in at Resp. 3.402d1-9) 
of why embodied beauty, in this earthly world, is the most vividly perceived form and hence the one 
that triggers in us the greatest degree of desire.”  
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defect, he’d be patient and would willingly take delight in him” (402d10-12).71 We 
now understand that Glaucon bases his answer on experience, and from this, it follows 
that Socrates’ reflections on harmony between soul and body are not an issue for 
Glaucon. Thus, Socrates starts by referring to Glaucon’s own erotic predicament.72 He 
indicates knowing that Glaucon has or has had such a boy; therefore, he does not 
problematize this theme any further. Instead, Glaucon is asked to consider if 
“excessive pleasure has anything in common with moderation […] or with the rest of 
the virtues” (402e2-5). On this Glaucon answers negatively and confirms that 
excessive pleasure is related to insolence and licentiousness; he further confirms that 
there is no greater “pleasure than the one connected with sex” (403a4-5). Glaucon also 
responds positively to the next two questions: Is “the natural right kind of love (ὀρθὸς 
ἔρως) to love in a moderate and musical way what’s orderly and fine?” (403a7-8). Or, 
is it that “nothing that’s mad or akin to licentiousness must approach the right kind of 
love (ὀρθῷ ἔρωτι)?” (403a10-11). Socrates rounds off with a conclusive question: 
“Then this pleasure mustn’t approach love, and lover and boy who love and are loved 
in the right way (ὀρθῶς ἐρῶσί) mustn’t be partner to it (i.e., sexual pleasures)?” 
(403b1-3).  
The passage 402d-403b is worth observing. Lucia Prauscello (2014) made me 
aware that the semantic mode changes notably in this passage. She argues that “it is 
only when Socrates’ discourse switches from the perceptual recognition of some 
universal qualities to the perception of the embodied beauty of human beings that the 
language of erōs kicks in” (ibid, 42). So far, the love has been described in terms of 
generic philia, and strictly speaking it has, as Prauscello notes, been “promoted to the 
level of passionate desire (erōs) among the fledging guardians only when applied to 
the sphere of interpersonal relationships, and, more to the point, to same-sex 
relationships” (ibid, 43). Contrary to Prauscello,73 I suggest that Socrates now has 
                                                          
71 This alludes to Protagoras’ distinction on evils that are due to nature or chance versus lack of 
cultivation, cf. Protagoras 323d f. I return to this in chapter 7: Setting the stage, section 7.6.2.1: The 
consequences of the myth, pp. 270-73. 
72 On Glaukon as an erotic man, cf. 368a, 458d, 468b, 474c-475a. 
73 She claims, p. 43, that the argument develops as the following: “In fact, what follows at 3.402d10–
e2 is Socrates’s playful reference to Glaucon’s well-known homoerotic entanglements (3.402e1 
παιδικὰ τοιαῦτα).This becomes explicit at 3.403b1–c6, when Socrates defines the form of “correct 
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awakened the paiderastia topos or the Athenian political practice of paiderastia.74 
Thus, I suggest that Glaucon is now confronted with his own ways, as he mirrors the 
Athenian practice. The answer he gave Socrates (cf. 402d) also indicates that maybe 
he has not understood the full concept of the musical (harmonic) man either. However, 
Glaucon concludes in accordance with Socrates that sexual pleasure (the most insane 
pleasure) cannot approach the “correct love” (ὀρθῷ ἔρωτι). But what exactly is 
“correct love”? 
Prauscello argues that Socrates “defines the form of ‘correct erōs’” at 403a7, but 
does he do that? At 403a7 he says that the correct kind of erōs is to love in a moderate 
and musical way and that this is orderly and fine, but I do not take this to be a 
definition. I rather suggest that the definition is set forth in the proposed law and that 
Socrates is ambiguous when he infers that it seems like Glaucon will set down a law in 
the city that’s being founded.75 Viewed in light of the argument, I am not able to see 
that the law is Glaucon’s suggestion. This law states that … 
  
… a lover may kiss, be with, and touch his boy as though he were a son, for fair 
purposes, if he persuades him; but as for the rest, his intercourse with the one for 
whom he cares will be such that their relationship will never be reputed to go 
further than this. If not, he’ll be subject to blame as unmusical and inexperienced 
in fair things (403b6-c2). 
 
Socrates’ inference may rather be viewed as a Socratic correction to what Prauscello 
denotes as “Glaucon’s well-known homoerotic entanglements,” because Socrates here 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Eros” (ὁρθὸς ἔρως 3.403a7, a11; cf. also ὀρθῶς ἐρῶσι at 3.403b2) among erastes and eromenos to 
be promoted in Callipolis. Because there cannot be any “communion” (3.402e3 κοινωνία) between 
“moderation”’ (σωφροσύνη) and “excessive pleasure” (ἡδονῇ ὑπερβαλλούσῃ), and because sexual 
pleasure (3.403a4–5 ἡδονὴν τῆς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια) is, by its nature, the ‘keenest’ (3.403a4 
ὀξυτέραν), greatest, and “most insane” pleasure (3.403a6 μανικωτέραν) experienced by man, then 
the relevant law (νόμος) will be established in Callipolis (3.403a10–c2).” 
74 On the subject of pederasty, my main sources are Dover (1978) and Thornton (1997). One concern 
regarding pederasty is that “[p]art of the problem is that homosexuality, contemporary as well as 
ancient, is not easier for us so-called moderns to understand than it was for the Greeks. One of our 
difficulties when reading about ancient Greece is that the most common manifestation of 
homosexuality in the evidence concerns pederasty, the quasi-ritualized, transient, physical and 
emotional relationship between an older male and a youth” (Thornton 1997, 100). For a profound 
survey of the litterature, see Thornton pp. 263-65.  
75 The underlining of “the city that’s being founded” I take to be a reminder to Glaucon (and the 
readers) that by the profound purging of the “feverish city,” they are on their way to found a new 
city, and in this regard Adeimantus’ “true city” is the paradigm.  
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restricts the relationship between an older and a younger man to resemble that between 
father and son.76 Thus, “correct love” is defined by this law, which, in turn, entails that 
Socrates has declined the Athenian practice of paiderastia. After this law is launched, 
Socrates abruptly proclaims that the argument about music has reached an end, and it 
ended exactly where it ought to end. When he underlines that “surely musical matters 
should end in love matters (ἐρωτικά) that concern the fair (τοῦ καλοῦ)” (403c6-7), I 
assume that he refers to the latter prohibition because the relations developed through 
paiderastia are, I take it, to be a political inculcating practice aiming toward same-
mindedness (homonoia), which is incompatible with the Socratic practice.77 It is 
interesting that the argument of music found its end in testing Glaucon’s understanding 
of moderation, which at this point is not in accordance with Socrates’. Therefore, I 
take this to be a moment foreshadowing the redefining of virtues coming up in G3. 
Glaucon did not pass the test, but by being corrected and given a new law, Socrates 
showed him the consequences of being moderate. This implies that Glaucon now 
should be more disposed to partake in a philosophical investigation than he was when 
they set out. They now turn to gymnastic and the harmony between body and soul. 
5.4.3 The path toward excellent models (403c9-410a4) 
Socrates’ next point of departure is his view that it does not look “as though it’s a 
sound body that by its virtue makes the soul good, but the opposite: a good soul by its 
own virtue makes the body as good as it can be” (403d2-5).78 This is a turning around 
of the conventional view that said “music for the soul and gymnastic for the body,” 
and it is this upending Socrates in the following sections will be stating reasons for.  
                                                          
76 In the Symposium (217a-e), Alcibiades confirms that Socrates himself lived by this law. Here he tells 
about his master-plans to let Socrates seduce him, but Alcibiades failed this mission three times. I will 
comment on this in chapter 8: Saving youths, section 8.2.5: Alcibiades’ swan song, p. 305. The 
restriction set forth is also in accordance with the Athenian Stranger when he argues that “the 
pleasures given according to nature, it seems, when the female unites with the nature of males for 
procreation. Males coming together with males, and females with females, seems against nature, 
and the daring of those who first did it seems to have arisen from a lack of self-restraint with regard 
to pleasure” (Laws, 636c). 
77 This is a practice both Alcibiades and Charmides have been exposed to. I return to them in chapter 
8: Saving youths. The paideia program launched by Protagoras, has same-mindedness at its core; I 
return to that theme in chapter 7: Setting the stage. The topos of same-mindedness will be discussed 
in chapter 10: The Apologies. 
78 This theme was the point of departure in A2 at 376e4-5 when Adeimantus and Socrates started 
their evaluation of the conventional paideia, cf. p. 168n30 above. 
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If the guardians are to be guardians, they must receive precise training from 
childhood throughout life. According to Socrates, this is imperative because, “It 
doesn’t look to me as though it’s a sound body that by its virtue makes the soul good, 
but the opposite: a good soul by its own virtue makes the body as good as it can be” 
(403d2-5). As this premise now is laid down, Socrates suggests a new course of action: 
“If we gave adequate care to the intellect (διάνοιαν) and turned over to it the concern 
for the precise details about the body, while we, so as not to talk too much, showed the 
way only to the models (τύπους), would we be doing a the right thing?” (403d7-e2) 
For Glaucon, this suggestion is momentous because Socrates now demands that they 
first and foremost should take care of the intellect (make Glaucon upraise his thoughts) 
and take on the task of showing the way to new models. Now that Socrates has 
launched a new procedure, it is the way toward that is imperative, not the models 
themselves. This is a turnaround, which implies that Socrates now starts to prepare 
Glaucon (unaware) for partaking in a new thought experiment that will follow after the 
two cities are superposed; that is, Adeimantus’ “true city” and Glaucon’s purged 
“feverish city.” These paths will eventually lead to the beautiful city - Kallipolis. 
5.4.3.1 First path—health (403e4-410a4) 
In addition to prohibiting drunkenness, they must clarify whether the habit and diet of 
ordinary athletes will be proper for the guardians (cf. 404a). Socrates quickly discards 
this theme because it “is a sort of sleepy habit and not a very steady one so far as 
health is concerned” (404a4-5).79 Instead, he proposes the best gymnastic to be of a 
                                                          
79 Texts on diet have been difficult to track down; the one I found refers to Pausanias and 
Philostratos. It is interesting that the earliest athletes lived their lives in a manner similar to that 
which Socrates is about to propose for the guardians. The exceptional long-distance runner Dromeus 
of Stymphalos won all the PanHellenic games in the mid-5th century, and he “[…] is said to have been 
the first who thought of eating meat as part of his training diet. Until then, the food for athletes was 
cheese fresh out of the basket. (Pausanias, Description of Greece 6:7:10). Philostratos, writing later 
than Pausanias, compared and contrasted early and contemporary athletic diet through the years: 
These athletes [in olden times] washed in rivers and springs [...] learned to sleep on the ground [...] 
others on beds made of straw they gathered from the field. Their food was bread made from barley 
and unleavened loaves of unsifted wheat. For meat, they ate the flesh of oxen, bulls, goats, and deer; 
they rubbed themselves with the oil of the wild olive and phylia. This style of living made them free 
from sickness and they kept their youth a long time. Some of them competed in eight Olympic 
Games, others for nine; they were also excellent soldiers. [...] They made war a training for athletics, 
and they made athletics a military activity (Philostratos, Concerning Gymnastics 43).” Quoted from 
Grivetti and Applegate (1997, 862). 
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kind of the simple music they have already described. Glaucon does not understand 
this. The backdrop for this discussion (403e-409e) is the subjects Socrates introduced 
in relation to the extensive need of doctors and judges in the feverish city (cf. 373d). 
Despite Glaucon’s indications that he does not understand all of Socrates’ suggestions, 
the latter continues and sketches a way that leads to the famous healer-doctor 
Asclepius,80 now viewed as a politician (πολιτικόν, 407e3).81 In the tradition 
established by Asclepius, Socrates finds an ideal for the art of medicine and judging 
that potentially will fit the purged city. The question is if Glaucon is willing to … 
  
… set down a law in the city providing as well for an art of medicine such as we 
described along with such an art of judging, which will care for those of your 
citizens who have good natures in body and soul; while as for those who haven’t, 
they’ll let die the ones whose bodies are such, and the ones whose souls have bad 
natures and are incurable, they themselves will kill (409e5-410a4).  
 
This is the first law that concerns the multitude, and from my point of view the content 
of the law seems at first to be both controversial and somehow gruesome.82 However, 
as I also notice that Socrates here talks of “your citizens (πολιτῶν σοι),” and as I take 
these citizens to allude to the Athenians, my first impression begins to alter. When 
Socrates earlier mentioned “the citizens,” he used the term in a general sense. This is 
the first time he denotes them as “yours,” and he will do so one more time toward 
Glaucon in G3 (463d). This gives way for two equal interpretations. First, we can read 
it literally and state that all the citizens in the feverish city that do not have good 
natures in bodies, the doctors will let die and the ones that do not have good natures 
(cf. lack of harmony) in their souls, the doctors will kill. Secondly, we can read it as 
yet another Socratic challenge or test of Glaucon. As he now partakes—aware—in the 
purging of the feverish city he initially wanted to investigate, and—unaware—is 
preparing himself for participation in a thought experiment, Socrates once again tries 
                                                          
80 Planeaux (2001, 181), explains that “[…] When Asclepius entered Attica (after the Peace of Nicias), 
he promptly established himself both in Piraeus and in the asty. Upon entering Athens proper, 
furthermore, Asclepius settled under the Acropolis in the area of Amynos, and soon Asclepius 
overshadowed the older healing cult.”  
81 This I take as an allusion to Parmenides who also was a healer-politician and legislator. I return to 
Parmenides the healer in chapter 7: Setting the stage, section 7.1: Parmenides, the legislator, p. 250. 
82 This law alludes to the law code Protagoras launches as a threatening element connected to his 
paideia program. I return to this in chapter 7: Setting the stage, section 7.4: Protagoras the teacher, 
p. 267 ff.  
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to wake him up and make him see this distinction. The question is if Glaucon 
recognizes it.  
Glaucon’s response to the proposed law is not a simple yes or no. His answer is 
politically ambiguous: “Well […] that’s the way it looked best for those who undergo 
it and for the city” (410a5-6). From this cloudy response, Socrates infers that your 
young will then “plainly beware of falling into need of the judge’s art since they use 
that simple music which we claimed engenders moderation” (410a7-10). We (the 
universal audience) now understand that the denotation “your young” refers to the 
guardians in their making. Hence, we also understand that we are on our way to ascend 
to a new thought experiment. Glaucon does not grasp the latter, but he understands that 
the explicit threats of the last law will work. Through the next line of questioning, we 
learn that the musical man will need neither a doctor nor a judge. Thus, the law 
proposed above will be dismissed.  
When doing his exercises, the musical man will look less to strength and more to 
the spirited part of his nature—as opposed to the other kinds of athletes who treat diets 
and labors as means to force. Hence, there is no need for doctors in the guardian class; 
a preventive diet and gymnastic will be sufficient. Socrates now starts to pick up the 
loose ends. First, he returns to the starting point of their evaluation—the traditional 
view that music cared for the soul and gymnastic for the body—and asks if those (i.e., 
a reference to the ‘sons of Asclepius’) who established this education did not do it for 
other purposes? It is more likely “that they established both chiefly for the soul” 
(410c5-6), Socrates concludes. Again, Glaucon is at loss, and Socrates elaborates by 
an analogy pointing back to their discussion on the nature of the guardians (cf. G1, 
374d-376c). Now his theme is savageness and hardness versus softness and tameness. 
He explains that savageness stems from the spirited part of nature, and if correctly 
trained it will be courageous, it will not become cruel and harsh (cf. 410d); the 
philosophic nature will become tame and orderly if properly trained. He reminds 
Glaucon that according to their demand, the guardians ought to have both these natures 
and these needed to be harmonized (cf. the noble dog-philosopher analogy at 375a2-3). 
They have already shown that the harmonized soul is moderate and courageous, and 




… some god gave two arts to human beings for these two things, as it seems—
music and gymnastic for the spirited and the philosophic—not for soul and body, 
except incidentally, but rather for these two. He did so in order that they might be 
harmonized with one another by being tuned to the proper degree of tension and 
relaxation (411e5-412a2).  
 
As Glaucon concedes, Socrates can give his overall conclusion on the themes 
discussed so far. “Then the man who makes the finest mixture of gymnastic with 
music and brings them to his soul in the most proper measure is the one of whom we 
would most correctly say that he is the most perfectly musical and well harmonized, 
far more so than of the man who tunes the strings to one another” (412a3-6). If the 
regime is to be saved (πολιτεία σῴζεσθαι, 412a9-10), this is the kind of man they 
always need as a supervisor of training (ἐπιστάτου, 412a9) in the purged city. These 
are the models (τύποι) of education and rearing, Socrates says, and they must be 
followed. Because they are clearly stated, they are “no longer difficult to discover” 
(412b6), Socrates concludes. It is significant that in his response to Socrates’ 
conclusion Glaucon again signals hesitancy: “Perhaps, they aren’t,” he says. This 
indicates that Glaucon understood that they decided on the models (τύποι) for a new 
paideia, but did he understand that the important issue was the path toward the 
models? 
5.4.3.2 Second path—testing the guardians (410a5-414b7)  
Socrates does not pick up on Glaucon’s ambivalence. Instead, he wants to go on by 
determining “who among these men will rule and who be ruled” (412b9-10). To 
enable himself to make this decision, he once again picks up on the discussion on the 
nature of the guardians. Since they are to be rulers, must they not be the best of the 
guardians and the most skillful in guarding the city? (cf. 412c). Socrates’ argument 
develops like this: Because a man always cares most for what he loves, the guardian 
must, to begin with, be prudent, powerful, and care for the city (cf. 412c-d). He then 
makes a distinction with regard to selection: “[…] we must select from the other 
guardians (τῶν ἄλλων φυλάκων) the sort of men who, upon our consideration, from 
everything in their lives, look as if they were entirely eager to do what they believe to 
be advantageous to the city and would in no way be willing to do what is not” (412d9-
e3). This entails that not all guardians are suited to rule, and it is now Glaucon and 
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Socrates’ job to rule out those who are not.83 Thus, their intention is to lay down 
procedures for a selection praxis within the class of guardians (or soldiers).  
In Socrates’ opinion, the guardians are to be watched at every age, from 
childhood on. In this way, they will be able to find those who are skillful according to 
this dogma (δόγματος, 412e6). The word δόγμα means “an opinion,” and usually an 
authoritative opinion, a decree of assembly, or the opinion or consensus of the rulers of 
the people. According to Bloom (1991b, 455n64), the word here has both senses: “an 
opinion” and “a public agreement or law.” This must entail that Socrates refers to an 
already established law (δόγμα) concerning selections.84 Further, they must secure that 
the guardians never—under the influence of wizardry or force—forget and thus banish 
this dogma. That is, it is all a matter of what is best for the city (cf. 412d-e). Glaucon 
does not understand what is meant by ‘banish.’ Socrates expounds and tells that “an 
opinion departs from our minds either willingly or unwillingly; the departure of the 
false opinion from the man who learns otherwise is willing, that of every true opinion 
is unwilling” (412e-413a).85 Glaucon understands the case of “the willing departure,” 
but he needs to learn more about “the unwilling.” “What?” is the response, whereupon 
Socrates declares that men are unwillingly deprived on true opinion.86 “Don’t they 
suffer this by being robbed, bewitched by wizards, or forced?” Socrates asks next. 
Glaucon is still at a loss: “Now I don’t understand again,” he says (413b3). At this 
point, Socrates apologizes (cf. his apology to Adeimantus at 392d-e): “I’m afraid I am 
speaking in the tragic way” (413b4), he says, and continues by carefully defining the 
three concepts.87 Glaucon is again on track and Socrates starts anew:  
                                                          
83 The question regarding who will rule and who are to be ruled will be answered when Socrates 
launches the third wave at 473c ff. Hence, I take this to be the fifth hint toward the interruption at 
449a when Socrates is accused for not telling it all (cf. pp. 167n29, 173n45, 174n47, and 181n68). 
84 By this implicit law, Socrates is again warranting his argument in a concealed topos, and I take this 
to be the sixth hint toward the interruption at 449a when Socrates is accused for not telling it all (cf. 
pp. 167n29, 173n45, 174n47, 181n68note, and 189n83). 
85 Cf. Euthyphron (11b-d); see also Introduction, section 3.2: The demiurge at work, pp. 20-3. 
86 This we learned in A2 (cf. 370a f.), and the reason was lack of proper education. Thus, this is yet 
another hint toward Glaucon’s inattentiveness.  
87 By “being robbed” Socrates meant “those who are persuaded to change and those who forget, 
because in the one case, time, in the other, speech, takes away their opinions unawares” (413b5). By 
“being forced,” Socrates meant “those whom some grief or pain causes to change their opinions” 
(413b6). By “bewitched” Socrates meant “those who change their opinions either because they are 




Now then, as I said a while ago, we must look (ζητητέον) for some men who are 
the best guardians (ἄριστοι φύλακες) of their conviction (αὑτοῖς δόγματος) that 
they must do what on each occasion seems best for the city. So, we must watch 
them straight from childhood by setting them at tasks in which a man would most 
likely forget and be deceived out of such a conviction. And the man who has a 
memory and is hard to deceive must be chosen, and the one who’s not must be 
rejected, mustn’t he? (413c5-d2)88 
 
From this statement, it looks like they within the class of guardians already live by the 
dogma as a law, and it is among these they must look for the best. Socrates has also 
presented two additional demands—they must have a good memory because then they 
are less likely to be deceived, and the potential rulers “must be set to labors, pains, and 
contests in which these same things must be watched” (413d4-5). Glaucon agrees. 
From this, it follows that the selectors must especially be aware of wizardry: “Just as 
they lead colts to noises and confusions and observe if they’re fearful, so these men 
when they are young must be brought to terrors and then cast in turn into pleasures, 
testing (βασανίζοντας) them far more than gold in fire” (413d8-e2). As I understand 
this unique form of testing, the guardians, right from childhood on, will be scared and 
then comforted to balance out pleasure and pain. If they manage this task throughout 
life, they have proved themselves not to be easily bewitched; more precisely, they 
have shown themselves to be musical men who possess rhythm and harmony in all 
occasions—these men will be useful for the city. When they have passed the tests 
untainted as children, youths, and men, they “must be appointed ruler of the city and 
guardian” (414a1-2). The men that do not pass are rejected. According to Socrates, this 
“selection and appointment of the rulers and guardians is […] something like this, not 
described precisely, but by way of a model (τύπῳ)” (414a5-7).89 He then announces 
that it is “truly most correct to call these men complete guardians (φύλακας παντελεῖς, 
414b1-2).” As a whole, the guardians can watch over enemies from without and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(449a1 ff.) Socrates is accused by Adeimantus for robbing the gathering of a whole section (εἶδος) of 
the argument. 
88 This is a pointing forward to the third wave and the explicit introduction of the philosopher-kings. 
89 With regard to this specific kind of testing, there are at this point some ambiguities—especially 
what models Socrates is referring to here—which will be clarified when Socrates launches the third 
wave, and further during the curriculum of the philosopher. This indicates that Socrates is again 
warranting his argument in a concealed topos, and I take this to be the seventh hint toward the 
interruption at 449a when Socrates is accused for not telling it all (cf. pp. 167n29, 173n45, 174n47, 
181n68, 189n83, and 189n84). 
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friends from within;90 and the beauty of the selection and, hence, the distinction, is that 
the friends from within will not wish to do harm, while the enemies from without will 
not be able to. From this argument, Socrates presents the second redefinition of the 
concept “guardian,” he says that “the young, whom we were calling guardians up to 
now, we shall call auxiliaries and helpers of the rulers’ convictions (τῶν ἀρχόντων 
δόγμασιν, 414b4-6).”91  
At this point, I will summarize the conversation so far. First, Glaucon was forced 
to prohibit all the conventional modes and start searching for the “true rule” 
concerning the rhythms fit for a harmonious man. He was tested, but it turned out that 
he had not grasped the full meaning of the musical man. Secondly, Socrates urged him 
to leave details regarding physical experiences (the body) behind and start to take care 
of the intellect. From this urging, they started a search for the paths leading to new 
models. They described two: first, the way to health which led them to Asclepius, 
second, the testing of the guardians which led them to the true rulers. With regard to 
the latter, we can infer that three classes were identified implicitly: the multitude; the 
guardian/soldier-class that through a profound testing will be divided into two: the 
class of auxiliaries/helpers/soldiers, and the class of rulers.92 There is one more 
question to attend to, though, and this is related to the Athenian topos of autochthony. 
5.4.4 The noble lie (414b8-417b10) 
The “noble lie” as presented in the upcoming sections is broadly discussed.93 I do not 
deviate from the orthodox readings and interpretations regarding the content of 
Socrates’ story, but I will claim that the “noble lie” is not transported into the 
“beautiful city.” On the contrary, I think that Socrates repeals it in G3 (444a4-6).94 The 
two-part myth Socrates now is about to tell is of major importance. The point of 
departure is Socrates asking: “Could we […] somehow contrive one of those lies that 
                                                          
90 This distinction I take to be a pointing forward to G3 470b. Here, Socrates makes a distinction 
between polemos (external war) and stasis (internal war). I return to this in chapter 6: The demiurges 
of freedom, section 6.2.2.3: Third consideration: War and faction, pp. 229-34. 
91 Cf. p. 166n25. 
92 This last point is foreshadowing G3 where the three classes will be made explicit. 
93 For a summary of recent debates, see Dombrowski (1997) and Lay Williams (2013). 
94 I have not found any scholar who takes the statement of Socrates in 444a4-6 into consideration 
when discussing and concluding with regard to the “noble lie.”  
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come into being in case of need, of which we were just now speaking, someone noble 
(γενναῖόν)95 lie to persuade, in the best case, even the rulers, but if not them, the rest of 
the city?” (414b8-c2). The word γενναῖόν has connotations that point strongly toward 
the Athenian myth of their origin, so Socrates is hesitant to speak when he now 
awakens the topos of autochthony,96 
 
I shall speak—and yet, I don’t know what I’ll use for daring or speeches in telling 
it—and I’ll attempt to persuade first the rulers and the soldiers, then the rest of the 
city, that the rearing and education we gave them were like dreams; they only 
thought they were undergoing all that was happening to them, while, in truth, at 
that time they were under the earth within, being fashioned and reared themselves, 
and their arms and other tools being crafted. When the job had been completely 
finished, then the earth, which is their mother, sent them up. And now, as though 
the land they are in were a mother and nurse, they must plan for and defend it, if 
anyone attacks, and they must think of the other citizens as brothers and born of 
the earth” (414d1-e6). 
 
“It wasn’t […] for nothing that you were for so long ashamed to tell the lie” (414e7), 
Glaucon responds. Socrates replies that his disinclination was indeed appropriate. This 
little word exchange indicates that both Socrates and Glaucon apprehend the Athenian 
myth of autochthony to be a lie. Thus, it suggests that they both, at this point, turn their 
back on the significant topos sustaining the political ideology of their native city.97 
Autochthony,98 as self-representation, was imperative and reinforced in Athens 
through the rituals of the Panathenaea festival.99 The story tells that it was king 
                                                          
95 Bloom (1991b, 455n65) points out that γενναῖόν is, primarily, “noble” in the sense of “nobly born” 
or “well bred” (cf. 375a and 409c). According to Liddle and Scott, the word γενναῖόν means true to 
one’s birth or descent; of persons, high-born, noble, noble in mind; of animals, well-bread; of things, 
good of their kind, excellent. 
96 According to Loraux (1994, 41), this is a civic myth. She maintains: “To give it its historical moment, 
let us call it a myth of the “classical city,” or even better, a myth of the fifth century. […] It is true that 
in this period, the domain of politics appropriates all representational space, the language of all 
illustration: it takes over the tragic stage, where the logos becomes a spectacle, and the Athenian 
cemeteries, where the private stēlai give way to public monuments. During this great movement of 
political appropriation, when visual representation is taken over by the spoken word, it is not 
surprising that the civic myth of autochthony should find its prestigious place.” 
97 Cf. I have reformulated Rosenstock (1994, 368); his formulation is uttered like this: “In the 
Republic, Plato turns his back on the political ideology that sustains his city.”  
98 On thorough examinations on the myth of autochthony, see Loraux (2006), (2000), and (1994); on 
the importance of autochthony generally to Athenian thought, see especially Loraux (1994), chapter 
I: “Autochthony: An Athenian Topic,” pp. 37-71.  
99 Prior to the Panathenaea, the Athenians celebrated the Arrhephoria festival. “The ritual of the 
Arrhephoria recalls the biological unity of Athenians as children of one mother, the land of Attica,” 
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Erichthonius who founded the festival. He was “born from out of earth” and “was 
claimed by the Athenians to be their autochthonous progenitor.”100 Josiah Ober (1989, 
288) links autochthony as self-presentation to the powerful topos of same-mindedness 
(homonoia)101 and claims that “paradoxically, ‘same-mindedness’ on a political plane 
threatened to tear the society apart” (ibid). He refers to Lysias (one of the men 
gathered) who, in his Funeral Oration, activated the topos of autochthony and orated 
on “how the autochthonous ancestors of the Athenians threw out their rulers 
(dunasteias) and established a democracy ‘believing that the freedom of all is the 
greatest consensus’” (ibid, 298).102 Ober (ibid, 299) points out that for Lysias it was no 
problem to link autochthony, same-mindedness (homonoia), and freedom (eleutheria):  
 
Far from facing the contradiction squarely and deciding which concept was of 
greater utility or how each might be moderated, the Athenians continued to 
believe that both freedom and consensus were simultaneously good, valuable to 
state and society, and attainable. […] Any attempt to limit either one by 
constitutional means might have been constructed as an intolerable assault on 
basic Athenian values.  
 
When Socrates has introduced the myth and denoted it as “a noble (γενναῖόν) lie,” it is 
difficult not to see it as a direct attack on basic Athenian values.103 However, there is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Rosenstock (1994, 365). It is also noteworthy that in the two dialogues, the Parmenides and the 
Timaeus, where the principles of philosophy are discussed and explicitly voiced, the dramatic 
backdrop is the Panathenaea. 
100 Rosenstock (1994, 364-65) gives a summary of the myth: “The festival that Erichthonius founded 
celebrates his ascension to power as kings, and it is dedicated to the goddess Athena who, in the 
mythic narrative of Erichthonius’ birth, functions as his foster mother. Athena, the story goes, was 
sexually assaulted by Hephaistos and, after having repelled his attack, wiped his seed off herself with 
a piece of wool and threw the wool to the earth. The earth became pregnant with the seed and 
produced a child, the half-human and half-serpent Erichthonius. Athena took up the child and 
charged the virgin daughters of the king (Kekrops) who ruled in Attica at that time with responsibility 
for watching over the covered basket that concealed the infant. Although instructed not to open the 
basket, all the girls but one disobeyed and, in punishment, the disobedient daughters were driven 
mad by the child. They leapt to their deaths from the rocky heights of the Acropolis.” It is the myth of 
these virgin daughters that is reenacted every year in the ritual of Arrhephoria. 
101 I will return to the topos of same-mindedness when I read the Apology in chapter 10: The 
Apology, section 10.1 The ideal of same-mindedness, or the homonoia topos, pp. 354-56. 
102 Ober (1989, 298n13) stresses that in this passage the context is that of eleutheria, the “throwing 
out of the rulers,” and this “suggest that freedom here is meant to be constructed as the freedom of 
the citizens to engage in political action, rather than freedom of the state from external domination.”  
103 Socrates also awakens this topos in the Alcibiades I (131e10-132a7) when he warns Alcibiades and 
urges him to be aware of the corrupted Athenian politicians. I return to this in chapter 8: Saving 
youths, section 8.2: Alcibiades and Socrates. 
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yet another attack beneath the surface; the female aspect, which will come to light later 
when Socrates introduces the first wave. The myth of autochthony excludes half of the 
Athenian population, as women are not part of the myth that explains the origin of the 
city.104 Saxonhouse (1986, 259), among others, has pointed this out:  
 
For the most part, a founding myth of autochthony suggests the exclusion of 
women from the origins of the city. The city and its public space is the realm of 
male warriors sprung from the earth. They are not to be divided by their ties to 
separate mothers, to separate wives, returned to a private realm that may raise 
questions about the universality of the polis and its goals.105  
 
As I argue that the myth of autochthony is taken out of the equation, I will not pursue 
this discussion here. However, I return to the exclusion of women in my next chapter. 
For now, Socrates admits to Glaucon that he was disinclined to tell this lie, 
nevertheless, it does not hinder him from continuing. “All the same,” he says, “hear 
out the rest of the tale” (415a1-2), 
 
All of you in the city are certainly brothers, we shall say to them in telling the tale, 
but the god, in fashioning those of you who are competent to rule, mixed gold in 
at their birth; this is why they are most honored; in auxiliaries, silver; and iron and 
bronze in the farmers and the other craftsmen. So, because you’re all related, 
although for the most part you’ll produce offspring like yourselves, it sometimes 
happens that a silver child will be born from a golden parent, a golden child from 
a silver parent, and similarly all the others from each other. Hence, the god 
commands the rulers first and foremost to be of nothing such good guardians and 
to keep over nothing so careful a watch as the children, seeing which of these 
metals is mixed in their souls. And, if a child of theirs should be born with an 
admixture of bronze or iron, by no manner of means are they to take pity on it, but 
shall assign the proper value to its nature and thrust it out among the craftsmen or 
the farmers; and, again, if from these men one should naturally grow who has an 
admixture of gold or silver, they will honor such ones and lead them up, some to 
the guardian group, others to the auxiliary, believing that there is an oracle that the 
city will be destroyed when an iron or bronze man is its guardian (415a2-c8). 
 
This second part of the story is a Socratic twist of Hesiod’s story on decay through the 
ages.106 By this Hesiodic allusion, Socrates also alludes to the topos of peace. As 
                                                          
104 On the exclusion of women with regard to the myth of autochthony, see especially Loraux (1994, 
37-143), and Saxonhouse (1986). The exclusion of women is also a theme in the Laws (805a3-b2). 
The Athenian Stranger refers to statistics when he argues that it will be a tremendous mistake if the 
lawgiver leaves out half of the population. See Appendix IV: The Laws, pp. 398-405. 
105 Some objections on Saxonhouse’s view are set forth by Rosenstock (1994, 365-66). 
106 This Hesiodic allusion, among numerous more in the Republic, makes Noorden (2015, 106) argue 
that Socrates is “playing Hesiod,” because he “in this dialogue is set the challenge of proving the 
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pointed out by Raaflaub (2011, 7), Hesiod “characterizes his Golden Age by 
abundance and peace, while the Bronze Age and the Iron Age are plagued by incessant 
war.” The Socratic twist is to grip Hesiod’s metallic metaphor of the ages and 
transform it into an image illustrating the souls of the citizens. Socrates will elaborate 
on this transformed metallic metaphor at 423d2-6. The rulers have a soul mixed with 
gold. Because they are the most honored and by having gold mixed in their souls, they, 
in turn, allude to peace. The auxiliaries’ souls are mixed with silver, while the farmers’ 
and craftsmen’ are mixed with bronze and iron. These metal souls are to remain pure, 
that is, they are not to be mixed. The worst-case scenario is bronze and iron mixed 
with gold. If this happens, the citizens are to believe—by means of the ‘noble lie’—
that due to an oracle prediction, the city will be destroyed. This demand of purity 
within the classes is also an element embedded in the topos of autochthony. Athens 
employed strict rules with regard to citizenship and, thanks to their extraordinary 
origin and their rearing and education, they grow—from generation to generation—
capable of preserving a collective prowess. Sissa (2011, 5) suggests that this 
combination of birth and personal virtue creates true nobility within the Athenian 
culture.  
When Socrates now asks Glaucon if he can suggest some device that can 
persuade the citizens of this tale, Glaucon has none that can contribute to convincing 
the first generation; “however for their sons and their successors and the rest of the 
human beings who come afterward,” it is easier (415d1-2). Socrates finds himself in 
agreement: “Well, even that would be good for making them care more for the city and 
one another. […] For I understand pretty much what you mean” (415d3-4).  
So far in the text, the reformed paideia seems to go hand in hand with the myth 
of the soul-metal as an argument for keeping the classes pure, but—as stated earlier—I 
argue that the myth of autochthony will be taken out of the equation. The questions 
discussed further indicate that this is the case. When Socrates next asks how these 
earth-born guardians are to be settled and educated, Glaucon believes they already 
have been educated. Nevertheless, Socrates states that this is not the entire picture. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
value of justice but without mentioning its material rewards, unlike Hesiod […] The basic task that 
aligns Socrates in the Republic with ‘Hesiod’ in the Work and Days is that of persuading certain 
individuals, who are inclining toward injustice, to choose to be just.” 
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“It’s not fit to be too sure about that […] However, it is fit to be sure about what we 
were saying a while ago, that they must get the right education, whatever it is, if 
they’re going to have what’s most important for being tame with each other and those 
who are guarded by them” (416b9-c1). Socrates now speaks in an ambiguous manner; 
“whatever this education is” signals that there are more to come. From this ambiguity, 
I infer that this is a pointing forward to the third wave, where the philosophers are 
introduced as rulers and their education is subsequently described in detail.107 At this 
point Adeimantus interrupts.  
5.5 A3: The apology (419a1-427d8) 
It is thinkable that someone will argue that these men are not made happy. In such a 
situation, “what would your apology108 be, Socrates,” Adeimantus wants to know 
(419a1-2). Taking on his role as a judge, he sets forth an accusation. For an outsider, 
these blessed men look exactly like mercenary auxiliaries who sit in the city and do 
nothing but keep watch. They, to whom the city in truth belongs, are deprived of the 
goods the other citizens have access to—conventionally, it is the latter that seems to be 
blessed (cf. 419a-4120a). When meeting this accusation, Socrates makes a little twist: 
He does not take full responsibility, but includes the two brothers in his apology—a 
twist that may indicate, on the one hand, that none of them have yet grasped the full 
picture, and on the other, reminds both that they have been partaking in the making or 
these men; “You ask what our apology will then be?” he asks (420b1) before he 
elaborates. 
 
We’ll say that it wouldn’t be surprising if these men, as they are, are also happiest. 
However, in founding the city, we are not looking to the exceptional happiness of 
any one group among us but, as far as possible, that of the city as a whole. […] 
                                                          
107 This simultaneously indicates that Socrates is again warranting his argument in a concealed topos, 
and I take this to be the eighth hint toward the interruption at 449a when Socrates is accused for not 
telling it all (cf. pp. 167n29, 173n45, 174n47, 181n68, 189n83, 189n84, and 190n89). 
108 Bloom (1991b, 455n1) gives the following reflection on what is about to happen, and I think it is 
noteworthy: “This is a trial: Socrates is accused. The fact that Socrates was a man who finally really 
was accused, who presented an apology in a court, and who was put to death play an important role 
in this drama, all uses of the word apology in the Republic refer to this event and cast light on it. 
Socrates’ outlandish way of life and the consequences of his thought somehow injure the men and 
the regimes in existing cities; and from the various instances in which he is forced to make an 
apology, one can piece together the true reasons for Socrates’, and hence the philosopher’s, conflict 
with the city. This is a valuable supplement to the dialogue, Apology […].” 
197 
 
Now then, we suppose we’re fashioning the happy city—a whole city, not setting 
apart a happy few and putting them in it. […] So now too, don’t compel us to 
attach to the guardians a happiness that will turn them into everything except 
guardians. […] But don’t give us this kind of advice, since, if we were to be 
persuaded by you, the farmer won’t be a farmer, nor the potter a potter […] But 
you surely see that men who are not guardians of the laws and the city, but seem 
to be, utterly destroy an entire city, just as they alone are masters of the occasion 
to govern it well and to make it happy. Now, if we’re making (ποιοῦομεν) true 
guardians, men least likely to do harm to the city […] we have to consider 
whether we are establishing the guardians looking to their having the most 
happiness. Or else, whether looking to this happiness for the city as a whole, we 
must see if it comes to be in the city, and must compel and persuade these 
auxiliaries and guardians to do the same, so that they’ll be the best possible 
craftsmen (δημιουργοὶ) at their jobs, and similarly for all the others, and, with the 
entire city growing thus and being fairly founded, we must let nature assign to 
each of the groups its share of happiness (420b3-421c6).  
 
In this apology, Socrates at one level lectures Adeimantus for bringing the happiness 
of the guardians into the equation. On account of my reading (and argument), this is an 
interesting turn. For the universal audience, Adeimantus’ interruption and Socrates’ 
response are enlightening because now the whole project is explicitly clarified. 
Socrates does not want Adeimantus to attach happiness to the guardians because that 
will turn them into everything except guardians. Nor does he want Adeimantus to give 
this kind of advice, because if they were to be persuaded by him, the farmer would not 
be a farmer, or the potter a potter. This means that by including happiness into the 
discussion at this point, Adeimantus is about to deconstruct the idea of the division of 
labor—or the premise “one man, one job.” If I understand Socrates correctly, he 
indicates that Adeimantus does not fully understand that they are actually “making 
(ποιοῦομεν) true guardians” and that these men are a new breed. They are not earth-
born Athenians but are coming into being through speech. That this initially was a 
thought experiment, Socrates never forgets. He aims to make “the best possible 
craftsmen (δημιουργοὶ)” for the whole city.109 Adeimantus takes it all into silent 
consideration, “You seem to me to speak finely” (421c7), he says.  
The situation is now stabilized, and Socrates is prepared to speak about 
something akin to what he just said. He will do this in a manner that also seems 
                                                          
109 That Socrates now denotes the guardians demiurges, is a pointing forward to the demiurges of 
freedom which, in turn, points toward the philosopher-kings. Therefore, I take this to be the ninth 
hint toward the interruption at 449a when Socrates is accused for not telling it all (cf. pp. 167n29, 
173n45, 174n47, 181n68, 189n83, 189n84, 190n89, and 196n107). 
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sensible to Adeimantus. Socrates asks him to consider if wealth and poverty corrupt 
the other craftsmen (cf. 421d).110 Adeimantus acknowledges that due to poverty the 
craftsmen are unable to provide themselves with tools, and thus they make poorer 
products, and their sons and other apprentices, therefore, turn out to be bad craftsmen. 
Socrates now observes that they have found yet another task for the guardians to 
guard: they are to secure that poverty and wealth in no way “slip into the city without 
their awareness” (421e8-9).111 Due to poverty and wealth, both the craftsmen and their 
products are getting bad; wealth “produces luxury, idleness, and innovation,” while 
poverty “produces illiberality, wrongdoing, and innovation” (422a1-3). Adeimantus 
has no objections to this; however, an additional thought strikes him: War is expensive 
so “how will our city be able to make war when it possesses no money, especially if 
it’s compelled to make war against a wealthy one?” (422a5-7). Socrates’ solution is 
original and controversial. He reasons that if the guardians are forced to fight, it will 
be as “champions in war fighting with rich men” (422b3-4). Because their rich 
enemies are not champions, it follows that they have less knowledge and experience of 
the art of war. Therefore, “our champions will easily fight with two or three times their 
number” (422c8-9). If they told the others the truth and persuaded them that gold and 
silver are prohibited in their city, no one would wage “war against solid, lean dogs” 
(422d6). They would rather join the dogs and wage war against “fat and tender sheep” 
(422d6-7). This is a strategy that aims toward avoiding war, but Adeimantus is not at 
ease: “But if the money of the others is gathered into one city, look out that it doesn’t 
endanger the city that isn’t rich” (422d8-e2). In his reply, it looks like Socrates once 
again lectures Adeimantus, though not so harshly this time; “You are a happy one […] 
if you suppose it is fit to call ‘city’ another than such as we have been equipping” 
(422e3-5). It is plain that when Socrates denoted their city as the true city, 
Adeimantus’ city was the only city that deserves this name. What should one call the 
other cities?  
                                                          
110 The mentioning of “the other craftsmen” picks up on A2 and the discussion of the craftsmen that 
was supposed to be banned from the city (cf. 395b9-c1), pp. 176-77 above. 
111 This picks up on the “true city” founded in A1; one of the two things the inhabitants had to look 
out for was poverty (cf. 372b-c). In the Laws, the Athenian Stranger denotes wealth and poverty as 
the sources to stasis (cf. 690d1).  
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5.5.1 The board game (422e7-423d7) 
To elaborate on this, Socrates refers to a game of draughts where the two halves of the 
board were called “cities.”112 Against this backdrop, Socrates explains that there are 
one poor and one rich, and within each part there are many. If one chooses to approach 
the many as though they were one, the game is lost. However, if one chooses to 
approach the many as many, the game is won.113 The lesson learned is that there is 
always use for many allies and few enemies. So Socrates assures Adeimantus that “as 
long as your city is moderately governed in the way it was just arranged, it will be 
biggest” (423a6-7). The city will be truly biggest, even if it should be made up of only 
one thousand defenders (προπολεμούντων). “This would also be the fairest boundary 
for our rulers” (423b4-5), Socrates states. They must allow the city to grow to the 
point where it is willing to be one, and not beyond that size (cf. 423b6-7). By this they 
have found a further command that they will set on the guardians, who must “guard in 
every way against the city’s being little or seemingly big; rather it should be sufficient 
and one” (423c3-5). To prohibit endless growth is a war-preventive suggestion, but 
Adeimantus thinks that this is perhaps a slight task. However, Socrates argues that the 
task set forth in the story on the metallic-souls (cf. 415a-c) was even slighter. He now 
states that the intention with this myth was “to make plain that each of the other 
citizens too must be brought to that which naturally suits him—one man, one job—so 
that each man, practicing his own, which is one, will not become many but one; and 
thus, you see, the whole city will naturally grow to be one and not many” (423d2-6). 
By his clarification, Socrates has confirmed that the metal-metaphor was meant to 
envision the strict and distinct responsibility and work-division within each of the 
three classes.  
 
5.5.2 Further preparations (423d8-427d8) 
They agree that they have not imposed many commands on their guardians, but these 
are all insignificant if the guardians do not guard the most sufficient thing, their 
education and rearing. In his continuous reasoning, Socrates is preparing Adeimantus 
                                                          
112 Bloom (1991b, 455n5) points out that in this passage there is a play on the similar sound of the 
words for “many” and “cities.” Also, Socrates picks up on the conversation with Polemarchus and the 
section where they discussed the usefulness of justice, peacetime, and partnerships, cf. 333a-b.  
113 This is a pointing forward to the upcoming second wave and how the guardians conduct war. 
200 
 
and the particular audience (and the readers) for the upcoming three waves and the 
entrance into the realm of philosophy.114 His first step is, again, to underline education 
and, hence, he is foreshadowing the first two waves: “If by being well educated they 
become sensible men, they’ll easily see to all this and everything else we are now 
leaving out—that the possession of women, marriage, and procreation of children 
must, as far as possible, be arranged according to the proverb that friends have all 
things in common” (423e5-424a2). The following arguments gradually point toward 
the philosopher, and hence the third wave. As overseers of the city, the guardians must 
guard the education against all newcomers because “there must be no innovation in 
gymnastic and music contrary to the established order” (424b5-7), and “they must 
beware of change to a strange form of music, taking it to be a danger to the whole. For 
never are the ways (τρόπον)115 of music moved without the greatest political laws 
being moved, as Damon says, and I am persuaded” (424c3-6). Also, Adeimantus is 
persuaded. So, it is here in music “that the guardians must build the guardhouse” 
(424d1-2), Socrates concludes. Adeimantus adds, “this kind of lawlessness 
(παρανομία)116 easily creeps in unawares” (424d3-4). The children, or our boys as 
Socrates now calls them, are to take part in lawful play right from the beginning, 
because if play becomes lawless, they will not grow up to be law-abiding men. The 
lawfulness is received from music and will accompany them in their growth and 
“setting right anything in the city that may have previously been neglected” (425a5-
6).117 During this section, they work their way toward an agreement that the education 
                                                          
114 Socrates’ following reflections I take to be the tenth hint toward the interruption at 449a when 
Socrates is accused for not telling it all (cf. pp. 167n29, 173n45, 174n47, 181n68, 189n83, 189n84, 
190n89, 196n107, and 197n109). 
115 The word τρόπον original means a “turning,” a “direction,” or a “way,” and from there a moral 
sense evolves; it is the word for “character”—“the way of a man.” It has a technical sense in music, 
referring to various kinds of songs. They are called tropoi because they evoke certain dispositions of 
the soul, cf. Bloom (1991b, 456n7). 
116 The word is παρανομία; lawlessness in music is a paradoxical notion, but it is made to sound more 
plausible by using a word that reminds of the musical nomos as well as the political, cf. Bloom 
(1991b, 456n8). Cf. also 365e. 
117 These things that have been neglected I take to be an implicit reference to Athens. Examples are: 
“Such as the appropriate silence of younger men in the presence of older ones, making way for them 
and rising, care of parents; and hair dos, clothing, shoes, and, as a whole, the bearing of the body and 
everything else of the sort” (425b2-4). It is also an allusion to Cephalus’ reference to the complaining 
of his friends.  
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itself will preserve a decent conduct of life, so setting down laws that dictate 
gentlemen is foolish.118 The last thing they do with regard to legislation is to 
implement the laws of Apollo for all sacred domains (cf. 427b-c). This conversation 
ends with Socrates’ conclusion: 
 
So then, son of Ariston, your city would now be founded. In the next place, get 
yourself an adequate light somewhere; and look yourself—and call in your brother 
and Polemarchus and the others—whether we can somehow see where the justice 
might be and where the injustice, in what way they differ from one another, and 
which the man who’s going to be happy must possess, whether it escapes the 
notice of all gods and humans or not (427d1-8). 
 
We do not learn what the others might have said because at this point Glaucon 
interrupts and delivers his accusation to Socrates. In A3, Adeimantus advocated his 
initial role as judge. On behalf of the inhabitants of his city, he presented two 
concerns: The first regarded their happiness, and the second regarded warfare. 
Socrates settled the first by arguing that the main thing was to prevent poverty and 
wealth among them, and he settled the second by referring to restricted growth, 
securing an unbreakable unity, and preserve the right education and rearing. He 
concluded that Adeimantus’ city was fully founded. The vision of it was described so 
vividly that we must assume that Socrates takes for granted that all the men gathered 
have imprinted a clear image of it. They are all invited to make their own search for 
justice and injustice. When Glaucon now interrupts, he takes on his previous role as 
the devil’s advocate and sets forth his concern regarding justice. 
5.6 G3: The just city (427d9-449a6) 
“You’re talking nonsense. You promised you would look for it because it’s not holy 
for you not to bring help to justice in every way in your power” (427d9-e2). Socrates 
confirms that Glaucon is right and meets his outburst with an assumption: If our city 
(i.e., the cleansed feverish city) has been correctly founded, then it is perfectly good—
that is, it is wise (σοφή), courageous (ἀνδρεία), moderate (σώφρων), and just (δικαία). 
                                                          
118 Cf. 348c. Examples on this are: market business, the contracts individuals make with one another 
in the market, contracts with manual artisans, and libel, insult, lodging of legal complaints, the 
appointment of judges, and whatever imposts might have to be collected or assessed in the markets 
or harbors, or any market, town, or harbor regulations, or anything else of the kind (cf. 425c-d). 
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The situation now implies two things. First, the devil’s advocate is back, which signals 
that Glaucon has not yet fully grasped that Adeimantus’ city was founded in speech. 
Nor has he grasped that the work laid down in G2 was executed in continuance of A2, 
hence, he is not fully aware of the impact of the purging process of the feverish city. 
Secondly, Socrates states that if his and Glaucon’s city, that is our city, had been 
correctly founded, that city would also be perfectly good. However, since this is not 
the case, and since Glaucon is unaware that Socrates implicitly tries to prepare him for 
partaking aware in an upcoming thought experiment, it now seems like Socrates has 
decided to set this last undertaking on hold. Instead, he invites Glaucon into 
Adeimantus’ city to investigate, or evaluate, the virtues that secured the perfectly good 
city. 
 
5.6.1 The city being wise (428a3-429a7) 
When they enter the city, Socrates states that wisdom (σοφία) comes easily to light.119 
However, there is something strange (ἄτοπον, 428b) about it, Socrates argues. Glaucon 
does not understand what is outlandish about it. Hence, Socrates performs an elenchus 
to make him understand. “The city we described is really wise […] because it is of 
good counsel (εὐβουλία)120 […] good counsel is plainly a kind of knowledge. For it is 
surely not by lack of learning, but by knowledge, that men counsel well. […] on the 
other hand, there’s much knowledge of all sorts in the city” (428b4-5). As Glaucon 
concedes, Socrates continues by making him decide upon which kind of knowledge 
leads to good counseling (cf. 428b-c). Glaucon answers satisfactorily, and Socrates 
presents the final question: “Is there in the city we just founded a kind of knowledge 
[…] about how the city as a whole would best deal with itself and the other cities?” 
(428c13-d4)121 Glaucon confirms that it is “the guardian’s skill” and that this is 
                                                          
119 Here σοφία is given an exclusively political character, and as described in this passage, it means 
φρόνησις. Further this is taken to be the essentially Socratic character of this virtue. See also 
Protagoras 352b and Laws 689b. Cf. Adam, note on Rep. 428b. 
120 Cf. the discussion on “good counsel” in the conversation with Thrasymachus (348d ff.). I will 
return to “good counsel” in chapter 7: Setting the stage, section 7.2: Protagoras; and in chapter 8: 
Saving youths, section 8.2: Alcibiades and Socrates. 
121 “The political wisdom described here is akin to the βασιλικὴ τέχνη of Euthydemus 291c ff. It is also 
akin to Aristotle’s view of πολιτική as the architectonic art (Eth. Nic. I, 1, 1094b27). It knows what is 
good and evil, and legislates for the other arts, but the good which it knows is a political and moral 
conception, not (as yet) the metaphysical Idea of Book VI.” Adam, note on Rep. 428d. 
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observable “in those rulers whom we just now named perfect guardians” (τελέους 
φύλακας, 428d7-8). This is worth noting, as the guardians have not been so named 
before.122 This is the only place in the Republic they are denoted as “perfect.” When 
Glaucon now states that the guardians are fully constituted, this must be, on the one 
hand, due to his inference from the elenchus, and hence, he understands that he is 
evaluating the virtues in Adeimantus’ fully founded city, and on the other, due to 
Glaucon’s interpretation of Socrates’ statements in his apology, as it was presented to 
Adeimantus (cf. 421a). Therefore, Glaucon now signals that he has grown more 
attentive. I take this to be confirmed by Socrates when he simply goes on and lets 
Glaucon conclude that the city is now of good counsel and wise (cf. 428d). This 
conclusion leads to another task for Glaucon to consider: “[…] do you suppose […] 
that there will be more smiths in our city than these true guardians (ἀληθινοὺς 
φύλακας, 428dd12-e1)?” I notice that Socrates now denotes the guardians as “true,” 
not “perfect.” I interpret this to be a silent indication that the guardians are not yet 
fully constituted but still in their becoming. Hence, this is also foreshadowing the third 
wave, where the assignment of the guardian merges with that of the philosopher. For 
now, Socrates and Glaucon agree that there will be far more smiths in the city, and 
“among those who receive a special name for possessing some kind of knowledge,” 
the “guardians will be the fewest of all in number” (428e3-5). “Therefore,” says 
Socrates, 
 
it is from the smallest group and part of itself and the knowledge (ἐπιστήμῃ) in it, 
from the supervising (προεστῶτι) and ruling part (ἄρχοντι), that a city founded 
according to nature would be wise as a whole. And this class, which properly has 
a share in that knowledge which alone among the various kinds of knowledge 
ought to be called wisdom, has, as it seems, the fewest members by nature (428e7-
429a3).    
 
This conclusion is fascinating. The man that never touches music and philosophy 
becomes a misologist (μισόλογος)—a hater of speech or reason—and unmusical, we 
learned in G2 (411c-d). The opposite man will be a λογιστικόν—a man endued with 
                                                          
122 Generally, they are just denoted as “guardians.” Prior to Glaucon’s naming here, the notion of 
“true guardians” has been used once—in Socrates’ apology when he stated that “if we are making 
‘true guardians’ […]” (421a). Socrates will speak of “true guardians” two more times: at 428e and 
464c. Socrates once called them “complete guardians” (414b). 
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reason—hence musical. Here, in the discussion of wisdom, the city is denoted wise 
because its guardians are wise, and the guardians are in turn wise due to their 
λογιστικόν, which is wise. Thus, the wisdom of the whole city is constructed based on 
the knowledge of quite few guardians.123 The outlandish feature of wisdom that was 
the starting point must be that the city is wise due its smallest class, which is according 
to nature. Through this layout of wisdom, the structure of the new politeia is beginning 
to dawn, but there is still much more to consider before it can be fully grasped. 
Socrates states that they now have found how one of the four virtues is, and where it’s 
seated in the city, and that what counts for wisdom also counts for courage.  
 
5.6.2 The city being courageous (429a8-430c7) 
According to Socrates, it is also easy to find what courage is, and where it is situated 
in the city (cf. 429a). However, it is not easy for Glaucon, because Socrates obviously 
describes this virtue in a way unknown to him. “I didn’t quite understand what you 
said” (429c4), Glaucon admits, whereupon Socrates explains that “courage is a certain 
kind of preserving” (429c5). This is a preservation of the opinions produced by law, 
through education of what is terrible (429c7-8)—this statement alludes back to the 
discussion of pleasure and pain and testing in G2, 413e. Socrates now states that “by 
preserving through everything I meant preserving that opinion and not casting it out in 
pains and pleasures and desires and fears” (429c9-d1).124 Glaucon is not quite at ease 
with this definition either, so Socrates offers to give an example which will illustrate 
that they are now doing something similar to “when we selected the soldiers 
(στρατιώτας) and educated them in music and gymnastic” (429e8-430a1). After the 
example is presented (cf. 429d-430b), Socrates concludes that what he calls courage is 
the “kind of power and preservation, through everything, of the right and lawful 
opinion about what is terrible and what not” (430b2-5). By Glaucon’s response, it 
becomes clear that Socrates has presented a redefined and new kind of courage. He 
says, “[…] you regard the right opinion about these same things that come to be 
without education—that is found in beasts and slaves—as not at all lawful and call it 
                                                          
123 Cf. Adam, note on Rep. 428d. 
124 This definition points forward to the discussion of legislation and pleasure and pain that will take 
place later, at 462a ff. 
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something other than courage” (430b7-9). When Socrates confirms that he was right in 
his doubt, Glaucon accepts Socrates’ definition of courage. However, Socrates stresses 
that he must accept it only as “political courage” (πολιτικήν ἀνδρείαν, 430c3). 
 
5.6.3 The city being moderate (430d1-432b7) 
Moderation is “a certain kind of order and mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and 
desires […]” (430e6-7), Socrates pronounces and elaborates further through the 
ridiculous125 phrase “stronger than himself.” However, the phrase can still exemplify 
that in the soul there is something better and something worse and has meaning when 
it is used to describe “that which is better by nature is master over that which is worse” 
(431a6-7). If Glaucon now is willing to take a “glance at our young city” (431b4), he 
will find that the city is “designated stronger than itself” because the rulers (the ones 
born with the best natures and best educated) are moderate. The reference to our young 
city is a two-fold reminder. First, Glaucon is reminded that he now is visiting the city 
founded by Adeimantus and Socrates and, second, that they now are evaluating the 
virtues in this city. This is confirmed by Socrates’ next question. “Don’t you see that 
all these are in your city too and that there the desires (ἐπιθυμίας) in the common many 
(τοῖς πολλοῖς) are mastered by the desires (ἐπιθυμιῶν) and the prudence (φρονήσεως) 
in the more decent few?” (431c9-d2). Glaucon claims to see this.  
5.6.4 The city being just (432b8-435a4) 
Socrates now insists that by the initial rule of their city-founding—that each man must 
function in accordance with how his nature made him naturally most fit (cf. 433a)—
they have from the beginning formulated one form (εἶδος) of justice.126 So, when 
justice comes into being, it is through the practice “of minding one’s own business” 
(433b9). The premises for Socrates’ inference at this point are that after they 
considered moderation, courage, and prudence, they found justice to be left over. 
Justice was the virtue that provided the power (δύναμιν) by which the other three came 
                                                          
125 The phrase is ridiculous because “the one who is stronger than himself would also be weaker than 
himself, and the weaker stronger. The same ‘himself’ is referred to in all of them” (430e11-431a2).  
126 This was a proposal when Adeimantus and Socrates constructed the “true city;” in addition it picks 
up on 372a2 when Adeimantus was not able to tell where justice and injustice were to be found. 
Hence, this statement shows that Glaucon has—through his purging—assimilated the laws proposed 
by Adeimantus.  
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into being. When this was the result, it became clear that justice provided them with 
preservation as long as it was in the city (cf. 433b). This consideration indicates that 
Adeimantus’ true city was just in its becoming right from the start. The inhabitants 
lived in peace, and to preserve the peace they had to watch out for poverty and war.  
It now turns out that the power of justice is a potential rival to wisdom; 
moderation, and courage (cf. 433d-e). To enable themselves to judge in this matter, 
they divide the city into three classes—money-making, auxiliary, and guardian—and 
Socrates proclaims that “meddling among the classes […] and exchange with one 
another is the greatest harm for the city and would most correctly be called extreme 
evil-doing” (434b10-c2). This evil-doing is denoted as injustice, and when each class 
does what is appropriate and is minding its own business, the city as a whole is just. 
They now set out to investigate whether the bigger thing (the city) agrees with the 
smaller thing (the single man). If it should turn out that this is not the case, they will go 
back and test (βασανιοῦμεν) the whole city. “Perhaps, considering then side by side 
and rubbing them together like sticks, we could make justice burst into flame, and 
once it’s come to light, confirm it for ourselves” (435a1-4). They agree that this is the 
way to proceed. 
 
5.6.5 No more need for telling lies (435a5-449a6) 
They have hardly started the testing before Socrates observes that “now it’s a slight 
question about the soul we’ve stumbled (ἐμπεπτώκαμεν) upon” (435c4-5). Glaucon 
does not think that this is a slight question, and he is right. The investigation related to 
the soul goes on from 435e to 444a. During these considerations, they find that justice 
is the power that produces just men and cities, and Socrates can conclude that “the 
dream of theirs had reached its perfect fulfillment” (443b8). He goes on, “I mean our 
saying that we suspected that straight from the beginning of the city’s founding, 
through some god, we probably hit upon an origin (ἀρχήν) and model (τύπον) for 
justice” (443b8-c2). If they in one way or another should be in doubt with regard to 
justice in their city, Socrates has already suggested that “we could reassure ourselves 
completely by testing our justice in light of the vulgar standards” (442e1-3). 
In his summary, Socrates highlights that justice is that a man minds his own 
business concerning what is within—“what truly concerns him and his own” (443d2). 
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The just man “arranges himself” and harmonizes the three parts of his soul “exactly 
like three notes in a harmonic scale, lowest, highest and middle” (443d6-7). It is 
precisely the same parts that harmonize the city. Now that this investigation is 
completed, and justice is identified both in man and city, he concludes, “If we should 
assert that we have found the just man and city and what justice really is in them, I 
don’t suppose we’d seem to be telling an utter lie” (444a4-6). This conclusion entails 
that by evaluating the virtues in Adeimantus’ city of speech, Glaucon understands that 
these features are also present in his feverish city, that by now is fully purged, and 
hence the two cities are superposed. Further, the devil’s advocate can rest his case 
because they have turned the tables and reached a definition of justice, which they also 
have tested and evaluated. This new concept of justice enables them to assert that both 
city and men are just. Finally, this turnabout also entails that there is no longer a need 
for the rulers to tell “noble lies” to its citizens (cf. 444a4-6). Hence, the Athenian lie is 
taken out of the equation.  
The next thing to consider is injustice. Glaucon states that by now such an 
inquiry seems to be ridiculous (γελοῖον, cf. 445a). Socrates insists anyway and will 
look into how many forms of vice there are. The easiest way is to assert that there are 
as “many types of souls as there are types of regimes possessing distinct forms” 
(445c9-10). At this point the narrator interrupts. 
  
5.7 Interlude (449a1-451b8) 
The narrator informs us that Polemarchus, who was sitting at a little distance from 
Adeimantus—stretched out his hand, took hold of his cloak from above by the 
shoulder, and began to draw him toward himself and, as he stooped over, said some 
things in his ear, of which the others overheard nothing other than him asking, “Shall 
we let it go or what shall we do?” Socrates understood that something was brewing 
and asked what was going on. Adeimantus addresses Socrates and states that in their 
“opinion you’re taking it easy […] and robbing us of a whole section (εἶδος) of the 
argument, and that not the least, so you won’t have to go through it” (449c2-3). He 
confronts Socrates rather harshly: “And you supposed you’d get away with it by 
saying, as though it were something quite ordinary, that after all, it’s plain to everyone 
that, as for women and children, the things of friends will be in common” (449c3-5). 
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Adeimantus now confirms what Thrasymachus suspected: that Socrates is warranting 
his claims and arguments in a topos out of the ordinary. It is starting to dawn on 
everyone that the community Socrates is arguing for—and especially the things related 
to women and children—they need to know more of. Once more, he challenges 
Socrates because the men gathered “think it makes a big difference, or rather, the 
whole difference, in a regime’s being right or not right” (449d5-6). Hence, they have 
resolved not to release him until he has told them the entire story he has heard on the 
matter. Again, Socrates warns them against arresting him in this manner:  
 
How much discussion you’ve set in motion, from the beginning again as it were, 
about the regime I was delighted to think I had already described, content if one 
were to leave it at accepting these things as they were stated then. You don’t know 
how great a swarm of arguments you’re stirring up with what you are now 
summoning to the bar. I saw it then and passed by so as not to cause a lot of 
trouble (450a7-b3). 
 
As they all stand behind the resolution, Glaucon sees it fit to underline that for 
“intelligent men […] the proper measure of listening to such arguments is a whole 
life” (450b7-8). This is a bold statement coming from Glaucon, and it indicates that his 
brother’s interruption somehow had an impact on him, because from here on, Glaucon 
starts to signal a profound interest and, hence, he starts to be fully attentive. He urges 
Socrates to go on. “Never mind about us,” he says, “and as for you, don’t weary in 
going through your opinion about the things we ask: what the community of children 
and women will be among our guardians, and their rearing when they are still young, 
in the time between birth and education, which seems to be the most trying. Attempt to 
say what the manner of it must be” (450b8c5). Socrates still hesitates and states that it 
is not easy to go through these arguments they request:   
 
Even more than what we went through before, it admits of many doubts. For it 
could be doubted that the things said are possible; and, even if, in the best possible 
conditions, they could come into being, that they would be what is best will also 
be doubted. So that is why there’s a certain hesitation about getting involved in it, 
for fear that the argument might seem to be a prayer […] (450c7-d3).  
 
Glaucon now assures him that his audience will not be hard-hearted, distrustful, or ill-
willed. Socrates correctly interprets this to be encouragement, and concludes that it has 




If I believed I knew whereof I speak, it would be a fine exhortation. To speak 
knowing the truth, among prudent and dear men, about what is greatest and dear, 
is a thing that is safe and encouraging. But to present arguments at a time when 
one is in doubt and seeking—which is just what I am doing—is a thing both 
frightening and slippery. It’s not because I’m afraid of being laughed at—that’s 
childish—but because I’m afraid that in slipping from the truth where one least 
ought to slip, I’ll not only fall myself but also drag my friends down with me. I 
prostrate myself before Adrasteia,127 Glaucon, for what I’m going to say. I expect 
that it’s a lesser fault to prove to be an unwilling murderer of someone than a 
deceiver about fine, good, and just things in laws. It’s better to run that risk with 
enemies than friends. So, you’ve given me a good exhortation (450d9-451b2). 
 
Now Glaucon laughed, and the word exchange before Socrates starts to speak signals a 
sort of nervous joyfulness that picks up on the theme “arresting Socrates” for the 
second time. The first time happened through the challenges set forth by Glaucon and 
Adeimantus (cf. 357a1-369b4). Through the sections that followed after these 
challenges, Socrates did not reveal his concealed topos. Instead, he continued to 
warrant his arguments there, but as the conversations developed, the particular 
audience now concludes that to be able to judge whether the new-founded regime is 
just or not—they need Socrates to reveal all that he has heard on the matter. Hence, the 
second “arrest” resolved by them all, forces Socrates to be transparent and show that 
his concealed topos is the topos of philosophy (the particular audience does not know 
this yet). Glaucon calms Socrates and says: “But, Socrates, if we are affected in some 
discordant way by the argument, we’ll release you like a man who is guiltless of 
murder, and you won’t be our deceiver. Be bold and speak” (451b2-5). Socrates is not 
quite confident128 and states that “the man who is released in the case of involuntary 
murder is indeed guiltless, as the law says. And it’s probably so in this case too, if it is 
in the other” (451b6-7).129 After this pronunciation, Socrates admits that something 
                                                          
127 On the reference to Adrasteia, see Bloom (1991b, 458n6). 
128 The reason for Socrates’ reluctance to reveal that his arguments are warranted in the topos of 
philosophy, could point back to his initial encounter with Parmenides who told him that a 
philosopher would meet severe problems in convincing a non-philosopher on grounds of 
philosophical arguments. The non-philosopher would reject the arguments, and thus remain 
unconvinced. This I return to in chapter 7: Setting the stage, section 7.1.2: Parmenides, the teacher.  
129 Bloom (1991b, 458n7), points out that this legal terminology is “referring to the treatment of men 
who commit accidental homicide. The killer was believed hateful to the gods and polluted by his act. 
The punishment under the Athenian Draconian law was exile, the killer could be absolved and 




was left out, and says that “Then […] I must go back again and say what perhaps 
should have been said in its turn” (451b9-c1). His intention now, after having 
completed the male drama, is to complete the female.130 Hence, Socrates starts to 



















                                                          
130 Bloom (1991b, 458n8), states that this is “A probable allusion to Aristophanes’ Ecclesiazusae, 
which also proposed the emancipation of women and communism.” 
131 My notion that we now are entering the realm of philosophy is in accordance with Brann (2002) 
who proposes that Books V-VII constitutes the center of the Republic, cf. Howland (1998b, 634n3). 
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Chapter 6: The demiurges of freedom  
 
So far, the readings have shown that the two initial cities have superposed and the new 
ideal city1 is now in its becoming and, starting to surface as a thought experiment 
designed for Glaucon. This city is to be strengthened by a sustainable politeia which 
must be secured and preserved by paideia. At this point, we are ready and well 
prepared, to hear “all of what Socrates has heard” and to learn what happens when he 
openly activates the topos of philosophy. In the first part of this philosophical 
elaboration, Socrates launches the three famous, paradoxical, and controversial 
waves.2 The first wave (454c1-457c11) proclaims the same way of life for women and 
men; the second (457c12-473c5) concerns the community of wives and children, and 
the third (473c6-487a8) pronounces the rule of the philosophers. These are radically 
new thoughts both for the particular and the universal audiences, and they have given 
rise to multiple and long-lasting discussions.3  
As I now continue my reading of G3, the aim is three-fold. The overall premise is 
that I will follow Socrates’ arguments consistently. This is in accordance with his 
                                                          
1 If I understand the argument Howland (1998b, 640) sets forth, I think this “new ideal city” is 
equivalent to the one he denotes as the “Second Just City.”  
2 The word κῦμα translates “wave,” and Bloom (1991b, 459n16) explains that this also means 
“foetus.” He refers to the Theaetetus (149 ff. and 210b) where the words are related to the latter. 
Here, “Socrates claims (at 210b) that he is only an intellectual midwife and not himself capable of a 
pregnancy. That statement may not be wholly adequate, for here we are to see three of his own 
brainchildren.” At this point, I disagree due to Adeimantus’ underlining that Socrates must tell them 
all he has heard on the matter. This entails that it is not Socrates’ own “brainchildren” we are about 
to learn about, but something he has heard. Thus, Socrates’ outlining is consistent.  
3 Because it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to enter these discussions, I will give examples on 
two influential lines of interpretations: The first signals strong hostility toward the idea of female 
rulers. The tone was “set by Schleiermacher who forcefully expresses his distaste for Plato’s abolition 
of conventional marriage and elevation of women to leadership roles […] in the numerous 
translations, explanations, and ‘companions’ that have continued to appear down to our day, 
hostility toward the Platonic suggestion of equality persisted” (Bluestone 1994, 110). For a survey of 
this hostility-interpretation line, see Bluestone (1994). The second line holds “that the material on 
women is meant to indicate that the entire political proposal is ‘ironic’” (Nussbaum 1995, 210n15). 
Bloom (1991a) follows this line of interpretation when he argues that the two first waves Socrates 
launches in the Republic “are the absurd conceits of a comic poet [i.e., Aristophanes] who only 
suggested them [i.e., the waves] in order to ridicule them [i.e., the women],” p. 380. Halliwell (1993) 
intends to give a conclusive refutation of this position. According to Nussbaum (ibid), Halliwell “thus 
confirms Susan Okin’s account to Plato (in Women in Western Political Thought) […]: Plato is best 
read as making serious, if radical proposals for the reform of women’s education.”  
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premise, as he stresses that he will follow the argument consistently and make sure 
that everything proceeds according to nature. It is not directly relevant for my 
argument to go in depth regarding the content of the waves. Thus, I will instead 
highlight the considerations made after they are launched. Regarding the first 
consideration, Socrates explains that due to the power of the contradicting art, women 
have been prevented from partaking in the society as men’s equals; the result of this 
consideration is that the distinctions between sophistry (i.e., eristic) and philosophy are 
sharpened. Related to the second, a new kind of warfare is disposed, and also, the 
concepts “war” and “stasis” are redefined compared to conventions. This I take to be 
an important support of my claim that in the Republic we find a profound criticism 
targeted against Athens, which at the bottom promotes a pro-peace argument. Lastly, 
Socrates promotes that the philosophers are to be the rulers of the new regime. This is 
because the politeia as exposed in contemporary cities does not work satisfactorily, 
and the discussion shows that the ideal city and the contemporary cities are completely 
incompatible. The introduction of the third wave marks the end of my reading.  
6.1 First wave: Same life for women and men (451c1-457c11) 
In Socrates’ opinion, the argument so far has not been sound because as human beings, 
born and educated in the way described hitherto, there has been “[…] no right 
acquisition and use of children and women other than in their following their path 
along which we first directed them” (451c5-7). According to Socrates, the argument 
erred when they attempted to establish only the men as guardians of the herd. 
Therefore he will now follow this up. To make Glaucon grasp the picture, Socrates 
sets up the human-dog analogy once more and thus reminds him that their arguments 
will be consistent according to nature: “Do we believe the females of the guardian 
dogs must guard the things the males guard along with them and hunt with them, and 
do the rest in common; or must they stay indoors as though they were incapacitated as 
a result of bearing and rearing the puppies, while the males work and have all the care 
of the flock?” (451d4-9). This time, Glaucon can infer, and from the analogy, he 
concludes that if men and women are given the same kind of education and rearing, 
they also can do the same things. They agree that music, gymnastic, and “what has to 
do with war must be assigned to the women also” (452a4-5). Socrates underlines that 
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even if these things sometimes appear to be ridiculous, it is only so when they are 
compared to habit (παρὰ τὸ ἔθος, 452a7-8). At this point, I must make a comment due 
to some remarks from learned scholars.  
Socrates says this: “What’s the most ridiculous thing you see among them? […] 
Or is it plain that it’s the women exercising naked with the men in the palaestras, not 
only the young ones but even the older ones too, like the old men in the gymnasiums 
who, when they are wrinkled and not pleasant to the eye, all the same love 
gymnastic?” (452a10-b3). The tendency among commentators is to stress that it is the 
older women that are highlighted as “wrinkled and not pleasant to the eye,” but this is 
not what Socrates states.4 He states that old men are (nowadays) present in the 
gymnasiums because they love gymnastic, despite that they are “wrinkled and not 
pleasant to the eye.” The same would be the case for old women—not more, not less. 
It is only the habit of not seeing women present at gymnasiums that makes women 
laughable, that is, the thought of them partaking; and according to Socrates’ general 
proceedings, it is a valuable and necessary lesson to learn why we must rid ourselves 
from old habits.  
However, when the consequences5 of this agreement start to dawn on Glaucon, 
he lingers and swears, “By Zeus […] that would look ridiculous in the present state of 
things” (452b4-5). This reaction calls for some Socratic reminders. First, that the 
                                                          
4 Here are three examples, and I am not able to see that these are actual comments on Socrates’ 
statement; they are interpretations that allude far beyond. Lampert (2010, 312): “Socrates focuses 
on an erotic upshot, women exercising naked with men, and fixes attention on a comic aspect: even 
old women, wrinkled and not pleasant to the eye, exercise naked with men.” Rosen (2005, 172) 
states: “And this has laughable consequences, prominent among them the aforementioned sight of 
women wrestling naked with young men, but also with older wrinkled ones who love gymnastics but 
are not pleasant to the eyes. One wonders immediately whether this part of the education may not 
stimulate sexual desire in ways that are harmful to the city.” Howland (2004b, 113) makes the 
following comment referring to the laughter in this sequence: “That he has comedy in mind is clear 
from his repetition of the word laughable (it appears six times in 452a-d); his explicit mention of 
making comic drama at 452d; and his introduction of the typically comic themes of sexuality and 
bodily ugliness. Glaucon’s shock (“By Zeus!”) at the notion of hideous old ladies exercising in the 
nude (452a-b) calls to mind Aristophanes’ Assemblywomen (976ff), in which one old hag after 
another demands sex from a younger man. The latter situation result from the fact that the women 
of Athens, having commandeered the Assembly and established that property and women shall be 
held in common—measures enacted in the Kallipolis as well—have made a law requiring men to 
have sex with the ugly women first.”  
5 If such a change took place, some laughable consequences could be found with regard to 
gymnastics, music, bearing of arms, and the riding of horses (cf. 452c). 
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philosophers are courageous, and as Socrates now openly voices philosophical 
arguments, that it is imperative not to be afraid of all the jokes (σκώμματα, 452b6-7). 
Secondly, habits are changeable. For example, Socrates explains, “not so long ago it 
seemed shameful and ridiculous to the Greeks […] to see men naked” (452c7-8).6 
Thirdly, “what was ridiculous to the eyes disappeared in light of what’s best as 
revealed in speeches” (452d6-8). This is the first time Socrates explicitly hints to 
Glaucon that he is partaking in a thought experiment.7 Socrates continues and suggests 
that they must first come to an agreement about “the opportunity to dispute whether 
female human nature can share in common with the nature of the male class in all 
deeds or in none at all, or in some things yes and in others no, particularly with respect 
to war” (452e6-453a4). It seems like Socrates senses that Glaucon’s preoccupation is 
the atopos aspect of the argument. Hence, Socrates suggests that they start with the 
contra-arguments “so that the opposing argument won’t be besieged without defense” 
(453a8-9). He further reminds Glaucon that regarding the city they now are founding, 
the initial agreement was that “each one must mind his own business according to 
nature” (453b4-5). To this reminder, Glaucon responds, “I suppose we did agree. Of 
course” (453b6). At this moment, Glaucon signals hesitation, and this I take to indicate 
that he now acknowledges a turn in the argument which he is not sure he can or wants 
to handle. He is about to enter foreign territory, and that makes him uncomfortable, “I 
shall beg you and do beg you to interpret the argument on our behalf too, whatever it 
may be” (453c8-10). 
Socrates reassures him that he had anticipated this reaction, “This, Glaucon, and 
many other things of the sort […] foreseeing them long ago (πάλαι),8 is what I was 
frightened about, and I shrank from touching the law concerning the possession and 
                                                          
6 The nakedness refers to the men and boys exercising naked in the palaestras. When the Cretans 
originated the gymnasiums, and the Spartans followed, it was possible for the urbane of the time to 
make a comedy of all that, today this habit seems ridiculous to many among the barbarians (cf. 
452c8-d3). 
7 This explicit hint will be explained later when Glaucon demands arguments for the regime to be 
empirically realized, pp. 234-37. 
8 Cf. Thrasymachus’ when he pronounced that he recognized a change in Socrates’ behavior and 
asked what nonsense had possessed him for so long (336b8-c1); see chapter 3: The tide is turning for 
Socrates, section 3.1: Displayed and concealed topoi, pp. 92-4. Thrasymachus then used the term 
πάλαι, as Socrates is doing now. This entails that Socrates recognized the controversial feature of this 
proposal long ago, as well as right here and now. 
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rearing of the women and children” (453c11-d3). They agree that this will be a 
difficult task; nonetheless, Socrates insists that they jump into the sea and start 
swimming—maybe a dolphin will rescue them?9   
6.1.1 The power of the contradicting art (454a1-457c11) 
The first task is to find the reason why the situation of women and children is 
laughable.  “Come, then,” he says, “let’s see if we can find the way out” (453e2). The 
premise “one man, one job according to nature” has functioned as a grounding 
assumption for the discussions hitherto. Although women and men are different, it 
does not follow that within the class of men we cannot identify different natures, and 
within the class of women, all are of the same nature. Hence, according to their 
agreement, the problem is that they now, regarding women, “are asserting that 
different natures must practice the same things” (453e4-5). Both Socrates and Glaucon 
acknowledge that this is an accusation against them if they are to follow the argument 
consistently. The way out is to investigate the power of the contradicting art (ἡ 
δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης, 454a1-2), which, according to Socrates, is a grand and 
deceiving art. The distinction that surfaces is habit (ἔθος) versus nature (φύσις). When 
the sophists defend paideia, it is from the premise that the shaping of a cultural 
mindset is done by making the students’ habits uniform; in this process, they employ 
the art of eristic.10 This is contrary to the philosophers, who leave the habits behind 
and argue that the aim of paideia is an individual shaping according to nature; they 
employ dialectic to display each student’s inherent potential. According to Socrates, 
eristic is deceiving because it allows many to fall into it—even unwillingly, and it 
leads men to think they are discussing when they are indeed quarreling. We learn that 
this happens because “they are unable to consider what is said by separating it out into 
its forms (διαιρούμενοι, 454a5-6).”11 Instead, they pursue contradiction in the mere 
                                                          
9 Cf. Herodotus, I: 23-24. 
10 Cf. the encounter between Thrasymachus and Socrates, and my argument that they are activating 
incompatible topoi. Socrates is now explicit on this distinction, by clarifying the difference between 
eristic and dialectic.  
11 Bloom (1991b, 453n50); διαιρέω is the term used for the activity of discerning the forms or classes 
to which things belong. Bloom stresses that “it is the fundamental task of dialectic to define things 




name of what is spoken about. In this pursuing they are “using eristic (ἔριδι), not 
dialectic (διαλέκτῳ), with one another” (454a8). Glaucon understands that this 
happens to many men, but he does not see the relevance of mentioning it in this 
context, “this doesn’t apply to us too at present, does it?” (454a11), he asks. Socrates 
claims that it certainly is relevant. When entering the discussion regarding women, the 
eristic man will follow the name (i.e., woman) alone;12 he will also insist that natures 
which are not the same must have different practices. From this, it follows that he fails 
because he too quickly assigns different practices to different natures and the same 
ones to the same. The readers now understand that if such arguments are to be 
consistent, it is permissible to ask, for instance, whether the nature of the bald and the 
longhaired is the same or opposite. If it turns out that the eristic man should agree that 
it is opposite, and if he states that it is the bald men who are shoemakers, then the 
consequence is that the longhaired are not allowed to be shoemakers and vice versa. In 
agreement with Glaucon, we find this deduction ridiculous. Socrates also agrees, but 
he finds it ridiculous for no other reason “than that we didn’t refer to every sense of 
same and different nature but were guarding only that form of otherness and likeness 
which applies to the pursuits themselves” (454c8-d1). Furthermore, we are reminded 
of the earlier agreement that a man and a woman whose souls were suited for the art of 
medicine have the same nature. From this, it follows that … 
 
… if either the class of men or that of women shows its superiority in some art or 
other practice, then we’ll say that that art must be assigned to it. But if they look 
as though they differ in this alone, that the female bears and the male mounts, 
we’ll assert that it has not thereby yet been proved that a woman differs from a 
man with respect to what we’re talking about; rather, we’ll still suppose that our 
guardians and their women must practice the same things (454d7-e5). 
 
We again turn to the eristic man, who most certainly will claim the opposite 
concerning what art or what practice are connected with the organization of a city and 
                                                          
12 Bloom (1991b, 458n14) reminds us that in the Seventh Letter, in the “Philosophical digression” 
(342a6-345c2), we are given a description of the requisites for the attainment of knowledge of a 
thing. “There are three; name (for example, circle); definition (for example, ‘that in a plane which is 
everywhere equidistant from the extremities to the center’); presentation or image (for example, the 
circle drawn by the geometer, which is only an imperfect example and an aid to learning, not the real 
circle).” The point is that an eristic disputant misleads his interlocutors by looking only to names, in 
this case the names “man” and “woman,” and not to their definition.  
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assert that he will also claim that the natures of women and men are different (cf. 
455a). Socrates suggests that he and Glaucon should beg the man who contradicts to 
follow them, and hence investigate how they can point out to him that there is no 
practice relevant to the government of a city that is peculiar to woman (cf. 455a-b). 
This is also an invitation to the readers who contradict this claim to free themselves 
and follow the argument. Socrates sets this forth in the form of “an imaginary 
interlocutor,”  
 
Come, now, we’ll say to him, answer. Is this what you meant? Did you distinguish 
between the man who has a good nature for a thing and another who has no nature 
for it on these grounds: the one learns something connected with that thing easily, 
the other with difficulty; the one, starting from slight learning, is able to carry 
discovery far forward in the field he has learned, while the other, having chanced 
on a lot of learning and practice, can’t even preserve what he learned; and the 
bodily things give adequate service to the thought of the man with the good nature 
while they oppose the thought of the other man? Are there any other things than 
these by which you distinguished the man who has a good nature for each 
discipline from the one who hasn’t? (455b5-c3) 
 
Glaucon gradually accepts that Socrates’ arguments hold, and he admits that the male 
class has dominated the female class in virtually everything. He also recognizes that 
women traditionally have been identified through female practices such as weaving 
and cooking, not according to their nature. He even admits that “many women are 
better than many men in many things” (455d4-5).  
The consequence of the argument so far is that there is no practice that belongs to 
a woman because she is a woman, and the same principle goes for men. Instead, “the 
natures are scattered alike among both animals; and woman participates according to 
nature in all practices, and man in all, but in all of them, woman is weaker than man” 
(455e1-2). Is the fact that women are physically weaker than man an argument for 
assigning all tasks to men and none to women? This Glaucon declines, and according 
to Socrates, there are also different natures within the female class just as in the class 
of men. One is apt for medicine, another is not. One is apt at gymnastic and war, 
another is unwarlike and no lover of gymnastic (cf. 456a). From this, it follows that 
one woman is fit for guarding, another is not. This is consistent with the earlier claim 
that the men fit for guarding should be selected in accordance with their nature, and 
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the conclusion is that men and women of the same nature are apt with respect to 
guarding the city (cf. 456a). Therefore, such “women […] must also be chosen to live 
and guard with such men, since they are competent and akin to the men in their 
nature” (456b1-3), and the same practices must be assigned to the same nature. 
Socrates rounds off and states that by now they “have come around full circle to where 
we were before and agree that it’s not against nature to assign music and gymnastic to 
the women guardians” (456b8-10). For those who mark the argument as being 
unsound, his conclusion may be received as provocative: “[…] the way things are 
nowadays proves to be, as it seems, against nature” (456c2-3). 
When they now have concluded that women are fit for guarding, the women will 
also partake in the same education as men, and because of their same nature, the 
education will not produce men or women but guardians (cf. 456c-d). The women are 
now ready to strip, Socrates says. Instead of clothing themselves in robes, they shall 
now clothe themselves in virtue. They must—as the male guardians—take part in war, 
and the rest of the city’s need for guarding, and they must not do other things (cf. 
457a). After having gained Glaucon’s content by demonstrating that women were left 
out due to eristic arguments that did not consider the nature of human beings, the 
initial denotation “the female drama” is now changed to “the woman’s law.” By this 
law, they are not “swept away” by the first wave, but on the contrary, they have by law 
secured “that our guardians, men and women, must share all pursuits in common” 
(457b9-c1). As the argument is in “agreement with itself,” Socrates claims that what it 
says is both possible and beneficial. “It is not a little wave you’re escaping” (457c5), is 
Glaucon’s final remark in this section. However, Socrates indicates that when Glaucon 
hears the next, he will not consider the first a big one. 
6.2 Second wave: The community of women and children (457c12-473c5) 
The law that follows the second wave is that “All these women are to belong to all 
these men in common, and no woman is to live privately with any man. And the 
children, in their turn, will be in common, and neither will a parent know his own 
offspring, nor a child his parent” (457c12-d2). Glaucon’s reaction when Socrates 
presents this law is peculiar. One might have expected him to be shocked over such a 
controversial suggestion. Instead, he serenely observes that this wave is far bigger than 
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the other and states that this law will implicate doubt with regard to both its benefit 
and possibility (cf. 457d3-4). Socrates does not suppose that the benefits of the 
community of women and children will be disputed, but he supposes “that there would 
arise a great deal of dispute as to whether they are possible or not” (457d7-9). Glaucon 
does not share Socrates’ optimism and repeats that “There could […] very well be 
dispute about both” (457e1). Referring to the arrest, he demands an argument for both 
benefits and possibilities (cf. 457e). Socrates submits to his penalty and argues that it 
is his “desire to put off and consider later in what way it is possible” and will begin 
with a consideration on “how the rulers will arrange these things when they come into 
being and whether their accomplishment would be most advantageous of all for both 
the city and the guardians” (458b2-8). Glaucon admits Socrates first to consider the 
benefits and return to the possibilities.  
6.2.1 The benefits of the second law (458b10-466d5) 
Socrates’ argument on the benefits of the second law develops as follows. At the 
outset, he lays down two conditions. First, he supposes that if the rulers and their 
auxiliaries are to be worthy of their names, the latter will be willing to do what they 
are commanded and the former to command (cf. 458b-c). In “some of their commands 
the rulers will in their turn be obeying the laws; in others—all those we leave to their 
discretion—they will imitate the laws” (458c2-4). Secondly, Glaucon is now explicitly 
denoted as “their lawgiver” (458c6), hence he is upgraded, and this position gives him 
the responsibility to set down the laws for selecting the women in the same manner as 
they earlier proposed to select the men,13 and turn them over to natures that are as 
similar as possible.14 When the selection is done, the first law advises that all the men 
and women will be together, they will have no private possessions of any kind, they 
will have common houses and mess, they will be mixed in gymnastics and training, 
and lastly, Socrates supposes that they will be led by an inner natural necessity to 
sexual mixing with one another. The next law proposal is that all marriages must be 
                                                          
13 This refers back to the testing of the guardians discussed in G2, cf. chapter 5: Founding cities 
making (ποιοῦομεν) guardians, section 5.4.3.2: Second path—testing the guardians, pp. 188-90. 




sacred,15 and especially the most beneficial (cf. 458e), but how will some marriages be 
more beneficial than others? To answer this question, Socrates again employs the 
human-dog analogy, but this time with a twist. He now explicitly addresses Glaucon, 
the dog breeder; and in the discussion that follows, Socrates infers that if it is the same 
with the human species as with dogs, horses, and other animals, then they need 
eminent rulers (cf. 459b). These eminent rulers will be introduced in the third wave, 
but Socrates already now proclaims that it is “likely that our rulers will have to use a 
throng of lies and deceptions for the benefit of the ruled. And, of course, we said that 
everything of this sort is useful as a form of remedy” (459c8-d3). Here he recalls the 
useful lie, which is necessary because all that they have agreed upon so far “must 
come to pass without being noticed by anyone except the rulers themselves” (459e2-
3).16 The main aim is to secure that the community of the guardians is to be as free as 
possible from faction. 
After they have specified the rules regarding procreation and offspring, Socrates 
concludes: “So, Glaucon, the community of women and children for the guardians of 
your city is of this kind” (461e6-7). Socrates further concludes that the community of 
women and children is consistent with the rest of the regime and by far the best. 
However, this last claim must be secured by arguments and agreement. Hence, 
Socrates proposes the following procedure:  
 
[…] the first step toward agreement for us is to ask ourselves what we can say is 
the greatest good in the organization of a city—that good aiming at which the 
legislator must set down the laws—and what the greatest evil; and then to 
consider whether what we have just described harmonizes with the track of the 
good for us and not with that of the evil (462a2-7). 
 
                                                          
15 The sacred marriage “ἱερὸς γάμος” alludes to the marriage between Zeus and Hera and was 
celebrated throughout Greece; cf. Bloom (1991b, 459n18). According to Scheid and Svendbro (2001), 
this celebration was connected to peace through the political topos of weaving. They argue that to 
“weave is really ‘to give order to a great tangle of matters’ in order to ‘put each matter in it proper 
place.’ It is to interweave what is different, contrary or hostile, in order to produce a unified, 
harmonious textile, worthy of covering the great goddess of Olympia herself” (p. 12). I take this 
allusion, in turn, to be a reference to the topos of peace, which I will return to in my final conclusion. 
16 That this “throng of lies” is identified as “a form of remedy” points directly to the “useful lie,” and I 
take that as yet another confirmation that it is not the “noble lie” that is transported into the ideal 
city, cf. my argument related to 444a, pp. 206-07. There is scholarly precedence to argue the 
opposite, but then this distinction is not taken into consideration; see for example Pettersson (2014, 
19-22), Lay Williams (2013), Price (2007), Carmola (2003)—among others. 
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With regard to the first step, Socrates identifies the greatest evil to be what splits and 
makes many instead of one, and the greatest good is what binds it together and makes 
it one (cf. 462a9-b2).17 The greatest good is secured by “the community of pleasure 
and pain” (462b9) because here “all the citizens alike rejoice and are pained at the 
same comings into being and perishings” (462b5-6).18 From this Socrates infers that 
privacy dissolves unity.  
6.2.1.1 Considering the first step 
When Socrates earlier presented the myth of autochthony and denoted it a “noble lie,” 
he stated that when the city was attacked and needed protection, the earthborn men had 
to “think of the other citizens as brothers and born of the earth” (414e5-6). This 
demand he is now about to alter by suggesting more specific etiquettes related to 
habits of addressing. To secure unity and strengthen kinship, the inhabitants of the new 
regime must address one another in specific ways. This entails new names, which in 
turn create new habits and attitudes. Socrates pictures this by a comparison to other 
cities. In a democracy (i.e., Athens), people call the rulers “rulers,” the rulers call the 
people “slaves,” and the rulers call one another “fellow rulers.” This creates the habit 
of addressing fellow rulers as kin and the others as outsiders, thus the phrase “my 
own” is used in relation to a kin while the outsider is “not my own.” This, in turn, 
creates faction. To avoid this, Socrates and Glaucon work their way toward an 
agreement, holding that in their city the people will call the rulers “saviors and 
auxiliaries,” they will call the people “wage givers and supporters,” the rulers will call 
one another “fellow guardians.” The inference Glaucon makes from this is that when 
fellow guardians meet, they hold that they are meeting “a brother, or a sister, or a 
father, or a mother, or a son, or a daughter, or their descendants or ancestors” (463c6-
7). Socrates emphasizes that it is “only the names of kinship” (463d2) Glaucon has set 
down in the laws for them. This is not sufficient; he also must take all the actions that 
go with the names into consideration. He lists examples, such as shame before fathers, 
providing for parents and obeying them, pain of not being in good stead with gods or 
                                                          
17 This refers back to the example of the board game discussed in A3, cf. chapter 5: Founding cities 
making (ποιοῦομεν) guardians, section 5.5.1: The board game, p. 199.  
18 Cf. the discussion of “pleasure and pain,” pp. 174, 190 and 204. 
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human beings, and he argues that when these sayings (φῆμαι, 463d6)19 are singing in 
the ears of the children, they will from early age understand the difference between 
doing well or badly. Regarding the phrase “my own,” they will also be aware that 
“‘my own’ affairs are doing well or badly” (463e4).  
Socrates and Glaucon’s discussion on this first step exhibit three things. First, he 
has made it explicitly clear that the greatest evil is faction, and the greatest good is 
unity. Secondly, the laws set down by Glaucon—with some guiding help from 
Socrates—aim toward securing this unity. In this process the addressing language had 
priority. The language used to mouth the names of kinship and the deeds that 
consequently followed resulted in sayings (φῆμαι), which would ring in the ears of the 
children and thus teach them right from wrong. These specific consequences points 
back to an earlier discussion. In that context, rearing and education were received as 
dreams (cf. 414d), and the φήμη (415d6) ringing in the children’s ears was the myth of 
the earth-born men. This would entail that rearing and education were unaware 
undertakings, related to an oracle or a source of mysterious and obscure origin. These 
φῆμαι gradually changed their status, and bit by bit denoted what men said about such 
things, and then finally became tradition. This tradition, the Athenian myth of 
autochthony, is what Socrates earlier denoted a “noble lie” (cf. 414c). In this context, 
however, he dismisses it for the second time by making rearing and education an 
aware undertaking. Due to the demands set forth to the new φῆμαι, the guardians and 
their children learn by experience, through pain and pleasure.20 Thirdly, by stressing 
that the phrase “my own” in this context means “my own affairs,” Socrates has 
reformulated the phrase “my own” and connected it more tightly to the definition of 
justice presented at 441e2, where it was said that justice was to mind one’s own 
business (according to nature). Together, these three elements lead to the proposed 
agreement regarding the first step. Hence, they can give a two-fold conclusion: first, 
that the community of pain and pleasure is the greatest good for the city, and secondly, 
that the community of children and women among the auxiliaries has “turned out to be 
the cause of the greatest good to our city” (464b).  
                                                          
19 Bloom (1991b, 455n67) elaborates on the meaning of the term φήμη, cf. Pettersson (2014, 24). 
20 This education stands in stark contrast to the practice recommended by Protagoras, to whom I will 
return in chapter 7: Setting the stage, section 7.2.2: Protagoras, the teacher, p. 267 ff. 
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6.2.1.2 Considering the second step 
In step two, they aim to consider whether what they already have described 
harmonizes with what they set down as the good for their city. This consideration is 
undertaken to secure that their agreement does not harmonize with the greatest evil—
faction. Socrates recapitulates and starts anew with the premise that the guardians must 
not be owners of private houses, nor land, nor any other possession. Instead, they 
should receive “livelihood from the others, as a wage for guarding, and use it up in 
common all together, if they are going to be guardians” (464c1-3). Further, the phrase 
“my own” they had to use “with one conviction about what’s their own, straining 
toward the same thing, to the limit of the possible, they are affected alike by pain and 
pleasure” (464d3-5). Because they do not possess anything private except for their 
bodies and have all the rest in common, there will be no lawsuits and complaints 
among them, and on this basis, they will be free from faction (cf. 464d).21 Socrates 
also supposed that “unless rulers command it, it’s not likely that a younger man will 
ever attempt to assault or strike an older one. […] For there are two sufficient 
guardians hindering him, fear and shame: shame preventing him from laying hands as 
on parents, fear that the others will come to the aid of the man who suffers it […]” 
(465a8-b4). The result of these laws, Socrates assumes, is that they will all live in 
peace with one another in all respects (cf. 465b6-7).22 The conclusion on these 
considerations is that “Since they are free from faction among themselves, there won’t 
ever be any danger that the rest of the city will split into factions against these 
guardians or one another” (465b9-11). Thus, they have reached an agreement that the 
laws prescribed harmonize with the good. Socrates is especially happy that they are rid 
of the greatest of all evils, which is poor men flattering the rich (cf. 465c f.). The 
guardians will live a life more blessed than the lives of Olympian victors, Socrates 
claims enthusiastically. Nevertheless, despite all his enthusiasm, he does not forget 
that Adeimantus previously questioned the happiness of the guardians (cf. 419a ff.); 
hence, he addresses Adeimantus’ objections as he earlier promised he would. The 
                                                          
21 This refers to the discussion in G2 when Socrates and Glaucon described the paths toward a new 
politeia; this led them to the healer-doctor Asclepius who Socrates suggested should be viewed as a 
politician, see p. 186 above. 




argument has developed, and contrary to the manner in which it was presented then, 
Socrates argues, “now we were making guardians (φύλακας ποιοῖμεν) guardians and 
the city as happy as we could, but we were not looking exclusively to one group in it 
and forming it for happiness” (466a3-6). Nonetheless, Socrates admits that there is a 
possibility that a “guardian attempts to become happy in such a way that he is no 
longer a guardian […] and (as we assert) best life won’t satisfy him; but, if a foolish 
adolescent opinion about happiness gets hold of him, it will drive him to appropriate 
everything in the city with his power, and he’ll learn that Hesiod was really wise when 
he said that somehow ‘the half is more than the whole’” (466b5-c3). Glaucon is not 
willing to consider this possibility but promptly states that if he follows his advice, he 
will stay in this life. As Glaucon now accepts the benefits of the second law, which is 
the premise of the community of women and children, Socrates announces that this 
part of the discussion has come to an end. The next thing to consider is the possibility 
of realizing this project. 
6.2.2 The possibility of the community of women and children (466d6-468a1) 
What remains is to determine if this proposed law on the community of women and 
children, is possible. As his point of departure, Socrates supposes that such a 
community can come into being among other animals, but in what way is it possible 
among human beings? (cf. 466d7-8). To enable themselves to reach an agreement on 
the probability of realizing such a community, their starting point is warfare.23 The 
implicit premise in the upcoming discussions is that human beings are the only 
animals that wage war. 
In accordance with the argument as it has developed so far, Socrates supposes 
that by now it is “plain (δῆλον) how they’ll make war (τρόπον πολεμήσουσιν, 466e1). 
They (women and men) will carry out their campaigns together, and also they will 
“lead all the hardy children to the war, so that […] they can see what they’ll have to do 
                                                          
23 In the commentary literature, there is a tendency to warn readers to take the upcoming sections 
seriously. The statements in Syse (2010, 119) can serve as a general example: “It could be objected 
here that it is problematic to put too much emphasis on the direct moral lessons we can draw from—
or the concreteness of the criticism of Athens (and other Greeks) implied by—this particular section 
of the dialogue. After all, it appears right after the famous discussion of the equality of women and 
the commonality of property, easily the most utopian and some would even say ironic (albeit 
attractive and lively) part of the work.”  
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in their craft when they are grown up” (466e5-467a1). I assume that this argument is in 
accordance with the conventional view on rearing: all craftsmen made their children 
observe how the crafts are done with an expert’s touch, in this way they are educated 
in practice by observing their future duties. Regarding the children of the guardians 
and their observation of the art of war, Socrates considers this particular partaking also 
to be an advantage for the parents because the children will “help out and serve in the 
whole business of war, and care for their fathers and mothers” (467a1-2). To get 
Glaucon’s consent, he again refers to the human-dog analogy and concludes that 
“every animal fights exceptionally hard in the presence of its offspring” (467a10-b1). 
Nevertheless, Glaucon is concerned, and his worry is related to the risk of defeat in 
war. If the campaign fails, then both parents along with the children are lost, and how 
will the city then be able to recover? Socrates is not concerned. On the one hand, the 
safety of the children will be secured by the most experienced tutors (παιδαγωγοὺς, 
467d7); on the other hand, the risk-evaluation will be done by those who are 
“knowledgeable about all the campaigns that are risky and all that are not” (467c10-
d1).24 From this, it follows that they lead their children to some campaigns and take 
precautions toward others (cf. 467d3). Also, the children are to be trained on horses, 
and thus, if needed, they can make the surest escape following their experienced 
leaders. Again, by following his argument consistently, Socrates has now pinned down 
that its consequence is an army composed in a way not seen (or thought of) before and, 
that in turn, entails a new and controversial way of making war.  
Ober (1994, 14) underlines that in antiquity there was no canonical list of rules 
concerning war, but claims that it is possible to trace some important “unwritten 
conventions governing interstate conflicts.”25 When Socrates now continues by 
                                                          
24 Socrates stresses that the παιδαγωγοὺς are not the most ordinary men, but those adequate by 
experience and age (467d5-7). In contrast, Adam, note on Rep. 467d, points out that the tutorial 
office in Athens was assigned to slaves, while in this context it is exercised by the very best of the 
citizens. This gives reason to emphasize the revolution which Socrates’ arrangement involves in the 
education of the young, cf. Bloom (1991b, 460n27). 
25 Ober (1994, 14) presents a list of twelve unwritten conventions. Lanni (2008, 470) categorizes 
these conventions and highlights “three observations that help explain why the laws of war may have 
been more effective than generally thought First, everyday domestic Greek law was very different 
from our own in that it included unwritten, customary law. For the Greeks, the notion of applying a 
customary international law based on state practice was familiar and completely uncontroversial. 
Second, the importance of honor and status in the ancient world meant that reputational sanctions 
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presenting three considerations on war and warfare, his deliberations, through the next 
three sections, are firmly connected to these conventions of warfare, and he highlights 
some of those that were severely transgressed during the Peloponnesian War.26 
Socrates first deals with the business of war, then with how their guardians are to deal 
with enemies, and lastly, when considering the practice of ravaging the Greek 
countryside and, the burning of houses, he proposes a radically new way of 
understanding the concepts of “war” versus “faction.”  
6.2.2.1 First consideration: The business of war (468a2-469b4)  
After having claimed that by now it is obvious how the guardians are to make war, it is 
noteworthy that Socrates makes a point of asking Glaucon how your soldiers must 
behave toward enemies. “Is the way it looks to me right or not?” (468a3-4), Socrates 
asks. It is also noteworthy that Glaucon’s enthusiasm at this point fades; he is not 
willing to take part in the discussion of the matter: “Just tell me […] what it is” 
(468a5), he responds. This unenthusiastic and dismissive attitude corresponds to how 
he responded when the origin of war was identified in his feverish city; his reaction 
then was silence.27 Socrates continues to follow the argument consistently, and in this 
section, that implies at least two things. First, the army on this war campaign stands 
forth as a united family—all reared within the ideal community of pleasure and pain. 
Secondly, the children are present as observers, and the aim is that they shall learn and 
understand the art of warfare. These two elements entail that the soldiers (fathers and 
mothers) must behave both toward one another and the enemies in a manner that does 
not contradict the premises grounding their rearing and education. Thus, it is the 
consequences of behavior that now are highlighted.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
for violating the laws of war could be effective even in the absence of formal enforcement 
mechanisms. Third, for the most part, the Greek laws of war grew out of religious customs. The laws 
of war were therefore naturally part of the culture and values of constituent states and, as such, 
could more easily encourage compliance than laws whose legitimacy was based on a theory of 
consent or on the fairness of the procedure by which they were enacted.” In addition, he gives a 
survey of what we know about the laws of war in ancient Greece; and he addresses the sources of 
the Greek law of war, their enforcement, mechanisms, and the content of the laws themselves. 
26 Cf. chapter 1: Preparing the stage, Section 1.3.2: Socrates’ prayers, pp. 57-61. 
27 Cf. chapter 5: Founding cities making (ποιοῦομεν) guardians, section 5.2: G1: Socrates, Glaucon and 
the feverish city, pp. 162-68. 
227 
 
Socrates starts with the opposition cowardly versus courageous behavior. If a 
soldier on the campaign chooses to leave the rank or throw away his arms, he signals a 
cowardly attitude and must be punished. The punishment is, on the one hand, to be 
downgraded to a craftsman or a farmer. If this cowardly man, on the other hand, is 
taken alive by the enemy, he will be considered a gift to those who took him—and 
they are free to use their catch for the purpose they see fit (cf. 468a).28 Hence, the 
children learn by observation that cowardly behavior in no way is rewarded, and also 
that the cowardly individual is not offered any help what so ever. He or she is cut off 
and deported. They will also observe and learn the benefits of being courageous: They 
will be hailed and paid tribute to. Unengaged, Glaucon agrees that “[…] the man who 
has proved best and earned a good reputation must first be crowned by each of those 
who made the campaign with him, youths and boys in turn” (468b3-6). However, there 
is a limit for Socrates. He does not suppose that Glaucon would go so far as to accept 
the opinion that the honored man should kiss all and be kissed back by each (cf. 468b). 
To his surprise, this is what Glaucon most of all is willing to accept. Now, he even 
wants to add to the law that “as long as they are on that campaign no one whom he 
wants to kiss be permitted to refuse, so if a man happens to love someone, either male 
or female, he would be more eager to win the rewards of valor” (468b13-c4). I find 
Glaucon’s law suggestion very peculiar, and I take it to be a pointing back to section 
402d-403b where Socrates laid down a law connected to “correct love.” The moment 
that Socrates refers to “kissing,” Glaucon is back; he signals attentiveness by 
suggesting an appendix for the earlier Socratic law proposal. Thus, Glaucon has now 
reinforced his erotic desires and circumscribed them to the guardian’s war-campaigns, 
and further, juxtaposed them to a desire of winning honor.  
The praising of courageous soldiers belongs to a long-lasting tradition, and 
therefore, in this regard, they are not out of joint with the conventions. Socrates refers 
to the Homeric narrative on the hero Ajax and states that “according to Homer too, it’s 
just to honor in such ways whoever is good among the men” (468c10-d1). Therefore, 
they will believe Homer in these cases (at least) and “give the good men and women 
what is conducive to their training at the same time as honoring them” (468e1-2). Of 
                                                          
28 Cf. the Spartan ideal; see pp. 142n7 and 150 above.  
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those who die in the campaign and by their deaths earn a good reputation, they will say 
they are members of the golden class. In this case, they will believe Hesiod (cf. 468e-
469a). Glaucon gives his consent, and later he approves and states that “if the females 
join in the campaign too, either stationed in the line itself, or in the rear, to frighten the 
enemies and in case there should ever be any need of help—I know that with all this 
they would be unbeatable” (471d4-7). 
6.2.2.2 Second consideration: Dealing with enemies (469b5-470a4)  
Socrates now ponders how our soldiers are to deal with enemies. This collective 
addressing makes Glaucon partake, and the view they present on this matter is the 
opposite of the conventions which have the moral topos (do good to your friends and 
harm your enemies) as its grounding premise.29 Lanni (2008, 479) points out that 
“[t]he absence of humanitarian impulses in Greek military values is most evident in 
the norms surrounding the treatment of captives.” The established convention was that 
the “victorious state had complete discretion over how to treat the soldiers and 
civilians of its vanquished enemy” (ibid, 480).30 Xenophon reports that “there is an 
eternal law among all mankind, that whenever a city is taken in warfare, both the 
people and their possessions belong to those who captured the city.”31 When Socrates 
wants to hear Glaucon’s opinion on enslavement, his questions allude to these 
conventions: Does it seem just (δίκαιον, 469b8) that Greek cities enslave Greeks? Or 
should they, “insofar as it is possible, not even allow it but make it a habit to spare the 
Greek stock, well aware of the danger of enslavement at the hands of the barbarians?” 
(369b9-c2). Glaucon decides that the latter is “wholly and entirely superior” (469c3), 
and Socrates proposes that as they do not possess a Greek as slave, they should “give 
                                                          
29 We remember that Socrates dismissed this topos during his conversation with Polemarchus. 
30 Lanni further explains: “There was no convention requiring fighters to show mercy to enemy 
combatants defeated in battle. This was true even if they attempted to surrender. The victor had the 
option of killing the enemy soldiers on the spot, enslaving them, or exchanging them for ransom. All 
three practices are well attested in our sources. Massacres could be gruesome. The Spartans set fire 
to a forest where fleeing Argive fighters had taken refuge, killing thousands (Herodotus, 6.80). In 
another episode, the Athenians stoned to death the surviving enemy soldiers (Thucydides 1.106). The 
killing of captives on the battlefield was so well-accepted that out sources generally don’t bother to 
comment on why the victorious army chose this option. It seems likely that the choice was made 
based on self-interest: Execution would prevent enemy soldiers in a long-running conflict from 
fighting again, while enslavement and ransom brought financial rewards.”  
31 Xenophon, Cyropaedia 7.5.73. Quoted Lanni (2008, 480). 
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the same advice to the other Greeks” (469c5). This entails that Socrates and Glaucon’s 
view on this topic is a severe break with Greek conventions. Also, they launch 
themselves as counselors for the Greeks and thereby also contradict Pericles who 
declared Athens an education to Greece. 
Further, Socrates allows their soldiers to strip dead enemies of their arms, but 
plundering corpses for anything else is viewed as a pretext for cowards (469c-d) and 
thereby prohibited (469e).32 The last thing mentioned is respect for the temples. It is 
prohibited for their soldiers to bring enemies arms to temples as votive offerings. 
Socrates concludes that this is how our soldiers will deal with enemies (469b).  
6.2.2.3 Third consideration: War and faction (470a5-471c3) 
The last thing to consider, is the ravaging of the Greek countryside and burning 
houses, and again Socrates probes for “[w]hat sort of thing will your soldiers do to the 
enemies?” (470a6-7), and once more Glaucon backs off. He will not discuss, but states 
that “I would be glad […] to hear you present your opinion” (4708a), whereupon 
Socrates responds, “Well, in my opinion […] they’ll do neither of these things, but 
they’ll take away the year’s harvest; and do you want me to tell you why?” (470b1-3). 
Socrates now proposes an innovative distinction between war (πόλεμος) and faction 
(στάσις):  
 
It seems to me that, just as there are two different words, polemos and stasis, so in 
fact there are two different things which are distinguished by two different 
criteria. The two things are the domestic and blood-related, on the one hand, and 
the foreign and external, on the other. Stasis is applied to the enmity of the 
domestic, polemos to the enmity of the foreign (470b5-11).33  
                                                          
32 According to Lanni (2008, 478), “Stripping a dead solider to claim his armor was standard practice, 
but by the early classical period it was considered contrary to international law to mutilate or harm 
the body in any way (Herodotus 9.78-79; 4.202-205).” 
33 Here I follow the translation used by Price (2007, 68-9). In Greek, the passage reads: φαίνεταί μοι, 
ὥσπερ καὶ ὀνομάζεται δύο ταῦτα ὀνόματα, πόλεμός τε καὶ στάσις, οὕτω καὶ εἶναι δύο, ὄντα ἐπὶ 
δυοῖν τινοιν διαφοραῖν. λέγω δὲ τὰ δύο τὸ μὲν οἰκεῖον καὶ συγγενές, τὸ δὲ ἀλλότριον καὶ ὀθνεῖον. 
ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῇ τοῦ οἰκείου ἔχθρᾳ στάσις κέκληται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου πόλεμος. Bloom 
translates it in the following way: “It appears to me that just as two different names are used, war 
and faction, so two things also exist, and the names apply to differences in the two. The two things I 
mean are, on the one hand, what is one’s own and akin, and what is alien, and foreign, on the other. 
Now, the name faction is applied to the hatred of one’s own, war to the hatred of the alien.” The 
reason why I deviate from Bloom here is his choice to translate οἰκεῖον καὶ συγγενές as “one’s own 




This much-discussed passage, Price (2007, 68) denotes as “problematic,” and 
maintains that “Socrates’ words here are most certainly not ‘a formal declaration of 
Plato’s political faith in the Panhellenic ideal’” (ibid, 69).34 This seems a sturdy 
verdict, and it represents a long and well-constructed reflection based on the 
assumption that the “noble lie” still dwells under the surface. This assumption leads 
Price to conclude that Socrates’ distinction between faction and war, and “especially 
the premise [i.e., the noble lie] on which it is based, are endorsed neither by Socrates, 
who speaks the words nor by Plato, who wrote them” (ibid, 70). Due to my argument 
that the “noble lie” is no longer a part of the equation, I can present an alternative 
understanding of this passage. However, let us first observe what happens next in the 
text. Maybe surprisingly, Glaucon is back and states that what Socrates is saying “is 
certainly not off the point” (470b11). Socrates signals excitement when he wants to 
hear whether Glaucon has the same opinion regarding the follow-up argument: 
 
Then when Greeks fight with barbarians and barbarians with Greeks, we’ll assert 
they are at war and are enemies by nature, and this hatred must be called war; 
while when Greeks do any such thing to Greeks, we’ll say that they are by nature 
friends, but in this case Greece is sick and factious, and this kind of hatred must 
be called faction (470c5-d1).  
 
Glaucon’s response is: “I, for one […] agree to consider it in that way” (470d2). Now 
that Glaucon gave his consent to both proposals, let us take a closer look at what 
Socrates is doing here. First, he applies faction to the enmity of the domestic and 
blood-related and war to the enmity of the foreign. Secondly, he maintains faction to 
include all Greeks which entails that any conflict between them must be called faction, 
while war proper is conflicts with barbarians because they are enemies by nature. 
Summarized, Socrates has redefined the concepts “faction” and “war.” Hence, what do 
the consequences of these new concepts entail within this context?  
First, regarding war, I take this Socratic perspective as alluding to the narratives 
describing how a uniform Greek army victoriously battled in the Persian War. With its 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
passage gives unfortunate allusions given Socrates’ recent emphasis on how that particular phrase is 
supposed to be understood.  
34 Price here quotes J. Adam and D. Rees, The Republic of Plato I (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1963, 323), and on that ground he argues that this is a widely accepted opinion. 
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heroic and celebrated battles at Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea, the Persian War was, 
according to Sissa (2011, 5), “the defining event for the history of the city [i.e., 
Athens] in the fifth century.” The external threat was the Persian kings Darius and 
Xerxes, who threatened to enslave the whole of Greece. Thus, the war was defensive, 
fought for freedom (cf. ibid, 5-6)35 and, throughout history it stands forth as “the 
paradigmatic war: defensive, intrepid, and altruistic.”36  
Second, regarding faction, I take this Socratic perspective to be, on the one hand, 
a specific pointing back to the “noble lie” and thus to the myth of autochthony, and on 
the other, it is a general reference to the Peloponnesian War.37 Hence, I suggest that 
this is Socrates’ final dismissal of the myth and his final critique of war-waging 
politics. My argument for this develops as follows. The point of departure is Ober’s 
list of the five central holdings of the Athenian democratic ideology, whereof the first 
is of utmost relevance: “A belief in the autochthonous nature of the Athenians, their 
innate intellectual superiority vis-à-vis all other peoples, and the necessity of 
maintaining the exclusivity of the citizens” (Ober 1989, 33). The belief in their 
“autochthonous nature” made them convinced that the Athenians were the only natives 
in the Greek world. This conviction is confirmed by Lysias. In his Funeral Oration 
(17) he says of the Athenians: 
  
Now in many ways it was natural to our ancestors, moved by a single resolve, to 
fight the battles of justice: for the very beginning of their life was just. They had 
not been collected, like most nations, from every quarter, and had not settled in a 
foreign land after driving out its people: they were born of the soil, and possessed 
in one and the same country their mother and their fatherland. 
 
From Lysias’ tribute to his ancestors, it follows that the other Hellenes were, according 
to Sissa (2011, 4-5), viewed as “just a collection of disparate people, who originally 
migrated from elsewhere into a foreign territory.” This, in turn, entails that the 
                                                          
35 Sissa maintains, that the loss of freedom “was the danger to which the Athenians were the first, 
and the fiercest, to respond—for the sake of all Greeks—because of their idiosyncratic aspiration to 
freedom. They were exceptional eager to stand up for liberty, their dearest value, but a value they 
were also ready to shield, on behalf of their friends.” 
36 Cf. chapter 5: Founding cities making (ποιοῦομεν) guardians, section 5.2: G1: Socrates and Glaucon, 
and the feverish city, pp. 164-65, where I, when referring to the narratives describing the Persian 
War, quoted the same passage from Sissa (2011, 5). 
37 Cf. chapter 1: Preparing the stage, section 1.3.2: Socrates’ prayers, pp. 57-61. 
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Athenians were “citizens of an ethnically pure and legitimate city […] at each new 
generation, the Athenians become worthy men, andres agathoi, because as children 
they learn the goodness (agatha) of their ancestors, as young men they cultivate that 
heroism and, finally they come to emulate it with their own excellence, aretê” (ibid). 
During his discourse, Socrates has already dismissed this Athenian idea of purity, and 
in light of his new-grounded paideia, he has also cast serious doubt about the value of 
the Athenian ideal on how to become worthy men. Further, it is not unreasonable to 
argue that the myth of autochthony was a political tool,38 aiming toward same-
mindedness, and from Ober’s argumentation, we have learned that same-mindedness 
on a political level threatened to tear the society apart.39 This is confirmed by Ryan K. 
Balot (2008, 59), who has demonstrated the dangers of Athenian political life. He 
argues that … 
 
… Athenian politics was acrimoniously competitive. Political rivals used the 
courts to wage political warfare against one another. The orators emphasized the 
dangers of free speech and wanted credit for their civic courage. […] Athenian 
political leaders seem in the sources to devote an extraordinary energy to trying to 
get each other executed. 
 
The situation Balot describes points to faction. How to avoid violent internal political 
warfare and corruption, and hence faction, we find in the core of Socrates’ 
argumentation in this context, and more broadly, throughout his philosophical practice 
as we know it from the dialogues. Therefore, he is bound to dismiss the myth of 
autochthony because it is incompatible with the politeia he now is about to construct. 
Faction is usually understood as civil war splitting a city internally, but Socrates 
expands its meaning and includes the whole of Greece.40 The Persian War was fought 
against natural enemies, and Socrates underlines that all Greeks are friends by nature, 
thus, when Greeks hate Greeks, this kind of hatred leads to splitting, and therefore it 
                                                          
38 This is demonstrated by Loraux (1994, 41), see chapter 5: Founding cities making (ποιοῦομεν) 
guardians, p. 192n96. 
39 See p. 193 above. 
40 A little reminder: Earlier, Socrates told Glaucon that he feared our guardians would get hotter and 
softer than they ought due to the wrong kind of rearing (cf. 387c). Therefore, he proposed a model 
opposite to the former because the men they are rearing is the guardianship of the country (χώρας). 
At that point, Socrates expanded the rearing of the guardians to go from the city to the country, this I 
took to be foreshadowing these arguments, cf. p. 174 above. 
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must be called faction—the greatest evil. That the Peloponnesian War was fought for 
twenty-eight years, where democratic Athens and oligarchic Sparta battled for Greek 
hegemony,41 demonstrates that—as Socrates says—Greece is sick and factious (cf. 
470c). These reflections should entail that Socrates, contrary to Price’s argument 
quoted above, is in accordance with Thucydides, who Price (2007, 69) claims 
“presented the inter-Hellenic struggle as fundamentally stasis.”42 
The initial problem Glaucon and Socrates set out to investigate in their third 
consideration was related to the ravaging of the Greek countryside and the burning of 
houses. Should this be allowed? Socrates clarifies a few things after the redefinitions, 
and states,  
 
Now observe […] in what is nowadays understood to be faction, that wherever 
such a thing occurs and a city is split, if each side wastes the fields and burns the 
houses of the others, it seems that the faction is a wicked thing and that the 
members of neither side are lovers of their city. For, otherwise, they would never 
have dared to ravage their nurse and mother. But it seems to be moderate for the 
victors to take away the harvest of the vanquished, and to have the frame of mind 
of men who will be reconciled and not always be at war” (470d3-e3).  
 
Glaucon admits that the city he now is founding will be Greek, and this entails that his 
citizens will be lovers of the Greeks and consider Greece their own and hold the 
common holy places along with all the Greeks (cf. 470e-471a). Socrates underlines 
again that they must consider the differences with Greeks to be denoted as faction, and 
not use the name war (cf. 471a). The result of this will be that they “correct opponents 
in a kindly way, not punishing them with a view to slavery or destruction, acting as 
correctors, not enemies” (471a6-7). Socrates now gives his final summary: 
 
Therefore, as Greeks, they won’t ravage Greece or burn houses, nor will they 
agree that in any city all are their enemies—men, women, and children—but that 
                                                          
41 Cf. Lendon (2010, 60-72). The continium of this war does not dealt with in the Republic, but I will 
still brifly mentioned it: Athens was defeated and victorious Sparta placed the Thirty oligarchs in 
office in Athens. The gruesome rule of the Thirty resulted in a devastating civil war, which found its 
end in Piraeus. This substantial period of war, damaged the politeia of Athens, which in Platonic 
terms is the soul of the city. 
42 On quite different grounds, Thein (2015) argues for a connection between Thucydides and Plato’s 
arguments. They have the same preoccupations (p. 221), and they both are keenly aware of the same 
danger: “they both realize that there is only a very thin line separating destruction from self-
destruction. In fact, for these authors, there is a sort of unbreakable moral continuum between the 
political and the personal conflict” (p. 222). 
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there are always a few enemies who are to blame for the differences. And, on all 
these grounds, they won’t be willing to ravage lands or tear down houses, since 
the many are friendly; and they’ll keep up the quarrel until those to blame are 
compelled to pay the penalty by the blameless ones who are suffering (471a8-b6).  
 
Glaucon’s concluding remark is approval, “I for one […] agree that our citizens must 
behave this way toward their opponents; and toward the barbarians, they must behave 
as the Greeks do now toward one another” (471b7-9). They agree that they will set 
down as a law for the guardians that they shall never waste countryside nor burn 
houses on Greek soil (cf. 471c).  
6.2.3 Will the regime come into being? (471c4-472b2) 
Glaucon has given his consent, and he has concluded that what has been said so far 
was fine. Nevertheless, he is still concerned and troubled: “But, Socrates, I think that if 
one were to allow you to speak about this sort of thing, you would never remember 
what you previously set aside in order to say all this” (471c4-7). He lists the things 
Socrates left out in his initial description and further stresses that the domestic (good) 
consequences were also left out in Socrates’ account. He now wants to know if it is 
“possible for this regime (πολιτεία) to come into being, and how is it ever possible?” 
(471c7-8). Glaucon acknowledges that such a πολιτεία would be good. Nonetheless, 
he suggests that they do not talk more about it, and “rather, let’s now only try to 
persuade ourselves that it is possible and how it is possible, dismissing all the rest” 
(471e3-5). Socrates’ reaction is to prepare the coming of the third wave. He 
prophesizes that when Glaucon hears it, he will “be quite sympathetic, recognizing that 
it was, after all, fitting for me to hesitate and be afraid to speak and undertake to 
consider so paradoxical an argument” (472a5-7). Glaucon dismisses this, and promptly 
states, “The more you say such things […], the less we’ll let you off from telling how 
it is possible for this regime to come into being. So, speak and don’t waste time” 
(472a8-b2). 
Socrates now sees it is necessary to explicitly explain to him that he is partaking 
in a thought experiment and the reason why. He reminds him that, initially, this whole 
undertaking was a search for justice, and this search is still ongoing: “[…] if we find 
out what justice is like, will we also insist that the just man must not differ at all from 
justice itself but in every way be such as it is? Or will we be content if he is nearest to 
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it and participates in it more than the others?” (472b7-c3). Glaucon responds that they 
will be content with that, and his content whirls up the waters, hence, this calls for a 
few comments.  
First, the city where men live nowadays—the feverish city modeled on Athens—
is fully purged. Socrates has dismissed its conventions regarding paideia; further, he 
dismissed the authority of the poets in two aspects, on the one hand, their religious 
authority due to their lies about the gods that leave people unwillingly in ignorance, 
and on the other, their moral authority by demonstrating how the Athenian moral topos 
(do good to your friends, and harm your enemies) was embedded in the poetic topos. 
Socrates also demonstrated that the new teachers, the sophists, are not trustworthy due 
to their art of eristic; also, he dismissed the powerful Athenian topos of autochthony 
and denoted it a “noble lie,” hence, he altered traditional views on politics and warfare. 
Thus Glaucon, the politically motivated and proud Athenian, is left with nothing. Is 
this the reason why he does not want Socrates to talk about the new politeia anymore? 
Secondly, it has been a long and thorough discussion where Socrates all along 
demanded attentiveness. From Glaucon’s point of view, being an empirically oriented 
young man, he recognizes that concrete answers regarding his initial challenges have 
still not surfaced. Alternatively and metaphorically stated, Glaucon stays grounded 
while Socrates ascended. Maybe this observation makes him uncomfortable, even a 
little bored and tired? However, we can still detect a desire to learn more, but perhaps 
not on Socrates’ terms. Socrates anticipated this uneasiness, and explains:  
 
It was, therefore, for the sake of a pattern (παραδείγματος) that we were seeking 
both for what justice by itself (αὐτό δικαιοσύνην) is like, and for the perfectly just 
man, if he should come into being, and what he would be like once come into 
being; and, in their turns, for injustice and the most unjust man. Thus, looking off 
at what their relationships to happiness and its opposite appear to us to be, we 
would also be compelled to agree in our own cases that the man who is most like 
them will have the portion most like theirs. We were not seeking them for the sake 
of proving that it’s possible for these things to come into being (472c5-d4). 
 
To this Glaucon agrees. Nonetheless, I would like to point out two things. The formula 
“justice by itself” picks up on Adeimantus’ earlier challenge. There, he argued that 
those responsible for rearing children “don’t praise justice by itself (αὐτὰ δικαιοσύνην) 
but the good reputation that comes from it” (363a1-3). In that context, the formula 
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meant merely “justice apart from its consequences.” Here, however, it points to 
“abstract justice,” but it has not yet, according to Adam (note on Rep. 472), developed 
into a metaphysical idea as it will during Books VI and VII. Further, the “pattern 
(παραδείγματος)” they are seeking must be understood in a strict sense as a pattern to 
be followed, a “standard.”43 Therefore, the question now is whether Glaucon at this 
point fully understands what he was agreeing to. I do not think so; he still has a long 
way to go. We have to wait until G5 before he signals a deeper understanding of the 
city in speech; here he says, “I understand. […] You mean he (i.e., the truly musical 
man) will remain  in the city we have now gone through, the one that has its place in 
speeches since I don’t suppose it exists anywhere on earth” (592a10-b2).  
For now, Socrates strives to get Glaucon on track, and their following word 
exchange is clarifying with regard to the ongoing thought experiment. Socrates first 
asks if they did not assert to make a paradigm (παράδειγμα) in speech of a good city 
(cf. 472e1-2). He continues by asking if Glaucon supposes “that what we say is any 
less good on account of our not being able to prove that it is possible to found a city 
the same as the one in speech” (372e4-6). Socrates signals annoyance when he points 
out that to gratify Glaucon he must meet his demand by striving to prove how and 
under what condition the city could be empirically realized. He urges Glaucon to grant 
him the same points for proving this in speech (cf. 472e8-11). Glaucon does not 
understand which points Socrates refers to, hence, yet another underlining is 
necessary: “Can anything be done as it is said? Or is it the nature of acting to attain to 
less truth than speaking, even if someone doesn’t think so?” (473a1-3). This 
emphasizing triggers Glaucon to reflect on the following: Does he believe that what 
has been said so far is less true than what could be accomplished by acting in the 
empirical world? Or does he believe that everything that is said in speech can be 
                                                          
43 Cf. ibid. Adam argues that in the Theaetetus 176e we find the same meaning. Here, Socrates, in a 
conversation with the geometrician Theodorus, argues that, in reality, there are two such patterns or 
standards: one is divine and supremely happy, the other is the pattern of deepest unhappiness. A 
reflection on the term παραδείγματος is given by Rosen (2005, 201-06). Rosen indicates “some of the 
problems that arise when we try to sort out the meaning of paradeigma,” and his intention here is 
“to show the background complexity to what will shortly be introduced as the doctrine of Platonic 
ideas” (p. 205). When the term is viewed in light of this doctrine, I agree with Rosen. However, in this 




realized in the empirical world? He eventually gives up his demand for empirical proof 
and concrete examples on how the city in speech can be realized. Rather harshly, 
Socrates ends this intermezzo: 
 
Then don’t compel me necessarily to present it as coming into being in every way 
in deed as we described it in speech. But if we are able to find that a city could be 
governed in a way most closely approximating what has been said, say that we’ve 
found the possibility of these things coming into being on which you insist. Or 
won’t you be content if it turns out this way? I, for my part, would be content 
(473a5-b2).  
 
After Glaucon again gives his consent, Socrates unveils his next task, which is to “try 
to seek out and demonstrate what is badly done in cities today” (473b5-6). This 
investigation has a future aim, and therefore, it is a preventive act that will secure the 
best ruling. Socrates intends to show how a transformation is possible. Thus, he 
hesitantly launches the third wave. This launching turns out to take place at the center 
of the dialogue and, according to Howland (1998b, 634n3), the “thematic elements in 
the Republic are arranged in opposition around the third wave.” Hence, Howland sets 
out to show that “[t]he centrality of the third wave suggests that the relationship 
between philosophy and politics constitutes the foremost theme of the Republic as a 
whole” (ibid, 636). So far, my readings of the Republic have moved toward this center 
around which it all evolve. However, there are yet some elements to consider. 
6.3 Third wave (473c6 ff.) and the third consideration 
Socrates acknowledges that his argument will be apprehended as paradoxical.44 The 
much-discussed argument goes as follows: 
 
Unless […] the philosophers rule as kings or those now called kings and chiefs 
genuinely and adequately philosophize, political power and philosophy coincide 
in the same place, while the many natures now making their way to either apart 
from the other are by necessity excluded, there is no rest from ills for the cities 
[…] nor I think for humankind, nor will the regime we have now described in 
speech ever come forth from nature, insofar as possible, and see the light of sun 
(473c11-474e5).45  
                                                          
44 According to Howland (1998b), Plato scholars have followed two main lines of interpretation when 
approaching the third wave. For a survey and discussion, see pp. 636-38. 
45 In the Seventh Letter (326a-b), Plato launches exactly the same reflection: “At last I came to the 
conclusion that all existing states are badly governed and the condition of their laws are practically 




The argument is indeed innovative, and never before proposed.46 We can deduce some 
elements from it. First, if educated philosophers gain political power, they will be able 
to secure a just city, as opposed to those in office today. Secondly, they will be the 
remedy cities need to get rid of ills; these “ills” include stasis and war-waging 
politics.47 Thirdly, such a regime is according to nature; but will never surface without 
philosopher-kings.48 Glaucon’s reaction to the third wave and Socrates’ response to 
him are significant because this word exchange offers some hints toward the turning of 
Glaucon. He first foresees all the trouble Socrates will meet when men in power hear 
about this proposal; they will attack him with every weapon available, and if Socrates 
does not defend himself in speech and gets away, he will really pay his penalty. Due to 
this prediction, he offers to be an ally in battle, and his enthusiasm is now growing: 
“[…] I won’t betray you, and I’ll defend you with what I can. I can provide goodwill 
and encouragement, and perhaps I would answer you more suitably than another. And 
so, with the assurance of such support, try to show the disbelievers that it is as you 
say” (474a6-b2). 
Regarding his political ambitions, maybe it is a new opportunity that now starts 
to dawn on Glaucon; maybe he transforms his visions from Athenian politics to the 
prospect of becoming a king in a new regime. This interpretation is made possible due 
to Socrates’ response. He acknowledges that support for this controversial view is 
necessary in the beginning, but he also recognizes that Glaucon’s goodwill and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
praise of true philosophy (τὴν ὀρθὴν φιλοσοφίαν), that from her height alone was it possible to 
discern what the nature of justice is, either in the state or in the individual, and that the ills of the 
human race would never end until either those who are sincerely and truly lovers of wisdom come 
into political power, or the rulers of our cities, by the grace of God, learn true philosophy.”  
46 I find Howland (1998b) very enlightening and inspirational when I briefly consider the third wave. 
My readings have had the aim to show that it is in Book V we enter the realm of philosophy. Even if 
Howland highlights the launching of the third wave as the focal point, I think I am not out of joint 
when I claim that the entrance into Book V is essential and a turning-point in the text. Howland 
further states: “The centrality of the third wave constitutes the foremost theme of the Republic as a 
whole. The placement of the third wave is furthermore a key to the organization of the dialogue. […] 
the paradoxical character of the relationship between philosophy and politics can be grasped most 
directly through an examination of certain fundamental oppositions that are systematically arranged 
around the third wave as the primary thematic and dramatic focal point of the Republic” (p. 636). 
47 I take this to be pointing back to 373e11-374a2, where Socrates stated that they at that point 
should not consider whether war works good or evil. At this point the question is clarified by the 
considerations that followed the second wave. 
48 Cf. the short discussion in the Timaeus (19e-20c), see p. 239n49 below. 
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encouragement are not sufficient in the long run. When the philosophers come to light, 
they will be able to defend themselves, Socrates argues.49 They will be able to show 
“that it is by nature fitting for them both to engage in philosophy and to lead a city, 
and for the rest not to engage in philosophy and to follow the leader” (474c1-3). Thus, 
Socrates’ aim now is to bring philosophy, and hence, the philosophers, to light. This 
implies that he does not need an ally in this battle; therefore, Glaucon’s offer is 
politely rejected. That Glaucon is not there yet, as a philosopher, is confirmed in the 
next section when Socrates picks up the former discussion on the erotic man, and also, 
the lover of honor. It now turns out that Glaucon does not remember adequately, and 
states, “I need reminding […] For I scarcely understand” (474c12-d1). What Socrates 
now tries to do is to make an analogy between the erotic lover’s desire and that of the 
philosopher. However, as we have witnessed before, Glaucon is not always able to 
infer. This conversation is concluded with an explicit spelling out: Philosophers are 
just like the lovers of honor and the erotic man because they have learned to love the 
whole and not only the distinctive parts. Also, when it comes to the philosophic nature, 
Socrates wants Glaucon to understand “that they are always in love with that learning 
which discloses to them something of the being that is always and does not wander 
about, driven by generation and decay” (485a10-b3). Summarized, the philosopher 
must be, by nature, a person with an excellent memory, a good learner, magnificent, 
charming, and a friend and kinsman of truth, justice, courage, and moderation. These 
                                                          
49 This statement is somehow confirmed in the Timaeus (± 429); when Socrates shared the thoughts 
on a radical new regime with his philosopher friends, he met enthusiasm and excitement. From the 
summary Socrates gives of his speech yesterday, we understand that his theme was one similar to 
the three waves of the Republic. Today, when they meet again, he gives a survey of his feelings 
regarding the political structure of the city he described (cf. 19b). He states: “I’d love to listen to 
someone give a speech depicting our city in a contest with other cities, competing for those prizes 
that cities typically compete for. I’d love to see our city distinguish itself in the way it goes to war and 
in the way it pursues the war: that it deals with the other cities, one after another, in ways that 
reflect positively on its own education and training, both in word and deed—that is, both in how it 
behaves toward them and how it negotiates with them” (19c1-d1). However, he does not trust that 
the poets would be able to do the city justice in such a completion, and neither the sophists; he is 
“afraid their representations of those philosopher-statesmen would simply miss their mark. Sophists 
are bound to misinterpret whatever these leaders accomplish on the battlefield when they engage 
any of their enemies, whether in actual warfare or in negotiations. So, that leaves people of your sort 
[i.e., philosophers]. By nature as well as by training you take part in both philosophy and politics at 
once” (19e2-20a1). Hermocrates confirms Socrates’ enthusiasm: “Yes indeed, Socrates, you won’t 
find us short on enthusiasm, as Timaeus has already told you” (20c4-5).  
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natures are to be cultivated and perfected by education and age (cf. 487a), thus, 
according to Socrates, there is no risk in turning the city over to them alone. 
Adeimantus’ interruption at 487a9 marks the end of G3, and of my reading; to 
paraphrase Socrates: It ends exactly where it ought to. I will round off with a few 
comments.  
6.4 Some remarks on the continuance 
Adeimantus’ interruption marks the beginning of A4 (487a9-506d1). After having 
listened to Socrates’ elaboration on the nature of the philosopher and his claim that 
they are the highly recommended rulers, Adeimantus is concerned. His considerations 
are worth listening to and Socrates responds likewise. Adeimantus argues that no one 
will contradict what has been said so far. This truth is not affected by his distress as he 
now looks into the present case:  
 
Now someone might say that in speech he can’t contradict you at each particular 
thing asked, but in deed he sees that of all those who start out on philosophy—not 
those who take it up for the sake of getting educated when they are young and 
then drop it, but those who linger in it for a longer time—most become quite 
queer, not to say completely vicious; while the ones who seem perfectly decent, 
do nevertheless suffer at least one consequence of the practice you are praising—
they become useless to the cities (487c4-d6). 
 
This is an objection that needs to be addressed, but surprisingly, Socrates does not do 
so directly. Instead, he refers to the men he has heard it all from and asks, “Do you 
suppose that the men who say this are lying?” (487d7-8). Adeimantus wants to hear 
Socrates’ opinion, which is harshly stated, “You would hear that it looks to me as if 
they were speaking the truth” (487e1). Adeimantus does not take Socrates’ response at 
face value, but continues his probing: “Then, how […] can it be good to say that the 
cities will have no rest from evils before the philosophers, whom we agree to be 
useless to the cities, rule in them?” (487e2-4). When Socrates claims that this question 
needs an answer given through an image (εἰκόνος), Adeimantus obviously experiences 
a new facet of Socrates when he gives the image of the ship (cf. 487e7-489e2). This 
image is meant to resemble the cities in their disposition toward the true philosopher, 
and Socrates asserts that they do not need to scrutinize it because he takes it for 
granted that Adeimantus understood. He confirms he did. Now Socrates makes a turn. 
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Instead of elaborating further, he gives Adeimantus two arguments which he is 
supposed to use when confronting opponents. First, he shall teach the image of the 
ship “to the man who wonders at the philosophers’ not being honored in the cities and 
try to persuade him that it would be far more to be wondered at if they were honored” 
(489a8-b1). Secondly, he shall admit to telling the truth “in saying that the most decent 
of those in philosophy are useless to the many” (489b3-4). Socrates further argues that 
by far the greatest and most powerful slander comes from competing sciences; it is 
they who argue that philosophers (the most decent ones) are useless. However, 
philosophy itself is not to be blamed for this. The elaboration on the difference 
between the philosophers and the non-philosophers does not satisfy Adeimantus. 
During A4, Socrates elaborates thoroughly on this theme, but does he convince 
Adeimantus? Toward the end of the conversation, Socrates asks: “Won’t our regime 
be perfectly ordered if such a guardian, one who knows these things, oversees it?” 
(506b1-2). Adeimantus believes it is necessarily so, but he does not understand if 
Socrates by “the good” refers to knowledge, pleasure, or something else. Socrates does 
not signal surprise; he just states that by now “it’s pretty transparent all along that 
other people’s opinions about these things wouldn’t be enough for you” (506b6-7). 
Again Socrates made a reference to what he has heard, hence, it is not the content 
Adeimantus disapproves of, but that Socrates does not speak his own mind: “It doesn’t 
appear just to me, Socrates […] to be ready to tell other people’s convictions but not 
your own when you have spent so much time occupied with these things” (506b9-11). 
This is an accusation, and Socrates defends himself by asking if it, in Adeimantus’ 
opinion, is just to speak about things one does not know and, pretend one knows. To 
this, Adeimantus answers: “Not at all as though one knew […]. However, one ought to 
be willing to state what one supposes, as one’s supposition” (506c3-4). Socrates is in 
trouble now and responds with yet another question: “Do you want to see ugly things, 
blind and crooked when it’s possible to hear bright and fair ones from others?” 
(506c10-d1) Because Glaucon interrupted, this question marks the end of A4. On 
behalf of his brother, Glaucon answers negatively to Socrates’ question and now 
demands him to go through the good as he has done with justice. They will be satisfied 
even if he does it in the same manner (cf. 506d2-5).     
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When entering G4 (506d2-548d8), Socrates at the outset makes it clear that he is 
not willing for the time being to tell what the good itself is; due to the lack of trust he 
will not attain his own opinion. However, he is willing to tell what looks like a child of 
the good (cf. 506d6-e5). I take this to entail that throughout G4 we gradually get in 
touch with the philosopher’s opinion.50 However, I do not think it is a spelling out on 
what philosophy is, but rather a showing of the path toward becoming a philosopher. 
Through the parable of the sun (508b-509c), and the divided line (509c-511e), 
Glaucon (and we) are carefully trained in how to elevate our thoughts and, thus be able 
to conduct abstract thinking. After having presented the allegory of the cave (514a-
517c), Socrates starts to elaborate on education that is based on his grounding 
assumption that there is a “power which already exists in each man’s soul”51 and, “the 
instrument with which each learns […] must be turned around from that which is 
coming into being, together with the whole soul until it is able to endure looking at that 
which is and the brightest part of that which is” (518c4-10). There are some 
preliminary studies (arithmetic, astronomy, geometry)52 by which this power is 
“purified and rekindled,” but “destroyed and blinded by the other practices” (527d7-
e1), and further, this power is “more important to save than ten thousand eyes” (527e2-
3). So, when the other practices (i.e., sophistry) try to put knowledge “into a blind 
eye,” Socrates’ educational practice will try to purge the eye of the soul of its 
blindness by turning it around. How does he do this?  
 
There would […] be an art (τέχνη) of this turning around (περιαγωγῆς) concerned 
with the way in which this power can most easily and efficiently be turned around, 
not an art of producing sight in it. Rather, this art takes as given that sight is there, 
but not rightly turned nor looking at what it ought to look at, and accomplishes 
this object” (518b8-d7). 
 
                                                          
50 This inference I make due to Socrates’ allusion to the arrest, and further that he is afraid to be 
ridiculed. As it is, this is the last mentioning of the arrest. Therefore, I assume that this problem is 
solved. 
51 Bloom (1991b, 465n3) underlines that when translating this clause, he follows J. H. Kells who 
translates the clause as followes: “[…] that this power is the power which alredy exists in each man’s 
soul […]” 
52 It is noteworthy that when Protagoras proclaims the efficiency of his educational program, he 
states that others abuse the young terribly when they teach them arithmetic, astronomy, and 




This art is the art of dialectic, and the power of dialectics is elaborated on. Socrates 
now invites Glaucon to partake in an investigation on how philosophers come into 
being: “Do you want us to consider in what way such men will come into being and 
how one will lead them up to the light, just as some are said to have gone up from 
Hades to the gods?” (521c1-3) As Glaucon concedes, Socrates explains the procedure: 
“Then, as it seems, this wouldn’t be a twirling of shell, but the turning (περιαγωγή) of 
a soul from a day that is like night to the true day; it is that ascent to what is which we 
truly affirm to be philosophy” (φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθῆ, 521c4-8). They work their way 
through the studies necessary for this particular becoming, and of these, geometry is 
essential, and as Glaucon conceives it, “geometrical knowing is of what is always” 
(527b7-8). Socrates supplements this statement and explains that geometry “would 
draw the soul toward truth and be productive of philosophical understanding in 
directing it upward what we now improperly direct downward” (527 b9-11). Glaucon 
does not seem to be quite convinced when he replies that “[i]t does so […] to the 
greatest extent possible.” Socrates, on the other hand, signals enthusiasm when he 
concludes that “to the greatest extent possible […] the men in your beautiful city 
(καλλιπόλει) must be enjoined in no way to abstain from geometry” (527c1-2). Hence, 
Socrates now states that Glaucon’s city has become beautiful and, it will be preserved 
in this condition in so far as the men ruling uphold their geometrical training.53 
6.5 Summary 
As the grounding premise of this chapter, I argued that we now entered the realm of 
philosophy. The two cities (“the true city” and “the feverish city”) were superposed, 
and a new alternative was allowed to surface. The founding of this city developed (and 
continues to do so) as Glaucon’s thought experiment and, as I see it, a vital part of the 
theme “educating Glaucon.” The question is whether he makes his turning and become 
educated in Socratic terms. Through my reading of G3, I have tried to follow Socrates’ 
argument consistently (as he urges us to do). From this outset, I highlighted Socrates’ 
considerations following the first wave and showed that women were excluded from 
partaking in politics due to old habits constituted by men. Socrates argued that there 
                                                          
53 The necessity of decay is set in motion when the geometrical training of the rulers starts to 
dissolve, cf. 545d ff. 
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are no sound arguments—according to nature—to support such a view; hence, he 
referred to the art of eristic to demonstrate how these old habits were grounded in the 
first place. In his considerations following the second wave, Socrates’ grounding 
principle was that men are the only animal that wage war. He did not reflect upon 
whether war was good or evil but on how war is conducted. Hence, he launched a new 
kind of warfare, and redefined the concepts “war” and “stasis.” Through these 
redefinitions and the discussions throughout these sections, I infer that war as a 
defensive act is necessary while war-waging is not.  
I also paid close attention to Glaucon and the question related to his turning and 
education. His attitude and behavior has been continuously in movement; he alternated 
in that he was sometimes fully attentive and sometimes the opposite; he signaled both 
enthusiasm and boredom; sometimes he was eager to discuss, and sometimes he did 
not want to talk at all. I am not convinced regarding his philosophical abilities, because 
Socrates strived hard to make him partake in a thought experiment and thus make him 
elevate his thoughts. That he also offered to be Socrates’ ally in battle and was politely 
excused (contrary to Polemarchus who was invited and Adeimantus who was given 
advice on how to stand up against arguments contra philosophers), I take to be a sign 
of him not turning toward philosophy. It is also indicated in the frame story (±400) of 
the Symposium that Glaucon had no direct contact with Socrates at that point, and 






































Chapter 7: Setting the stage 
 
I am now entering Part II: Historical touchdowns—the dialogues.1 When reading them 
as historical touchdowns framed as philosophical-literary dramas, and when reading 
them chronologically from the outset of their (internal) dramatic dating,2 the reader 
experiences a kind of philosophical-literary time-travel. The overall focus in Part II is 
paideia, and the theme is “saving youths.” I will try to show how the new paideia 
grounded in Socrates’ practice stands forth as a powerful alternative to the sophistic. I 
begin with the beginning, which is a hunt for facts about Socrates. This hunt leads us 
to a travel wherein we are allowed to witness Socrates’ work throughout fifty years. 
Because the two first touchdowns, the Parmenides (450) and the Protagoras (432), 
have a significant impact on the whole literary-philosophical universe, I will make 
them a point of departure.  
This chapter contains two distinct parts: the Parmenides and the Protagoras 
sections. Before I start my readings, I will, as an introduction to each section, very 
briefly present the dialogues and, through a transitory sketch, indicate their impact on 
the whole corpus. Regarding the Parmenides, I will first briefly present Parmenides, 
the legislator, before I read the conversation between him and Socrates as a five-step 
dialectical procedure. I suggest that this proceeding marks the founding of Socrates’ 
philosophical practice. I then turn to the Protagoras where I first present Protagoras 
the city-founder and legislator, and then present the paideia program he launches. The 
overall aim is to present two contrasting procedures (philosophy and sophistry) related 
to paideia. Both educators propose a lifelong path for their teachings, but this is where 
the similarities end. Parmenides stands forth as a guide advocating dialectic as his 
pedagogical tool; the ultimate aim is to lead students toward the final result which is 
free and autonomous individuals. Because the student enters and stays on this path 
voluntarily, the burden of learning belongs to the student. Protagoras stands forth as an 
inculcating teacher, advocating threats and punishment as parts of his pedagogical 
                                                          
1 Again, a reminder: the dialogues as spoken about here do not include the Republic and the Laws. 




method. Within his paideia program the aim is to rear and educate all students through 
the same doctrines; viewed from a political point of view, it is utility-based and guided 
by the ideal of same-mindedness.  
7.1 The Parmenides  
In the Prologue of the Parmenides, dramatic date ±382, the readers are led to believe 
that about seventeen years after the death of Socrates, a rumor reached the 
philosophical milieu in Clazomenae. This rumor told that there was only one man still 
alive who was able to voice the narration of the meeting between Parmenides and 
Socrates which allegedly took place some sixty-eight years prior. This man turns out to 
be Plato’s brother Antiphon who once heard the story from Pythodorus, the host of the 
gathering. Antiphon voiced the story to Cephalus from Clazomenae, who now voices it 
to us. This entails that it all starts with a hunt for facts about Socrates, and also it is a 
foreigner, named but unknown, who introduces us to the beginning of Socrates’ 
journey.  
The reason why Parmenides and Zeno came to Athens in 450 was to join the 
celebration of the Great Panathenaea. Socrates meets Parmenides at a gathering in a 
private house outside the city wall in the Potters’ Quarter in Kerameikos. Besides 
Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates, and some of his unnamed friends, Pythodorus of Athens 
and Aristotle of Thorae were also present. We do not hear more of the latter two in the 
corpus, but they both serve as pointers forward to the Peloponnesian War and the 
upcoming political climate in Athens. By the naming of Aristotle of Thorae3 and the 
information that he later became one of the Thirty (127d3), he can be taken to 
symbolize the time span from 450 to the Athenian defeat in 404, and he also represents 
a direct connection toward the devastating civil war. Pythodorus is said to have been a 
student of Zeno. He later became a prominent politician in Athens. Both he and 
Aristotle had military careers. Aristotle was the commander of twenty ships that sailed 
to Peloponnese in 426/5,4 and as a commander also in 426/5,5 Pythodorus was sent to 
                                                          
3 Aristotle of Thorae is approximately 15 years old here and about the same age as the young 
Socrates when the latter encounters the Eleatic Stranger in the Statesman (399). The choice of 
names on these two characters is puzzling.   
4 For further information on Aristotle, see Nails (2002, 57-8). 
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Sicily where he superseded Laches whom we meet in the Laches (424) around a year 
after these military campaigns. Thus, Pythodorus represents an implicit connection to 
the Laches where Socrates meets the military commanders Laches and Nicias.  
Zeno is presented as Parmenides’ student; however, some clues indicate that he 
left philosophy. When Socrates does not understand how to employ the method 
proposed, he asks Parmenides to go through the whole exercise (cf. 136c7-9), but 
Parmenides refers to Zeno and asks if he can do so. Parmenides regards himself too 
old for such an undertaking. On this request, Zeno laughed scornfully (γελάσαντα, 
136d5). He finds it too difficult and suggests that they ought to beg Parmenides to take 
on the assignment. Zeno’s attitude and utterings at this point suggest that he has not 
practiced, trained, or received guidance for quite some time. This is somehow 
confirmed when eighteen dramatic years later we hear of Zeno in the Alcibiades I. 
Here we are told that both Pythodorus and the politician Callias from Aexone6 became 
wise and famous experts after they paid him a hundred minas each (cf. 119a). In the 
Phaedrus (421/16), Socrates states that Zeno “is such an artful speaker that his 
listeners will perceive the same things to be both similar and dissimilar, both one and 
many, both at rest and also in motion” (261d7-10). This could, in turn, indicate that he 
was seduced by might and money; a danger Socrates was aware of and later warned 
against.  
Parmenides himself is present throughout the corpus as a point of return in 
several conversations. In the Symposium (416), Phaedrus—the first speaker—refers to 
Parmenides as an authority and claims that he once said, “The very first god [she] 
designed was Love” (178b10). Agathon finds himself in disagreement with Phaedrus 
and his reference to Parmenides (cf. 195b-c). In the Theaetetus (399), Socrates states 
that compared to the wise men of the past Parmenides is exceptional (cf. 152d-e); his 
teachings are investigated and discussed by Theodorus and Socrates at 180e-184a; in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
5 Cf. Nails (2002, 259-60). On his return to Athens, Pythodorus was banished for having been 
defeated.  
6 According to Nails (2002, 74) Callias proposed a decree in ±435 that concerned public works, and 
another decree in 434/3 that concerned the repaying of money owed to the gods. The two decrees 
are sometime together called the “Callias Decrees”—aimed at putting Athens on a war footing. 
Callias fell in the battle at Potidaea in the fall of 432.   
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the Sophist (399) he is mentioned by Socrates at 217c, and the Eleatic Stranger 
commits his father-murder on Parmenides at 216a-258c.  
7.2 Parmenides, the legislator 
In 1962, at the cult site of Elea, an inscription was found which reads: Parmenides son 
of Pyres Ouliades Physikos. Patrick Lee Miller (2011, 54) suggests that by being 
denoted as a physikos it is likely that Parmenides was known for being both a 
physician and a natural philosopher. Ouliades suggests that he was not only Pyres’ 
son, but also the spiritual son of Oulios, which in turn indicates that he was a priest of 
Apollo. Richard G. Geldard suggests that Ouliades Physikos could denote either a 
physician in a traditional sense or something more esoteric, such as a natural healer. 
Physikos has a broader meaning than “natural philosopher,” and when combined with 
ouliades, according to Geldard, it may “refer to a local cult in which Parmenides was a 
leader or guardian of ritual items or a leader of ceremonies” (2007, 19). Lee Miller and 
Geldard agree that Parmenides was highly respected by the whole community of Elea 
as a healer-philosopher. From Diogenes Laertius (Lives, 9: 3) we learn that in mature 
age Parmenides was called upon to revise the laws of Elea.7 In this process, he earned 
respect from his townspeople and beyond. The city itself earned a reputation of 
religious and intellectual tolerance, and it is said that “the citizens of Elea began each 
year by swearing to abide by Parmenides’ laws” (Nails 2002, 217). The lawgiver also 
lived an exemplary life. This became an ideal and later known among the Greeks as a 
“Parmenidean life” (Geldard 2007, 9). Parmenides’ fame and extraordinary reputation 
due to his exemplary life-style alludes strongly to the mindset of the philosopher-kings 
Socrates was trying to form in the Republic.   
7.3 Parmenides, the teacher 
When Socrates and some unnamed companions went to Pythodorus’ house, they 
aimed to hear Zeno read from his book that he and Parmenides brought to Athens for 
the first time. Socrates was seemingly not enthralled because after he had heard the 
reading, and after he had discussed some issues with Zeno, he concluded that Zeno had 
written the same thing as Parmenides only with some minor alterations. Addressing 
                                                          
7 On the story of the founding and development of Elea, see Geldard (2007, 1-3). 
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Parmenides, Socrates argues that “by changing it round he tries to fool us into thinking 
he is saying something different. You say in your poem that the all is one, and you 
give splendid and excellent proof of that; he, for his part, says that it is not many and 
gives a vast array of very grand proof of his own” (128a7-b3). Socrates concludes that 
when Parmenides says “one” and Zeno says “not many” they are practically saying the 
same thing, but in different ways, thus Zeno fools us and gives nothing more than a 
paraphrase. Addressing Zeno, Socrates states that he would be “much more impressed 
if someone were able to display this same difficulty (ἀπορίαν), which you and 
Parmenides went through in the case of visible things, also similarly entwined in 
multifarious ways in the forms themselves—in things that are grasped by reasoning” 
(129e5-130a3). By these words, Socrates got Parmenides’ attention, and the 
conversation which develops between them is, viewed from my perspective, as 
imperative. On the one hand, the reader here witnesses how a student of philosophy is 
tested and then guided into entering the next level; on the other hand, the reader gets a 
first glimpse into how a dialectical practice unfolds and how it is performed in an 
encounter between a teacher and a student devoted to philosophy. This is quite 
different from the practice Socrates is advocating later because most of the time he 
does not encounter dedicated students. On the contrary, his practice is part of his 
mission to awaken fellow citizens. He acts like a gadfly and, if possible, he will make 
them turn toward philosophy. So, how did the conversation between teacher and 
student develop? 
Cephalus of Clazomenae (our narrator) tells us that Antiphon (Cephalus’ 
narrator) said that Pythodorus (Antiphon’s narrator) said that when Socrates uttered his 
doubt about Zeno’s work, he was “from moment to moment expecting Parmenides and 
Zeno to get annoyed” (130a4-6). However, Socrates’ assumption was wrong because 
neither of them got upset. Instead, the narrator reports, “they both paid close attention 
to Socrates and often glanced at each other and smiled, as though they admired him” 
(130a6-8). Pythodorus’ account of the situation was confirmed by Parmenides when he 
turned to Socrates and said that “you are to be admired for your keenness (ὀρμῆς) for 
argument” (130b1). This “keenness” that Parmenides referred to contains the meaning 
of “a rapid motion forward.” It therefore looks like it is only Socrates’ swiftness in 
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discussions Parmenides tributes at this point because it also turns out later that he is 
not quite content. I take it that the philosopher instantly notices Socrates’ philosophical 
potential, and thus he was prepared to test and guide him further. This is exhibited 
through Parmenides’ questioning, which is designed as a five-step procedure.  
7.3.1 Step one: Testing 
Parmenides first asks Socrates if he “himself has distinguished as separate things […] 
certain forms (εἲδη) themselves […]” (130b1-2). Socrates insists he has, so 
Parmenides goes on: But “is there a form, itself by itself, of just, and beautiful, and 
good, and everything of that sort?” (130b7-9), and further, “what about a form of 
human being, separate from us and all those like us? Is there a form itself for human 
being, or fire, or water?” (130c1-3). Socrates signals uncertainty toward this set of 
questions. He admits that “I’ve often found myself in doubt (ἀπορία) whether I should 
talk about those in the same way as the others or differently” (130c4-6).8 I take it that 
Parmenides recognized that Socrates himself acknowledges that a reflection on these 
subjects results in an aporetic state of mind, but he does not pay attention to it. Instead 
he goes on. What about things “that might seem absurd (γελοῖα δόξειεν), like hair and 
mud and dirt, or anything else totally undignified and worthless? Are you doubtful 
whether or not you should say that a form is separate for each of these, too, which in 
turn is other than anything we touch with our hands?” (130c7-d2). Socrates stresses 
that he is not doubtful regarding these mirth-provoking and amusing things, on the 
contrary. His opinion is that these things are in fact just what we see, and he states 
with confidence that “surely it’s too outlandish (ἄτοπον) to think there is a form for 
them” (130d4-5).  
When Socrates, with this high degree of certainty, claims that it is atopos 
(outlandish) to think that there is a form for things like hair, mud, and dirt, we can 
identify a reference to a topos for the first time.9 Parmenides’ questioning regards the 
topos of the forms (or the doctrine of the forms) that I take to be a sub-category of the 
topos of philosophy. Hence, when Socrates argues that there is no form for 
                                                          
8 Socrates’ answer at this point resembles the answer Theaetetus will give to Socrates some seventy 
dramatic years later. Socrates’ response to Theaetetus also resembles Parmenides’ response to 
Socrates.  
9 The Republic is the exception, so by “the first time” I am here referring to the other dialogues—or 
the historical touchdowns. 
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“undignified and worthless thing” he is actually stating that these things do not belong 
to the forms.10 Even so, he quickly modifies his confidence. This is hinted at when he 
states that he has been troubled from time to time if this assumption holds in all cases. 
He explains that when this troubling thought bothers him and “when I get bogged 
down in that, I hurry away, afraid that I may fall into some pit of nonsense and come 
to harm; but when I arrive back in the vicinity of the things we agreed a moment ago 
have forms, I linger there and occupy myself with them” (130d5-9). This is yet another 
confession. When confronted with a problem of this particular kind, the strategy of the 
swift young Socrates is to pause. That is, he hurries away from the problem and 
chooses to enter a more familiar place because he is afraid he could be harmed. It is 
when he (after a while) returns to the vicinity he left that he can occupy himself with 
the problem. Parmenides concludes rather sympathetically that the reason for this 
conduct is that Socrates is still young (cf. 130e1), “philosophy has not yet gripped you 
as, in my opinion, it will in the future, once you begin to consider none (ἀντιλήψεται) 
of the cases beneath your notice. Now, though, you still care about what people 
think,11 because of your youth” (130e2-5). Parmenides’ observations and his firm 
elucidation of Socrates’ demeanor is revealing because it all mirrors Socrates’ ways 
when he later stands forth as a philosophical guide. This calls for a little detour. 
The first point to notice is Parmenides’ claim that “philosophy has not gripped 
you (ἀντείληπται) yet.” The term “ἀντιλαμβάνω” means to “receive instead of.” I 
understand this to be a hint that can be related to the phrases “turning toward 
philosophy” versus “turn into philosophy.” It is obvious that Socrates in his encounter 
with Parmenides has already “turned toward philosophy,” that is, he has started the 
road toward his final turning. In the Seventh Letter (cf. 340c), we are told the first turn 
signals a transformation, and from that point forth, the student pushes himself and 
urges his teacher until he has reached the end of the journey or has become capable of 
doing philosophy without a guide and finding the way himself. However, this road is 
                                                          
10 We have already seen that Socrates gave—very reluctantly—a more groundbreaking elaboration 
and exhibition of the topos of philosophy in the Republic. Hence, when reading the other dialogues, I 
assume it to be known to the readers (cf. my back-drop-argument). 
11 These are almost the exact words Socrates utters to Glaucon when they discuss education: “You 
are like a man who is afraid for the many […]” (Republic, 527d5-6). 
254 
 
not for everyone to travel we are told in the Republic. Why is that? First, the 
candidates must have a talent or inherent potential. To secure that the potential 
candidates have this talent embedded, they are tested.12 It is testing with regard to “the 
turning toward philosophy” I think is the work Socrates performs in his meetings with 
the youths he will encounter later.13 Secondly, through the paideia program and the 
curriculum as displayed in the Republic, it is a long-lasting and demanding travel for a 
philosopher in his/her becoming. The student’s progress is firmly tested throughout the 
study, whereas the last and final test concerns the entrance into the study of dialectic. 
For the candidates who pass the test, this study lasts for about twenty years, and the 
educated philosopher is then supposedly around the age of fifty. We are also told in the 
Seventh Letter that the “turn into philosophy” happens “suddenly (ἐξαίφνης), like a 
light flashing forth when a fire is kindled; it is born in the soul which straight away is 
nourished by itself” (314c). At this moment, the flashing light lays hold of the soul, 
and clarity is reached. Then, philosophy has replaced something else—or as the term 
“ἀντιλαμβάνω” suggests—one has received something that replaces something else. 
So “turning into philosophy” resemblances a rebirth. I suggest that Socrates 
experiences this final turning in the course of the Protagoras, where we witness him 
acting out of place14—that is, he acts atopos.  
With this perspective in mind, I return to Parmenides and Socrates. Parmenides 
makes Socrates’ last confession the point of departure when he presents a set of new 
problems for him to consider. “Is it your view that, as you say, there are certain forms 
from which these other things, by getting a share in them, derive their names?” 
Socrates replies that there certainly is (130e5-131a1). It looks like Parmenides is 
seeking to steer up the ground of Socrates’ certitude when he, after a short sequence of 
questioning, states: “Socrates, how neatly you make one and the same thing be in 
many places at the same time! It’s as you were to cover many people with a sail, and 
                                                          
12 Cf. the various tests we witnessed in the Republic; see chapter 5: Founding cities making 
(ποιοῦομεν) guardians, section 5.4.3.2: Second path—testing the guardians. 
13 Cf. Introduction, section 3: Displaying the path toward philosophy—two Socratic practices, pp. 18-
26. I will also elaborate on this in chapter 8: Saving youths, when I study Socrates’ encounters with 
Hippocrates, Alcibiades, and Charmides.  
14 Cf. Kastely (1996, 37). I return to this in chapter 8: Saving youths, section 8.1: Hippocrates’ dream, 
p. 282 ff. 
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then say that one thing as a whole is over many. Or isn’t that the sort of thing you 
mean to say?” (131b7-10) Socrates is again somewhat reluctant, but he admits that 
perhaps it is so. Parmenides’ follow-up questions are puzzling: “In that case would the 
sail be, as a whole, over each person, or would a part of it be over one person and 
another part over another?” (131c2-3) Socrates now works himself into more trouble 
and Parmenides wonders if he is willing to say “that our one form is really divided” 
(131c9-10). As Socrates strongly denies this, they continue until Parmenides forces 
him to decide “in what way, then, will the other things get a share of your forms, if 
they can do so neither by getting parts nor by getting wholes?” (131e4-6). In the core 
of this question, there is a hint that Socrates is on his way to define the concept of the 
forms in his manner (cf. “your forms”). This hint helps him because he does not 
answer but exclaims: “By Zeus! It strikes me that’s not at all easy to determine” 
(131e7-8). What occurred now? To me, it seems like Socrates worked his way out of 
the aporetic state, and my assumption is somewhat confirmed by Parmenides who at 
this point gives the conversation a new direction. 
“I suppose you think each form is one on the following ground: Whenever some 
number of things seem to you to be large, perhaps there seems to be some one 
character, the same as you look at them all, and from that, you conclude that the large 
is one” (132a1-3). Socrates agrees in Parmenides’ presumption, whereupon 
Parmenides strategy alters in that he now problematizes Socrates’ answers until 
Socrates stops him: “But, Parmenides, maybe each of the forms is a thought and 
properly occurs only in minds. In this way, each of them might be one and no longer 
face the difficulties mentioned just now” (132c4-7). Here it seems that Socrates now—
by himself—found the solution that he at the outset stated that Zeno lacked (cf. 129e5-
130a3). That is the distinction between visible things versus things grasped by 
reasoning.15  
With this suggestion, Socrates is on the right track, but not quite there yet. So, 
Parmenides problematizes firmly until Socrates presents a new suggestion: “[…] what 
appears most likely to me is this: These forms are like patterns (παραδείγματα) set in 
                                                          
15 It was this distinction Socrates, in the Republic, strove to make Glaucon acknowledge. Then 
Socrates worked during the whole night until sunrise.  
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nature, and other things resemble them and are likeness, and this partaking of the 
forms is, for the other things, simply being modeled on them” (132d1-4). Parmenides 
does not problematize further; instead, he concludes that “other things don’t get a 
share of the forms by likeness” (133a5), and then he sets the next task before Socrates: 
“We must seek some other means by which they get a share” (133a6). So far, Socrates 
has found his way out of the aporia but has only partially been able to work his way 
through some severe difficulties. Hence, the continuation is to evaluate if he 
understands the impact of his proposed solutions and where they went wrong.  
7.3.2 Step two: Evaluation 
When Parmenides now sets down specific problems for Socrates to consider, he 
signals that this is a kind of evaluation and the aim is to make Socrates “scope it 
out.”16 Parmenides first points out that it is important for Socrates to understand why 
he failed to solve the former problems and how it happened. He says, “Then you see, 
Socrates, how great the difficulty is if one marks things off as forms, themselves by 
themselves?” (133a8-9). He continues by assuring Socrates “that you do not yet, if I 
may put it so, have an inkling of how great the difficulty is if you are going to posit 
one form in each case every time you make a distinction among them” (133a11-b2). 
At this point, Socrates’ eagerness and swiftness is calmed down. Instead, he starts to 
wonder why it is so. Hence, Parmenides explains and makes Socrates (and the reader) 
understand:  
 
There are so many reasons, but the main one is this: suppose someone were to 
say17 that if the forms are such as we claim they must be, they cannot even be 
known. If anyone should raise that objection, you wouldn’t be able to show him 
that he is wrong, unless the objector happened to be widely experienced and not 
ungifted, and consented to pay attention while in your effort to show him you 
dealt with many distant considerations. Otherwise, the person who insists that 
they are necessarily unknowable would remain unconvinced (133b4-c2).  
 
This explanation opens quite a few questions that point toward Zeno’s underlining of 
the importance of the method (cf. 136e1-4), which will be exhibited later through the 
                                                          
16 This is exactly what Socrates does to Hippocrates 18 dramatic year later, cf. Protagoras 311b. 
17 My italics. This way—“if someone were to say”—of illuminating an important topic for the purpose 
of making an interlocutor grasp a point is one of the proceedings Socrates later uses frequently. I 
have called it “to create an imaginary interlocutor,” see Introduction, section 3: Displaying the path 
to philosophy—two Socratic practices, pp. 18-26. 
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conversation between young Aristotle and Parmenides. The point now is that a 
philosopher claims that the forms are such as the philosopher claims, but a non-
philosopher will then claim that the forms cannot be known. Further, the philosopher 
will not be able to show the non-philosopher that he is wrong. The result is that the 
non-philosopher would remain unconvinced.18 Socrates ponders why that is. “Because 
I think that you, Socrates, and anyone else who posits that there is for each thing some 
being, itself by itself, would agree, to begin with, that none of those beings is in us” 
(133c4-7), Parmenides answers. Socrates is not yet convinced and asks, “Yes, but how 
could it still be itself by itself?” He is complimented on that question, and Parmenides 
answers this question at length. I will also quote at length because I think what 
Parmenides sets forth here is of relevance when we later encounter the Eleatic 
Stranger. This is what Parmenides tells Socrates:  
 
All the characters that are what they are in relation to each other have their being 
in relation to themselves but not in relation to things that belong to us. And 
whether one posits the latter as likeness or in some other way, it is by partaking of 
them that we come to be called by their various names. These things that belong 
to us, although they have the same names as the forms, are in their turn what they 
are in relation to themselves but not in relation to the forms; and all the things 
named in this way are of themselves but not of the forms (133c9-d5).  
 
Because Socrates did not fully grasp this explanation, Parmenides suggests that it may 
be clearer through an example:  
 
If one of us is somebody’s master or somebody’s slave, he is surely not a slave of 
master itself—of what a master is—nor is the master a master of slave itself—of 
what a slave is. On the contrary, being a human being, he is a master or slave of a 
human being. Mastery itself, on the other hand, is what it is of slavery itself; and, 
in the same way, slavery itself is slavery of mastery itself. Things in us do not 
have their power in relation to forms, nor do they have theirs in relation to us; but, 
I repeat, forms are what they are of themselves and in relation to themselves, and 
things that belong to us are, in the same way, what they are in relation to 
themselves (133e7-134a1). 
 
Socrates understood this example, and I suppose so do the readers. Parmenides gives 
more details when he, in the next step, argues that the same principle also goes for 
knowledge itself (cf. 134a). So, what is knowledge? Or more precisely: What have we 
                                                          
18 Cf. the Republic (487b-506d) where Socrates displays and defines the fundamental difference 
between the philosopher and the non-philosopher. 
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learned regarding knowledge so far? Particular knowledge is knowledge of a particular 
thing or knowledge about what that thing is.19 Knowledge that belongs to us is the 
truth about things that belong to our world. From this, it follows that each particular 
knowledge, which belongs to us, is in turn knowledge of some particular thing in our 
world. However, this is getting more complicated when Parmenides continues, “We 
neither have the forms themselves nor can they belong to us. […] What each of them 
is, are known by the form of knowledge itself, […], and this is the very thing we do 
not have” (134b3-9). Does this lead to a paradox? Or does it point toward the limits of 
philosophy itself? For the reader, it certainly looks like—as the consequence of this 
outlining so far—that none of the forms is known to us because we do not partake in 
knowledge itself. The implication of this, Parmenides explains, is that “the beautiful 
itself, what it is, cannot be known to us, nor can the good, nor, indeed, can any of the 
things we take to be characters themselves” (134b13-c2). So, what can be known to us 
then? At this point, there is no answer to this. Hence, this conclusion indicates that the 
reader now experiences an aporetic state of mind. It gets even more complicated and 
shocking when Parmenides proclaims that “even if god partakes of knowledge itself, 
the god is not able to know things that belong to our world” (134d1-2). Still, according 
to Parmenides, “this is because those forms do not have their power in relation to 
things in our world, and things in our world do not have theirs in relation to forms, but 
that things in each group have their power in relation to themselves” (134d5-7). From 
this line of reasoning, it is possible to identify a material conditional that says: If this 
most precise mastery and this most precise knowledge belong to the divine, so can the 
gods’ mastery can never master us. Further, if this most precise mastery and this most 
precise knowledge belong to the divine, so the gods’ knowledge can never know us or 
anything that belongs to us. The implication of this is that just as we do not govern the 
gods by “our governance and know nothing of the divine by our knowledge, so they in 
their turn are, for the same reason, neither our masters nor, being gods, do they know 
human affairs” (134e3-6). This is awe-inspiring reasoning that displays yet another 
level of the topos of philosophy, and by grasping this, the reader can now calmly 
assume that the former did not lead to a paradox nor was it pointing toward the limits 
                                                          
19 Cf. the Seventh Letter and the teachings displayed in the “Philosophical digression” (342a6-345c2). 
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of philosophy. On the contrary, it starts to dawn on the reader that turning toward 
philosophy entails a willingness to enter and work within a completely foreign 
territory. One must be willing to challenge and investigate all previous convictions, 
refute them and establish a new way of reasoning that replaces the former one. In this 
way, the limit of philosophy reveals itself in quite an unexpected way: The limit is 
rejection. Rejection from those who are not willing to work hard and accept that within 
the territory of philosophy the burden of learning belongs to the student. From this, it 
follows that a student cannot gain philosophic insight through inculcation, but by 
training and guidance.20  
Socrates is also blown away after this last revelation: “If god is to be stripped of 
knowing (ἀποστερήσει τοῦ εἰδέναι), our argument may be getting too bizarre 
(θαυμαστὸς)” (134e7-8), is his reaction. When listening to the arguments for the first 
time, this is a reasonable conclusion. Parmenides apparently understand this—maybe 
he even anticipated this reaction, because his next step is to reassure that such a 
response is inevitable: “[…] the forms inevitably involve these objections and a host of 
others—if there are those characters for things, and a person is to mark off each form 
as “something itself” (135a1-3). The result of this is that … 
 
… whoever hears about them is doubtful and objects that they do not exist, and 
that, even if they do, they must by strict necessity be unknowable to human 
nature; and in saying this he seems to have a point; and […] he is extraordinarily 
hard to win over. Only a very gifted man can come to know that for each thing 
there is some kind, a being itself by itself; but only a prodigy more remarkable 
still will discover that and be able to teach someone else who has sifted all these 
difficulties thoroughly and critically for himself (135a3-b3). 
 
Socrates agrees and confirms that this is in accordance with the way he is thinking 
right now. By this preliminary introduction to the topos of the forms, Parmenides, on 
the one hand, has prepared Socrates for the future criticism he can anticipate. This 
perspective of the criticism that awaits the philosopher was displayed and discussed in 
the Republic. From the other dialogues, we learn that Socrates encounters both 
doubtful men and men who are extraordinarily hard to win over. Further, Parmenides 
visions Socrates’ aim. I take it that Socrates surpasses “the very gifted man” and 
                                                          
20 Alcibiades is an excellent example on this topic. 
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represents the prodigy who will eventually examine the difficulties and then be able to 
teach others.  
 
7.3.3 Step three: Decision-making 
Parmenides’ next step is to dare Socrates to take a stand. This is the challenge: There 
are some that have an eye on all the difficulties just brought up and other problems of 
the same sort. What will happen if they are not willing to allow that there are forms for 
things? What happens when they are not willing to mark off a form for each one? 
Parmenides answers himself and explains that “he won’t have anywhere to turn his 
thought; since he doesn’t allow that for each thing there is a character that is always 
the same” (135b7-9). This can be taken as a summary so far, and this “someone” I take 
to be Socrates. The lesson to be learned now is where to turn his thoughts. But what is 
the consequence of being occupied with these difficulties and simultaneously not 
willing to allow that there are forms for all things? Parmenides concludes that “in this 
way, he will destroy the power of dialectic entirely (διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασι 
διαφθερεῖ). But I think you are only too well aware of that” (135c1-3).21 Socrates 
agrees, and Parmenides presents his last question: “What then will you do about 
philosophy? Where will you turn (τρέψη) while these difficulties remain unresolved?” 
(135c5-6). Socrates does not have a clear view on that at present, and Parmenides tells 
him the reason why. It is “because you are trying to mark off something beautiful, and 
just, and good, and each of the forms, too soon, before you have been properly 
trained” (135c7-d1).22 Parmenides drew this inference when he observed the other day 
a conversation between Socrates and young Aristotle. He was impressed by the 
impulse (ὁρμὴ) Socrates brought to the argument; he even calls it noble and divine. 
However, as Socrates still is young, he is recommended to put his “back into it and get 
more training (γύμνασαι) through something people think is useless—what the crowd 
call idle talk” (135d4-5).23 If he does not follow this advice, the truth will escape him. 
Socrates listens and wants to know the manner (τρόπος) of the training Parmenides 
                                                          
21 On the “power of dialect,” cf. the Republic 511b ff., and 532d ff. 
22 Cf. the Protagoras 314b where Socrates urges Hippocrates to be patient because they both are too 
young to be making a decision on such great matters.  
23 On philosophy as a useless undertaking, see A4 (487a9-506d1), the conversation between 
Adeimantus and Socrates, Republic (487d ff.). 
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refers to. Parmenides points to Zeno and says that the manner is what Socrates just 
heard from him. This reference to Zeno is enlightening because during his encounter 
with him Socrates was trained and tested quite from the outset without noticing it 
himself. This piece of information also alludes to the part of the conversation between 
Theaetetus and Socrates when Socrates tells about his “secret art” that enables him to 
test if youths are pregnant or barren.24  
Parmenides observed the conversation between Zeno and Socrates and concluded 
that Socrates passed the test. He was “impressed by something you had to say to him; 
you didn’t allow him to remain among visible things and observe their wandering 
between opposites. You asked him to observe it instead among those things that one 
might above all grasp by means of reason and might think to be forms” (135e1-4). 
Socrates explains that he did that because he thought that here, among visible things, it 
is not at all hard to show that things are both like and unlike and anything else you 
please. However, Parmenides now states that this is not adequate, there is something in 
addition: “if you want to be trained more thoroughly, you must not only hypothesize if 
each thing is and examine the consequence of that hypothesis; you must also 
hypothesize if that same thing is not” (135e8-136a2).  
 
7.3.4 Step four: The method 
Socrates did not understand the additional demand, so Parmenides explains. He 
exemplifies through Zeno’s hypothesis “if many are.” The preliminary steps of the 
recommended method are as follows: 
 
1) On consequence. What must the consequence be both for the many themselves 
in relation to themselves and in relation to the one, and for the one in relation to 
itself and in relation to the many? 
2) On the hypothesis: if many are not, you must again examine what the 
consequence will be both for the one and for the many in relation to themselves 
and in relation to each other. 
3) If you hypothesize: if likeness is or if it is not, you must examine what the 
consequence will be on each hypothesis, both for the things hypothesized 
themselves and for the others, both in relation to themselves and in relation to 
each other. 
 
                                                          
24 Cf. Introduction, section 3: Displaying the path to philosophy—two Socratic practices, pp. 18-26.  
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We are told that the same method applies to unlike, to motion, to rest, to generation 
and destruction, and to being itself and not being. Parmenides elaborates that 
concerning whatever Socrates might ever hypothesize as being or as having any other 
property, he must examine the consequences for everything he hypothesizes in relation 
to the thing itself and in relation to each one of the other things he selects. Further, he 
must examine them “in relation to several of them and to all of them in the same way; 
and, in turn, you must examine the others, both in relation to themselves and in 
relation to whatever other thing you select on each occasion, whether what you 
hypothesize you hypothesize as being or as not being” (136c2-6). All this must be 
done if Socrates wants to achieve a full view of the truth after he has completed his 
training. 
  
7.3.5 Step five: Observing how the method is practiced 
After this elaboration, Socrates finds the task Parmenides described as “scarcely 
manageable,” and he does not quite understand the method. However, he is eager to 
get a grip of it and asks Parmenides to instruct him, “To help me understand more 
fully, why don’t you hypothesize something and go through the exercise for me 
yourself?” (136c7-9). As I said above, Parmenides was reluctant due to his age and the 
great work involved in such an undertaking. However, as both Zeno and Socrates beg 
him, he takes on the task. Cephalus of Clazomenae tells us that Antiphon said that 
Parmenides agreed to demonstrate his procedure. He is anxious to make his way 
“across such a vast and formidable sea of words,” (137a7) and when he now has 
decided to “play this strenuous game (παίζειν)” (137b2), he prefers to begin with 
himself and his own hypothesis. Further, he prefers that the younger answers his 
questions because “he would give the least trouble and would be the most likely to say 
what he thinks” (137b7-9). At this point Socrates takes on the role as an observer, just 
as he will do fifty-one dramatic years later when he observes how the Eleatic Stranger 
plays his game with Theaetetus and the young Socrates. But now we change the 
subject and turn to Protagoras. 
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7.4 The Protagoras 
In the Protagoras, we are witnessing a sophistic gathering around the time of the 
outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Here we meet the crème de la crème of the 
sophistic intellectuals of the fifth century. Many commentators have called this 
dialogue a literary masterpiece, and recently Andrea Capra suggested that the 
Protagoras is a dialogue constructed to resemble the Aristophanic comedy the Clouds. 
It was aimed “for hearers or readers who would have been thoroughly familiar with the 
dramatic theater and its conventions and who would immediately have recognized the 
allusions to comedy in setting, action, even characterization” (Rowe 2002, 521).25 
Contrary to this claim, Tore Frost (1999, 78-9) shows in his introduction to the 
Protagoras that the textual structure of the dialogue juxtaposes the genre of tragedy, or 
stated with my terminology, Frost demonstrates that the generic subtext of the 
Protagoras is tragedy. If these arguments hold, and the Protagoras can be viewed as a 
mixture of comedy and tragedy, and therefore the impact of its structure is double.26 
This mixture may entail that on a textual surface the characters on stage partake in a 
sophistic summit and do their “business as usual,” however, under this sparkling 
(comic) surface the subtext is in movement, and a tragedy lies in wait—that is, a 
devastating war and, ultimately, the death of the only philosopher present. Thus, this 
dialogue also has a strong proleptic impact, and through the men present it alludes to 
the political Athens in a unique way.  
In this dialogue, we are introduced to an ideological fight, which had many 
spectators. In addition to Protagoras and Socrates, four of the men present received a 
dialogue bearing their name: Hippias, Alcibiades, Charmides, and Phaedrus, and 
                                                          
25 Andrea Capra, Αγων Λογων: Il Protagora Tra Eristica E Commedia. (Milan: LED (Edizioni Universiarie 
di Lettere Economia e Dirrito), 2001). Because I do not read Italian, I here trust the review by Rowe 
(2002). 
26 Here, I follow Asper (2005) who states that the “function of Old Comedy has usually been 
described as critical, i.e., as aiming at the exposure of some intolerable state of public life or political 
affairs with the intent to change it” (p. 6). Contrary to tradition, Asper argues that as two forms of 
drama, comedy and tragedy are complementary: “Comedy was an affirmative discourse concerned 
with civic identity […] tragedy evidently has a problematic effect which means its impact will have 
caused a limited feeling of uncertainty with regard to basic norms of behavior. […] comedy, by its 
own affirmative purpose, was meant to balance the problematic effect of tragedy. […] their impact, 
taken together, may be described as a complex affirmation, a direct affirmation by comedy, and 
indirect one by tragedy” (p. 27).  
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beside this, Socrates later encounters many of the men and boys present. Hippias we 
meet again in Hippias Minor (421/16) and Hippias Major (412/16). Alcibiades is the 
main character in the Alcibiades I and II; he also turns up drunk in the Symposium 
(416) singing his swan song at the age of thirty-five. Charmides is fourteen years old 
in the Protagoras, and we meet him again in the Charmides (429) three years later. 
Phaedrus was even younger, only twelve years old in the Protagoras; when we meet 
him again in the Phaedrus (418/16), he is twenty-six/twenty-eight years old. In the 
Symposium (416) he is one of the speakers. Critias from Athens was twenty-eight 
years old in the Protagoras; we meet him three years later in the Charmides (429) 
where he is presented as Charmides’ guardian, and he is present in the Euthydemus 
(≥407) approximately at the age of fifty-three. Eryximachus was sixteen years old in 
the Protagoras and Agathon was fifteen; we meet them both again in the Symposium 
(416) as thirty-two and thirty-one years old, respectively. The host, Callias of 
Alopece,27 was around eighteen years old in the Protagoras. He is discussed in the 
Cratylus (422) when his brother Hermogenes and Socrates discusses the sophists 
(391c1). In the Theaetetus (399), Theodorus tells that Callias is the guardian of 
Protagoras’ relicts (165a1). In the Apology (399) we hear that Callias alone has spent 
more money on the sophists than everybody else put together (20a). Protagoras 
himself is discussed in the Cratylus (422) at 385e-386e; he is mentioned in the Hippias 
Major (421/16, 282d) and the Meno (402, 91e); his teachings are discussed in the 
Theaetetus (399) at 152a-154c, 161d-165e, and 169d-171c, and he is briefly discussed 
in the Republic, 600c. There is also an implicit connection to the two brothers we meet 
in the Euthydemus (407). These had been residents in Thurii (like the brothers from the 
Republic) and are now living in exile in Athens.  
7.5 Protagoras, the legislator 
Around 444-43, Greek settlers founded Thurii (or Thourioi)—a city in southern Italy.28 
Fleming (2002, 5) argues that Thurii “does appear to have been planned as a kind of 
                                                          
27 On Callias, see Nails (2002, 68-74). 
28 The first century B.C.E. author Diodorus Siculus’ The Library (12.9ff) is the main ancient source on 
the story of Thurii. For modern accounts, see Muir (1982), Ehrenberg (1948), and Freeman (1941). 
Ehrenberg (1948, 156) argues that the founding of Thurii was a function of rivalry between 
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model polis and is usually so described by modern scholars.” In Athens at this time, 
Pericles had reduced the power of the aristocratic Areopagus, instituted pay for jurors, 
and provided works for ordinary Athenians by building up the public spaces of Athens. 
According to Victor Ehrenberg (1948, 170), Pericles “tightened the criteria for 
Athenian citizenship, making the state essentially a closed society, monopolized power 
in his own person for nearly a generation, and followed a brazenly imperialistic 
foreign policy toward allies and enemies alike.” With regard to the founding of Thurii, 
Fleming suggests that it looks like Pericles “had a higher purpose in mind for the town 
[…] something that prompted him to invite men like Hippodamus of Miletus and 
Protagoras to help him” (ibid, 9). However, what was Pericles’ higher purpose, and 
what design indicates that Thurii was planned along sophistic or Protagorean, lines?  
We have already learned that Hippodamus of Miletus was known as the father of 
town-planning; and before he was involved in designing Thurii, he had “cut up” 
Piraeus.29 We have also learned that the idea of straight streets alludes to correctness 
(orthos) and truth. Fleming argues that it is the term orthos which establishes the link 
between Pericles and Protagoras (cf. ibid, 15). In both Pericles’ depiction of Athenian 
decision-making (cf. Thucydides 2.40.2), and in Protagoras’ theory on civic discourse, 
orthos meant not just right-angled or straight, but also upright, correct, true, and just 
(the opposite is “crookedness”—skolios). Thus, the important thing about the town 
grid is “the way it divides a city into uniform precincts or lots” (Fleming, 2002, 16).30 
Ehrenberg explains that the plan of Thurii was “an expression of democracy because 
its houses were of equal size” (1948, 166), and Fleming that “the most important 
feature of Hippodamus’ work is his integration of physical town planning with 
political philosophy” (2002, 17).31  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
democratic Athens and aristocratic Sparta; and further that the ambitious Pericles used the colony to 
extend Athenian influence in the West in order to establish its leadership over the Greeks (cf. p. 163).  
29 On Piraeus, see chapter 1: Preparing the stage, section 1.3.1: Piraeus—the land beyond, pp. 55-7. 
30 In the Politics (7.11), Aristotle states that “private dwellings are thought to be more pleasantly 
arranged, and more usefully with a view to other activities, if they are neatly divided in the more 
recent and Hippodamean fashion.”  
31 In addition, I suggest that this particular town-design is found at the core of the planning and 
design presented by the Athenian Stranger when he plans and constructs Magnesia (cf. Laws, 848d-
850c).   
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Fleming argues that Hippodamus’ ideas are especially compatible with sophistic 
thinking and practice, and regarding Thurii, he highlights three such notions. First, the 
city was founded as a Panhellenic colony which gave Thurii an international character, 
and this is “extraordinary in the history of Greek city-founding” (ibid, 20).32 He further 
points out that “[a]s itinerant teachers, cultural relativists, theorists of political life and 
language who constantly emphasized the social construction of beliefs and values and 
the need for flexibility in civic affairs—the sophists would presumably have been 
comfortable in such a diverse community” (ibid, 20). Secondly, the “rational and 
humanistic spirit that seems to have informed it” (ibid), and thirdly, it is compatible 
with the sophistic movement due to “the political ideology behind Thurii” (ibid, 21). 
Thus, Thurii can be viewed as a Periclean experiment, where the project’s idealism 
mirrors the political thoughts of all three men involved. This assumption is somewhat 
confirmed by Fleming when he argues that it is plausible to assume that Protagoras 
“brought to Thurii a theory of civic discourse perfectly keyed to both Periclean politics 
and Hippodamian space” (ibid). According to Fleming, Protagoras’ discourse 
informed the law code of Thurii and the laws (nomoi) “occupy a kind of middle 
ground between pre-literate mythoi and philosophical-scientific logoi” (ibid, 23). 
These laws are defined by Susan Jarratt (1991, 74) as “provisional codes (habits or 
customs) of acceptable behavior, socially constructed and historically and 
geographically specific.” Regarding Protagoras’ law-code, the ancient sources overlap, 
and on the basis of these overlaps, Fleming reconstructs its main features. First, “a 
                                                          
32 Fleming highlights the uniqueness of Thurii with reference to Diodorus who “tells us that ten tribes 
participated in the project: three from the Peloponnese (Arcase, Achais, Eleia), three Dorian groups 
from outside of the Peloponnese (Boeotia, Amphictyonis, Doris), and four from other races (Ias, 
Athenais, Eubois, Nesiotis).” This initial mix of tribes makes the project of Thurii extraordinary, cf. 
Freeman (1941, 56 ff). However, Magnesia in the Laws signals an extraordinary mix of tribes. When 
the legislation of Thurii is compared with the foundation that the Athenian Stranger designs and 
institutes the laws of Magnesia on, there is a fundamental difference. As Protagoras’ law code 
demonstrates a pronounced concern for punishment, the Magnesian law code demonstrates quite 
the opposite. “Should the lawgiver only rise up in the state and threaten all mankind?” the Athenian 
Stranger asks. “Should he not rather, when he is making laws for men, at the same time infuse the 
spirit of persuasion into his words, and mitigate the severity of them as far as he can?” (Laws, 890b-
d). When demanding that the legislator should “mitigate the severity” of the laws, the Athenian 
Stranger stresses that the laws should never offer threatening arguments to the citizens—they 
should be rational and applicable to rearing and education. The Athenian Stranger also differs when 
in regard to education and rearing. The aim is that one must in every way “manifest the power to 
make bodies and souls the most beautiful and the best possible” (Laws, 788c). 
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shared commitment to democracy, to self-rule by ordinary individuals,” second, “there 
is a countervailing concern for order, punishment, and restraint,” and third, there is an 
“interest in the care and education of children” (ibid, 23-4). These features mirror the 
rearing and education proposed in the paideia program launched by Protagoras. 
7.6 Protagoras, the teacher 
Due to Thucydides’ description of Pericles as a man “most able in speech and action” 
(1, 139: 4), Pericles stands as an excellent example of Protagoras’ abilities as a 
teacher. Protagoras himself praised Pericles when he described how he, despite the 
deaths of his sons through the plague, still managed to “appear dry-eyed before the 
assembly and give a speech; this is maybe a confirmation on Protagoras’ admiration of 
the ‘nobility of spirit’ which he saw emerged in this great statesman.”33 However, it is 
not only as a great teacher that Protagoras earned his fame. He was also a writer who 
composed famous pieces such as the “man-measure doctrine:” “Man is the measure of 
all things, of those that are, that (or how) they are, of those that are not, that (or how) 
they are not.”34 That this form of writing—a bold statement of general truths, 
ambiguous, and unsupported by discussion—struck someone as being reminiscent of 
the oracular, is shown in the Theaetetus through Socrates’ reference to Protagoras’ 
fragment B1. Socrates says it is uttered “from the inner sanctum of his book.”35 This 
Socratic expression tenaciously recalls the practice of Delphi, and maybe it was the 
lawgiver of Thurii—who wrote in such a style—that Socrates, when displayed as a 
sophist in Aristophanes’ comedy the Clouds (line 331), referred to as “the Thurian 
seer/prophet (Θουριομάντεις).”  
First and foremost, Protagoras taught his students how to make good decisions 
(εὐβουλία),36 and a theory of civic discourse. This civic discourse is twofold. On the 
one hand the “two-sided thinking” (anti-logic), and on the other the correctness of 
language and belief, or orthos logos (cf. Kerferd 1981). To get in touch with 
Protagoras the teacher, and the method he proposed for education, the Protagoras is 
our main source. From my perspective, this creates a problem because I view all the 
                                                          
33 O’Sullivan (1995, 31) in his commentary to Protagoras’ fragment B9. 
34 Protagoras, fragment B1. Quoted in ibid, p. 18. 
35 Theaetetus, 162a. Cf. also ibid. 
36 On eubolia, see Woodruff (2013). 
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dialogues as historical touchdowns, which are parts of a philosophical-literary 
universe. Within this universe, the conversations are fictitious, and the historical 
personas are put on stage at a specific date to communicate a message for the readers 
to decode. It follows from this that the information on Protagoras we can deduce from 
this text cannot be taken at face value. Therefore, I cannot view the Protagoras as a 
historical source with regard to the historical Protagoras, but rather as an outlining of 
the sophistic paideia program, narrated by Socrates to display the ideology he fights 
against. Thus, I refer to the experimental feature of my text when I try to create an 
image of Protagoras, the teacher. In the opening scene of the dialogue, we learn that 
Socrates arrives somewhere and narrates his encounter with Protagoras to someone. 
Hence, Socrates, the narrator, does not address a universal audience as he did in the 
Republic. Here he addresses an anonymous friend. Thus, the readers are now somehow 
reduced to eavesdroppers.37 In this reading, I will literally take on the role of 
eavesdropper and listen to how the narrator claims that Protagoras presented himself 
and his methods. This should give us an idea of why his ideology, stature, and 
inheritance are returned to throughout the corpus.  
7.6.1 Hippocrates is introduced to Protagoras 
When Socrates, the narrator, approached Protagoras on a particular day in 432, it was 
on behalf of young Hippocrates, who had had a long-lasting dream of becoming a 
student of this famous teacher. From Socrates’ narration, I get the impression that 
Protagoras was very obliging when he addressed the hopeful Hippocrates: “young 
man, it will assuredly be the case for you, if you associate with me, that on the day on 
which you come into association with me you’ll go home having become better, and 
the same things will happen on the following day, and each day you’ll make continual 
progress for the better” (318a6-9). Coming from a teacher, this is a tremendous 
promise. However, Socrates tells that he was not impressed because this is what all 
sophists claim. So, what is it that makes Protagoras stand out?  
                                                          
37 Cf. Introduction, section 2: Plato, the architect, p. 18. 
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I understand that Protagoras greatness is that, contrary to others, he does not 
waste time by teaching his students arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, and music.38 
Socrates reports that when Protagoras said this, he laid his eyes on Hippias from Elis. 
Thus, from Protagoras’ point of view, this must mean that Hippias is an inefficient 
teacher, who wastes the student’s time; therefore, he is not recommendable. It can be 
taken as a warning. Instead, Protagoras pronounces that the thing to be learned “is how 
to make good decisions (εὐβουλία) […] so he can be the most powerful (δυνατώτατος) 
in his city’s affairs in both action (πράττειν) and speaking (λέγειν)” (318e6-319a2). He 
even promises Hippocrates that he can make all men good citizens (ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας, 
319a5). But now a problem dawns on me. Must one not possess virtues to be a good 
citizen? From other sources, I have learned that justice is a virtue, and I remember 
Clitophon, who reported that Socrates once said that “you won’t find anyone to teach 
you justice, if indeed it is learnable; and if it is acquired by training and practice, you 
won’t find anyone to give you the thorough practice and training that it would take” 
(Clitophon 407b). Meno was troubled by the same question: Is virtue teachable or not? 
(cf. Meno 70a). Also, I have taken for granted that one of Socrates’ preoccupations has 
been the distinction between the learnable and the teachable (cf. 319c).39 So, why does 
not Protagoras take this distinction into consideration? Socrates admits and underlines 
that this question also bothers him. He even asked Protagoras if these matters are 
teachable. If so, Socrates pondered, why is it that men considered wise and virtuous 
are not able to make their sons the same? It was fortunate that Protagoras decided to 
give a demonstration. For a moment he wondered if he ought to demonstrate it “the 
way an older man does to younger ones, by telling a story (μῦθον, 320c4) or by going 
through an argument (ἢ λόγω διεξελθών, 320c4).” This is a reasonable worry due to 
the mixed ages of the public he is about to address.40 He is considerate and decides to 
do both. He starts with the myth. 
                                                          
38 When Protagoras states that such teachings are a waste of time he starkly contrasts the curriculum 
posted for the philosopher in the Republic, 524a ff. Here these four subjects are of major importance. 
39 I will return to this distinction in chapter 8: Saving youths, section 8.1: Hippocrates’s dream, p. 282 
ff. 
40 With regard to the ages of the men and boys gathered in Callias’ house, see Appendix I: The 
chronologies of the dialogues and their participants, p. 386. 
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7.6.2 Protagoras’ myth 
Protagoras presented a myth of the origin of civilization. Another eavesdropper, 
Robert Zaslavsky (1982, 79), effectively explains what Protagoras was doing when he 
told this story; he “equates virtue with justice, which arose out of the interaction of 
nature (Epimetheus and the subterranean gods), art (Prometheus), and convention 
(Zeus and Hermes).” The lesson learned so far is that, due to Zeus’ demand, Hermes 
established justice (δίκην, 322c4) and shame (αἰδῶ, 322c4) so that all humans have an 
equal share in them. Protagoras claimed that Hermes’ assignment was imperative 
because if only a few humans possessed justice and shame, neither cities nor arts 
would have come into being. This must mean that justice and shame are inherent. If 
that is the first premise, is it then necessary to teach—is not cultivation the preferred 
option, as I learned from the Republic? This, as the story goes, is not a choice reflected 
on by Protagoras. Socrates tells that he, instead, established Zeus’ demand as a law, 
and the punishment for not abiding by it, is gruesome as Zeus demands: “[…] make it 
a law from me to put to death anyone incapable of sharing in a sense of shame and of 
the right, as a plague on a city” (322d4-5). This is both punitive and harsh, and my 
worry now is that if Hermes, on Zeus’ demand, gave all humans an equal share in 
justice and shame, how is it that some are incapable of partaking? Or, is it only the 
ones not capable to partake that Protagoras teaches? But how are some incapable when 
all have an equal share? Is this not a contradiction? As Socrates does not elaborate on 
his mention of this unclearness, I am left in the dark. The only way I can find my way 
around this is by assuming that, as Protagoras warrants his law in Zeus’ demand he 
simultaneously warrants his teachings in the god. Hence, from Protagoras’ perspective, 
the righteousness of both law and teachings are indisputable. This implies that he has 
taken upon himself a God-given mission which is to save what he acknowledges as 
incapable youths or to make them better in the face of fear of capital punishment.41  
7.6.2.1 The consequences of the myth 
Still eavesdropping, I hear that Protagoras also described the consequences of the 
myth. His pronounced law is the reason why he, as well as the Athenians, takes for 
granted that virtues are teachable. As I know this does not go for Socrates, I assume 
                                                          
41 Socrates’ mission is also God-given. However, his calling came directly from Apollo who appointed 
him to be the gadfly in the city in order to awake his fellow citizens.  
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Protagoras views him as an outsider (atopos). However, I start to shiver when I learn 
that it is due to the threat of being sentenced to death that Protagoras and the Athenians 
argue that virtues are teachable. Why does not anyone interrupt at this point? And 
what about giving advice, is it likely that all Athenians can give good advice? No, 
Protagoras said, but then he claimed that when it comes to giving “advice (συμβουλὴν) 
on political virtue (πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς), which must all go the way of justice 
(δικαιοσύνης) and moderation (σωφροσύνης), it’s reasonable for them to permit every 
man to give it” (323a1-3). This is a strange pronouncement, but Protagoras maintains 
that this is so because everyone has a share in this sort of virtue. Hence, the 
contradiction is upheld, and it becomes almost bizarre when Protagoras repeats himself 
and states that the proof for the claim that everybody can give advice is the existence 
of cities, if humans did not have a share, there would be no cities. I ask myself once 
again, was it not justice and shame that all had a share in? What sort of proof is this? 
Protagoras seems not to have elaborated on this, and no one questioned this except 
Socrates who says he tried to probe on it; he reports that Protagoras addressed him 
directly and promptly concluded, “This, Socrates, is the cause of the matter” (323a4-
5). Hence, he also was left unanswered, and as a soundless eavesdropper, I am at this 
point left with a fair amount of unanswered questions. 
After this relatively harsh conclusion addressed to Socrates, Protagoras seems to 
have altered his rhetorical mode. According to Socrates, he now presented a proof 
positive to make it clear that we are not misled if we believe that all people think 
this—that all men have a share in justice and the rest of the political virtues. Is an 
argument based on what all people think a sound argument? Is it sound to warrant an 
argument in an imaginary reference group? No one seems to care, so Protagoras 
continued by demonstrating the validity of proof through an analogy: flute-playing 
versus justice and the rest of political virtue. He asked, what happens when a man 
claims to be a good flute player, and it turns out that he is not? People will either laugh 
at him, or they will be angry. His family will warn him. Protagoras explained that the 
best thing for this man would be to admit that he is a bad flute player, that is—it is best 
to tell the truth. Protagoras denoted this as sane moderation. What does that imply? 
However, when it comes to justice, it is different. I wonder why it is so. Socrates 
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reports that Protagoras said that even if both people in general and the family 
acknowledge that a man is unjust; they all would regard it as craziness if the man told 
the truth and admitted he was unjust. In this case, they all “declare that all people have 
to claim to be just, whether they are or not, and that anyone would be crazy not to 
make that pretense, since they think no one at all could have no share of justice in one 
way or another, or he wouldn’t be included in the human race” (323b6-c2).42 
According to Socrates, this is a fact which pronounces “that it’s a reasonable thing for 
people to accept every man as an advisor on this sort of virtue because they regard 
everyone as having a share of it, that’s what I have to say” (323c2-4). At this moment, 
I am confused, and I am beginning to take into consideration that a lot of very young 
men were present and listened to this. What impact did it have on them? I think 
especially of Alcibiades, who leans on this line of reasoning when, a few days later, he 
meets up with Socrates. Another problem arises: How does Protagoras understand 
justice? Do I have to listen to Glaucon’s exposure to understand him, or perhaps 
Thrasymachus’ outlining can be enlightening? Socrates’ report is not helpful because 
Protagoras at this point has made ambiguity an art, and it looks to me like he assumes 
that everybody listening is attuned to his opinions. 
Protagoras’ last point was to demonstrate that people regard justice as something 
that does not come by nature or something that pops up on its own.43 On the contrary, 
justice is a teachable thing, which becomes present because of painstaking effort 
(πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι, cf. 323d5-8). Again, this seems to be at odds with his previous 
claims that all humans partake in justice. Nevertheless, what is this painstaking effort? 
Socrates elaborates, and to make us understand he says that Protagoras highlighted two 
kinds of evils which he argued all men possesses. The first is due to nature or chance.44 
Socrates explained that when people recognize this kind of evil, they pity those who 
possess it; in these cases, people never try to reprimand, lecture, or discipline. Here 
                                                          
42 This line of argumentation is in accordance with Thrasymachus’ presentation of justice. 
43 This stands in stark contrast to Socrates’ practice where, as we learned from the Republic, one of 
the aims was to show that justice was inherent and “according to nature.”  
44 Denyer (2008, 111) points out that “everything not ascribable to human activity was standardly 
ascribed to either nature or chance. […] Laws 892b objects that the standard way of understanding 
these contrasts can blind us to the possibility that so-called ‘natural’ things are ‘subsequent to and 
derivative from artifice and reason’—the artifice and reason of God.” 
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Protagoras asked, “Who would be so senseless as to try to do any of those things with 
people who are, say, ugly or small or weak?” (323d3-5). The second evil is due to lack 
of cultivation because these things are believed to come by effort, training, and 
teachings. When recognized, they result in a flare-up of feelings, disciplinary 
measures, and reprimands. According to Socrates, Protagoras exemplified this through 
injustice and impiety; but are not injustice and impiety generally regarded as the 
opposite to political virtue? This must entail that when we react the way we do, it is 
because virtue is something one can get by effort and learning. The evil related to the 
body is accepted,45 but the evil related to the soul can be mended through training and 
teachings—and here Protagoras claimed to be of help.  
7.6.2.2 Reflections on discipline 
Socrates now tells that Protagoras challenged him once more. He demanded that 
Socrates take the trouble to reflect on discipline, and especially to consider how the 
power of discipline can be exerted on unjust people (cf. 324a3-6). Protagoras stated 
that such a reflection would, by itself, teach Socrates that human beings think virtue 
can be imposed. When Protagoras connected his argument on injustice to retribution, 
he again warranted it in the imaginary reference group, and he based it on the fact that 
it is impossible to undo things that are done. This last point is self-evident. A question 
now is how one proceeds when it is recognized that injustice has been done? 
According to Socrates, Protagoras elaborated and claimed that it is irrational to 
discipline someone who has committed injustice for that sake alone. It is equally 
irrational to try to discipline with rationality because then one does not take retribution 
for the sake of the bygone act of injustice. One must rather discipline for the sake of 
the future, so that neither the person himself nor anyone else who sees him punished, 
will commit injustice again. Here, discipline seems to be imposed for the sake of being 
preventive, and those who have such a thought think that virtue is obtained by 
education. My assumption is confirmed by Protagoras as Socrates goes on. I hear that 
Protagoras even stressed that everyone who holds this opinion is engaged in 
retribution, privately or in public; “the rest of mankind take retribution and impose 
                                                          
45 This reflection is similar that set forth by Glaucon when he was tested by Socrates. Then, Glaucon 
stated that he would not love a man with a defect on his soul, but if “there were some bodily defect, 
he’d be patient and would willingly take delight in him” (Republic, 402d10-12). 
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discipline on those they believe commit injustice” (324c1-2). The impact of hearing 
this is that this kind of discipline is randomly imposed. That is, if someone believes 
that a man has committed injustice—he is free to discipline him. And when this, in 
turn, is connected to retribution, it may be dangerous to act in a political setting. This 
impression recalls Balot (2008, 59), who described the dangers of Athenian political 
life.46 I do not claim that Protagoras is responsible for this kind of conduct, but I think 
sophistic teachings might have had an impact.  
When rounding off his myth, Socrates reports that Protagoras again addressed 
him directly, and stated that his opinions are valid for all Socrates’ fellow citizens 
because the Athenians are among those who regard virtue to be something that can be 
imposed and taught. Due to this, it is reasonable for the Athenians to permit craftsmen 
to give advice on matters of civic concern. He closed the myth and stated that he now 
had sufficiently demonstrated that virtue can be taught, at least in his opinion (cf. 
324c5-d1). It is difficult for me to agree that this demonstration was sufficient. 
However, it was sufficient for grasping the difference between Socrates’ and 
Protagoras’ perspectives of the matter. We were promised an argument also, and 
Socrates reports that before Protagoras went on, he returned to Socrates’ initial 
question on why “good men have their sons taught all the other things that are in the 
scope of teachers and make them wise, but don’t make them better than anyone else in 
that sort of virtue by which they themselves are good” (324d2-6). To answer this, he 
turned to the argument.  
7.6.3 Protagoras’ logos 
As I hear it, Protagoras now equates punishing toward virtue with the teaching of 
virtue. Socrates’ question, or puzzlement (ἀπορία, 324d2) as Socrates claims 
Protagoras called it, found its solution after Protagoras gave an answer to whether 
there is “[…] or is not some one thing that it’s necessary for all citizens to share in if 
there’s going to be a city” (324d9-e1). However, how does Protagoras intend to help 
Socrates out of the aporetic state? Socrates tells that he prepared his help through four 
steps. During the first, the premise was that it was not necessary for all to have a share 
in carpentry, blacksmithing, pottery, and so forth, but it was necessary for everyone to 
                                                          
46 Cf. chapter 6: The demiurges of freedom, section 6.2.2.3: Third consideration, pp. 229-34. 
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have a share in “man’s virtue, that is justice (δικαιοσύνη, 325a1), moderation 
(σωφροσύνη, 325a1), and being pious (τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι, 325a2).” The second followed 
from the first. If it turns out that someone does not have a share in “man’s virtue” there 
is a need “to teach (διδάσκειν, 325a6) and disincline (καλάζειν, 325a6) […] whether 
it’s a child, a man, or a woman, until the one who’s disciplined becomes a better 
person” (325a6-b2). The third gave the consequence of the second; the consequence 
for those who do not respond when being disciplined and taught is to be viewed as 
incurable, and one “needs to cast them out of the cities or put them to death” (325a9-
b1). This I see is in accordance with the law Protagoras proposed in the myth, and it is 
a foreign thought for me. According to Socrates, Protagoras further presumed that “if 
this is the way it is and even if it is this way by nature, good men teach their sons 
everything else—but not this” (325b2-3). With this concrete reference to the myth, he 
claimed that he, through that discourse, demonstrated that good men regarded virtue as 
something “teachable both in private and in public” (325b4-5). In the fourth step, he 
concluded, “virtue is teachable and can be instilled by attentive care, the good men 
teach their sons all other things for which there are not death penalty if they do not 
know them” (325b6-7). When Socrates tells about Protagoras’ next initiative, I find it 
rather shocking. He addressed it to Socrates. Does Socrates believe that parents do not 
teach their children virtue when “there is a penalty of death or exile for their children if 
they don’t learn it […] and not only death but confiscation of property and, to put it all 
in one phrase, the overthrow of households?” (325c1-3). If this is the proposed penalty 
for disobedient children, I am inclined to agree with Protagoras when he concluded 
that one would have to assume the parents will teach to their best ability. Of course, 
they will act in accordance with their best ability; they are too scared and frightened to 
do otherwise. Nonetheless, I am very sympathetic toward the conclusion reached by 
Polemarchus and Socrates when they agreed that punishment harmed and made both 
humans and animals worse. However, how does Protagoras himself teach, and what do 
the children learn? 
 
7.6.3.1 Reflections on education  
Again, according to Socrates, the aim of the Protagorean educational program is that 
every child advances to be most excellent (ὅπως βέλτιστος, 325d1), which I think, at 
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the outset, is a noble aim. The program displayed holds pedagogical demands and 
spans throughout a life-time. Also, it gives guidelines for how to teach (διδάσκουσι, 
325c7) and how to admonish (νουθετοῦσιν, 325c7). The requirements for this lifelong 
learning, Protagoras exhibited through four levels. The first level starts as soon as the 
child understands what is said. Then the nurse, the mother, the tutor, and the father 
strive mightily by pointing out every deed and word (ἔργον καὶ λόγον, 325d2). In this 
manner, the child learns through examples; one deed is just, and another unjust; this is 
beautiful, and that is shameful; this is pious, and that is impious; one does some things 
and not others (cf. 325d3-5). Nonetheless, it is possible that the child is persuaded 
(πείθηται, 325d6) willingly, but if not, Protagoras suggested the following procedure, 
“just as with wood that’s warped and bent, they straighten him out with threats and 
beatings” (325d6-7). The second level starts when the child is sent off to teachers. At 
this stage, the aim is to teach the children to write, read, and introduce them to music. 
However, discipline is to be prioritized. The fathers, or the good men as Protagoras 
called them, command (ἐντέλλονται, 325d8-e1) the teachers to take much greater pains 
so that their children learn orderly behavior or good conduct (εὐκοσμίας, 325e1). 
Protagoras underlined that it is imperative that the teachers take these pains 
(ἐπιμελοῦνται, 325e2-3). The third level starts when the child has learned to read and 
write and is “on the point of understanding written things just as well as they 
understood spoken ones before” (325e4-5). The teachers now set before them on their 
desks works of good poets; these works are to be read and required to be learned by 
heart. These works contain “lots of admonitions and lots of detailed descriptions and 
praises of and tributes to good men of ancient times, so that the child will be eager to 
imitate them and will long to become that kind of person” (325e6-326a3). Besides the 
teachers who teach the child how to imitate, the harp teachers take pains in similar 
ways over moderation (σωφροσύνης, 326a4) so that the youngsters do not behave 
badly in any way. Once the children have learned to play the harp, they are taught the 
works of good poets who composed songs. The children will now learn how the songs 
are set to the music of the harp (cf. 326a8-b1). The teachers compel (ἀναγκάζουσιν, 
326b1-2) the children to absorb the rhythms and harmonies into their souls. This will 
make them more civilized (ἡμερώεροί, 3262-3). It is by becoming in tune with rhythm 
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and harmony that the children will be fitted to speak and to act. According to Socrates, 
Protagoras claimed that this is a necessity because for the whole life a human being 
needs to be rhythmic and harmonious to be in good condition (εὐαρμοστίας, 326b5-6). 
Also, the good men send their children to an athletic trainer, so that they will have 
better bodies in service of their thinking (cf. 326b6-c1). When their bodies are in fit 
conditions they will not be forced to be cowards, neither in war nor other actions (cf. 
326c1-3). It is the most powerful people that do these things the most—and it is the 
richest people who are the most powerful. Their sons start going regularly to teachers 
at the earliest age and are freed from them the latest (cf. 326c3-6).  
The fourth level starts when the child is set free from teachers. Now, the city 
compels (ἀναγκάζει, 326c8) them to learn (μανθάνειν, 326c8) the laws and live by 
them as standards (παράδειγμα, 326d1). By this, the child learns not to act randomly at 
the prompting of his whims, “but in literally the same way that writing teachers give 
those children who aren’t yet skilled at writing a tablet with letters they’ve already 
traced out with stylus and make them write along the guiding lines” (326d2-5). The 
city has, in the same manner, traced out the laws written down by good lawgivers of 
earlier times; hence, “the city compels the youths to rule and be ruled along these 
lines, and disciplines whoever strays outside them” (326d5-6). The name for this 
disciplinary process (εὐθυνούσης, 326e2) is corrections (εὐθῦναι, 326e2), Protagoras 
stated and claimed that judicial punishment produces correctness. He summarized his 
curriculum with a question: “So when there is so much painstaking care (ἐπιμελείας, 
326e3) about virtue in private and in public, are you wondering and puzzled Socrates 
whether virtue is something teachable?” (326e2-4). Socrates reports that in Protagoras’ 
opinion there should not be any wonder in that at all, on the contrary, it should be 
more to wonder about if virtues were not teachable.  
Socrates further reports that Protagoras claimed that Socrates was spoiled, 
because in Athens “everyone is a teacher of virtue to the extent each has the power to 
be” (327e1-2). Protagoras found it remarkable that for Socrates it appeared that no one 
is; he further claimed that this is the same as if “you were looking for someone who’s 
a teacher of Greek, there wouldn’t appear to be even one” (327e3-328a2). Socrates 
says that as a necessary follow-up Protagoras added that everyone should be delighted 
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if there were anyone who surpassed the multitude in leading people to virtue. He 
concluded that “it’s exactly in this category that I believe myself to be, someone who 
is better than other human beings at helping people come toward the beautiful and 
good” (328b2-4). On this ground, Protagoras believed himself to be worth the fee he 
charges.  
7.7 Summary  
We are told that when Protagoras finished his speech, Socrates was spellbound for a 
long time (cf. 328d). He addressed Hippocrates and thanked him deeply for having 
talked him into coming along. During Protagoras’ speech, Socrates argued that he 
learned something of value:  
 
For in all the time before this, I used to think it was not by any human effort that 
good people become good, but now I’m persuaded. Except there’s one little thing 
standing in my way, which obviously Protagoras will easily explain away […] For 
if one were to go to any of the public speakers too about these same matters, one 
would probably hear speeches like this from either Pericles or any of the others 
who are competent at speaking. But if one were to press any of them with any 
question, then like books they have no answer to give and no question to ask 
themselves (328e1-329a4). 
 
Socrates had learned that people become good also by human effort, and this insight, 
when connected to paideia, must be at least partly negative. From my point of view, 
Socrates had been persuaded that there are pedagogical tools which do not work. This 
because it is contrary to the Socratic practice to use threats and beatings to make 
young children understand right from wrong; it is also an alien thought to inculcate 
youths to make them civilized. This Protagorean practice points toward same-
mindedness, which is an ideal incompatible with Socratic teachings. However, as 
Socrates points out, these teachers do not reflect on the matter; they are like books: 
They neither ask questions nor do they answer. They repeat themselves using 
readymade speeches. Thus you will hear the same message from whomever you ask. 
In this regard, Socrates’ utterance is noteworthy: “Protagoras, you’re saying nothing 
surprising in this, but just what’s likely, since even you, even at your age and as wise 
as you are, would become better if anyone were to teach you something you happened 
not to know” (318b1-4). Hence, Socrates aims to teach Protagoras something he does 
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not know, while Protagoras aims to prove himself better than others. Such a drama is 
bound to end in aporia. 
In this chapter, I have highlighted the roles of two teachers and legislators that 
have an impact on the whole corpus. Compared to the paradigmatic regime established 
in the Republic, I suggest that Parmenides’ city and rule alludes to the best regime, 
while Protagoras’ alludes to a city in need of a purging. Through the reading of the 
Prologue of the Parmenides, I have shown how Parmenides made Socrates turn toward 
philosophy in his late teens. I argued that the proceedings employed by Parmenides 
will be recognizable when Socrates later encounters youths, where his ultimate aim is 
to lead students toward the final result which is free and autonomous individuals. This 
dialectical procedure stands in stark contrast to the Protagorean method as it was 
launched through Protagoras’ mythos and logos. In the next chapter, we will witness 
Socrates’ encounter with three youths who were all present and listening to the 








































Chapter 8: Saving youths 
 
Right at the beginning of the corpus, we witness Socrates’ encountering three youth: 
Hippocrates, Alcibiades, and Charmides. They were all present at the sophistic 
summon in Callias’ house as this is displayed in the Protagoras. The conversations 
with Hippocrates and Alcibiades take place around the outbreak of the war (432), 
while the meeting with Charmides takes place after Socrates’ return from the battle of 
Potidaea (429).  
In section 8.1: Hippocrates’ dream, I perform a close reading of the Hippocrates 
section (309a1-314e2) in the Protagoras. At this point, eighteen dramatic years have 
passed since our last encounter with Socrates. We must assume that he has studied 
philosophy during these years, and if the curriculum designed for philosophers in the 
Republic is noteworthy here, Socrates at this point has studied dialectic for several 
years. This is the point of departure for my present reading. I argue that we are about 
to witness philosophy’s first appearance in the distinctive form of the Socratic 
practice. From what we have learned so far, it is not surprising that the architect saw it 
fit to place Socrates’ debut on a stage crowded with champions of sophistry. In 
addition to witnessing how Hippocrates “turns toward philosophy,” the readers will 
also witness Socrates’ own “turning into philosophy.” During a simple line of 
questioning, it will be exposed that, according to Socrates’ practice, the burden of 
learning rests with the student as learner, rather than with the teacher as inculcator, 
which is according to Protagoras’ practice. This simultaneously entails that the 
learnable is not necessarily teachable.1  
                                                          
Titled “Reading a Platonic Dialogue: The Protagoras and Hippocrates’ Dream of Education,” a version 
of this chapter was presented at the International Symposium: Poetry and Philosophy in the Light of 
Plato´s Protagoras, University of Bergen (June, 2014). I want to thank prof. Vigdis Songe-Møller for 
substantial and valuable feedback which I am very grateful for. I will also thank prof. Hayden Ausland 
and ass. prof. Knut Ågotnes for constructive comments.  A version is published as: “Turning Toward 
philosophy: A Reading of Protagoras 309a1-314e2,” in Plato’s Protagoras. Essays in the Confrontation 






In section 8.2: Alcibiades: A lion reared in the city, I read parts of the Alcibiades 
I. Alcibiades is close to the age of majority, and because he has decided to enter the 
stage and give political advices to the Athenians, Socrates will try to awaken him. I 
assume that the arguments he heard from Protagoras’ logos were contributory factors 
for his decision. In this dialogue, the problem of peace and war is explicitly put on 
stage, and the main theme in this dialogue I take to be Socrates’ first attempt to turn 
Alcibiades toward philosophy. I argue that Socrates succeeds in his attempt, but, as 
Alcibiades’s entrance in the Symposium shows, Alcibiades did not manage to endure 
the work Socrates laid upon him. Hence, he ended up as the student Socrates was 
prohibited by the god to associate with any further.2  
In section 8.3: Charmides: Beauty on stage, I read parts of the Charmides. 
Socrates and Alcibiades have now both been on a campaign together where they are 
bound to have made some shocking experiences.3 When Socrates is back, he is warmly 
welcomed by his friends and treated almost like a celebrity. At least Charmides seems 
to be somewhat star struck. In this section, I intend to show two things. First, we 
witness how Socrates loses himself when confronted with physical beauty manifested 
through young Charmides, and we learn how Socrates—little by little—gains control. 
Secondly, when conversing with Charmides, Socrates finds a youth who is not willing 
to take on the burden of investigating his own opinions. Hence, regarding Charmides, 
the outer beauty does not correspond to the inner. I suggest that he ends up in the 
group of students who are in no need of Socrates. The overall aim of this chapter is to 
show how Socrates encounters and, tries to guide different youth. The conclusion 
points to the core of the Socratic practice where we find the demand that the burden of 
learning is the student’s responsibility.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1 The distinction between the “teachable” and the “learnable” is of importance here because the 
main question in the dialogue is: “Is virtue teachable?” I take it that if virtue is teachable, then the 
student can get knowledge of virtue through instructions (only) from a teacher; the teacher is then 
an inculcator and the knowledge is inculcated in the student; thus, the student being capable of 
being instructed. If not teachable, virtue can still be learnable. In this case, the student takes on the 
burden as a learner and is gaining knowledge and skill by studying, practicing, and experiencing. In 
this instance, the teacher is not an inculcator, and the knowledge is not inculcated; instead, 
knowledge is gained by experience through proper guidance. 
2 Cf. Introduction, section 3.2: The midwife at work, pp. 23-6.  
3 Cf. Chapter 1: Preparing the stage, section 1.3.2: Socrates’ prayers, pp. 57-61. 
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8.1 Hippocrates’ dream—a reading of Protagoras 309a1-314e2 
Through their undertakings as “speakers of words and doers of deeds,” both 
Protagoras and Socrates have connections to the oracle of Delphi. Due to Protagoras’ 
wisdom, the oracle recommended him for the pioneering enterprise in Thurii, and the 
same oracle is said to have defined Socrates as the wisest man of all. Then again, as his 
name implies, Protagoras was the first to the agora, thus, when Socrates enters the 
stage with his new ideas on paideia, Protagoras was already set and famous for his. 
Therefore, when the two oracular teachers meet in the Protagoras, I take the overall 
theme of the dialogue to be a battle of ideas concerning paideia.  
8.1.1 The turning toward and into philosophy 
In the Republic (521c ff.), Socrates clarified that the turning of the soul toward 
philosophy is the start of a process where proper studying, training, and guidance are 
imperative undertakings. The moment of the turn signals transformation, or a rebirth. 
We are told in the Seventh Letter (340c) that when this happens, the student pushes 
himself and urges his teacher until he has reached the end of the journey or had 
become capable of doing philosophy without a guide and finding the way himself. 
This is a momentous turn, as we saw when we met young Socrates in the Parmenides. 
When Socrates, eighteen dramatic years later, discusses the teachings of the sophists 
with Hippocrates, he says, “Let’s consider these things with our elders too, since we 
are still too young to be making a decision on so great a matter” (314b4-6). 
Supposedly, Socrates has trained for many years, but at the outset of the Protagoras, 
he reflects himself still too young for being a proper solitary guide for Hippocrates. 
Thus, I suggest that Socrates at this point still considers himself to be a trainee. 
However, during the drama evolving in the Protagoras, this changes and the alteration 
on behalf of Socrates can be detected through three steps: First, his state of mind 
signaled in the prelude; secondly, his awakening in the “bedroom scene;” thirdly, his 
final turning into philosophy which is something that happens suddenly: “Suddenly 
(ἐξαίφνης), like a light flashing forth when a fire is kindled; it is born in the soul which 
straightaway is nourished by itself” (Seventh Letter, 341d1-2). This element of 
suddenness will be a recurring theme. So far, however, I suggest that Socrates’ turning 
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can be seen through the “great aporia” in the last scene of the dialogue, and 
Hippocrates’ turning through the “small aporia” in the “courtyard scene.”  
8.1.2 The prelude (309a1-310a7) 
The Protagoras is bracketed by the movements “arriving” and “leaving.” The last 
word of the dialogue is ἀπῆμεν, which literary means “we went away, or we 
departed;” the first word is πόθεν,4 which literally means “from where?” Hence, 
already through the first word uttered, the readers understand that Socrates has been 
somewhere; he left something behind and arrived at quite another place. Through the 
last word it is stated that Socrates left; but where did he go?5 One answer can be given 
if the readers turn to the first page and start reading the dialogue all over again. Then 
we learn, once again, that Socrates has been somewhere, he is arriving at a place not 
named and populated by anonymous people. These movements embrace Socrates’ 
extraordinary experience, which makes the Protagoras something like a circular 
dialogue, a closed universe.  
This movement theme is traceable in the prelude where the opening line is 
constructed as a question put forth by Socrates’ anonymous friend, who also is 
gathered with someone, somewhere: “From where, Socrates, are you appearing 
(πόθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνει, 309a1)?” The friend answers the question himself: “No, 
don’t tell me. It’s pretty obvious that you have been hunting the ripe and ready 
Alcibiades” (309a1-2). Why is this obvious? Is it due to Socrates’ behavior? Is he 
acting oddly? From the friend’s two utterances we can detect at least three things: 
First, the friend has observed something, sometime, which gives him reason to 
conclude that Socrates was hunting Alcibiades for sexual pursuit.6 Secondly, the 
friend’s attitude signals he is convinced that when Socrates is approaching a young 
man, it is with seductress intents; an attitude which in turn suggests—at a personal 
                                                          
4 This is an interrog. adv. whence? 1) of place: who, from what, from where? 2) of origin: from what 
source? 3) of the cause, whence? From where? 
5 The last utterance of the dialogue says: “we went away […].” Who Socrates left with has been a 
theme of long-lasting speculations and will not be touched upon here. It is certain that Socrates did 
not leave alone, and thus, it also is certain that he left.  
6 “Socrates was hunting Alcibiades for sexual pursuit,” is due to the hunting metaphor κυνηγεσίου 
(309a2), cf. Denyer (2008, 65). 
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level—a validation of Socrates’ reputation in the city.7 Thirdly, the friend is hunting 
for gossip or, at this point, news with a sort of spicy content. However, Socrates is not 
quite willing to enter this hunting-Alcibiades discourse. He admits coming from 
Alcibiades right now and states that “I want to tell you something really strange 
(ἄτοπον) though: even with him present, I paid no attention to him and often forgot 
that he was there” (309b7-9). By this reply Socrates himself—implicitly—confirms 
the existence of a rumor regarding Alcibiades; however, and more important here, is 
the phrase “something really strange” which translates the term “ἄτοπον,”8 and 
understood as “something illogical.” It signals a contradiction and thus creates a 
tension concerning Socrates’ state of mind at this point. The friend is surprised: 
“Surely you didn’t meet up with someone else more beautiful, not in this city anyway” 
(309c2-3). Socrates holds that the wisest thing appears more beautiful than Alcibiades 
and makes known that he has just met Protagoras. When hearing that Protagoras is in 
town, the friend’s attitude changes: he is now eager to learn what went on in this 
meeting, whereupon Socrates replies: “I’d count it as a favor (χάριν) if you’d listen” 
(310a5). Coming from Socrates as we know him, these statements are somewhat 
rare—and as such—they may present an affirmative hint toward Socrates’ mood in 
this prelude. It is of importance to bear in mind that the prelude is presented as a 
postscript regarding Socrates’ encounter with Protagoras. It seems like Socrates is, to 
some extent, upset and, therefore needs to tell someone about what caused the distress. 
This—in turn—points toward a general human need to share with others when having 
experienced something extraordinary.  
However, what is this extraordinary or this “something really strange” (ἄτοπον) 
that happened? I think the “really strange” is the first clue enabling the readers to 
expose Socrates’ awakening and turning. A second clue we find at the end of the 
                                                          
7 I conclude that the rumor Socrates’ friend relies on is false. This is due to the law for sexual pursuit 
Socrates set down in the Republic 403b6-c2, and it is confirmed by Alcibiades later. I will return to 
this below, in section 8.2.5: Alcibiades’ swan song, p. 305 f. Socrates’ rumor in the city is also a theme 
in the Apology which I return to in chapter 10. 
8 Cf. Eide (1996, 59-60) who argues that “ἀτοπία is the quality of being ἄτοπος, a favorite adjective in 
Plato, around 230 instances (including the adverb ἀτόπως) being found in his work” and further that 
atopos “had its origin in Greek science ‘contrary to τόπος’ (τόπος being the mathematical concept of 
‘geometrical topos’), thus ’illogical,’ ’inconsistent,’ ’contradictory,‘ and that this sense should be 
given to the word” (p. 60). On the “atopos theme,” see also Songe-Møller (2017).  
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dialogue when things are so confused and displaced that Socrates and Protagoras 
apparently have changed their respective positions without being aware of it—their 
authority is not confirmed but rather put into question. This confusion detectable 
toward the end makes James L. Kastely (1996, 36) state that “this is one of the few 
dialogues in which I am not sure that Socrates is always in control of himself.” I agree 
with Kastely, but I think that “the Socrates out of control” at the end indicates that he 
understood the awakening and the turning in the fullest extent: He was mystified by 
himself because he found himself insensible to physical beauty and under the 
attraction of his new Eros, philosophy.9 This insight perplexed him. To elaborate on 
the first step of this process, we need to do a close reading of the Hippocrates section. 
8.1.3 The Hippocrates section (310a8-314e2) 
According to John S. Treantafelles (2013, 149-50), the Hippocrates section is not well 
recognized in the literature on the Protagoras. Michael Gagarin (1969, 135), argues 
that the dialogue’s opening scenes serve only as literary devices to bring Socrates and 
Protagoras together. C.C.W. Taylor (1976, 64-8) recognizes the Hippocrates section, 
but only to analyze the questions Socrates asks, as does Beversluis (2000, 245-56), but 
his agenda is to defend Hippocrates’s answers against the questions which he argues 
are designed to silence rather than persuade Hippocrates on the merits. Also, Charles 
L. Griswold Jr. (1999, 283) claims the Hippocrates section to be a “classic and 
successful little example of Socratic dialogue.” Shannon Dubose (1973, 15-21) claims 
that the Protagoras is a dialogue with no serious philosophical intention, and in 
accordance with H.D.F. Kitto (1966, 284), she argues that it is a work in need of 
revision, for example, to reintroduce Hippocrates at the end of the dialogue, whom 
Plato apparently forgets along the way. Plato’s forgetting of Hippocrates is mentioned 
by Eugenio Benitez (1992, 231) in relation to Socrates’ first elenchus on Protagoras 
and is also pointed out by Marina McCoy (1999) in relation to the discussion evolving 
around the poem of Simonides. Treantafelles (2013) examines the Hippocrates section 
to understand the activity of philosophy from the perspective of “Socratic testing.” I 
                                                          
9 With quite a different outcome, this point is also touched upon by Kastley (1996, 32). Further, in the 
Republic, we are told that a man experiencing the shift is from light to darkness or from darkness to 
light, can appear most ridiculous (cf. 517d-518a).  
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find parts of Treantafelles’ paper very inspirational due to his elaboration of details, 
but contrary to him, I develop my reading of this section from the perspective of 
Socrates’ awakening and Hippocrates’ turning as suggested above.  
8.1.3.1 The character Hippocrates 
Hippocrates is largely unknown as a historical figure, but Nails (2002, 160-70) argues 
that there is evidence to suggest that he was a nephew to Pericles and, besides this 
interesting piece of information; we get to know Hippocrates quite well during this 
section. He is very enthusiastic, has a fighting spirit, he is bold, he knows and trusts 
Socrates.10 Also, he knows that Socrates has met Protagoras on an earlier occasion, 
and thus he begs Socrates to help him to get introduced. Hippocrates apprehends 
Protagoras as the wisest man in the Greek-speaking world, and he possesses a long-
lasting dream: He wants to become a student of Protagoras, the famous teacher. He 
developed his dream based on what he heard from people in the city and through these 
stories he made up his mind regarding Protagoras and his wisdom. He is so eager to 
fulfill the dream that he is prepared to bankrupt both himself and his friends. When his 
brother, at supper one night, tells him that Protagoras is in town, it instantly dawns on 
Hippocrates that this is the opportunity to realize his dream. He experiences an almost 
sleepless night, and supposedly long before daybreak, he has made his decision. He 
then rushes into the night with the intention to find his friend Socrates to whom he 
now really needs to talk to.  
8.1.3.2 The bedroom scene (310a8-311a7) 
The first specified place in the Protagoras is the bedroom scene. Hippocrates stands 
forth as noisy, loud, and very eager. During this scene, Socrates calms him down, and 
toward the end, Hippocrates is noiseless. Hence, it seems like he has gained self-
control. So, what happened here? 
Very early, before daylight, Socrates hears shouting and heavy banging on the 
door. In the dark he recognizes the yelling voice of Hippocrates: “Socrates, are you 
awake or asleep?” (310b3-4). The earsplitting Hippocrates stumbles into a dark room, 
                                                          
10 These characteristics make him fit the demands set forth in the Republic (376c4-6) with regard to 




tumbles toward a bed and places himself by Socrates’ feet—but why this underlining 
of the noise and shouting? From Hippocrates’ perspective, the answer is given when 
the narrator reports that he roared: “Have you heard? Protagoras has arrived!” (310b7-
8). But what can be said from Socrates’ perspective? Treantafelles (2013, 158) points 
out that almost without exception it is assumed that Socrates is (1) at home, and (2) 
that he is asleep,11 but according to him, there is no textual evidence to support these 
assumptions. Is Socrates at home? The narrator reports that someone opened the door 
for Hippocrates (310b2). Who is this someone? According to Nicholas Denyer (2008, 
68), in this context, someone (τίς) probably refers to a slave. But is there any evidence 
to suggest that Socrates had a full household; that is, family and slaves? I think not. 
So, what about the sleeping Socrates? Hippocrates found him on a simple bed,12 but 
was he asleep? Surely, Socrates is somewhere, but it is not for certain that he is at 
home, and it is not for certain that he is asleep. I suggest that this is a symbolic clue 
regarding Socrates’ awakening, and hence, the “bedroom scene” can be viewed as an 
allegory related to the cave-dwellers in the Republic. How? The development here is 
similar to that of the cave parable: An instance of suddenness (ἐξαίφνης) initiated an 
action.13 We are not told explicitly what exactly frees the prisoners in the cave from 
the passive gazing on the drifting shadows in front of them. We are just told that 
something “suddenly” happens: “One was compelled to stand up suddenly (ἐξαίφνης) 
and turn his head around and walk and to lift up his eyes to the light” (Republic, 
515c6-8). From this perspective, I suggest that Socrates, in the bedroom scene, also is 
dwelling, somewhere in the dark, and by Hippocrates’ entrance, he is suddenly forced 
to wake up and start his ascent toward “the light of the veritable day” (Republic, 
521c8).  
Now, the very loud and eager Hippocrates wants them to leave immediately 
because he is afraid to miss out on Protagoras. However, Socrates is holding back: 
                                                          
11 See for example Zuckert (2009, 218), and Beversluis (2000, 246). They both place Socrates at home 
as well as asleep, and they put forth the assumption that “at home” means communal living, cf. also 
Coby (1988, 26). However, there is no textual evidence to support such living arrangements for 
Socrates, cf. Treantafelles (2013, 158n26). 
12 This bed is a (σκίμποδος) which denotes a cheap and low bed, light enough to be used as a 
stretcher for invalids, cf. Denyer (2008, 69). 
13 Cf. the Republic, 515c7, 516a4 and 516e5, cf. also Wyller (1984, 49).  
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“Let’s not go there just yet. It’s too early (πρῲι γάρ ἐστιν, 311a3).” The obvious 
reference here is the early hour of the day, but this phrase may also suggest that any 
meeting with Protagoras would be intellectually premature regarding Hippocrates’ 
current state (cf. Denyer 2008, 71). So, trying to calm him down, Socrates suggests: 
“Why don’t we go out here into the courtyard and stroll around until its light? Then we 
can go” (311a5).  
8.1.3.3 The courtyard scene (311a8-314c2) 
Socrates pushes Hippocrates into the courtyard. This is the second place explicitly 
named. At this point, Socrates employs two proceedings to make Hippocrates realize 
that he has made up his mind through doxa, and hence, he does not understand the 
danger he is in. So, here, outside, in the hour when night becomes day, Socrates 
decides to see what Hippocrates is made of (311b1-2). He sets out to “test” 
Hippocrates to see if he can “scope it out.” The term “test” translates the verb 
ἀποπειράζω which points toward an athletic context, meaning to evoke a wrestler by 
tentatively “trying” his opponent in a competition. The phrase “scope it out” translates 
the verb διασκοπέω which means to “look at thoroughly.” So, Socrates—it seems—is 
preparing Hippocrates for entering a kind of “wrestling game.” Thus, it is imperative 
that he can pay close attention to the opponent’s alleged set of trickeries.14 It is 
obvious that Socrates considers Protagoras to be Hippocrates’ opponent in an 
upcoming wrestling game, and through the tests, he is about to perform on Hippocrates 
we witness the birth of the Socratic activity/questioning. The aim is to prepare 
Hippocrates for the encounter with the great sophist and learn the importance of taking 
a stand of his own. Socrates starts the preparation by employing two different (well-
known) proceedings, the elenchus and “creating an imaginary interlocutor.” He starts 
with the elenchus:  
 
(a)  
Socrates: “[…] you’re making an effort now to go to Protagoras and pay him 
money as a fee on your own behalf; what’s your idea? Who will you be going to 
                                                          
14 I am indebted to Professor Hayden Ausland for making me aware of the depth of meaning in these 




and what will you become? […] Tell me, if you’re going to pay Hippocrates from 
Cos, and someone asked you this, what would you answer?” 
Hippocrates: “He is a doctor, and I’ll become a doctor.” 
 
(b)  
Socrates: “But if you were intending to go to Polycleitus the Argive or Pheidias 
the Athenian to pay them on your behalf, what would your answer be then?  
Hippocrates: “I’d say because they’re sculptors, I’ll become a sculptor.” 
 
(c)  
Socrates: “[…] What other name do we hear spoken about Protagoras, the same 
way ‘sculptor’ is about Pheidias and ‘poet’ about Homer—what do we hear like 
about Protagoras?”  
Hippocrates: “Well, Socrates, what people say, anyway, is that the man is a 
sophist.” 
Socrates: “Then you’re going to Protagoras, what will you become?” 
Hippocrates: “If it’s anything like the previous cases, it’s obvious so I’ll become a 
sophist” (311b-312a).  
 
The elenchus turned out to be effective because it made Hippocrates able to 
distinguish between different arts and also he became aware of one simple fact: by 
seeking the teachings belonging to one particular art, you will become an expert within 
the field in question. So, he now understands that by paying Protagoras for studying 
with him, he will eventually become a sophist. Socrates’ response to Hippocrates’ last 
answer is to swear by all the gods before asking: “What? You? Wouldn’t you be 
ashamed to present yourself to the Greek world as a sophist?” (312a5-7). Hippocrates 
admits he would. At this point, the narrator reports that as “he spoke, he was turning 
red—for a bit of day was just breaking, so he became clearly visible” (312a2-4). 
Hippocrates’s blushing did not occur when he understood he would become a sophist 
but by the thought of presenting himself as a sophist to the Greek world. This is 
noteworthy because here the physical dawn of the day coincides—both in time and 
color—with Hippocrates’ blushing, and it can indicate that something is also starting 
to dawn upon him, intellectually (cf. Denyer 2008, 74). Put another way—he finds 
himself in an aporetic situation. 
However, through his questioning, Socrates also did something else: When he 
enumerated the artisans to identify their abilities for Hippocrates, he started with the 
doctor at step (a), at step (b) the doctor is excluded and replaced by the sculptor. At 
step (c), Protagoras is grouped with the poet and sculptor—that is, Protagoras is placed 
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within the imitative arts. In this way, Socrates performs a little twist,15 but did 
Hippocrates notice this? Apparently not, because the result of this questing turns out to 
be just a preliminary step and by no means satisfactory. Consequently, at this point, 
Hippocrates failed. Socrates now claims that Hippocrates does not understand what he 
is about to do: He is about to expose his soul to something he does not understand. 
Thus, Socrates starts anew:  
 
Socrates: “[…] What do you consider the sophist to be?”  
Hippocrates: “I’d say he’s just what the name says; someone who knows wise 
things” (312c5-7). 
  
At this point Hippocrates performs a fallacy by deriving a person’s capacity, ability, or 
skill from the name.16 Maybe this is the reason why Socrates now chooses to employ 
the second proceeding, to create “an imaginary interlocutor.” It goes like this: What if 
someone asked us, what would we answer? I would probably say […], what would 
you say?  
 
Socrates: You could say the same thing about the painters […] that they 
understand the wise things. But if someone asked us ‘wise in what respect’, we 
would probably answer ‘wise as far as making images’ […] so what about the 
sophist—what would we answer? […] 
Hippocrates: The sophist is wise concerning good speakers. […] 
Socrates: True answer, but not sufficient. On what subjects does the sophist make 
you a clever speaker? 
Hippocrates: I don’t know. […] 
Socrates: Are you aware of the danger you are about to put your soul in? 
Hippocrates: I don’t know (312b-313c). 
 
Using “an imaginary interlocutor,” we have learned that it had a didactic impact. We 
also witnessed that the Socratic activity/questioning was effective: In the mode of a 
sophist, Socrates posed questions which made Hippocrates blush; he virtually started 
to acknowledge the shame rising from the instantaneous moment one starts to grasp 
that the opinion first stated was wrong. Hence, Hippocrates realized the emerging 
aporia; and when he appreciated the aporetic condition, Socrates redirected his 
                                                          
15 This “little twist” alludes to the Republic (595a-601a) where Socrates also assigned sophistry to the 
imitative arts, arguably far away from the truth. The connection between the imitative arts and 
sophistry is also repeatedly established by the Eleatic Stranger in the Sophist. Him I return to in 
chapter 9: The Eleatic Stranger: A turning-point.  
16 Theaetetus makes the same mistake in his encounter with the Eleatic Stranger.  
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ambition away from the dream career in sophistry through a set of questions which 
enabled Hippocrates to reveal his ignorance. This is an important revision of his earlier 
statement where he claimed that the sophist Protagoras was the most “clever speaker” 
and most skilled in wise things. It is noteworthy that at this moment Socrates decides 
to meet Hippocrates’ initial request, but before they set out, he gives some last 
warnings concerning the sophist:  
 
He [i.e., the sophist] is a kind of merchant who peddles provisions upon the 
teachings which nourish the soul, and thus the sophist can deceive us. […] So, if 
you are knowledgeable (ἐπιστήμων), you can buy teachings (μαθήματα) safely 
from Protagoras or anyone else. But if you’re not; please don’t risk what is most 
dear to you on a roll of a dice […] (313a ff.)  
 
So, when being knowledgeable he can buy teachings, the teachings will not be 
inculcated in his soul—if not knowledgeable, the teachings will be inculcated. This is 
the real danger; and as such, the situation calls for yet another form of preparation. 
8.1.3.4 In front of the entrance to Callias’ house (314c3-8)  
The area outside Callias’ house is the third specified place in this section, and here 
Socrates employs his third and last proceeding. When arriving at the door of Callias’ 
house, they do not enter but stay outside for a while, engaged in a “dialectical 
conversation” (διελεγόμεθα).17 We are not told what this conversation is all about, 
what they actually discussed, or how the conversation developed, but it must have 
been something important because they did not want to leave the subject unsettled 
before entering the house. Hence, the content of the conversation is concealed for the 
readers, so the important element here is the narrator who explicitly reports that the 
conversation was dialectic. In this context, that is a piece of important information. In 
the Republic, Socrates explained to Glaucon that “only the dialectical way of inquiry 
proceeds in this direction, destroying the hypotheses, to the beginning itself in order to 
make it secure, and when the eye of the soul18 is really buried in a barbaric bog, 
                                                          
17 On the term “διελεγόμεθα,” see Benitez (1992) and his discussion on dialectical versus dialogical 
conversations.  
18 Regarding the “eye of the soul” Socrates says: “It’s not scarcely an ordinary thing, rather it’s hard, 
to trust that in these studies a certain instrument in everyone’s soul—one that is destroyed and 
blinded by other practices—is purified and rekindled, an instrument more important to save than ten 
thousand eyes,” Republic, 527d6-e3. 
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dialectic gently draws it forth and leads it up above” (Republic, 533c9-d4). If we can 
assume that Socrates’ use of dialectic in the case of Hippocrates is similar to the 
explanation given to Glaucon, it is reasonable to conclude that, through the three 
proceedings; the philosophical pedagogue managed to guide Hippocrates and, thus, 
turned his soul toward philosophy. The closure of the dialectic conversation marks the 
end of the Hippocrates section.  
8.1.4 The three-fold door knocking 
Through the reading of the Hippocrates section, three specific places (the bedroom, the 
courtyard and the area in front of Callias’ house) have been isolated. Simultaneously, 
three different ways of the Socratic activity/questioning have been identified. Also, we 
find that the Hippocrates section is bracketed by door-knocking, a motif Treantafelles, 
among others, relates to the genre of comedy.19 But what will be the result if this door-
knocking motif is viewed from quite a different perspective? I think that this three-fold 
door knocking can be viewed as symbolizing the three-fold way of learning.20 This 
way is the guided process leading to doing true deeds and possessing true beliefs. 
When this training is done, it will eventually lead to true insight.21  
When Hippocrates first knocked on the door and entered the dark bedroom, he 
could be symbolizing the releasing power forcing Socrates suddenly (ἐξαίφνης) to start 
an ascent from his dwelling in the dark into the light. On behalf of Hippocrates, the 
consequence of this first knocking was entering a new state. He was transformed from 
being a rather noisy character to an individual signaling self-control. Socrates further 
led him from the dark into the daylight, by enabling him to start the process of 
correcting his own beliefs. Hence, Hippocrates experienced a dramatic transformation. 
By partaking in Socrates’ elenchus, he proceeded from a nescient knower to an 
                                                          
19 See Treantafelles (2013, 154, and 154n14). 
20 Generally, the philosophers divided the life of all things into three distinct parts: growth, maturity, 
and decay, which imply that between the twilight of dawn and the twilight of evening is the high 
noon of resplendent magnificence, and according to Wyller (1984, 51), Plato often displays a 
“threefold” (trehetlig) development regarding learning. One example is the Seventh letter (342a) 
where it is said that “every object has three things which are the necessary means by which 
knowledge of that object is acquired; and the knowledge itself is a fourth thing; and as a fifth one 
must postulate the object itself which is cognizable and true.; first of these come the name; secondly 
the definition; thirdly the image” which, in turn, leads to the fourth—knowledge. Cf. also the Laws, 
895c, where essence, definition, and name are enumerated; cf. also the Parmenides (142a).  
21 Cf. Republic (521c) quoted above, and the Seventh Letter (342a). 
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embarrassed inept, by taking a stand through “an imaginary interlocutor” he proceeded 
from the embarrassed inept to a self-conscious questioner, and through a “dialectical 
conversation” his soul turned and became strengthened toward the upcoming meeting 
with the sophistic assembly at the house of Callias. So, when Socrates initially claimed 
that Hippocrates did not understand what he was about to do, that is, he was about to 
expose his soul to something he did not understand—maybe this three-fold guiding-
process can be viewed as a soul-preparation. If so, Hippocrates’ soul is no longer in 
severe danger, and the teachings of Protagoras will not be inculcated in it. 
When they—together—are doing the second knocking on the door of Callias’ 
house, Hippocrates is supposedly equipped and well-armed. His turning is contrasted 
by the eunuch doorkeeper who instantly inferred they were sophists, and this inference 
was due to the dialectic conversation he overheard. Hence, he slams the door in their 
faces. His inference was unsound because the premises grounding the inference were 
unsound, but he could not do otherwise because this kind of conversation had not been 
overheard before. He was the first, and he did not understand it.22 
The third knocking is done by Socrates alone on the door of Callias’ house. By 
just stating that they are not sophists, the eunuch let them enter. No questions asked. I 
think this third knocking and Socrates’ entrance onto the stage overcrowded by 
sophists marks Socrates descent—a necessary turmoil in the process leading to his 
final turning. The gathering in the house of Callias is a sort of unworldly situation,23 
and as such Socrates’ entrance may equalize the descent to Hades which is followed 
by the ascent to the light, an occurrence Socrates tried to explain to Glaucon in the 
Republic (521c).  
                                                          
22 This is also in accordance with the experience Thrasymachus made in the Republic, cf. chapter 3: 
The tide is turning for Socrates, pp. 91-133. In addition, when reading the dialogues chronologically 
according to their dramatic dates, it follows that the Protagoras is the first Socratic dialogue, and 
consequently—within Plato’s dramatic universe—this is the first incident of the Socratic activity. So, 
no one could have overheard such a conversation earlier. It should also be noted that the 
Parmenides is the first dialogue. Both the dialectic and the conversations exposed there are different 
from that of the Protagoras because, in the Parmenides, Socrates is a youth (18-20 years old) 
questioned and guided by Parmenides, the mature philosopher; in the Protagoras it is Socrates who 
questions and guides the young Hippocrates. Thus, the two first dialogues expose two different 
entrances into philosophy. 
23 I am indebted to Professor Paul Woodruff for pointing out this “unworldly situation.”  
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8.1.5 Some concluding remarks  
When three times trying to expose Protagoras to the same procedures which worked 
toward Hippocrates, Socrates experiences them as ineffective. Why? Maybe because 
the Socratic activity has an aim: to lead the student toward philosophy, and through 
this process, the burden of learning rests with the student as learner. Hippocrates, as 
we have seen, took on that burden, but Protagoras is not that kind of student. 
Furthermore, during the dialogue, Protagoras demonstrates that he presents the 
inculcating teacher, contrary to Socrates who stands forth as a philosophical 
pedagogue/guide. Thus, through the famous aporia at the end—Socrates realizes this 
contrariness, and he instantly recognizes the abyss between the old and new ideas 
concerning paideia. How did this happen? In the Protagoras, we witness two 
productive aporias; both signaling a “transition by suddenness.” The first is related to 
the student (Hippocrates), the latter to the teachers: Protagoras the sophist versus 
Socrates the philosophic pedagogue. The first aporia occurred in the Hippocrates 
section where Hippocrates, by appreciating his aporetic situation, started his turning 
toward philosophy, a turning which exposed that confrontation with one’s beliefs and 
convictions is the necessary first step. The second aporia led Socrates toward his final 
turning into philosophy. Gaining this kind of insight is, according to descriptions given 
in the Republic and the Seventh Letter, a perplexing and confusing experience. I take it 
that a man in such a state can appear to be comical, out of control, and clowning 
around, but not for long (cf. Kastely 1996, 36). The clarity returned when Socrates—in 
his last reply to Protagoras, invited him to start the discussion all over again, but 
Protagoras declined. So, Socrates left, and maybe he even closed the door behind him. 
For certain, he arrived at quite another place where he met someone, gathered 
somewhere.  
8.2 Alcibiades: A lion is reared in the city 
According to Edmund F. Bloedow (1991, 49) the Athenian debate over Alcibiades 
gained in intensity in 405; the same year in which the Alcibiades theme was brought 
on stage by Aristophanes in his comedy the Frogs. After Dionysus had declared that 
Aeschylus is superior to Euripides, and after he had set forth the wish that his Great 
Festival ought to have continued in its former splendor, he acknowledges that this 
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could only have taken place within the frames of a prosperous polis—but as the 
Athenians did—also the god recognized that the polis at present was in great jeopardy. 
This is the situation when he poses a crucial question to each of the tragedians: “What 
would you do about Alcibiades?”24 Euripides’ answer is straightforward: No matter 
how bad the situation is for Athens, he is not willing to give Alcibiades a new chance. 
The reason for this is twofold. First, Euripides argues that Alcibiades’ demeanor had 
mainly been shown to be disadvantageous to Athens. Secondly, he underlines that 
Alcibiades’ actions were all motivated from selfish aims: “I hate a citizen who is slow 
to serve his country, but swift to do her great harm, who is resourceful when it comes 
to himself, but helpless when it comes to the polis” (Frogs, lines 1427-29). Aeschylus 
approves, but his answer to Dionysus is not so straightforward: “Rear a lion in the 
polis? By no means! But should you do so, then its whims you must humor” (Frogs, 
lines 1431-32). This metaphorical reply places the problem of Alcibiades vis-à-vis the 
city in a broader perspective and, as Bloedow argues, for “those who knew their 
Homer, this powerful metaphor would have been entirely self-explanatory” (1991, 63). 
The underlining here is that one ought not to rear a lion within a community. However, 
Athens reared a lion, and it is this lion Socrates tried to discipline and turn toward 
philosophy twenty-seven dramatic years prior to this discussion in Hades.  
8.2.1 Alcibiades encounters Socrates 
Socrates had for many years observed Alcibiades at a distance.25 He had noticed how 
the rich, handsome young man arrogantly treated the men who pursued him. The more 
they held themselves in high esteem, the more bigheaded he rejected them. It is 
Alcibiades’ feeling of being superior Socrates wants to address when he, on this 
particular day, approaches him for the first time. Alcibiades had also for many years 
observed that Socrates was always around and did not understand why he never 
pursued him. He had often wondered why. So, one day when he saw Socrates 
                                                          
24 For a bibliography on scholarly discussions on this subject, see Bloedow (1991 49n1, and 49n2).  
25 This observation was noticed and misunderstood by others, as for example the anonymous friend 
Socrates talked to in the prelude of the Protagoras.  
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unaccompanied, Alcibiades sent his guards away and prepared the ground for a 
conversation.26  
When Socrates utters his first words to Alcibiades, he says that “I was the first 
man to fall in love with you […] and now the others have stopped pursuing you I 
suppose you’re wondering why I’m the only one who hasn’t given up” (103a1-3). 
Socrates had been prevented to approach him by a divine being (cf. 103a5-6) because 
such a conversation would have been pointless earlier (cf. 105e7). Alcibiades is 
seemingly shocked by Socrates’ frank speech as he responds, “[…] now that you’ve 
started talking, you seem more bizarre to me than when you followed me in silence” 
(106a2-3); however, he is interested to hear what Socrates has to say. Socrates is still 
frank when he tells that he knows Alcibiades is planning to present himself for the 
Athenian people, and by that presentation, he intends to show them that he “deserves 
to be honored more than Pericles and anyone else who ever was” (105b2-3). After that, 
he reasons that he will be the most influential man in Athens, Greece, and beyond. But 
Socrates will prove to him that he has very different plans in mind, Alcibiades just 
does not know it yet.  
“Suppose one of the gods asked you: Alcibiades, would you rather live with what 
you now have, or would you rather die on the spot if you weren’t permitted to acquire 
anything greater?” (105a4-6). Socrates believes he would choose to die. So, what is 
Alcibiades’ real ambition in life? His overall plan is to come forward and advise 
(συμβουλεύσων, 106c4-5) the Athenians in the near future. Suppose “I stopped you as 
you were about to take the podium and asked: ‘Alcibiades, what are the Athenians 
proposing to discuss? You’re getting up to advise them because it’s something you 
know better than they do, aren’t you?’ What would you reply?” (106c5-9). Alcibiades 
answers somewhat arrogantly that “I suppose I would say it was something that I know 
better than they do” (106d1), and he states also that he considers himself to be a good 
adviser (σύμβουλος).27 This is their point of departure. 
                                                          
26 Alcibiades tells this in Symposium, 217b, hence, according to him, it was he who carefully planned 
their first encounter.  
27 I bear in mind that Alcibiades attended the great sophistic summon in the house of Callias. There 




8.2.2 What does Alcibiades know? 
I assume that Alcibiades has received his formal education within a milieu influenced 
by sophistic teachers. This assumption is due to the links between Alcibiades’ 
guardian Pericles and Protagoras among others. Alcibiades has learned how to write 
and read, and he learned lyre-playing (music) and wrestling (gymnastic). He did not 
want to learn flute-playing, though (cf. 106e). If measured against Protagoras’ 
curriculum, he has reached the third level and, thus starting to harmonize body and 
soul. If stated in Protagorean terms, he is in his becoming to become civilized. I think 
that Socrates makes implicit references to Protagorean teachings on orthos logos 
(correctness in language and belief) when he through the upcoming exercises wants 
Alcibiades to state what is correct according to rules. Even if I assume that Alcibiades 
ought, through his education, to know about these rules, Socrates strives to make 
Alcibiades utilize this knowledge. This, in turn, might indicate that the knowledge he 
possesses is a result of cramming, which points to inculcation. Hence, when 
encountering Socrates and his procedures, Alcibiades gives the impression of being a 
slow learner.  
The first thing Socrates does is to probe into Alcibiades’ attitude toward learning. 
This initial line of questioning is similar to how Parmenides set out when Socrates 
himself was questioned as a youth at the same age Alcibiades is now. After Alcibiades 
agrees that the only things he knows he has learned (ἔμαθες, 106d5) from others or 
found out (ἐξηῦρες, 106d6) by himself, Socrates asks, “Could you ever have learned or 
found out anything without wanting to learn it or work it out (ζητεῖν, 106d9) for 
yourself? […] Would you have wanted to learn or work out something that you 
thought you understood (ἐπίστασθαι, 106d11)?” Alcibiades has not bothered to 
investigate anything, nor has he ever learned something he did not want to learn (cf. 
flute-playing). There are two important elements embedded in these two questions. 
The first is the question of whether Alcibiades wants to learn or not. In the Protagoras 
section above, we learned that inculcated education brings about an element of force 
and punishment, and we will learn later that Alcibiades left his teachers early.28 As 
                                                          
28 In Protagoras this is hinted upon. Socrates tells that Pericles was afraid that Alcibiades should 
corrupt his younger brother Cleinias, so Pericles wanted to keep the two brothers apart and placed 
Alcibiades in Ariphon’s family so he could be educated there (cf. 320a-b).  
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Alcibiades confirms that he has not learned anything unwillingly, he confirms that he 
in no way is willing to respond to things he does not appreciate. This indicates that he 
did not respond to inculcation, and this Socrates had recognized a long time ago. 
Secondly, Alcibiades also confirms that he has never tried to work things out (ζητεῖν) 
by himself—that is, he has never tried to find the sources for what he claims to know. 
Socrates attempts to change this. He continues probing and wonders if there was a 
time when he did not think he knew what he now understands. Alcibiades believes that 
there must have been (cf. 106e). 
After they have agreed on the summary of Alcibiades education, Socrates asks if 
he intends to give the Athenians advice about correct writing (ὀρθῶς γράφοιεν, 
107a2). Or could it be that Alcibiades is considering the notes of the lyre? Wrestling? 
Building? Divination? Socrates’ guessing does not lead anywhere, so Alcibiades 
reveals his intentions and states that he will advise the Athenians “about war (πολέμου, 
107d4), or about peace (εἰρήνης107d4), or about other concerns of the state (πόλεως 
πραγμάτον, 107d5).” He intends to give advice on whom the Athenians ought to make 
peace with and whom they ought to wage war on, and how they should do it. But “if 
they ought to go to war with those against whom it is better (βέλτιον, 107d9) to go to 
war […] when is it better […] and is it for long better?” What does the term “better” 
mean? The line of questing that Socrates now develops is interesting because it shows 
that Alcibiades at the outset does not understand much, and he does not seem to be 
very keen on expanding his knowledge. However, due to Socrates’ patient work, he 
gradually gets a grip on it, and he also starts to enjoy it. Therefore, I will work my way 
through these passages.  
8.2.3 Alcibiades awakens  
Socrates first presents some analogies (wrestling, playing the lyre) for Alcibiades to 
consider. Rather quickly it is revealed that Alcibiades is not able to answer anything 
satisfactory. Hence, Socrates tries another approach. Alcibiades is now confronted by 
the following: “Since you used the term ‘better’ in both cases—wrestling and in 
playing the lyre while singing—what do you call what’s better in lyre-playing, as I call 
what’s better in wrestling ‘athletic’? What do you call that?” (108b1-5). As Alcibiades 
does not get it, Socrates urges him to try to follow his example, and stresses: “My 
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answer was, I think, ‘what is correct (ὀρθῶς) in every case’—and what is correct, I 
presume, is what takes place in accordance with the skill, isn’t it?” (1096-9). The skill 
was athletics, and what was better in wrestling was “athletic,” so “tell me what the 
skill is for singing and dancing and playing the lyre correctly. What is it called as a 
whole? Aren’t you able to tell me yet?” (108c6-9). Alcibiades is not. Socrates now 
tries to make him see the problem from another perspective: “Who are the goddesses 
to whom the skill belongs?” (108c11). Alcibiades guesses the Muses, and Socrates 
then asks the name of the skill that is named after them. Alcibiades suggests it is 
music, which is the correct answer. Now, they are almost there. He just has to consider 
one more thing: “[…] what is ‘correctly’ for what takes place in accordance with this 
skill? In the other case, I told you what ‘correctly’ is for what takes place in 
accordance with the skill, so now it’s your turn to say something similar in this case. 
How does it take place” (108d4-7)? Alcibiades suggests that it takes place musically, 
which also is the correct answer.  
They now return to the question of war and peace. “[…] what do you call what’s 
better in both going to war and keeping the peace? In the last two examples, you said 
that what was better was more musical and more athletic, respectively. Now, try to tell 
me what’s better in this case, too” (108d9-e3). Alcibiades is not able to. Socrates 
presents food as the third analogy and points out that Alcibiades could have answered 
healthier or tastier—hence he implicitly points out that a variety of answers is possible. 
Syse (2006, 294) calls Alcibiades’ effort so far disappointing and argues that there 
could be two reasons for this: Either he does not know what to say, or he is thinking of 
an answer but is not sure that Socrates would accept it. I think both suggestions are 
reasonable, and I add a third. As I suggested above, Alcibiades had learned by 
inculcation; he was trained in giving correct answers when confronted with questions. 
However, by Socrates’ proceedings, he must reason himself, or he must start to 
hypothesize, and this has not been part of his former training. Socrates is trying to 
make him infer from the singular to the universal, and this distinction is not merely a 
grammatical one; it is also a fundamental philosophical (or metaphysical) one. Thus, a 
speculative inference on my part will be that Alcibiades, who is trained only to 
concentrate on correctness in language and hence give correct answers, is now 
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challenged by Socrates to use his general knowledge as a basis for further reasoning. 
That is, Socrates is trying to make Alcibiades start to philosophize. Alcibiades also 
showed that he was not able to apply the same method on different examples even 
when this method was thoroughly explained, and the use of it was applied in three 
ways. I think this supports my assumption. These proceedings are both imperative for 
the kind of training Socrates proposes, and the question now is whether his patient 
mode holds. 
As Alcibiades did not manage to solve any of the questions laid before him, 
Socrates tries to appeal to him. Alcibiades must realize that when he intends to give 
advice on what is better than something else, and it turns out that he does not know 
what the term “better” means, his argumentation will be embarrassing, and that is 
shameful (αἰσχύνῃ, 109a2). Maybe the factual appealing to embarrassment and shame 
will serve as a wake-up call, and Alcibiades will realize that, if this happens, it is a 
result of his own doing. So, Socrates now urges him to “think about it, and try to tell 
me what the better tends toward, in keeping the peace or in waging war with the right 
people” (109a4-6). Alcibiades states that he is thinking, but he cannot get it. “But 
suppose we’re at war with somebody—surely you know what treatment we accuse 
each other of when we enter into a war, and what we call it” (109a8-b1). This is a new 
starting point, and once again, Socrates begins with something Alcibiades supposedly 
knows. Socrates’ mentioning of the accusations brought forth before entering a war 
alludes to Homer and the quest for the just cause of war. According to Raaflaub (2011, 
2), such a quest is “probably as old as the history of warfare” and that “such efforts 
also offer a long and sad story of futility and propagandistic deception.” The origin of 
the Trojan War was the love-story of Alexandros (Paris) and Helen (wife of Menelaus 
from Sparta) that resulted in Helen leaving her husband and child and following 
Alexandros to Troy. We learn that the Greeks sent off ambassadors to Troy. They 
demanded Helen’s return and some sort of compensation. Homer does not mention 
that they threatened with war if their demands were refused, but Raaflaub reasons that 
there is no doubt they did (cf. ibid, 5). Alexandros talked the matter over with Helen 
who did not want to return to Sparta; when her decision was passed on to the Trojan 
assembly, they sided with the couple, and king Priam promised to protect them. When 
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the Greeks understood that their effort to achieve a peaceful settlement of this conflict 
failed, they assembled and went to war. The Greeks were now fighting for a just cause 
that “guaranteed divine support and justified hope for victory” (ibid). This way is a 
pattern29 that also applies to the Peloponnesian War.  
If Alcibiades knew his Homer, he also knew this. However, I do not suppose he 
did.30 In his answer to Socrates, it rather seems that he is referring to contemporary 
discussions, and back on track he now states that he knows what the enemies are 
accused of before entering war: “[…] we say that they’re playing some trick on us or 
attacking us or taking things away from us” (109b2-3). Alcibiades’s answer is 
according to the contemporary pattern, where the first step before waging war was for 
the city to accuse its enemy affront, so Socrates takes hold on Alcibiades’ answer and 
urges him to go on, “Hold on—how do we suffer from each other of these treatments? 
Try to tell me how one way differs from another way” (109b4-5). In his question, 
Socrates first implies that there are various ways to insult proposed enemies, that is, to 
construct enemies, but Alcibiades does not give any examples on that. Instead, he 
responds to the second part: “When you say ‘way,’ Socrates, do you mean ‘justly’ or 
‘unjustly’?” (109b6-7)—and this is precisely what Socrates meant. According to 
Alcibiades, this makes all the difference in the world. “Really?” Socrates replies. 
“Who will you advise the Athenians to wage war on? Those who are treating us 
unjustly or those who are treating us justly?” (109b10-11). Alcibiades has now proven 
himself able to partake in an investigation; instead of just answering, “I don’t know,” 
he now first complains and, then reflects: “That’s a hard question you’re asking. Even 
if someone thought it was necessary to wage war on people who were treating us 
justly, he wouldn’t admit it” (109c1-3). This answer is telling with regard to justice 
and injustice because it is relatively clear that Alcibiades understands these concepts 
                                                          
29 On these kinds of discussions and negotiations, see Raaflaub (1997, 3-8).  
30 This inference is done due to a little piece of information found in the Phaedrus. In their discussion 
on rhetoric, Socrates asks if Phaedrus has heard of “the rhetorical treatises of Nestor and Odysseus—
those they wrote in their spare time in Troy […]” (261b8-9). Phaedrus answers: “No, by Zeus, I 
haven’t heard of Nestor’s—unless by Nestor you mean Gorgias, and by Odysseus, Thrasymachus […]” 
(261c1-2). This implies that the names of the great heroes from Homer are now used as references to 
the great rhetors and sophists. This is a reduction which implies that the authorities of the poets as 
teachers, are fading conventions, cf. Cephalus and the way he advocated the poetic topos, and also 
the three generations we met in the Republic.     
303 
 
according to contemporary conventions.31 Hence, the one who will wage war on 
someone who is thought to treat us unjustly, he would not admit it but pretend to have 
a just cause. But that is unlawful, and it will not be considered a proper thing to do, 
Socrates points out. Alcibiades agrees. The one imperative element set forth so far is 
that an advice on waging war or protecting peace must, one way or the other, be 
related to justice. So, when asked if these are the terms that will frame Alcibiades’ 
future speech, he admits that this is what he has to do.  
Socrates returns to the question of what is “better.” Maybe Alcibiades is more 
able now? Socrates ponders, “Then this ‘better’ I was asking you about—when it 
comes to waging war or not, on whom to wage war on whom not to, and when and 
when not32—this ‘better’ turns out to be the same as ‘more just,’ doesn’t it” (109c9-
11)? This last concluding remark is a puzzle, and Alcibiades recognizes it—“it 
certainly seems so,” he states. But how could it be something that is ‘more just’ or 
‘less just’?33 “Don’t you realize that this is something you don’t understand” (109d1)? 
Even if Alcibiades argues that he had known about justice from childhood on, Socrates 
argues that this is something that cannot be known without a thorough investigation. 
As Alcibiades now, quite half-heartedly, admits that if he is to give the Athenians 
advice on whether they ought to wage war or make peace, he must know justice. But 
does he? This they set out to investigate.  
8.2.4 What Alcibiades has learned 
Not long gone, Socrates gets Alcibiades to question the knowledge of his former 
teachers: “But aren’t you giving credit to teachers of this sort who, as you yourself 
                                                          
31 How these concepts are received, we have learned from Thrasymachus and Glaucon in the 
Republic, and from Protagoras’ outlining of the same theme.  
32 In this Socratic line of reasoning, Syse (2006, 293) makes some interesting observations: “First, we 
are reminded of the need to give advice when the city deliberates about whom to make war against 
and whom to remain (or become) at peace with—what much later in the tradition becomes the ad 
bellum question; and second, Socrates points out that the manner in which war is fought and peace 
is made must also be discussed—this corresponds more closely to what we today know ad in bello 
reasoning.” 
33 At this point, Socrates continues by saying: “Or perhaps, when I wasn’t looking, you’ve been seeing 
some teacher who taught you how to tell the difference between the more just and the less just. 
Have you? […] Well, who is he? Tell me who he is so that you can sign me up with him as well” 




admit, have no knowledge” (112d5-6)? Alcibiades agrees that he does, but he has a 
hard time understanding that by answering Socrates’ questions the answers come from 
within himself. “[…] given that your opinion wavers so much, and given that you 
obviously neither found it out yourself nor learned it from anyone else, how likely is it 
that you know anything about justice and injustice” (112d8-10)? Alcibiades responds 
that “from what you say, it’s not very likely.” This marks a turning point because, 
during the following discussion (112d-114e), Alcibiades gradually starts to see the 
point. When challenged to consider whether just things are advantageous, he says that 
“I’d better answer—I don’t think I’ll come to any harm (βλαβήσεσθαι, 114e10-11).” I 
suggest that at this point Alcibiades signals that he starts to free himself from his 
inculcated knowledge, and hence, he is more alive (or awakened) when he answers. 
From here on through the first half of the dialogue, Socrates leads Alcibiades to 
conclude (and understand) that the problem of war and peace is related to justice in an 
imperative manner. Their next major theme is the relation between body and soul. 
Alcibiades strives hard to accept that it is the soul—not the body—that is at stake, and 
that care for the soul is the most important business of all.34 By this, we pick up on the 
opening lines of the dialogue.  
 “Now, if there were someone who loved Alcibiades’ body, he would love 
something that belonged to Alcibiades. […] But someone who loved you would love 
your soul” (131c4-8), Socrates claims and, by this statement he is underling the first 
words he uttered. “Do you remember when I first spoke to you […] and that you were 
just about to say something: you wanted to ask me why I was the only one who hadn’t 
given up on you” (131e6-8, cf. 104c-d). Socrates now gives Alcibiades the reason why 
and, a warning: 
 
Well, this is the reason: I was your only lover—the others were only lovers of 
what you had. While your possessions are passing their prime, you are just 
beginning to bloom. I shall never forsake you now, never, unless the Athenian 
people make you corrupt and ugly. And that is my greatest fear, that a lover of the 
common people might corrupt you, for many Athenian gentlemen have suffered 
that fate already. ‘The people of great-hearted Erechtheus’ might look attractive 
                                                          
34 This alludes to the Republic and the upending of the conventional thought “gymnastic for the body, 
music for the soul,” cf. chapter 5: Founding cities making (ποιοῦομεν) guardians, section 5.4.3: The 
path toward excellent models, pp. 184-88. 
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on the outside, but you need to scrutinize them in their nakedness, so take 
precaution (131e10-132a7). 
 
The precaution for Alcibiades ought to be first to get into training and to learn what he 
needs to know before entering politics. This training and learning will give him an 
antidote against the terrible dangers (cf. 132b1-3). Alcibiades promises to do so. 
However, as we have learned, he did not.  
8.2.5 Alcibiades’ swan song  
The ambitious Alcibiades allowed himself to be corrupted by fame and might. So, 
when sixteen dramatic years later, he enters the Symposium and delivers a speech in 
which he praises Socrates, it turns out that Socrates does want to speak with him. This 
little passage is noticeable. The drunk and cheerful Alcibiades laid his eyes on 
Socrates and pronounced: “Good lord, what’s going on here? It’s Socrates! You’ve 
trapped me again! You always do this to me—all of a sudden you’ll turn up out of 
nowhere where I least expect you” (213b8-c2). Socrates’ reaction on Alcibiades’ 
entrance is to address Agathon and beg protection from him, the “fierceness of his 
passion terrifies me,” Socrates says. It is Alcibiades who explains the problem. He had 
heard many great orators, including Pericles, and admired their speeches. Alcibiades 
complains: “they never upset me so deeply that my very own soul started protesting 
that my life—my life!—was no better than the most miserable slave’s” (215e4-6). This 
means that Socrates’ proceedings had an effect on Alcibiades, but still, he did not 
choose the path of philosophy. Why is that? He explains himself, and because this is 
the only place in the corpus that we are given this kind of confession, I quote it in 
length. 
 
Socrates is the only man in the world who has made me feel shame—ah, you 
didn’t think I had it in me, did you? […] I know perfectly well that I can’t prove 
him wrong when he tells me what I should do; yet, the moment I leave his side, I 
go back to my old ways: I cave into my desire to please the crowd. My whole life 
has become one constant effort to escape from him and keep away, but when I see 
him, I feel deeply ashamed, because I’m doing nothing about my way of life, 
though I have already agreed with him that I should. Sometimes, believe me, I 
think I would be happier if he were dead. And yet I know that if he dies I’ll be 
even more miserable. I can’t live with him, and I can’t live without him. What can 




The lesson learned, from Alcibiades’ point of view, is that Socrates’ conversations 
with him had an impact. Everything was in harmony when he accompanied Socrates, 
but when left alone, he fell back into old habits. Nevertheless, Alcibiades gained 
insight, and he experienced that Socrates’ advices were accurate, but still, he preferred 
the tributes from the crowd. He acknowledges that being a celebrated commander is 
not the measure of being a harmonious man. He admits that he is doing nothing to 
change his life as he and Socrates agreed upon. The result is that he feels ashamed.  
When Socrates asked Agathon for protection, his request can indicate that 
Alcibiades is one of the students Socrates is prohibited by his inner daimon to take 
back after they have left him (cf. Theaetetus, 150e). Some students are allowed back 
more than once, but at one point the divine sign (δαιμόνιον) forbids him to associate 
with them any further (cf. Theaetetus, 151a).35 As Alcibiades did not have the 
discipline to contemplate on his own, the philosopher finally rejected him. The 
paradox of this situation is that when the future city wonders what to do with 
Alcibiades, Alcibiades wonders what to do with Socrates.  
8.3. Charmides: Beauty on stage 
Socrates had been away for nearly three years, together with Alcibiades, on the 
campaign at Potidaea. Nails (2002, 311) underlines that “[w]hat started out as an 
invading army, became a besieging army, then a defeated army, before its return” to 
Athens in 429. The day after his return, Socrates sought out his “accustomed haunts 
with special pleasure” (153a3). He went straight to the palaestra of Taureas. At his 
arrival, he was greeted warmly by his old friend Chaerephon who had heard that “the 
fighting was very heavy and many of our friends were killed” (153c1-2). He wants to 
know how Socrates had experienced it all. Socrates took his seat, greeted Critias and 
the rest, and told them what they wanted to hear. When Socrates’ story was done, he 
wanted to know about the “affairs at home, about the present state of philosophy and 
about the young men, whether there were any who had become distinguished for 
wisdom or beauty or both” (153d4-6).  
                                                          
35 Cf. Introduction, section 3.2: The midwife at work, pp. 23-6. 
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8.3.1 The entrance of Beauty 
Critias is very eager to tell about Charmides whom Socrates knew of. We have already 
learned that Socrates met him in Callias’ house around three dramatic years prior. 
Charmides was then fourteen years old and partook in the second flank dancing around 
Protagoras. Critias describes Charmides as the most beautiful youth ever. Socrates is at 
ease because everyone at Charmides’ age strikes him as beautiful (cf. 154b). When 
Charmides came, his calmness disappears. The narrator reports that … 
 
… at that moment Charmides came in he seemed to me to be amazing in stature 
an appearance, and everyone there looked to me to be in love with him, they were 
so astonished and confused by his entrance, and many other lovers followed in his 
train. That men of my age should have been affected this way was natural enough, 
but I noticed that even the small boys fixed their eyes upon him and no one of 
them, not even the littlest, looked at anyone else, but all gazed at him as if he were 
a statue (ἄγαλμα, 154c1-9).   
 
The narrator’s description of the men’s reaction to Charmides’ entrance is both 
intriguing and telling. The word ἄγαλμα means more than a mere statue; it also 
denotes a statue in honor of a god.36 Thus, it alludes to Phaedrus and the passage 
where Socrates, some eight to thirteen dramatic years later, will describe to Phaedrus 
what happens when gazing upon beauty:  
 
[…] first he shudders and a fear comes over him like those he felt at the earlier 
time; then he gazes at him with the reverence due a god, and if he weren’t afraid 
people would think him completely mad, he’d even sacrifice to his boy as if he 
were the image of a god (ἀγάλματι). Once he has looked at him, his chill gives 
way to sweating and a high fever, because the stream of beauty that pours into 
him through his eyes warms him up and waters the growth of his wings 
(Phaedrus, 251a2-b1).  
 
This could very well be a description of what happened to Socrates when he first laid 
eyes on Charmides. Charmides also fits the description from the Phaedrus. When 
Chaerephon asks Socrates what he thinks, the response is that Charmides’ face is 
extraordinary. “But if he were willing to strip, […] you would hardly notice his face, 
his body is so perfect” (154d3-4), Chaerephon adds. Maybe Socrates finds these 
ovations a little over the top because he swears and states: “By Heracles, you are 
describing a man without equal” ((154d6), whereupon he wonders if Charmides also 
                                                          
36 Cf. Liddle and Scott.  
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has a well-formed soul. Critias confirms that Charmides is also distinguished in that 
respect. Not only is he a philosopher,37 but many also hold him to be quite a poet. The 
question now is how Socrates can be suitably introduced to this youth. It turns out that 
yesterday Charmides had complained about a returning morning headache, so maybe 
Socrates could pretend to have a remedy.38 Socrates goes along, if that what it takes. It 
worked, and Charmides came and sat down between Socrates and Critias. What 
happened is worth a closer look: 
 
And then, my friend, I really was in difficulties, and although I had thought it 
would be perfectly easy to talk to him, I found my previous brash confidence quite 
gone. And when his full gaze upon me in a manner beyond description and 
seemed on the point of asking a question, and when everyone on the palaestra 
surged all around us in a circle, my noble friend, I saw inside his cloak and caught 
on fire and was quite beside myself. And it occurred to me that Cydias was the 
wisest love poet when he gave someone advice on the subject of beautiful boys 
and said the ‘the fawn should beware lest, while taking a look at the lion, he 
should provide part of the lion’s dinner,’ because I felt as if I had been snapped up 
by such a creature. All the same, when he asked me if I knew the headache 
remedy, I managed somehow to answer that I did (155c5-e1).    
 
In this description, the narrator is addressing an anonymous noble friend twice, and 
again, as a reader, I again get the notion of being eavesdropping. It is as if the 
description of this upsetting reaction was meant for the friend only. We are told that 
Socrates lost his initial confidence, he was paralyzed by Charmides’ gaze, and when 
he got sight of Charmides perfect body by an accidental glimpse inside his cloak—he 
caught on fire and was quite beside himself. It is easy to understand that he barely 
managed to talk. The narrator continues and tells that Charmides was led to believe 
that the remedy “was a certain leaf and that there was a charm to go with it. If one sang 
the charm while applying the leaf, the remedy would bring about a complete cure, but 
without the charm the leaf was useless” (155e4-7). Charmides allegedly believes this; 
he even asks if he can—with Socrates’ permission—write down the charm at his 
                                                          
37 Critias’ enthusiasm alludes to Theodorus’ when he describes the Eleatic Stranger as a philosopher 
in the opening lines of the Sophist.  
38 This “remedy” that Socrates now is about to pretend to have, alludes to the “useful lie” proposed 
in the Republic.  
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direction (cf. 156a).39 Socrates goes on by describing the nature of the charm. It is not 
able to cure the head alone. He refers to the good doctors who always “plan a regime 
for the whole body with the idea of treating and curing the part along with the whole” 
(156c4-6).40 Charmides confirms that he has heard of this principle, and he accepts it. 
The narrator tells that when Socrates heard this approval, his former confidence, little 
by little, was revived—he began to wake him up (ἀνεζωπυρούμην, 156d2-3). What 
happened here, and what is Socrates doing? 
First, he found himself seduced by Charmides’ beauty. This was such an 
upsetting experience that he had to tell it—in detail—to a friend.41 The description of 
this experience resembles the one Socrates is to explain to Phaedrus; when gazing 
upon bodily Beauty of Charmides’ kind, one is blinded and somehow lead into a 
trance. However, Socrates was able to awake himself, that is, he was able to rekindle 
his soul gradually. This alludes to the Republic (527d-e) when Socrates explains to a 
rather skeptical Glaucon that one must trust the studies proposed in the curriculum for 
the philosophic education. Through these studies, a certain instrument of everyone’s 
soul is purified and rekindled (ἀναζωπυρεῖται). This instrument is destroyed and 
blinded by other practices, but it is only by this instrument that the truth is seen. This 
entails that when the specific studies rekindle the soul, a philosopher so educated is 
able to rekindle himself over and over again, hence, light up his soul over and over 
again. I think that it is such an experience we have witnessed in the encounter between 
Socrates and Charmides. Secondly, it seems like Socrates has an easy match when it 
comes to persuading Charmides with regard to the remedy, or the charm. However, 
this is not necessarily so. Charmides has a strong effect on people, regardless age, as 
we learned from the narrator’s description of his entrance. Moreover, Critias, his proud 
guardian, is a friend of Socrates who, according to Charmides, appears to be quite a 
celebrity; he tells that Socrates is “no small topic of conversation among us boys” 
                                                          
39 That Charmides wants to write down the charm to remember it correctly, indicates that he is 
trained by an inculcating teacher, cf. Protagoras’ teachings.  
40 This alludes to the Republic and the path leading to health, hence to the healer-politician Asclepius, 
cf. p. 186. That Socrates claims to have heard of this remedy from a Thracian, points to the hero 
Deloptes who was a “Thracian Asclepius,” cf. p. 57-8n34. 
41 After the upsetting encounter with Protagoras, Socrates also needed to tell of his experiences to a 
friend, cf. the Protagoras, 310a. 
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(156a5). These elements may indicate that Charmides is flattered and excited by 
receiving Socrates’ full attention on this particular day. It is, after all, Socrates’ 
reunion with his friends after a long absence. Due to this, it is possible that Charmides 
is not lured but determined to show himself in company with a celebrity, and hence, he 
plays along. If this is the case, then Charmides fits the description of a man being 
easily bewitched. That is, he belongs to those who change their opinions either 
because they are charmed by pleasure or terrified by some fear (cf. Republic 413c). I 
think this is the case, and it will be confirmed as we read a little further. Thirdly, in the 
heat of the moment, Socrates agrees to lie to make conversation with this beautiful 
youth. It is noteworthy that after Socrates rekindled himself, or gained control, he also 
left the lie behind. He does not pretend to be a doctor anymore. Now, he argues that he 
learned it from a Thracian doctor of Zalmoxis when he was away in the army. This 
doctor belonged to a tradition that could make men immortal. Most diseases are 
beyond the Greek doctors because they do not pay attention to the whole, Socrates 
claims. They do not understand that “the soul is the source both of bodily health and 
bodily disease for the whole man, and there flow from the soul in the same way that 
the eyes are affected by the head” (156e7-157a1). So, Socrates insists that it is of most 
importance to cure the soul if the bodily parts are to be healthy. He even states that the 
Thracian doctor had urged him not to let “anyone persuade me to treat his head with 
this remedy who does not first submit his soul to you for treatment with the charm” 
(157b1-5). So, how is the soul to be treated? Socrates tells that the soul “is cured by 
means of certain charms, and these charms consist of beautiful words. It is a result of 
such words that temperance (σωφροσύνην) arises in the soul, and when the soul 
acquires and possesses temperance; it is easy to provide health both for the head and 
for the rest of the body” (157a4-b1). The question is now whether Charmides is 
willing to submit his soul first to be charmed with the Thracian charm, and then apply 
the remedy to his head.  
Charmides is not permitted to answer because Critias interrupts rather vulgarly. It 
does not seem to me that he understood what Socrates was suggesting. Hence, he also 
starts to fit the description of a bewitched man (cf. Republic, 413c1-3). “The headache 
will turn out to have been a lucky thing for the young man, Socrates, if, because of his 
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head, he will be forced to improve his wits (διάνοιαν)” (157c6-d1). He is 
acknowledging that Charmides can improve his reasoning, and that is a sound 
reflection. Nevertheless, he next reveals that he at this point is not preoccupied with 
what is best on behalf of Charmides. His occupation is to convince Socrates that 
Charmides is the best. He “not only outstrips his contemporaries in beauty of form but 
also in this very thing for which you say you have a charm” (157d2-3). What was it 
Socrates had a charm for? It was temperance, was it not, he must ask Socrates. When 
Socrates confirms that it was temperance, Critias replies, “Then you must know that 
not only does he have the reputation of being the most temperate young man of the 
day, but that he is second to none in everything else appropriate to his age” (157d4-
7).42 What are we to infer from this? I understand it at this point to be an overdone 
boasting on behalf of Charmides and, maybe Socrates also suspects it is so.  
Socrates response is to state that the reason why Charmides is superior to anyone 
else is that he descends from two prominent Athenian aristocratic families. By the 
description of Charmides’ linage, which also included Critias’—Socrates has flattered 
them both, and he can return to his task. The situation now, according to Socrates, is 
that “if temperance is already present in you, as Critias asserts, and if you are 
sufficiently temperate, you have no need of the charms […] and you may have the 
remedy for the head straightaway” (158b5-c1). If Charmides finds that he lacks these 
things, he must be charmed before he is given the remedy. Hence, Socrates challenges 
him, “Do you agree with your friend and assert that you already partake sufficiently of 
temperance (σωφροσύνης, 158c4), or would you say that you are lacking it?” The 
narrator now tells that at first Charmides blushed (ἀνερυθριάσας, 158c5) and looked 
more beautiful than ever, and that his bashfulness was becoming at his age. Charmides 
blushing is of another kind than the one Hippocrates experienced. When Hippocrates 
blushed, it was a result of an instant insight; Charmides’ blushing indicates rather that 
he is placed in an awkward situation. The narrator reports that this was how Charmides 
responded. He said it was not easy for him, in the present circumstances, either to 
                                                          
42 Critias’ ongoing defense of Charmides alludes to the way Theodorus defended the Eleatic Stranger; 
neither Critias nor Theodorus quite know what they are defending.  
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agree or to disagree with what had been asked. But, the narrator tells, Charmides 
answered in a way that was quite dignified when he said … 
 
… if I should deny that I am temperate, it would not only seem an odd (ἄτοπον) 
thing to say about oneself, but I could at the same time make Critias here a liar, 
and so with many other to whom, by his account, I appear to be temperate. But if, 
on the other hand, I should agree and should praise myself, perhaps that would 
appear distasteful. So, I do not know what I am to answer (158d1-6).  
 
 
Now Socrates starts to investigate whether there is a beautiful soul hiding within this 
beautiful body. 
8.3.2 Shallow beauty 
“What you say appears to me to be reasonable, and I think we ought to investigate 
(σκεπτέον, 158e1) together whether you do or do not possess the thing I am inquiring 
about […] If this is agreeable to you, I would like to investigate the question with you, 
but if not, we can give it up” (158d6-e4). Charmides would like this above all things, 
and he allows Socrates to “go ahead and investigate the matter in whatever way you 
think best” (158e5-6). Socrates proposes a method (σκέψις, 158e8). If temperance is 
present in him, Socrates supposes that Charmides has some opinion about it. 
Moreover, if the case is that it recedes in him, it necessarily provides a sense of its 
present. From these presumptions, Charmides is asked to form an opinion on that he 
has it and of what sort it is (158e7-159a4).  
8.3.2.1 The opinion of the many 
Charmides is now challenged to probe within, but he is very reluctant. Therefore, 
Socrates tries to appeal, “Well, then, since you know how to speak Greek […] I 
suppose you could express this impression of yours in just the way it strikes you” 
(159a5-6). Perhaps, Charmides replies. Socrates now tries to plead, “Well, help us 
decide whether it resides in you or not, say what, in your opinion, temperance is” 
(159a7-b1). Now, the narrator informs us that he was rather unwilling to answer. 
Finally, “he said that in his opinion temperance was doing everything in an orderly and 
quiet way—things like walking in the streets, and talking, and doing everything else in 
a similar fashion” (159b-5). From this, Charmides infers that “taking it all together, 
that what you ask about is a sort of quietness.” (159b5-6). Socrates acts surprisingly 
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patient when he signposts that this is an opinion of the many for “at least they say […] 
that the quiet are temperate” (159b7). They must see if this opinion could be right. 
Charmides is asked to consider whether temperance is an admirable thing. This he 
confirms immediately. After having performed an elenchus on him (159c2-160b2), 
they agree that temperance is not a sort of quietness. The reason why, Socrates 
explains, is that “both in soul and body, we think that quickness and speed are more 
admirable than slowness and quietness” (160b3-5). Socrates suggests that they start 
again, and this time he urges Charmides to “look into yourself” (σεαυτὸν ἐμβλέψας, 
160d6) with greater concentration.  
8.3.2.2 The opinion of Homer 
Socrates tells him that after he has looked into himself, he shall decide what effect the 
presence of temperance has upon him and also state what sort of thing it must be in 
order to have this effect. Finally, he shall put all this together and tell clearly and 
bravely, what temperance, in his opinion, appears to be (cf. 160d6-e1). Maybe the 
narrator signals irony when he tells that Charmides paused and looked into himself 
very manfully (ἀνδρικῶς, 160e2). The tension of irony is indicated when I imagine 
this young man, not sure what to think or answer, pretends and tries to look like he is 
making a mature effort to do this introspection. It is possible I am wrong, but for me, 
that comment had an ironic and, hence, comic ring to it. When finished with this 
exercise, Charmides says, “Well, temperance seems to me to make people ashamed 
and bashful, and so I think modesty (αἰδὼς) must be what temperance is” (160e1-4). 
Socrates is not satisfied with that answer, and with reference to what has been said so 
far, he reminds Charmides that they already agreed that temperance was a good and 
admirable thing. Charmides now admits that he agrees with Homer when he said that 
“modesty (αἰδὼς) is not a good mate for a needy man” (161a3). From that concession, 
Socrates infers that modesty, it seems, both is and is not good. Thus, it is not 
compatible with temperance. Charmides is quick to give in and asks if Socrates can 






8.3.2.3 The opinion of Critias 
Charmides explains that he suddenly remembered having heard someone say that 
“temperance is minding one’s own business” (161b3-4). He wants Socrates’ opinion 
on this definition, and he also wants to know if Socrates thinks the person who said it 
was right. Socrates immediately recognizes this definition and proclaims, “You wretch 
(ὦ μιαρέ), you’ve picked this up from Critias or some other wise man” (161b6-c1). 
Critias instantly responds, “I guess it was from some other […] because it was 
certainly not from me” (161c2). Socrates is not—at this point—very keen to explore 
the originator of the definition; the main issue “is not who said it, but whether is true 
or not” (161c5). “Now you speak correctly” (νῦν ὀρθῶς λέγεις, 161c6), Charmides 
replies, whereupon Socrates suggests that “[…] if we succeed in finding out what it 
means, I should not be surprised, because it seems to be a sort of riddle (αἰνίγματι)” 
(161c7-8).  
This minor word exchange is telling on at least two textual levels. First, when 
Socrates addresses Charmides, he uses the word μιαρέ (μιαρός). This means defiled, 
polluted, and in a moral sense it means abominable, foul.43 Hence, Socrates’ reaction 
to Charmides’ request points to Critias whom Socrates now suspects to have polluted 
his protégé. When Socrates states that the issue is whether the proposed definition is 
true or not, Charmides compliments Socrates by the concluding words “you speak 
correctly.” This indicates that he wants to witness a Socratic investigation, and (I 
think) such an undertaking would be even more pleasing for Charmides as he is the 
one staging the whole enterprise. Surely, he has heard rumors of these proceedings, 
and he once observed—from distance—the grand debate between Socrates and 
Protagoras. Further, the word μιαρέ alludes to the Apology. When Socrates comments 
on the charge against him, he argues that his fellow citizens claim that “That man 
Socrates is a pestilential fellow (μιαρώτατος, 23c9) who corrupts the young.” Hence, 
the accusation Socrates sets forth toward Charmides backlashes thirty dramatic years 
later. Secondly, Socrates claims that the author of the definition may have presented a 
riddle (αἰνίγματι). The word αἰνίγματι means dark saying or riddle. Critias will soon 
                                                          
43 Cf. Liddle and Scott. In Republic 562d accursed oligarchs (μιαρούς τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχικούς); this term is 
frequent in Aristophanes, cf. Adam, note on Rep. 562d.  
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use this meaning of the word when he, through his argumentation, refers to the Oracle 
of Delphi. However, it also alludes to the Apology, this time to Meletus who Socrates 
states “is like one who composed a riddle (αἴνιγμα) and is trying it out […]” (27a1). 
Hence, the accusation Socrates sets forth toward Critias also backlashes thirty dramatic 
years later. These two instances make me suggest a third connection toward the 
Apology. This suggestion is related to the old rumors, but before I get into that, we 
need to return to the text and read a little bit further. 
Through a short elenchus, Socrates demonstrates for Charmides that temperance 
cannot mean “minding your own business,” and he subsequently shows that the man 
who stated this apparently had been riddling, because, Socrates says, “I don’t suppose 
he was quite so simpleminded (εὐήθης, 162b1), or had he heard it from a silly fellow? 
No, on the contrary, Charmides apprehended him to be very wise. “Then I think he 
must certainly have tossed off a riddle since it is difficult to know what in the world 
this ‘minding your own business’ can be” (162b3-5). We, the readers, know that this is 
the way Socrates defined justice in the Republic, but is Charmides able to figure it out? 
“I’m at a total loss,” he says, “but perhaps the one who said it didn’t know what he 
meant either” (162b6-8). When Charmides uttered this, he gave a sly laugh (ὑπεγέλα, 
162b9) and looked at Critias.  
The narrator now takes the floor and tells that Critias had for some time been at 
unease because he was eager to impress Charmides and the rest who were there. He 
had held himself in with difficulty earlier, but now he could no longer do so. It is the 
narrator’s opinion that by now he was convinced that Charmides had picked up the 
definition of temperance from Critias. However, he explains that when Charmides 
gave in and stated he was in total loss, he intentionally tried to provoke Critias—as the 
author of the definition—to take over the argument. Critias, on the other hand, did not 
like this and seemed to be angry with Charmides. So, he gave him a look and said, “Do 
you suppose, Charmides, that just because you don’t understand what in the world the 
man meant who said that temperance was ‘minding your own business,’ the man 
himself doesn’t understand either?” (162d3-6). 
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8.3.3 Investigation and the Socratic topos  
Socrates defends Charmides and responds rather rudely, “Well, my dear Critias, there 
would be nothing remarkable in his being ignorant (ἀγνοεῖν, 162e1) of the matter at 
his age, but you, because of your age and experience, are very likely to understand it.” 
It is remarkable that no one addresses the elephant in the room. The three men on stage 
now perform a false game of pretending. As Charmides was lured by Socrates and 
Critias to approach them, now Critias is lured by Socrates and Charmides. Charmides 
gave Critias away by a sly laugh and a gaze, we were told by the narrator that Critias 
was the author, but Critias believes that all believe that Charmides had heard the 
definition by someone else. This is the situation when Socrates addresses Critias and 
suggests, “if you agree that temperance is what the man said it was and take over the 
argument, I would be very happy to investigate (σκοποίμην, 162e4-5) with you the 
question whether what was said is true or not.” Critias gives his consent, and Socrates 
compliments him, “I admire you for that,” he says. 
After Critias deepened his understanding of temperance as “minding your own 
business,” Socrates means to have identified the problem: Critias’ failure was not to 
distinguish between making (ποιεῖν) and doing (πράττειν)—he called them the same 
thing. With reference to Hesiod and many other men of sense, Critias tries to prove 
Socrates wrong. However, because Socrates had heard “Prodicus’ discourse on the 
distinction in words a hundred times” (163d4), he understood the first part of Critias’ 
explanation, but not the last part. Critias now refers to the inscription at Delphi and 
claims that “know thyself” is a riddle that means “be temperate.” Surely Socrates does 
not disagree in that temperance is to know oneself? Throughout Critias’ speech 
(164c6-165b4), we can detect a tone that becomes gradually more and more polemic—
and I take it that it is this tone Socrates addresses when he replies and awakes the 
Socratic topos,  
 
But Critias, […] you are talking to me as though I professed to know the answers 
to my own questions and as though I could agree with you if I really whished. 
This is not the case—rather, because of my own ignorance, I am continually 
investigating in your company whatever is put forward. However, if I think it 





Critias gives him time to consider. When done, Socrates presents an assumption with a 
twist compared with Critias’ reference to the Delphic imperative, “[…] Well, if 
knowing (γιγνώσκειν) is what temperance is, then it clearly must be some sort of 
science (ἐπιστήμη) and, must be of something, isn’t that so?” From the distinction 
“knowing” and “science” he creates some analogies for Critias to reflect on. For 
instance, medicine is the science of health, and it produces health; housebuilding is the 
science of building houses, and it produces houses, what is temperance the science of 
and what does it produce? Critias is not able to answer. Instead, he presents a 
counterclaim and stresses that Socrates is trying to refute him and ignoring the real 
question at issue (cf. 166c5). I think Critias has a point, but Socrates ignores it, and 
once again he activates the Socratic topos,  
 
Oh come, how could you possibly think that even if I were to refute everything 
you say, I would be doing it for any other reasons than the one I would give for a 
thorough investigation of my own statements—the fear of unconsciously thinking 
I know something when I do not. And this is what I claim to be doing now, 
examining the argument for my own sake primarily, but perhaps also for the sake 
of my friends. Or don’t you believe it to be for the common good, or for that of 
most men, that the state of each existing thing should become clear? (166c6-d6) 
 
From this statement, we understand that Socrates possesses a groundbreaking fear of 
unconsciously thinking that he knows something that he does not know. This fear is 
the prime mover when he engages himself in an investigation, and hence, the 
investigations he sets in motion is primarily for his own sake. He also has the benefit 
of his friends in mind, but in this particular instance—is his concern related to Critias 
or Charmides? Critias has polluted Charmides, but will Charmides be able to learn 
anything substantial as an observer? Why does Socrates not pursue and make him 
probe into himself—as he did with Hippocrates and Alcibiades? Charmides was asked 
three times to perform this inner probing, but the only thing he did was to remember 
sayings on temperance that he had heard from others. Does this mean that Socrates has 
given up on him and thus chooses to confront the one responsible for the definition? I 
think the latter is the most probable. This preliminary conclusion points toward the 
third allusion to the Apology and the old rumors Socrates refers to in his defense. 
There Socrates explains how he gained enemies through his investigations. The men 
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questioned got angry with him, and the by-standing youngsters were amused. I take it 
that this situation—Charmides versus Critias—is an example of how the old rumors 
set off. Thus, we are about to witness how the politician is exposed in front of the 
crowd. 
8.3.4 Critias and Socrates on stage  
It takes courage to admit that maybe the entire body of what one thinks to know, is not 
to know at all. Therefore, Socrates starts with an appeal and asks Critias to be bold. He 
must answer the questions as the argument develops, and not pay so much attention to 
who is being refuted or not, “Give your attention to the argument itself to see what the 
result of its refutation will be” (166e2-3). For Socrates and the bystanders to be on the 
right track, Critias is asked to remind them what he earlier said that temperance was. 
Critias states that temperance is “the only science that is both a science of itself and the 
other sciences” (166e6-7). He follows Socrates’ appeal and through the discussion (cf. 
166e-169b) they follow the argument without digression and work their way into an 
aporia. This is a difficult situation, so Socrates summarizes, whereupon he asks Critias 
to clarify some elements before they can conclude: “Do you then […] since the 
definition of temperance as the science of science and, more especially, of the absence 
of science belongs to you, first clear up this point, that what I just mentioned is 
possible and then, after having shown its possibility, go on to show that it is useful. 
And so, perhaps, you will satisfy me that you are right about what temperance is” 
(169b5-c2). We do not learn what Critias answered to this demand, because the 
narrator again takes the floor. 
He declares that when Critias heard this and recognized that Socrates was in 
difficulties (ἀποροῦντα, 169c3), he seemed to be affected by Socrates’ troubles and it 
further looked like he was seized by them. However, Critias does not have the courage 
to admit that he was incapable of dealing with the question posed, the narrator tells 
because his consistently high reputation made him feel ashamed in the eyes of the 
company. Critias said nothing clear. Instead he concealed his predicament. 
Nevertheless, Socrates wanted the argument to go forward. He therefore suggested that 
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the question whether the existence of a science of science is possible44 was an issue 
they could investigate on some other occasion. At this point, it seems like Socrates 
rescues Critias from an awkward situation, but he does not cut him loose. Before he 
again introduces the problematic question, he encourages Critias to view the initial 
distinction “knowing oneself” versus “temperance” from another perspective, “Come 
then […] is it possible to know what one knows and does not know? We did say, I 
think, that knowing oneself and being temperate consisted in this?” (169d2-8). This, 
Critias tries to explain, but Socrates is still at loss. “It is not this point on which I am 
confused, that whenever someone possesses this thing which knows itself, he will 
know himself, but how the person possessing it will necessarily know what he knows 
and what he does not know” (169e6-8). Critias claims that these elements are the same 
thing. Socrates is not content. Perhaps Critias is right, but—Socrates states, “I’m in 
danger of being as confused as ever, because I still don’t understand how knowing 
what one knows and does not know is the same thing as knowledge of self” (170a1-4). 
Critias now admits that he does not understand what Socrates means; hence, Socrates 
reintroduces the question of the possibility to claim that temperance is a science of 
science. Through an elenchus and, by using the same analogies as above, Socrates 
manages to complete the first part of refuting Critias’ definition of temperance. He 
launches medicine and politics as two distinct sciences. This is unproblematic. The 
problem arises as they are “concerned with science pure and simple” (170b3), because 
the person who lacks knowledge of the science of health and justice but knows science 
only (i.e., temperance)—and sees that this is the only knowledge he has—is it not 
likely that he knows that he knows something? But “how will he know whatever he 
knows by means of this science? Because he will know the healthy by medicine, but 
not by temperance, and the harmonious by music, but not by temperance, and 
housebuilding by that art, not by medicine […]” (170b9-c4). Further, if temperance is 
merely a science of science, how will this person know the healthy, or housebuilding? 
Hence, the man ignorant of these additional sciences will not know what he knows; 
only that he knows (cf. 170c6-7). This gives way for the following conclusion: “This 
                                                          
44 The problem of a science of science—or an art of art—Socrates also discussed with Thrasymachus, 
cf. Republic, 342b ff. 
320 
 
would not be being temperate and would not be temperance: to know what one knows 
and does not know, but only that one knows and does not know—or so it seems” 
(170d1-3). Critias agrees to this.  
During the second part of Socrates’ refutation (170d-172d), Critias does not 
oppose Socrates’ proposals. Nevertheless, Socrates is not content because “what we 
were saying just now, about temperance being regarded as of great benefit (if it were 
like this) in the governing of households and cities, does not seem to me, Critias, to 
have been well said” (172d3-6). Critias does not understand where they failed. The 
failure was that they “carelessly agreed that it would be a great good for men if each of 
us should perform the things he knows and should hand over what he does not know to 
those others who do” (172d6-9). From my perspective, it would have been a paradox if 
Socrates had not commented upon this careless agreement. However, Critias was 
convinced that they had agreed and signals confusion for the first time, “You certainly 
say some queer things (ἄτοπα λέγεις), Socrates” (172e2). Socrates admits this atopos 
speaking—an admission that is yet another allusion to the Apology—where we will 
learn that the philosopher’s words and deeds are apprehended this way by the many.  
When Socrates now proceeds, we recognize the philosopher at work. Strange 
things come to light if such an investigation is not correctly conducted, and this is 
exactly what he feared at the outset (cf. 166c). The problem now, according to 
Socrates, is that, so far, the investigation has demonstrated that no one benefits from 
temperance; at least this is what it looks like to the philosopher for the time being. 
Critias does not quite get it, and maybe he senses that Charmides is at loss too. 
Therefore, he appeals to Socrates, “Tell me, so that we can both understand what you 
are saying” (173a1-2). Socrates’ response to this appeal is an indirect hint toward the 
topos of philosophy and the importance of soul-caring. He states, “I think I am making 
a fool of myself (ληρεῖν με) […] but all the same, it is necessary to investigate what 
occurs to us and not to proceed at random, if we are going to have the least care for 
ourselves” (173a2-5). Critias agrees. Socrates’ next move is to prepare the final 
refutation. He invites Critias to listen to his dream in order “to see whether it comes 
through horn or through ivory” (173a6-7). If they find it coming through horn it is 
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true; if it comes through ivory, it is deceitful.45 Socrates presents his dream (173b-d), 
but the following discussion does not lead to a solution. On the contrary, the 
investigation failed, and after having stated the reasons why (175b-c), Socrates 
concludes that “there could be nothing more irrational than this” (175c6-7). Their 
investigation has not discovered the truth. According to the philosopher, it made fun of 
the truth in that it exposed temperance as useless. Therefore, Socrates is not so much 
vexed on his account as he is on Charmides.’  
8.3.5 Charmides’ future education 
Socrates now addresses Charmides, “I am very vexed indeed, if, with such a body and, 
also, a most temperate soul, you should derive no benefit from this temperance nor 
should it be of any use to you in this present life” (175d6-e2). He is even more vexed 
regarding the Thracian charm if it also should turn out to be useless and of no worth. 
He does not believe that temperance is useless, though, hence, he again appeals to the 
young man, “see whether you do have it and are in no need of the charm—because if 
you do have it, my advice to you would rather be to regard me as a babbler, incapable 
of finding out anything whatsoever by means of argument, and yourself as being 
exactly as happy as you are temperate” (176a1-4). What are we to make of this appeal? 
Charmides has observed the conversation between Socrates and Critias. He had 
listened to all the arguments, and he had heard Socrates explain where and why the 
investigation failed. Therefore, after this demonstration, he is better equipped and 
ought to be able to start his inner probing. If he, after this contemplative work, 
concludes that he possesses temperance, he is in no need of the charm and can view 
Socrates as a babbler. In this case, he will find himself to be in harmony; as happy as 
he is temperate. What happens next? Charmides once again argues that he does not 
know if he has temperance, whereupon he asks how he would know the nature of a 
thing when neither Socrates nor Critias were able to discover it (cf. 176a6-8). He adds 
that he does not really believe what Socrates said. Nevertheless, he says, “I think I am 
very much in need of the charm, and as far as I am concerned, I am willing to be 
charmed by you every day until you say I have had enough” (176b1-3). It is Critias, 
                                                          




not Socrates, who responds to this. Critias applauds Charmides’ answer and states that 
if he submits himself to Socrates’ charm, Critias will be convinced that he is 
temperate. Charmides concludes that this is a course to follow; he would be acting 
badly if he fails to obey his guardian who instructs him to listen to Socrates. Without 
discussing the matter with Socrates, they decide between themselves that Socrates is 
going to be Charmides’ teacher. When Socrates asks if they are going to use force and 
not give him “a preliminary hearing,” Charmides confirms that they will force him. 
However, this is not the way it works.  
Viewed from my perspective, I have witnessed the demiurge at work. First, he 
tried three times over to make Charmides think for himself whether he possessed 
temperance. Charmides was not able to. Instead, he referred to what others (the many, 
Homer, Critias) had said about the issue. This entails that the demiurge could not 
perform his procedure, that is, he could not set the false opinions in movement and 
help Charmides to hold on to the true ones. When Charmides’ last suggestion was 
recognized by Socrates, Socrates turned to Critias who denied being the originator of 
the definition. Socrates did not give him away; instead, he tried to discuss the matter. 
Because Critias’ occupation was to uphold his reputation and impress Charmides and 
the bystanders, the demiurge’s work was cut off. Hence, the discussion led nowhere, 
and this made Socrates conclude that the investigation failed. Viewed from the 
philosopher’s perspective, Critias—the guardian and mentor—was on his way to 
corrupt Charmides. Charmides, on the other hand, showed no intention to change his 
course. He was satisfied to receive inculcations, and that was also what he expected 
from Socrates. This implies that Charmides was barren and without the will to take on 
the inner probing, he had no need of Socratic guidance. From these indications, I think 
it is reasonable to conclude that Charmides belongs to the group of young men which 
Socrates declined.46 In addition, Critias proclaimed that Charmides was both 
philosophic and temperate. When it now has been revealed that he was neither, this 
demonstrates that Critias was ignorant. In this regard, he is a manifestation of those 
men who claimed to know philosophy, and hence, gave Socrates and philosophy a 
                                                          
46 Cf. chapter 1: Preparing the stage, section 1.2 The participants of the Republic, p. 52, and Niceratus 
whose father Nicias more than once asked Socrates to be engaged in Niceratus’ education, but 
Socrates always suggested other teachers. 
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fabricated and false reputation.47 The result of this was later picked up by Aristophanes 
and manifested in the comedy Clouds (424), as Socrates hints toward in the Apology 
when he describes the old rumors. 
8.4 Summary 
Regarding the main theme of this chapter—saving youths—I have presented three 
young men whom we meet at the outset of the corpus. What happened to Hippocrates 
we do not know because he is not mentioned later. However, it is possible to speculate. 
As the Protagoras is bracketed with the words “arriving” and “leaving,” the 
interesting question is who Socrates left with. Through the opening scenes, we witness 
two arrivals. First, Socrates arrives and meets his anonymous friend; second, 
Hippocrates arrives and knocks at Socrates’ door. When Socrates’ last word in the 
dialogue is “we left,” a consistent speculation would be that he left with Hippocrates 
because this closes the circle created by the movement and happenings enclosed 
between arriving and leaving. If this holds, then Socrates made Hippocrates turn 
toward philosophy and, thus, saved the nephew of Pericles from the sophistic 
teachings. Alcibiades, another nephew of Pericles, also turned toward philosophy. 
However, he was not sufficiently disciplined to take on the burden of learning. He was 
keen when he enjoined Socrates’ company, but when left alone, he was not able to 
uphold the training and rid his old habits. I think Alcibiades is an example of the 
young men who left, came back, and left again until Socrates declined him. Charmides 
was a lost case at the outset due to Critias. They were both barren, and neither of them 
showed signs of being able or willing to take on the work that fosters change. Hence, I 
think they were both declined by Socrates. Critias ended up as a member and leader of 
the Thirty in 404/03. According to Nails (2002, 110), Critias “appeared to have been 
one of the extreme members and personally to have plotted some if its most 
reprehensible measures: murders, confiscation, banishments, [and] mass execution of 
the citizen population of Eleusis.” He was killed at Munychia in battle with the 
returning democratic forces of Thrasybulus in May of 403. Charmides followed his 
                                                          
47 Cf. the discussion in the Republic (A4, 490c ff.) on philosophers and non-philosophers.  
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mentor and became one of the ten who were chosen by the Thirty to govern the 





















                                                          
48 Cf. Nails (2002, 92). She underlines that it is a common mistake in the literature to mistake 
Charmides for being a member of the Thirty; on Charmides, see pp. 90-4. 
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Chapter 9: The Eleatic stranger: A turning point 
 
When we now are about to be introduced to the Eleatic Stranger, we arrive at quite a 
different time and we will experience quite a different atmosphere. The dramatic 
dating is 399. The Peloponnesian War is over; the Athenians have lived through stasis 
and the gruesome rule of the Thirty, and started the restauration of democracy.  
Yesterday, after his conversation with Theaetetus, Socrates left in a hurry and, went to 
the King’s Poarch to meet the indictment brought against him by Meletus (cf. 
Theaetetus, 210d). Today, when he meets his friends again, Theodorus has invited the 
Eleatic Stranger to come along. I apprehend the Eleatic Stranger to be a confusing 
character; hence I launch “confusion” as a theme. Moreover, this theme expands also 
outside the text. First, it is detectable within the history of the dialogue’s reception,1 
                                                          
This chapter was first presented as a paper at International Symposium: Poetry and Philosophy in 
Light of Plato´s Sophist, University of Bergen (14-16 May 2013). I want to thank Professor Vigdis 
Songe-Møller for substantial and valuable feedback. I am also grateful to Professor Hayden Ausland, 
Professor Hallvard Fossheim, ass. Professor Kristin Sampson, and ass. Professor Knut Ågotnes for 
highly appreciated comments.     
 
1 This confusion is sort of manifested within the reception of the dialogue, and becomes visible when 
we ask what the Sophist is all about. The early grammarians assigned it to Plato’s logical 
investigations. The Neo-Platonists prized it for a theory of ontological categories they preferred to 
Aristotle’s. Modern scholars sometimes court paradox and refer to the Sophist as Plato’s dialogue on 
not-being (because the question of not-being occupies much of the dialogue). Whitehead (1933) 
took the Sophist to be primarily about ‘power’ (δύνμις) and found in it many of the central ideas of 
process theology. Cornford (1935) argued that the Sophist is mainly about truth and falsehood. Both 
Ackrill (1957) and Frede (1967) claimed that the Sophist was about predication. Rosen (1983) treated 
it as a metaphysico-aesthetic dialogue: in his view it was about the relation of images to originals. 
Frede (1996) argues that the Sophist reveals the difference between the sophist and the true 
philosopher through their use of aporia. The aporia of the Sophist are used constructively, to help us 
get clear on the subject. Notomi (2007, 1) argues that the issues discussed are “so problematic and 
so important in the history of philosophy that philosophers have hardly ever asked what problem the 
Sophist really confronts […] they have taken the ‘problems’ for granted.” Most readers isolate 
particular parts and thus ignore the context; but according to Notomi “the whole context alone can 
fix the meaning Plato originally gave to each particular issue, and present us with living problems of 
philosophy” (ibid, p. 9).  Brown (2010, 170) concludes that the Sophist has revealed to the reader a 
great deal about the contrast between the approach and interests of the sophist, but it has “done so 
not by producing a definition-by-division of the sophist that is intended to be correct; it leaves open 
the question how high Plato’s hopes were for the method if used on a more promising subject-
matter than sophistry.” Ambuel (2007, 4) argues that the Sophist is an “examination of Eleaticism 
and sophistry” and that the dialogue is “systematically ambiguous, it invokes a method that it does 
not correctly follow. If so, then the dialogue ties, rather than unties, a philosophical knot: it is 
aporetic,” (ibid, p. 11). Zuckert (2000, 97) addresses the differences between the philosopher and the 
sophist revealed in the Sophist, and concludes that “If philosophy consists in knowledge—either of 
the whole or merely of self—by the end of this dialogue, we see, neither Socrates nor the Stranger is 
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and secondly, it is supported through the two opposing manuscripts which I return to 
below. Thus, how are readers to understand the main speaker of the Sophist? Who is 
he? Or, what is he? For many decades it has been commonly assumed that the Eleatic 
Stranger simply speaks for Plato,2 a consensus about to dissolve.3 For example, Seth 
Benardete (1993, 750) argues that “in the first half of the Sophist, the Stranger presents 
himself as a hunter of the hunter sophist […] and the Stranger is himself the model for 
the sophist.” At the outset of his reading, Howland (1998a, 189) claims that the 
Stranger “imitates the sophist in cloaking his method in the appearance of knowledge.” 
Later, he “faults the Stranger, ultimately, for employing this quasi-mathematical 
method in a ridiculously rigid manner and for neglecting Socratic concerns with Eros 
and the human soul.”4 Victorino Tejera (1999, 201) and (1978a) does not talk of the 
Stranger at all, but of the Elean Sophist; and further, he also identifies the Stranger as a 
sophist in the Statesman and accuses him for fabricating clever arguments in a pseudo-
Socratic manner (1978b). Benitez (1996, 37) reaches the conclusion that “it appears as 
though the Eleatic ξένος is a sophist. If he is Plato’s mouthpiece, then Plato is a 
sophist.” So, who is the Stranger? Plato’s mouthpiece, thus a philosopher, a model for 
the sophist, an imitator of the sophist, or is he a sophist?  
Following this introductory backdrop, my aim in this chapter is to show that in 
the Sophist, the Stranger appears as a sophist. I will state reasons for this argument 
through a two-step-reading. First, the reading of the prologue intends to divulge the 
setting which the upcoming drama evolves from. Secondly, I will perform a close 
reading of the paradigm division and the upcoming three divisions. The paradigm 
division—modelled on the angler—is presented by the Stranger as the method that will 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
a philosopher. If philosophy consists merely in the search for wisdom, Socrates and the Stranger 
represent different routes, each able to give an account of some of the relevant phenomena, neither 
able to give an account of the whole.” By examining the Stranger’s methodology in contrast to that 
of Socrates in the Theaetetus, McCoy (2008, 139) argues that the Sophist and Theaetetus as “a pair 
demonstrate that the philosopher-sophist contrast is relative to the way in which one constructs a 
positive understanding of philosophy,” and concludes that ”while the Stranger defines sophistry in 
such a way that he would separate his own activity from that of the sophists, the drama of the 
dialogue suggests that Socrates would not consider the Stranger to be a philosopher.”  
2 Some examples on scholars employing and defending mouthpiece-theories: Friedländer (1929-30), 
Whitehead (1933), Cornford (1935), Ackrill (1957), Vlastos (1991). 
3 Some examples on scholars questioning the mouthpiece-theory: Rosen (1983), Benitez (1992), 
Howland (1998a), Tejera (1999), Gonzalez (1995a). 
4 Summarized by Zuckert (2000, 95n74). 
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enable him and Theaetetus to hunt down the sophist. The slow reading of the 
upcoming three divisions will reveal how the proposed method is gradually 
abandoned. So by paying attention to what the Stranger is actually doing, I suggest that 
due to discrepancies between deeds and words,5 he himself slowly but surely starts to 
look like a hunting sophist, and consequently Theaetetus starts to appear as the 
hunter’s prey. The impact of this unhurried turnabout is progressively dawning on the 
reader. The hunting method camouflages a hunting metaphor which conceals a 
threefold hunt: as a reader I start hunting the Stranger in order to grasp who he is or 
what he is; Theaetetus believes he is hunting the hunter sophist, while the Stranger, in 
a deceptive hunt—as a last resort—is hunting Theaetetus. So, let us enter the prologue. 
9.1 The Prologue (216a1-217b9) 
As stated earlier, the prologue of a dialogue is always significant because it sets the 
stage by presenting the characters and, hence, the theme of the dialogue is revealed.6  
The prologue of the Sophist is rich and gives the readers several hints and clues 
regarding the identity of the Stranger. Practically before starting to read, we are 
presented to an ambiguity due to two manuscripts which give us two versions of the 
opening lines stated by Theodorus, one manuscript read,  
 
Socrates, […] we’re bringing a Stranger, he’s from Elea and he’s a companion 
(ἑταῖρον) of the group who gather around Parmenides and Zeno […]7  
 
and the other, 
 Socrates, […] we’re also bringing this Stranger who comes from Elea, but he’s 
different from (ἕτερον) the group who gather around Parmenides and Zeno […]8  
 
                                                          
5 Cf. Howland (1998a, 173): “Plato leaves no doubt that the Sophist cannot be understood without 
attention to what the Stranger shows of himself in his deeds as well as what he says in argument.” I 
agree with Howland when he argues that the Stranger’s deeds and arguments ought to be central 
issues when reading the Sophist, but our readings do not reach the same conclusion.  
6 On the importance of the prologues of the dialogues, see Gonzalez (2003, 16). On the importance of 
establishing the “dramatic setting” and “place” of the dialogues, see especially Hyland (1994) and 
(1995). 
7 Codex Oxoniensis Clarkianus 39 - 895 AD; this manuscript is widely used and defended, and 
commonly used by commentators and scholars.  
8 Vindobonensis 21 (saec. XIV); this manuscript is strongly defended by Nestor-Luis Corderos, Le 
Sophiste, (Paris, Flammarion, 1993), and Emilsson (2004, 231-47). 
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These two versions of the opening-lines hold quite different allegations as the first 
states that the Stranger is a companion (ἑταῖρον) of those who gather around 
Parmenides and Zeno, and the second that he is different (ἕτερον) from them. The first 
gives reason to view him as a philosopher belonging to a philosophical tradition, the 
latter does not. Together this creates a puzzle which I choose to leave undiscussed at 
this point, however, I bear it in mind and will conclude after the reading.    
When introducing the newcomer to Socrates, Theodorus9 sets the atmosphere of 
the prologue by his excited and enthusiastic mode. Theodorus appears delighted when 
he points out that the visitor “is very much a philosopher (μάλα δὲ ἄνδρα φιλόσοφον, 
216a4).” Socrates’ reaction to Theodorus’ delight is noteworthy. Maybe, by his 
response, Socrates’ intention is to tone down Theodorus’ eagerness, and thus 
neutralize the situation: “Are you bringing a Stranger, Theodorus? Or are you bringing 
a god without realizing it instead, like the ones Homer mentions? He says gods 
accompany people who are respectful and just” (216a5-b1). Here we identify a dual 
Homeric allusion, both related to Zeus, the god who protects all travelers. The first can 
be taken simply as an appeal to treat all visitors respectfully (cf. Odyssey, 9: 269-71). 
The second transports us to a particular situation at the end of the Odyssey: after 
Antinous knocks down the still unrecognized Ulysses who at this point is disguised 
like a tramp, he receives a negative reaction from the others present:  
 
Antinous, you did ill in striking that poor wretch of a tramp: it will be worse for 
you if he should turn out to be some god – and we know the gods go about 
disguised in all sorts of ways as people from foreign countries, and travel about 
the world to see who does the right things (Odyssey, 17: 483-7).  
 
                                                          
9 Theodorus is a teacher of mathematics; he had known Protagoras and the Heraclitenas (Theaetetus 
161c, 164c, 179e-180c); he might therefore be expected to have developed some convincing mixture 
of geometry and the partitive sophistic of his friends. And, Theodorus does not give general cases by 
dividing oblong from square numbers; instead he proves individual cases (Theaetetus 147d) and 
furthermore, at 165a Theodorus confesses he turned too early from dialectic to geometry, and at 
180c he hopes to analyze the problems of universal motion as if they were purely geometrical, thus 
he is unable correctly to apply his mathematics to the concrete philosophical situation, cf. Plochmann 
(1954, 226). Theodorus takes on the same role in the prologue of the Theaetetus when he very eager 




This can be interpreted at least in two ways. First, it could be read as a warning from 
Socrates to Theodorus. It is as if Socrates is asking Theodorus: Are you sure you know 
who the Stranger is? Or, are you sure that the Stranger is what he appears to be? 
Secondly, it can be taken as an ambiguous clue for the readers toward the Stranger; a 
clue which is underscored twice by Socrates. First, when he questions Theodorus’ 
judgment by indicating that he has brought “a god without realizing it,” and thereafter 
when he states rather ironically: “Your Stranger might be a greater power following 
along with you, a sort of god of refutation to keep watch on us and show how bad we 
are at speaking—and to refute (ἐλεγκτικός) us” (216b7-8). The ironic underlining hits 
the reader when Socrates is connecting the Stranger and “a god of refutation.” In 
Socrates’ first reply to Theodorus, the dual Homeric allusion was identified as pointing 
toward Zeus, but this second reply points toward quite another direction: here he 
alludes to Hermes. Hermes, the god of transitions and boundaries, quick and cunning, 
who moves freely between the worlds of the mortals and the gods, a protector and 
patron of travelers, orators and wit, invention and trade, and more. But he is also a 
trickster and outwits others for his own satisfaction. The impact of Socrates’ two 
replies indicates that he, through these allusions and ironic outbursts, somehow 
suggests that he recognizes the Stranger, that he has met his kind before: He is a man 
reminiscent of a sophist, quick, cunning, sort of a trickster. Theodorus does not agree: 
“That is not our Stranger’s style (τρόπος), he is more moderate (μετριώτερος) than 
those who are eager to debate (ἔριδας), or do combat with words” (216b7-8). 
Theodorus quickly adds that he does not hold the Stranger to be a god, but he is 
divine—as Theodorus holds all philosophers to be. The ones “eager to debate” points 
to the new breed of sophists,10 but if one is more moderate than them does it follow 
that one is a philosopher? Theodorus seems to think so, but it looks like Socrates 
disagrees when he claims that the “family” (γένος, 216c3) of philosophers is as 
difficult to distinguish as the family of the gods. This, he explains, is because the 
“genuine philosophers (ὄντως φιλόσοφοι, 216c6),” by contrast to the fake ones, take 
on all sorts of different appearances due to the ignorance of people. Is Socrates, by 
these comments, implying that Theodorus is ignorant, or is this a hint related to the 
                                                          
10 By “a new breed of sophists” I mean for example the two brothers we meet in the Euthydemus. 
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purported recognition of the Stranger? Or does he signal both? At this point I want to 
recapitulate for a moment and look into the prologue of the Theaetetus.   
Theodorus signaled the same enthusiasm when he tried to arrange a meeting 
between Theaetetus11 and Socrates. In their initial talk, Socrates complimented 
Theaetetus and said: “For although Theodorus often gives me flattering testimonials 
for people, both Athenians and foreigners (ξένους), I assure you I have never before 
heard him praise anybody in the way he has just praised you” (149b6-9). Theaetetus 
suspected this was uttered as a joke, but Socrates assured him it was not. “That is not 
Theodorus’ way,” he says. Theodorus’ “way” translates τρόπος which in this context 
relates to the ordinary ethical meaning “character” or “temper,” thus, it looks like 
Socrates knows Theodorus better than Theaetetus knows him. When Theodorus, in the 
prologue of the Sophist, is echoing Socrates’ words, it gives the impression that 
Theodorus knows the Stranger better than Socrates does. But we know Socrates’ way 
from various dialogues, and according to that knowledge, is the meaning of the words 
uttered by Socrates in the Theaetetus transferable to the words uttered by Theodorus in 
the Sophist? I think not. Socrates recognizes the words uttered, and he also recognizes 
a certain kind of man (as suggested above). By repeating Socrates’ words, Theodorus 
appears to be an imitator of sorts, but the imitation backlashes. The impact is that the 
enthusiastic Theodorus does not know the Stranger as well as Socrates knows 
Theodorus.  
As we know, Theodorus is not a philosopher but a well-known expert in 
geometry, and it seems reasonable to infer that Socrates does not look upon him as a 
person who is able to tell the difference between a genuine philosopher and a fake one. 
However, Theodorus’ rather vague differentiation between “philosophers” and “the 
ones eager to debate”— that the former are more moderate than the latter—points to 
the Euthydemus, where the two brothers from Thurii are presented as men “eager to 
debate or do combats with words.” They practice the art of eristic, which literally 
means “designed for wrangling.” No matter how one attempts to refute eristic 
                                                          
11 Theaetetus is a student of mathematics and he knows some Eleatic doctrines. Theodorus is his 
teacher. The emphasizing of Theaetetus’ geometrical training is significant because—implicitly—he is 
presented as a person filling the qualifications of the Republic’s superior students (cf. Republic, 485b-
487a, 503a ff.), pointed out by Plochmann (1954, 226). 
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arguments, the argument is designed so that any means of refutation will fail. When 
Socrates is describing the expertise of the two brothers to his friend Crito, he says, 
 
They are both absolutely all-round fighters […]. These two are first of all 
completely skilled in body, being highly adept at fighting in armor and able to 
teach this skill to anyone else who pays them a fee; and then they are the ones best 
to fight the battle of the law court and to teach other people both how to deliver 
and how to compose the sort of speeches suitable for the courts […] not a single 
man can stand up to them, they have become so skilled in fighting in arguments 
and refuting whatever may be said, no matter whether it is true or false […].They 
can make any other person clever at the same things in a short time (Euthydemus, 
271c8-272b4).  
 
Could this be the kind that the Stranger differs from, according to Theodorus? And 
could this be the kind of man Socrates purportedly recognizes? Before concluding, let 
us read the last section of the prologue. 
After Socrates stated that the “family” (γένος, 216c3) of philosophers is as 
difficult to distinguish as the family of the gods, he proclaimed that he would like the 
Stranger to explain what the people from his hometown thinks about the difference 
between the sophist, statesman, and philosopher. Theodorus quickly interrupts: “What, 
or what kind of thing, especially makes you consider asking the question? What 
special problem about them do you have in mind?” (217a4-5). How are we to 
understand this interruption? Theodorus knows Socrates’ way, so is he anxious and 
concerned that Socrates will make the Stranger uncomfortable? Socrates elaborates, 
“[…] did they think that sophists, statesman, and philosophers make up one kind or 
two? Or did they divide them up in three kinds corresponding to the three names and 
attach one name to each of them?” (217a6-8). Socrates’ elucidating explanation makes 
Theodorus at ease, “I don’t think it would offend him to tell us about it. Or would it, 
sir?” The Stranger does not have any objection, and agrees to communicate what 
Socrates requested. The enthusiastic Theodorus’ last utterance in the Sophist is telling, 
“Luckily, Socrates, you’ve gotten hold of words that are very much like the ones we 
happened to be asking him about. And he made the same excuse to us that he made to 
you just now—since he’s heard a lot about this issue, after all, and hasn’t forgotten it” 
(217b5-9). These words actually give further clues towards the identity of the Stranger. 
First, Theodorus comprehends the Stranger’s answer as an excuse. Secondly, 
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Theodorus says that the Stranger have told him that he had heard a good explanation 
which he still remembers. Both instances could suggest that the Stranger has nothing 
original to present and that he might be using a procedure which he once heard of and 
remembers. If Socrates at the outset recognized the Stranger’s kind, the posed question 
which he laid before him could be understood as a test or a sort of trap. That is, 
Socrates probably already knows what they used to think about these things in Elea 
(note that Socrates also asks about these things in past tense: what did they think? […] 
how did they divide […]). Socrates’ silence from this point forward also corresponds 
to this alleged recognition.12  
9.2 Paradigm for the hunting-method (218b6-219b7) 
The Stranger and Theaetetus have now decided that they will hunt down the sophist. 
As an introduction to the hunt, the Stranger presents a petition. Since it is “hard to hunt 
down and deal with the kind (γένος), sophist, we ought to practice our method 
(μέθοδον) of hunting on something easier first. […] Do you want us to focus on 
something trivial and try to use it as a model (παράδειγμα) for the more important 
issue?” (218d3-9). Theaetetus finds the suggestion of practicing the method on 
something easy, agreeable. The Stranger then recommends the angler as a fitting, 
trivial issue because he is recognizable to everybody, and not worth being too serious 
about (218e4).13 Theaetetus’ first task is to decide whether the angler is a kind of 
                                                          
12 The assumed Socratic recognition can perhaps also be warranted through the fact that it is 
Socrates who set forth the issue discussed in the Sophist. The argument may find support in Notomi 
(2007). Notomi argues that in the Sophist Plato addresses the problem philosophy versus sophistry in 
order to set forth the worth of philosophy, which I also think is a theme in the Protagoras. Notomi 
claims that “Plato found that, without serious criticism of the sophist, there could not be philosophy” 
(301). This fundamental distinction is the backdrop of Socrates’ upcoming trial. Thus, through the 
Stranger, Socrates seeks a defense against his Athenian accusers that can distinguish him from the 
teachings of the sophists. This last point is also made by Miller (1980, 2-11); Sallis (1996, 464), 
Gonzalez (2000, 163). And further, the difference between Socrates and the Stranger in this regard is, 
for example, commented on in detail by Rosen (1983, 20-8), and (1995, 2-4, 41-2, 50, 91, 154), 
Zuckert (2000, 97), and Gonzalez (2000, 168). 
13 The angler “not worth being too serious about,” is a theme touch upon in Book VII of the Laws; the 
Athenian Stranger sets out the rules for hunting – which he treats as the last part of paideia. His 
listing is reminiscent of the Stranger’s paradigm-division, except the items distinguished at, moves 
beyond, the fifth bifurcation (land-hunting and aquatic-hunting) in the upcoming paradigm-division. 
These items are, in the Laws, characterized as unworthy activities; and as such – the activities are not 
suitable for building the excellent character which the education in the Laws is aiming at; the 
practicing of enclosure- and strike-hunting are regarded as the most damaging undertakings. When 
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expert or not, “Tell me, shall we take him to be an expert (τεχνίτην) at something, or a 
non-expert (ἄτεχνον) with another sort of capacity?” (219a4-6). Quite confident, 
Theaetetus states that the angler is certainly not a non-expert. If so, the Stranger 
continues – what sort of expertise does he possess? He claims that “expertise (τεχνῶν) 
as a whole falls pretty much into two types,”14 the “art of production” (ποιητικὴν, 
219b11) and the “art of acquisition” (κτητικὴ, 219c6). Agreeing upon the main 
categories of expertise, the first conclusion is reached: the angler is a kind of expert 
placed within the “art of acquisition.” On this ground they work their way through the 
first division which is supposed to be a paradigm (παράδειγμα) for the method 
(μέθοδον) that eventually will enable them to hunt down the sophist. 














                                                                                                                                                                                     
formulating the prelude (προοίμια) to the law on hunting, the Athenian Stranger states that “we 
hope you’ll never be seized by a desire or passion to fish in the sea or to angle or indeed to hunt 
water animals at all; and don’t resort to creels, which a lazybones will leave to catch his prey whether 
he’s asleep or awake” (823e1-4); thus, the subject in the paradigm-division – the angler – performs 
an activity labeled as unworthy by the Athenian Stranger, but the Stranger of the Sophist claimed 
that the angler was chosen because his expertise is trivial, and “not worth being too serious about.” 
So, in this regard, the two Strangers in the Platonic corpus contradict each other.  
14 The phrase “two types” translates εἲδη δύο (219a8). 
Section 1: The manner of the art. 
 
Art of production ↔ Art of acquisition Cut 1: What kind of expertise? 
          
Exchange    Taking possession  Cut 2: Where does it unfold?  
          
Art of combat   Art of hunting   Cut 3: How is it executed? 
 
                Section 2: The object of the art.  
      
Without name   Art of animal-hunting  Cut 4: What kind of object? 
       
Land-hunting   Aquatic-hunting Cut 5: Where is the object hunted? 
          
Art of bird-catching  Art of fishing  Cut 6: How is the object hunted? 
 
                         Section 3: The means of the art.  
  
Enclosure-hunting  Art of strike-hunting Cut 7: What kind of means?  
       
Art of torching   Hooking  Cut 8: Where is the means used? 
       




When the division is done with, the Stranger presents the summary in accordance with 
the division’s succession, 
 
Within expertise as a whole one half was acquisitive (κτητικὸν); half of the 
acquisitive was taking possession (χειρωτικὸν); half of possession-taking was 
hunting (θηρευτικὸν); half of hunting was animal-hunting (ζῳοθηρικὸν); half of 
animal-hunting was aquatic hunting (ἐνυγροθηρικόν,); all of the lower portion of 
aquatic hunting was fishing (ἁλιευτικὸν); half of fishing was hunting by striking 
(πληκτικόν); and half of striking was hooking (ἀγκιστρευτικόν). And the part of 
hooking that involves a blow drawing a thing upward from underneath is called 
by a name that’s derived by its similarity to the action itself, that is, it’s called 
draw-fishing or angling—which is what we’re searching for (221b2-c3).  
 
Because the Stranger launched this division as a paradigm for the method, and because 
they both agreed upon using it for hunting down the sophist, it is worth examining its 
structure in depth. The paradigm-division falls into three sections, with three items in 
each section (cf. Benardete 1993, 758).15 The bifurcations of the three sections follow 
the same procedure and, thus establish a coherent pattern. In section 1 (cuts 1, 2, 3) 
they are dealing with the manner of the art, and the first question asked is, what kinds 
of expertise are there? When the Stranger performs cut 1, he claims that expertise 
(τεχνῶν) as a whole is usually divided into “art of acquisition” (κτητικὴ, 219c7) and 
“art of production” (ποιητικὴν, 219b11). Hence, at the outset he presents two main 
categories of expertise: production and acquisition. The dividing of the latter in cut 2 
answers to the question, where, or within which areas, does the expertise unfold? He 
explains that it unfolds within “exchange” which is mutually willing exchange through 
gifts; wages or purchase (219d6 f.) and by “taking possession,” which denotes 
expertise in taking possession; or bringing things into one’s possession by words or 
action/deed (219d7 f.). When he divides the latter in cut 3, the third question we pose 
is, how is the expertise executed? The Stranger elaborates: It is executed through the 
“art of combat” (ἀγωνιστικὴ, 219d12) which is conducted openly, and the “art of 
hunting” (θηρευτικὴ, 219e1) which is done secretly.  
In section 2 (cuts 4, 5, 6) the Stranger establishes the object of the art; and his 
point of departure in this section is the secretive “art of hunting” (cut 3). From this 
                                                          
15 Benardete (1993) suggests that the paradigm-division falls into three sections where the manner-, 
object- and mean of the art are described, respectively. I found this suggestion to be very useful and 
have developed it further. 
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outset we now can ask, what kind of object is hunted for? Through cut 4 we learn that 
there is one kind without a name (ἀνώνυμον, 220a2) where the hunter is pursuing 
lifeless things, opposed to animal-hunting (ζωοθηρικήν, 220a4-5) where the hunter is 
pursuing living things; thus the main object is animals alive. But where is the object 
hunted? First there is the land-hunting (πεζοθηρικόν, 220a9), the Stranger claims, 
where the hunter hunts animals with feet, opposed to aquatic-hunting (ἐνυγροθηρικόν, 
220a10) where the hunter hunts animals that swim; this is displayed in cut 5. He 
further divides the latter and, thus answers a new question, how is the object hunted 
down? Cut 6 shows that it is through the “art of bird-catching” (ὀρνιθευτική, 220b5) or 
the “art of fishing” (ἁλιετική, 220b7). 
In section 3 (cuts 7, 8, 9) the Stranger establishes the means employed to catch 
the prey hunted for; and thus answers to, what kinds of means are used in the hunt? 
The “art of fishing” (cut 6) is now the point of departure and when divided (cut 7) into 
“enclosure-hunting” (ἔρκεσιν, 220b12) and “strike-hunting” (πληκτικὴ, 220d1), two 
main categories are exhibited. First “enclosure-hunting” which denotes the kind-all 
that surrounds and encloses anything to prevent egress, such as twig baskets, casting 
nets, nooses, creels. Then “strike-hunting” which is practiced by a blow with hooks 
and three pronged spears. The latter is further divided (cut 8) into nighttime hunt 
which is done by the “art of torching” (πυρετικὴν, 220d7) and daytime hunt which is 
called “hooking” (ἀγκίστρευικόν) as a whole (220d10). This explains where the means 
are used, and when. Daytime hunt is further divided (cut 9), and the Stranger gives 
answer to the question, how are the means used? On one hand there is “spearing” 
(220d10), which is done by striking a spear downward from above; the spear strikes 
any parts of the prey’s body; on the other hand there is “angling” (220d10) which is 
done with hooks; they are striking the prey’s head and mouth and pulls it upwards 
from below. This is what they are searching for, the Stranger concludes. 
What is the Stranger doing here? Apparently, he is establishing a rather strict—
and to a certain point inflexible—method. But he also creates the ground for an 
interesting game which exposes a further part of the Stranger’s own identity. For 
instance, after having agreed upon cut 6 (“art of bird-catching” versus “art of fishing”), 
and when about to perform cut 7 (“enclosure-hunting” versus the “art of strike-
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hunting”), Theaetetus is asked if he has a better suggestion for the name “art of 
striking.” His reply in this is, “Let’s not worry about the name, that one will do 
(220d4).”16 The Stranger does not pay attention to the reply but continues and states, 
without being contradicted, that there actually is an “art of striking,” from which 
torching and hooking split off. According to Benardete (1993, 762; cf. Wallace 
2007)17 an “art (τέχνη) of striking” did not exist as such in the empirical world and, 
thus the Stranger at this point is “laying himself open to the charge of making 
phantoms of the real.” The point taken, it is reasonable to conclude that this is a kind 
of “phantom-making,” which is going on throughout the divisions, and especially in 
the upcoming “hunter-division” (221d7-223b7). In addition it is pointing toward the 
dialogue’s last definition which states that the sophist belongs to the ‘blood and 
family’ of “imitation of the contrary-speech-producing, insincere and unknowing sort, 
of the appearance-making kind of copy-making, the word-juggling part of production 
that’s marked off as human and not divine” (268c8-d3). Does the Stranger at this point 
fit his own description?   
Maybe, because long before the sophist is explicitly set in the class of image-
making, the Stranger himself already here appears to belong to ‘the word-juggling part 
of production,’ the kind who uses nets made up by imitation which he initially set in 
the “art of production” (ποιητικὴν, 219b11). As we shall see, the two main, originally 
mutually exclusive, categories of “expertise”—“art of production” and “art of 
acquisition”—are blurred in the later exchange-division (cf. 223b8-224d3), which in 
turn undermines the paradigmatic function of the imperative paradigm division. In 
other words, the Stranger’s “phantom-making” at this point might not be accidental, 
but rather a hint pointing to the game he is about to initiate; and, thus a sign for 
                                                          
16 This quest which Theaetetus did not respond upon, can be read as a clue towards the Stranger and 
his “phantom-arts” which he is about to create – and especially in regard to the “art of striking.” 
17 Benardete (1993, 758) states that the Stranger here “starts to duplicate the historical development 
of the ικὴ-suffix from being an ethnic to a skill.” That is, the discussion regarding “art” (τέχνη) going 
on in the fifth century denoted abilities such as “striking” related to hunt, an ability generally known; 
for example the knowledge of how to use a spear was a knowledge handed down from father to son 
(being an ethnic and an ability generally known), thus, not an “art” (τέχνη) which denotes an 
expertise, skill or a craft learned by a student from a master. The same instance we find if my father 
teaches me how to use a hammer and a spike, my father is teaching me a bit of general knowledge; 
but that kind of knowledge does not make me a carpenter (an expert within an art). 
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revealing his identity. Yet another element in this regard is his emphasizing on the 
movements concerning angling and spearing (cf. cut 9). Spearing is said to be done by 
striking downward from above and aims to strike any part of the prey’s body (cf. 
220e). Angling, on the other hand, is done with a hook, striking the prey’s head and 
mouth and pulling it upward from below (cf. 220e-221a). Also in the summary these 
movements are underlined. First, when pinpointing the nature of angling as a method 
which involves a blow and drawing a thing upward from underneath, stating that it is 
called by a name which is derived by its similarity to the action itself, and, secondly, 
when concluding that the procedure is “called draw-fishing or angling – which is what 
we’re searching for.” Why this triple underlining of movements? The movement of the 
draw-fishing-procedure (angling) is in accordance with the movement of the Socratic 
dialectical method as we know it from various dialogues: Socrates activates an upward 
movement, from the particular to the general.18 The Stranger, however, advocates a 
method involving the opposite movement—from the general to the particular.19 In 
other words: when the Stranger performed the paradigm dividing, he underlined the 
angling-procedure, but performed the spearing-procedure. This emphasis on two 
opposite movements indicates not only a break with the familiar Socratic dialectics, 
but also that the art (τεχνή) as the point of departure of his divisions might be illusive, 
since they do not allow for a consistent method. Thus, the alleged outcome of the 
paradigm division, which was supposed to be an applicable method, is somewhat 
ambiguous and does not quite provide the simplicity which the Stranger anticipated, or 
pretended to anticipate. But still, it is the paradigm for the method. When the Stranger 
                                                          
18 Plochmann (1954, 230n17)  points out that “the whole problem of the nature of dialectic is so 
intricate that it would be folly to do more than offer a working definition of it here. We are given 
many accounts, a number of them highly figurative: a) dialectic is a way of beating up game 
(Republic, 432b-e); B) dialectic is like a sight (Republic, 532a); c) dialectic is a copingstone (Republic, 
534e); d) dialectic is of carving at the joints (Pheadrus, 265e); e) dialectic is a net (Sophist, 235b); f) 
dialectic is the harmless amusement of old men (Laws, 820c). Nearly every utterance in the dialogues 
is dialectical in this sense: every main speaker seems to have a dialectic, even if it be foreshortened 
incoherent obscure.”  
19 Cf. Emilsson (2004, p. 323n21), comments on the method employed in the dialogue generally, and 
especially on the science of dialectic when mentioned at 253d1-4: Just prior to this point the Stranger 
is pondering: “What if we, when hunting the sophist, have found the philosopher? […] Aren’t we 
going to say that it takes expertise in dialectic to divide things by kind and not to think that the same 
form is a different one or that a different form is the same?” (253c8-d4). Regarding the science of 
dialectic Emilsson (2004) is in agreement with Plochmann (1954). 
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underlined the “art of striking” as an art (τεχνή) he went against the truth of the arts, 
and when making “phantoms of the real” he simultaneously started to set forth 
phantom-speeches (cf. Benardete 1993, 758-60). However, Theaetetus believes that he 
is prepared to start the hunt for the sophist within the “art of acquisition” where the 
Stranger placed him, but the Stranger is, in addition, starting a parallel hunt rooted 
within the ”art of production” (ποιητικὴν), which he set aside at 219b11. How does it 
develop? 
9.3 First interlude 
The Stranger now creates a small interlude which serves as a steppingstone for a series 
of twists and turns and, he moves faster than before, “Well then, let’s use that model 
(παράδειγμα) to try to find the sophist, and discover what he is” (221c5-6). This is a 
sort of clarifying moment because now the reader realizes why they undertook the 
particular division, and further, comprehends exactly what Theaetetus and the Stranger 
are searching for. But this flash of clarity is not long lasting due to the Stranger’s next 
remark. It is problematic, and signals a new twist: “The first question, then, was 
whether we should suppose that the angler is a layman (ἰδιώτην), or that he’s an expert 
(τέχνην ἔχοντα) at something “ (221c8-10). The problem is that this was not the first 
question. The first question was posed at 219a4-5, framed in terms of an opposition 
between the expert (τεχνίτην) and the non-expert (ἄτεχνον). The Stranger now 
pretends to refer to an earlier question, and Theaetetus does not notice that he by that 
pretending is given quite a different opposition to consider. The opposition now is 
whether the angler is a layman (ἰδιώτην) or an expert (τεχνίτην). By introducing a new 
opposition just by substituting one of the initial main categories, the Stranger 
transports the angler into a different domain. As Theaetetus does not respond to the 
substitution, the Stranger goes on, “Well, shall we suppose that the sophist is a layman 
(ἰδιώτην) or completely and truly an expert (ἄληθῶς σοφιστήν)?” (221d1-2). When 
responding, Theaetetus seems to be awake: “He’s not a layman at all. I understand 
what you’re saying: he has to be the kind of person that the name sophist indicates” 
(221d3-4). If this little word exchange can be read as a test, then Theaetetus appears to 
be clever—but is he? According to the agreement and the conclusion reached at 221c1, 
a name was to be derived from an activity; not the other way around. Does he stretch 
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this point by assuming that a person’s capacity can be derived from the name?20 Why 
does not the Stranger comment on this apparent fallacy? From a logical point of view, 
the question posted could be read as a tautology: Is the sophist truly a sophist? If this is 
the case, then it would be pointless to deny it—but Theaetetus did not see this. It is 
also possible that the Stranger’s agenda, by this twist, is aiming to prepare Theaetetus 
for the upcoming division. By introducing the opposition “layman versus skilled man,” 
he points towards the fourth bifurcation. If so, the twist gives reason to ask if the 
Stranger is being programmatic. In other words, is he following some kind of pre-
designed and readymade procedure?21 If this is the case, it suggests that the Stranger 
holds pre-determined schemes and as such these operations, or separations, are 
directing us—once more—toward a sophistic performance, similar to the one we can 
witness in the Euthydemus.22  
The conclusion reached in this Interlude, is that the sophist is skilled, and 
Theaetetus now wants to know what the expertise of the sophist really is (cf. 221d6). 
The Stranger’s response to this is remarkable, “For heaven’s sake, don’t we recognize 
that the one man belongs to the same kind (συγγενῆ) as the other?” (221d7-8). He now 
gives the impression to be surprised! By the outbreak “for heaven’s sake,” he signals 
to have gained some insight through the paradigm dividing. Did he just now realize 
that the angler and the sophist both appear to be hunters? I do not think so. As I find 
the Stranger’s arguments very similar to the classifying of hunting and hunting 
techniques displayed by Xenophon in On Hunting, I take the “sophist-hunter” to be a 
well-known metaphor of sort. By launching the kinship between the sophist and the 
hunter, the Stranger also offers the same routine as Xenophon when he gives a detailed 
submission of hunting in course of his twelve first chapters; and leaving the last 
chapter to a profound comparison between the hunter and the sophist, through which 
                                                          
20 The young Hippocrates makes the same inference in the Protagoras. When asked what the sophist 
is, he answers: “as the name suggests, he is someone who has an understanding of wise things,” cf. 
312c; thus, he derives skills from the name. The same fallacy is pointed out in the Republic with 
regard to the women, cf. chapter 6: The demiurges of freedom, section 6.1.1: The power of the 
contradicting art, pp. 215-18. 
21 Plochmann (1954, 227) argues that the Stranger’s lists are ready made in advance. 
22 Protagoras presents a list at 334a2-c7 that resembles these “pre-determined schemes” when he 
argues that he knows a lot good things that are not of advantage to human beings. The narrator tells 
that when he said this those present broke into applause as though he had spoken well. 
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we learn how the sophists hunt down their preys. According to Xenophon, the sophists 
are … 
 
… engaged in robbing private persons of their property, or plundering the state, 
they render less service that private persons when plans for securing the common 
safety afoot, and in body they are disgracefully unfit for war because they are 
incapable of toil. But huntsmen offer their livers and their property in sound 
condition for the service of the citizens (13: 11).23   
 
Xenophon completes his comparison by stating the while huntsmen “attack the 
wild beasts, those others [i.e., the sophists] their friends. And whereas those who 
attack their friends earn infamy by general consent, huntsmen by attacking wild 
beasts gain a good report” (13: 12). Related to the Sophist, Xenophon confirms 
the coining “angler versus sophist,” and by this he further confirms that this was 
an issue discussed in contemporary Athens.24 Thus, the Stranger’s surprise is not 
trustworthy. A more plausible conclusion regarding the alleged surprise is that he 
tried to camouflage that he had forgotten the course of a pre-designed scheme. 
Therefore it is no wonder that Theaetetus at this point seems to be troubled. 
The worry is detectable in his next initiative: “We said which kind of hunting the 
angler does. What kind does the sophist do?” (221e1-2). His question is not 
answered. Instead the Stranger refers to the paradigm division, fifth bifurcation 
(land-hunting versus aquatic-hunting) and explains that when the angler went to 
the ocean, the rivers, and lakes to hunt the animals there, the sophist went to the 
land and different kinds of rivers, which are like plentiful meadows of wealthy 
youths, to take possession of the living things there. This is the point of departure 
for a new division. The subject is the hunter, and the division develops from 
land-hunting, the fifth bifurcation in the paradigm division.  
 
                                                          
23 The same theme is discussed in Isocrates, Against the Sophists, where he pronounces: “Now as for 
the sophists who have lately sprung up [...] although exhorting others to study political discourse 
(they) neglected all the good things this study [i.e. the study of rhetoric] affords, and became nothing 
more than professors of meddlesomeness and greed” (19-20). The new kinds of sophists are 
aggressive word-twisters, quite different from the ones from the past. The teachings of the older 
sophists are discussed by Isocrates in the Antidosis. 
24 On this, see Wallace (2007). 
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Already from the start, at cut 1 “hunting wild animals” versus “the art of hunting tame 
animals” (222c3), Theaetetus signals some kind of doubt, or surprise, when he asks: 
“Is there any such things as hunting tame animals?” (222b6). The Stranger answers 
that “there is if human beings are tame animals, at any rate” (222b7). He continues by 
giving Theaetetus some options, and tells him to decide, 
 
Either, there are no tame animals, or  
there are tame animals but humans are wild, or 
humans are tame but are not hunted. 
 
These options are presented in a disjunctive form (either … or), but the disjunction 
seems less than exhaustive of the possibilities. Is this something that requires a 
response? Is it a trap, or is it a test? If this can be read as a test directed toward 
Theaetetus, he at this point emerges quite clever. He chooses none of the options 
offered him; instead he confirms the Stranger’s first suggestion: “I think we’re tame 
animals and I’ll say that humans are in fact hunted” (222c1-2). Without further 
remarks, they proceed from an agreement that there is a kinship between the angler 
and the sophist. The angler and the sophist are joined in the “art of acquisition” but 
Land-hunting (cf. cut 5 in the “paradigm”) 
 
Section 1: The manner of the art 
 
Hunting wild animals  Art of hunting tame animals      Cut 1: What kind of hunt? 
      
Violent hunt   Art of persuasion       Cut 2: Where does it unfold? 
      
Persuasion in public  Persuasion in private                Cut 3: How is it executed? 
 
Section 2: ? 
 
Done by gift-giving (Cut 3.1) Done by earning wage (Cut 3.2)      
        
Art of love (Cut 3.1.1)  Art of private hunting (Cut 3.2.1)   
             




split off when the division reached animal-hunting. This premise suffices to allow the 
Stranger and Theaetetus to divide without further interruptions.  
The “art of hunting tame animals” is divided (cut 2) into “violent hunting” 
(βίαιον θήραν, 222c5) versus the “art of persuasion” (πιθανουργικήν, 222c9-d1). The 
former includes piracy, enslavement, tyranny and everything that has to do with the 
“art of war” (πολεμικήν), whilst the latter sums up arts such as legal oratory, political 
oratory and conversation. The “art of persuasion” is further divided (cut 3) into 
“persuasion in public” (δημοσίᾳ, 222d5) and “persuasion in private” (ἰδίᾳ, 222d5). So 
far the Stranger has followed the method put forth in the paradigm dividing, hence 
section 1 (cut 1, 2, 3) exhibit the manner of the land-hunting and the questions related 
to the manner of the art, what-, where- and how-, has been dealt with respectively. 
According to the proposed method in the paradigm it would now be reasonable to 
expect the Stranger to continue by displaying the object of the art,25 however, he does 
not, and at this stage he actually abandons the paradigm altogether. How? The 
expectation would be that the “art of persuasion in private” (cut 3) should have been 
cut off further, but instead the “art of persuasion in public” and the “art of persuasion 
in private” are now cut off separately. Thus, it looks like he is starting to duplicate the 
paradigm structure within this hunter-division.  
Persuasion in public (cut 3) is done by gift-giving (cut 3.1); this is the art of love 
(ἐρωτικῆς), and the hunt for lovers (ἐρώντων θήρᾳ). But, still, it is not quite clear what 
the Stranger actually states here. The reason for this puzzle is a genitive construction 
pointed out by David B. Robinson (1999, 141),26 and it makes me at unease. Straight 
forward, the construction means “giving gifts is a species of erotic pursuit;” but it is 
also possible to understand it as a definition: “giving gifts constitutes erotic pursuit.” 
However, the latter could be taken as the whole of erotic pursuit is gift-giving, and 
then all gift-giving is erotic pursuit. The ambiguity of this statement is not commented 
on, and the hunt of lovers is not discussed further. Thus, this is obviously a major 
                                                          
25 Cf. section 2 in the paradigm-dividing. 
26 Robinson points out this puzzle with regard to the genitive-construction as he asks: “Should logic 
prevail over humor, or vice versa?” I do not think that this is an example on Plato’s humor; I think the 
matter is quite another.  
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deviation from the proposed method, and the clarity that these divisions were supposed 
to contribute to, is dissolving.  
The opposite, persuasion in private (cut 3) is done by wage-earning (cut 3.2), and 
called “the art of private hunting” (ἰδιοθηρευτικῆς, cut 3.2.1). The Stranger now 
wonders: The one who claims to deal with people for the sake of virtue, does not he 
deserve to be called by another name? Theaetetus’ answer is peculiar: “It is obvious. I 
think we have found the sophist” (233a9-11). So, according to him they have now 
captured the sophist for the first time. However, the Stranger does not allow 
Theaetetus’ conclusion; instead he moves on to summarize.27  
 
According to this argument (λόγον), it seems that this sort of expertise belongs to 
the art of appropriation (τέχνης οἰκειωτικῆς), the art of acquisition (κτητικῆς), the 
art of hunting (θηρευτικῆς), the hunting of the living (ζῳοηρίας), the hunting on 
footed animals (πεζοθηρίας), animal living on dry land (χερσαίας), the art of 
hunting tame animals (ἡμεροθηρικῆς, cf. cut 1), human hunting (ἀνθρωποθηρίας, 
cf. cut 1), hunting privately (ἰδιοθηρίας, cf. cut 3), the art of wage-earning 
(μισθαρνικῆς, cf. cut 3.2), the art of money-changing (νομισματοπωλικῆς), the art 
of opinion teaching (δοξοπαιδευτικῆς) which is performed by the hunting of rich, 
prominent young men. And according to the way our account has turned out, it’s 
what should be called the art of the sophist (σοφιστική, cf. 3.2.1.2).28 
 
The terms underlined above are the “new arts” presented in the summary only, and 
Theaetetus’ reaction to this, is approval. However, the Stranger’s summary is not a 
summary of the argument; it just appears to be. It is presented as if the Stranger had 
just performed one division; he does not take into consideration that he doubled the 
division after cut 3. In addition, there are arrivals of terms in the summary which were 
not part of the argument, such as the “art of appropriation,” the “art of money-
                                                          
27 Regarding this summary there are some manuscript-discrepancies, but according to Benardete 
(1960, 129) “all the original readings are defensible […] it looks at first as if the summary (223b1-7) 
should show a progressive narrowing of the range within which the sophist is contained; but since it 
does not, the text has been changed to make it conform with our expectations.” According to 
Robinson (1999, 141), in this summary “confusion reigns […]: (i) terms are present which were not 
used earlier, and (ii) in the mss. text there is undoubtedly some redundancy; there are too many 
terms in this resume to fit the preceding division.” The explanation for these discrepancies is twofold: 
”(a) Plato had varied his terminology in making the resume, but (b) some redundant terms were 
glosses added by scholiasts from the original terminology.” (ibid.). One of the most spectacular cases 
of agreement with this judgment can be found in Cornford (1935, 170) who omits to translate the 
division-sections because “the modern reader […] might be wearied.” 
28 Sophist, 223a12-b5. The translation of the summary is partly mine, and thus it differs slightly from 
White’s due to the Greek additions as I use Auguste Diès.  
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changing,” and the “art of opinion teaching.” It is also noteworthy that these arts do 
not have equivalents in the empirical world, so why does not Theaetetus comment on 
these alleged new arts?  What is the impact of these discrepancies? In order to answer, 
I will try to reveal, step by step, what the Stranger is doing in course of this summary.  
He starts by deriving the “art of acquisition” from the “art of appropriation 
(τέχνης οἰκειωτικῆς).” This does not sound right, because the art of appropriation is 
not distinguishable from the art of acquisition unless, with Benardete’s words, “we 
realize that a pair of terms is needed to point up the double way the class of acquisition 
was originally defined” (1960, 131). So, what was the double way of the original 
definition? All arts, said the Stranger, fell under two kinds (εἴδη δύο, cf. 219a8); the art 
of production handled “being” (ὄντα) and “becoming” (γεγονότα), versus the art of 
acquisition in which nothing was produced. These two were set as main categories, 
and a main category cannot be derived from a sub category. In addition, the art of 
acquisition established the manner of the art (in accordance with the paradigm); hence, 
the art of appropriation must refer to the object of the art (i.e., what is to be 
appropriated?). Therefore, the deriving executed by the Stranger, is unsound. 
However, what about the impact of this mistake?  
Theaetetus believes they are equipped with a paradigmatic method and therefore 
he also apprehends himself to be a hunter hunting the hunter-sophist—but as a pure 
hypothetical being, and because he has never experienced meeting a sophist,29 he does 
not himself know exactly what kind of creature he is trying to hunt down. The result of 
Theaetetus’ ignorance is that as a hunter he also believes he has captured the sophist 
for the first time and, his ignorance is further displayed when he accepts the deviations 
of the hunter-division as well as the discrepancies between the presentation of the 
division and the summary. The Stranger also appears to be a hunter—but now placed 
within the phantom-art of striking.30 He has also started to display a grave discrepancy 
between his “words and deeds”—he is not doing what he says he is doing. He has 
                                                          
29 Sophist, 239e1, cf. Benardete (1993, 750), and Plochmann (1994, 226). They both argues that 
compared with the other youths we meet throughout various Platonic dialogues, Theaetetus – who 
has never met a sophist – stands as the most innocent in this regard. 




abandoned the method and his last summary does not summarize what he claims it is. 
Theaetetus’ silence and total acceptance, makes him start to appear as a prey. In 
addition, it also starts to dawn on the reader that Theaetetus is being exposed to a kind 
of manipulation not recognizable to him, but which has an impact on the reader who 
recognizes the Stranger’s phantom-speeches through which he is presenting phantom-
arts with ridiculous names.31 The manipulation can also be sensed as the Stranger 
moves faster and faster. It is noticeable how the speed or tempo, in the summary, has 
increased compared to the summary of the paradigm division. This is visible through 
the disappearance of conjunctions.32 From here on forward, textual twist and turns are 
to become more frequent and the textual tempo is increasing. These incidents create a 
set of discrepancies which gives reason to suspect that the originally proposed method 
was abandoned almost at the outset. That is, the methodical hunt which the Stranger 
initiated is now transformed into a metaphorical hunt where the hunted prey is 
Theaetetus. And, by paying attention to the movements initially underlined, I noticed 
that the movement in the summary went down from above, which is in accordance 
with spearing. Thus, the hunted prey Theaetetus seems to be hit by the spear for the 
first time.  
9.5 Division 2 of 3: Exchange (223b8-224d3) 
They now take a short break, and during the pause the Stranger creates a new situation, 
which denotes a momentum that becomes visible as they move towards a new 
division. The point of departure is cut 4.2 in the previous hunter-division and the 




                                                          
31 The Stranger himself denotes some names as “ridiculous”; especially at 224b4 when referring to 
the art of soul-wholesaling (ψυχεμπορικῆς), and at 227a4-5 when referring to the cleansing of 
nonliving bodies “which have lots of specialized and ridiculous names”.  
32 By “disappearing of conjunctions” I mean that in the summary of the paradigm-dividing, the 
Stranger said, for example: half of the […], and […]. The impact in that regard was that the Stranger 
was patient and progressed slowly so that Theaetetus would be able to follow him. In course of this 
summary the easy-going is no longer present, and now the impression is that the tempo in the text – 















The structure of this division resembles the paradigm division, but the use of phantom-
arts is similar to the previous, except this time the phantom-arts are introduced in 
course of the division itself.33 The “art of acquisition” is once again established as a 
main category, and is now cut off into “hunt” (θηρευτικὸν, 223c7) versus “exchange” 
(ἀλλακτικόν, 223c7). “Exchange” is cut off into “giving gifts” (δωρητικόν, 223c10) 
versus “sale and commerce” (ἀγορστικόν, 223c10). The latter includes the “art of 
selling” versus the “art of purveying,” that is, purveying of things other people make 
(μεταβαλλομένην μεταβλητικήν, 223d3). It is interesting to note that the former, “art 
of selling,” is sale of things the seller himself makes (αὐτουργῶν αὐτοπωλικὴν, 223d2-
3). The initial definition of the “acquisitive art” included the clause “the seller does not 
produce anything” (219c1-8). In other words, to be acquisitive was to be not-
productive the Stranger then argued, but now he seems to be arguing the opposite: the 
“art of production” and the “art of acquisition” are no longer presented as mutually 
exclusive, as the initial definitions suggested. Why does not Theaetetus comment on 
this obvious contradiction? My suggestion is that he now is so confused by the 
Stranger’s many twists and manipulations that he is no longer able to follow him.  
                                                          
33 Regarding this and the next dividing I will not comment upon the manner-, object- or mean of the 
art because this pattern which was presented systematically in the paradigm-dividing, is now 
abandoned pretty much in the same way as explained in the previous division.  
Expertise in the art of acquisition 
(cf. cut 4.2 in the Hunter-division)   
     
Hunt    Exchange    Cut 1 
     
Giving gifts   Sale, commerce   Cut 2 
     
Art of selling   Art of purveying   Cut 3 
     
Art of retailing   Art of wholesaling   Cut 4 
     
Sale of body-nourishment  Art of soul-wholesaling    Cut 5 
     
Art of display   Art of knowledge-selling  Cut 6 
     




The Stranger moves to cut 4 where the “art of purveying” is divided into the “art 
of retailing” (καπηλικὴ, 223d5) versus the “art of wholesaling” (ἐμπορικῆς, 223d6). 
The former is purveying within the city, whilst the latter is exchange between cities, 
which in cut 5 is divided into the “sale of nourishment for the body in exchange for 
cash” (223d12-e2) versus “soul-wholesaling” (ψυχεμπορικῆς, 224b4). Let us take a 
closer look at bifurcation five and onwards. The Stranger elaborates, “Wouldn’t the 
right thing to say be that the art of display is one part of soul-wholesaling? And don’t 
we have to call the other part of it, the part that consists in selling knowledge, by a 
name that’s similar and also equally ridiculous?” (224b4-7). We are by now used to 
Theaetetus’ passive agreement, but what is he agreeing upon this time? That the “art of 
display” (ἐπιδεικτικὴ, 224b4-5; cut 6) is one part of soul-wholesaling (cut 5), or that 
the name is ridiculous? He derives these names directly from an action, which 
obviously is an effective turn: Theaetetus becomes attentive and replies that he now 
has located the sophist for the second time. When noticing Theaetetus’ partaking, the 
Stranger quickly presents the summary, 
 
We’ll say that the expertise of the art of acquisition (κτητικῆς), the art of 
exchange (μεταβλητικῆς, cut 1), the art of selling (ἀγοραστικῆς, cut 2), the art of 
wholesaling (ἐμπορικῆς, cut 4), the art of soul-wholesaling (ψυχεμπορικῆς, cut 5) 
dealing in words and learning that have to do with virtue—that’s sophistry 
(σοφιστική, cut 7) in its second appearance (224c8-d2).  
 
The summary is selective because it is lacking some essential elements; the lacking of 
the sixth bifurcation (“art of display” versus “art of knowledge-selling”) is especially 
noteworthy due to the details given in course of the division (cf. 224a1-7 and 224b4).  
During this division and its summary, the reader is able to understand somewhat more 
of whom the Stranger is by noticing what he is doing. It may be read as a new 
illustration of how the Stranger is allowed to perform a sort of language manipulation 
by mixing categories, twisting words and presenting it all in a speeding litany. The 
only indication of alertness is Theaetetus’ relief for having located sophistry for the 
second time, but he himself has, simultaneously and metaphorically, been hunted 
down and hit by the spear for the second time.  
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9.6 Second interlude (224d4-e6) 
The Stranger’s next step is fascinating, and signals another kind of turn when he says: 
“I think you’d call somebody just the same thing if he settled here in the city and 
undertook to make his living selling those same things, both that he’d bought and the 
ones that he’d made himself; and thereby you have met the sophist for the third time” 
(224d4-8). Theaetetus agrees, but what happened here? According to the exchange 
division and its summary, the sophist belonged to the subcategory of wholesaling, and 
just by transporting him into the subcategory of retailing, the Stranger here performs 
yet another turn by picking up on a slightly altered definition of the “art of 
acquisition.” By now claiming that the sophist “makes his living selling things he’d 
bought and the ones that he’s made himself” the sophist does not only belong to the 
“art of acquisition,” he is also belonging to the “art of production.” Here, the 
mentioned contradiction is stated even more bluntly: the sophist belongs to both of the 
originally two main, mutually exclusive, categories. After having conducted the 
transport of the sophist from wholesaling to retailing, the Stranger himself concludes 
that they have encountered the sophist for the third time. So, subsequently he presents 
his summary in accordance with this turn,  
 
So apparently you’ll still say that sophistry (σοφιστικόν) falls under acquisition 
(κτητικῆς), exchange (μεταβλητικόν), and selling (ἀγοραστικόν), either by 
retailing things that others make (καπηλικὸν) or by selling things that he makes 
himself (αὐτοπωλικόν). It’s the retail sale of any learning (μαθηματοπωλικὸν 
γένος) that has to do with the sorts of things we mentioned (224d10-e3).  
 
This summary is a confirmation on the Stranger’s manipulative strategies, and as such 
it is eye-opening in order to observe how he, by transporting the sophist, has managed 
to abolish the two initial main categories. In this summary both are present, but mixed 
together. This turn simultaneously conceals the twist which makes Theaetetus 
responsible for the conclusion: “So apparently you will still say that […] (224e3).” 
Theaetetus’ response at this point signals that he is rather tired,34 and his acceptance of 
having come across the sophist again is rather submissive when he states that it has to 
be so “since we need to stay consistent with what we said before.” But is this 
                                                          
34 Theaetetus indicated himself that this could happen, cf. Sophist, 218b1-5. 
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consistent with what they said before? No, this is a break with several things said 
before. And it is due to manipulation, twists and turns that Theaetetus admits the third 
encounter with the sophist, and by this act he is once again—metaphorically—hit by 
the spear, for the third time. They move on, and this time a new aim is set: By dividing 
the “art of combat” they are now supposed to create ground for later comparisons.  











Prior to this division, Theaetetus and the Stranger decided that the “art of combat” 
(ἀγωνιστική, 225a2) was a part of the “art of acquisition.” This is in accordance with 
its previous definition as open attempts at mastery,35 which accordingly makes the 
sophist no longer a secret combatant or hunter.36 The “art of combat” is now cut off 
into the “art of competition” (ἀμιλλητικὸν, 225a6) versus the “art of fighting” 
(μαχητικόν, 225a6-7). This is an opposition questioning how the contest is carried out, 
rather than what it is about. Cut 2 divides the “art of fighting” into “violence” 
(βιαστικόν, 225a11) versus “controversy” (ἁμφισβητητικόν, 225b1). The “art of 
violence” denotes one body fighting against another and the “art of controversy” 
denotes the pits of words against words.  This refers to the means of the arts, which the 
manner of “forensic speeches” and “disputation” (ἀντιλογικόν, 225b10) is derived 
from. The former is a long public speech directed against another which deals with 
                                                          
35 Cf. Sophist, 219e1-2, 225a2. 
36 Cf. the paradigm-division, third bifurcation where the “art of hunting” (done secretly) was opposed 
to the “art of combat” (done openly). See also Benardete (1960, 134).  
Art of combat 
     
Art of competition  Art of fighting   Cut 1 
     
Art of violence   Art of controversy  Cut 2 
     
Forensic   Disputation   Cut 3 
     
Controversy   Art of debating   Cut 4 
     
Art of money-wasting  Art of money-making  Cut 5 
     




justice and injustice; the latter is private discussions chopped up into questions and 
answers. “Disputation” is by cut 4 divided in “controversy about contracts” (225b12-
c4) versus “debating” (ἐριστικὸν, 225c9). The former is not carried out in any 
systematic or expert way; the latter is done expertly and involves controversy about 
general issues, including what is just and unjust. It turns out that the “art of debating” 
is the artful “disputation,” but according to Benardete (1960, 134) this is “absurd since 
its anonymous opposite discusses contracts artlessly. Yet it is supposed to be a sub-
division of the ‘art of acquisition.’” The “art of eristic” is cut into the “art of wasting 
money” versus “making money.” The latter is cut into “chatter” versus the “art of the 
sophist.” After the completion of this division, Theaetetus appears to be impressed: 
“How could anyone go wrong in saying that the amazing sophist we’ve been after has 
turned up for the fourth time?” (225e3-5). The Stranger does not answer Theaetetus, 
instead he presents the summary—or again—what appears to be a summary, 
 
It seems his type is precisely the money-making branch of expertise (cf. cut 5) in 
debating (cf. cut 4), disputation (cf. cut 2), controversy (cf. cut 2), fighting (cf. cut 
1), combat, acquisition (226a1-3).  
 
The movement in the division was, apparently, in accordance with the paradigm, 
downward from above (spearing-procedure), but this changes because the summary 
now moves upward from below. This is the draw-fisher-procedure which was what 
they initially were looking for, and it is being practiced as the hunt no longer done 
secretly. So, now the draw-fisher strikes for the first time, and the impressed 
Theaetetus—metaphorically—swallows the hook, and is, like a prey now pulled in, 
upward from below, in accordance with the primary aim of the hunter.  
9.8 Toward a conclusion 
On account of the given hints toward the Euthydemus, especially 277d1-278e1, the 
conclusion will be framed with help from Socrates where he observed, off stage, what 
happened on stage when young Clinias met the sophist Euthydemus. Socrates reports: 
“Euthydemus was hastening to throw Clinias for the third fall, when I, seeing that he 
was going down and wanting to give him a chance to breathe so that he should not turn 
coward and disgrace us, encouraged him […]” (277d1-3). Socrates stopped that 
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combat, consulted Clinias and told him that when meeting a sophist, one must imagine 
oneself to be hearing the first part of the sophistic mystery, pay attention to the use of 
words, especially the correct meaning of words and, one must always think of the 
performance of the sophists as a game. After the first part—involving several falls—
the sophists will let one rest; in the pause they will doubtless display some serious 
things, before they start the game all over again.  
Is Socrates’ description of this performance of the sophists somewhat similar to 
the Stranger’s performance in the Sophist? Contrary to Clinias, Theaetetus was not 
explicitly told to view his assignment as partaking in a game. Trained in mathematics 
he approached his task—the alleged hunt which he approached in a purely 
hypothetically manner, and thus, he did not pay attention to the meaning and use of 
words. Hence, the Stranger was offered the opportunity to set his game into play. 
Theaetetus did not comprehend that the Stranger abandoned the proposed method and, 
therefore Theaetetus did not grasp that he himself was hunted, manipulated and, 
gradually appeared as a prey. After three falls (stroked by the spear) he—
metaphorically speaking—swallowed the hook and was pulled in.  
So, the readers’ hunt of the Stranger revealed that the proposed hunting method 
camouflaged a metaphorical hunt: Theaetetus thought he was hunting the hunter-
sophist within the “art of acquisition,” according to the method. The Stranger 
pretended to do the same, but his own hunt was partly carried out within the “art of 
production”—which he set aside at the outset, but later transported the sophist into. 
Further the Stranger, as a hunter working secretly, stroked his prey down three times 
with the spear; and when this hunter no longer hunted secretly,37 Theaetetus 
swallowed the hook and was pulled in. Through this slow reading of the prologue and 
by the analysis of four divisions, a specific problem concerning the Stranger has been 
revealed: there is a severe discrepancy between his words and deeds—that is, a 
discrepancy between what the Stranger says he is doing versus what he actually is 
doing. As the prologues of the Platonic dialogues, according to Francisco J. Gonzalez 
(2003, 16) “provides the foundation for the subsequent investigation by drawing our 
attention to specific problems […] that have a bearing on the main subject of the 
                                                          
37 This was revealed at the outset of “Division 3 of 3: The art of combat.” 
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dialogue,” it is imperative to note this discrepancy—not only in the prologue—but 
throughout the dialogue. The Stranger will set his game into play over and over again, 
and due to his twists and turns he appears to be a sophist more than the philosophical 
man Theodorus initially claimed him to be. This leads me to conclude that the Stranger 

























Chapter 10: The Apology 
 
Through a literary and rhetorical reading of the Apology, I do not intend to conclude 
whether Socrates was guilty or not;1 my aim is rather to show that he presented a 
coherent defense both as a philosopher and as a citizen. When confronted with the 
Apology a point zero is reached. This is a point where the Platonic narratives and the 
Athenian reality are merging.  The problem, if  a problem, is that Socrates, the main 
literary character throughout the narratives, is put on trial on a stage in the real 
(empirical) world and, in addition Plato, the author, is present in the narration as an 
eyewitness to the events unfolding on stage. Hence, the correlation between Socrates, 
the character and, Plato the author, is severely altered and, furthermore, the borders 
between narration and reality are being blurred; or maybe the case is that there are no 
borders anymore. This blurring represents a displacement, or a dislocation, a 
movement in which the reader gradually experiences being lead from narration into 
reality, so to speak. It is a textual fact that Socrates is in court in Athens and that Plato 
is present; it is a bibliographic fact that Plato has written this text; thus, these facts 
present a forced change in perspective. I will take this point zero as an invitation to 
step into the limbo between narration and reality. From this place, I will inquire into a 
few rhetorical aspects of the Apology and try to answer two questions.  
First, Socrates’ position when entering the stage is that at the age of seventy this 
is his first appearance in court (cf. 17d1-3). At this place Socrates is a stranger (ξένως) 
and an unskillful man (ἀτεχνῶς) because he does not know the conventions of how to 
                                                          
This paper was first presented at the International symposium “Poetry and Philosophy in Light of 
Plato’s Apology” at the University of Bergen (June 10-12 2015). A version of it is published as 
“Socrates’s Telling of the Truth. A Reading of the Apology 17a1-35d9.” In Readings of Plato’s Apology 
of Socrates. Defending the Philosophical Life, eds. Vivil Valvik Haraldsen, Olof Pettersson, and Oda E. 
Wiese Tvedt, pp. 101-20. London: Lexington Books, 2018. I want to thank Professor Vigdis Songe-
Møller and editor Vivil Valvik Haraldsen for substantial and valuable feedback on this paper. I am also 
grateful to Knut Ågotnes for his comments. 
 
1 Gonzalez (2009, 117), argues that in the disagreements regarding the Apology a central concern is 
whether Socrates’ defense is to be seen as ironic or sincere. The first group argue that Socrates is not 
seriously defending himself; and that he was guilty as charged; cf. West ( 1979); the latter group 
argue that the defense is sincere and that Socrates is innocent; cf. Reeve (1989). Gonzalez himself 
argues that “neither view is correct, but that instead the defense is ironic in the true sense of the 
word; neither literal not deceptive, but ambivalent.” 
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speak (cf. 17d3); but he knows very well the excellence (ἀρετή) of a judge and a 
speaker, and he knows what makes a speech just (δίκαια λέγω, cf. 18a4-5). So, how 
does Socrates the “dislocated”2 philosopher and, Socrates the citizen, structure the 
defense in court? Secondly, during the period 403-399, three types of civic discourse3 
served as powerful topoi in the forensic rhetoric employed by Athenian orators: the 
homonoia-topos, the demos-topos and the reconciliation-topos. How does Socrates—in 
his defense— respond to these topoi? Or, how does Socrates employ this new rhetoric 
which was developed during the restoration of the democracy?  
10.1. The ideal of same-mindedness or the homonoia-topos 
According to Wolpert (2002, 78), the Athenians’ fear of factional parties can be traced 
back to the origin of Greek notions of citizenship, and Ian Morris (2000, 3) maintains 
that as the polis emerged during the eight century, the Greeks “began to define their 
communities as groups of ‘middling’ citizens.” These middling citizens were “not a 
class but ‘an ideological construct’ allowing citizens to locate themselves in the middle 
and to suppress those traits and characteristics that distinguished them from other 
citizens” (Wolpert 2002, 78). Wolpert stresses that this ideological construct was not 
limited to a specific political system or a polis; on the contrary, it could be seen 
throughout ancient Greece. J. E. Lendon (2010, 32) shows that besides Athens, Sparta 
presents an example where the full citizens “proudly called themselves the homoioi, 
‘the peers’ or ‘the similar’” and, Rosenstock (1994, 367) argues that in Athens 
homonoia (literally: same-mindedness) denoted a “hoped-for consensus which would 
protect Athens’ democratic institutions from dissolving into factional parties seeking 
power at each other’s expense.” In addition, the Athenians also signaled their unity 
through the laws and decrees passed by the Athenian Assembly, which all began with 
the phrase “The people resolved (edoxe toi demoi).”4 Hence, in Athens participation in 
political affairs depended on an ideal of same-mindedness “and this characterized 
                                                          
2 I could also denote Socrates the philosopher “placeless” or as “having no place,” cf. Baracchi (2009, 
274). 
3 The term “civic discourse,” I have borrowed from Wolpert (2002, xiii-xiv). He uses the term to “refer 
to speeches delivered in a civic setting to a mass audience, whether at an official public ceremony or 
in one of the political institutions of the city.” I follow him. 




those men who possessed citizenship which again distinguished them from those 
individuals prohibited from politics: resident aliens, slaves, and women” (Wolpert 
2002, 78). This ideal had a definite function: “in order to avoid the citizens to visualize 
conflicts as a necessary part of the city, they constructed screens between themselves 
and the outer world” (ibid, 79). Wolpert presents a literary example of this: the chorus, 
at the close of Aeschylus’ Euminides (984-87), prays that the citizens of Athens should 
“repay joy with joy in the thought of common love and hate with one heart; for this is 
the remedy of many griefs for mortals” (quoted in ibid). This remedy—common love 
and hate with one heart—created a dichotomy and the main point was to uphold “a 
collective hostility and hatred directed outward, and a unified philia inward” (ibid). By 
placing hatred and philia in two distinct spheres, the Athenians managed to create 
harmony instead of stasis, strife or discord, which would destroy the polis. With stasis, 
the hatred was misdirected inward against the community and destroyed it rather than 
strengthening it outward (cf. ibid). In addition, Ober (1989, 298-99) has showed that 
the ideal of same-mindedness was at odds with both liberty and freedom of thought 
and speech. He argues “that the values of homonoia on the one hand and of the 
eleutheria and parrhêsia on the other, although theoretically in conflict, were accepted 
by Athenians as simply two aspects of a single lived political reality.”5  
Throughout the Platonic corpus we have witnessed how Socrates practiced 
philosophy; we have seen how Socrates was doing philosophy when he met a variety 
of people distinctively named (i.e., historical personae) who—one way or another— 
have had an impact on culture, education or politics in ancient Athens. Hence, it is safe 
to assume that the ideal of same-mindedness is not in accordance with the 
philosopher’s words and deeds (cf. Frede 1992, 217). On the contrary, with regard to 
the Athenian homonoia-topos Socrates stands forth as being atopos.6 However, in his 
defense he uses the values of the eleutheria and parrhêsia in order to claim that it is 
his god-given right not to be attuned to the Athenian ideal of same-mindedness. 
                                                          
5 Ober (1989, 298-99). Quoted in Rosenstock (1994, 367).  
6 a-topos, as I use it here, denotes a negation related to the homonoia-topos.  
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10.2 The men of Piraeus—or the demos-topos 
The crimes of the Thirty and their supporters were so terrible that it was nearly 
unthinkable that anyone would ever be able to repeat them; and as the Thirty were 
responsible for the civil war, the democratic resistance alone was given recognition for 
the restoration of the democracy. Viewed as a group named “the men of Piraeus” the 
democratic resistance gradually came to be serving as paradigms of excellence and, 
thus, as an illustration of how the Athenians should and should not act (cf. Wolpert 
2002, 133). Further, these new paradigms of excellence helped the Athenians “to 
bracket the period of civil unrest and stasis from their past and future” (ibid, 136). At 
the time of Socrates’ trial “the men of Piraeus” were referred to as the demos (the 
people) and the Athenians claimed that during the stasis the demos were in exile.7 This 
phrase—the demos in exile—became a new topos in forensic speeches, which I denote 
as the demos-topos. Because of this topos “the men of the city” (those who had not left 
the city during the stasis) experienced a new kind of pressure. They had to deny any 
involvement in the crimes of the Thirty—not only by professing their innocence—but 
also by declaring that their intent was to adhere to the laws of the restored democracy. 
So, as the Athenians praised “the men of Piraeus,” they simultaneously made it very 
difficult for many individuals who belonged to the group named “the men of the city.” 
Socrates fitted the latter. In his defense Socrates is not at odds with the demos-topos, 
on the contrary; he activates this topos right at the outset and, employs it later in order 
to convince the jury that he is, and has always been, loyal toward the democrats.   
10.3 The amnesty—or the reconciliation-topos 
The amnesty from 403 served as a condition to end the stasis and to reunite the 
opposing parties; it was a necessary concession for allowing a transition from a state of 
stasis, to a state of peace (cf. ibid, 77). Nicole Loraux (1998, 87) explains that the 
democrats proclaimed the general reconciliation with a decree and an oath: “The 
decree proclaims the ban: mḕ mnēsikakeîn, ‘It is forbidden to recall the misfortunes.’ 
The oath binds all the Athenians, democrats, oligarchs, important people and, quiet 
people who stayed in the city during the dictatorship, however, it binds them one by 
one: ou mnēsikakḕsō, ‘I shall not recall the misfortunes.’” Edwin Carawan (2002, 3) 
                                                          
7 On “the demos in exile” see Wolpert (2002, 91-5). 
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shows that the phrase μὴ μνησικακεῖν is usually understood as a general amnesty: 
granting immunity from prosecution for the wrongs of stasis. Wolpert (2002, 77) 
emphasizes that the phrase does not mean that the Athenians were prohibited from 
speaking about the past, but from initiating certain types of legal procedures. Loraux 
(1998, 88) stresses that the phrase is also “a way of proclaiming that there is a time 
limit for seditious acts” and further that the “aim is to restore a continuity that nothing 
breaks, as if nothing had happened.” Thus, the amnesty can be viewed as “an 
admission that the city had no alternative way of resolving the stasis fairly” and, 
because “the purpose of the amnesty was to prevent individuals from seeking revenge 
for the wrongs that they had suffered, this concern was not with the act of recounting 
the past, but rather with the possibility that someone would get revenge by recalling 
the past” (Wolpert ibid, 77). The possibility to get revenge by recalling the past also 
implies that remembering the past could be used as a weapon against others. With this 
in mind, there is yet another matter to consider. Robin Waterfield (2009, 33) argues 
that due to the amnesty and the reconciliation agreement, it would not “be safe to rule 
out the kind of political subtext that impiety trials made possible. It even begins to 
look as though a prosecution for impiety could be a prosecution for ‘un-Athenian 
activity.’” He maintains that on examination, a surprisingly high portion of known 
impiety trials has been revealed as involving a strong political agenda. Not to recall 
past wrongs on the one hand and, the concealed political agenda on the other, turns out 
to be a twofold perspective, which Socrates makes use of when implicitly referring to 
the reconciliation-topos; thus, this topos is present at the core of the defense. 
10.4 The accusers 
Meletus, Anytus and Lycon were the three men prosecuting Socrates. We do not know 
much about them, and the little information available is partly found within the 
Platonic corpus and, partly outside (cf. the limbo in between narration and the real 
world). How are these men described?  
In the Euthyphro (399) Meletus is described by Socrates as a young and, 
unknown man, with long hair, scraggly beard, and a somewhat hooked nose (cf. 2b10-
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11). Meletus is said to have prosecuted Andocides8 of impiety in 400 and, according to 
Waterfield (1990, 37n1), “it may be safe to infer that he was a champion of traditional 
piety.” In the Apology Socrates states that Meletus brought charges on behalf of the 
poets (cf. 23e6); it was him who laid down the charges of impiety (35d1-2); and he 
ridiculed Socrates’ δαιμόνιον, divine or spiritual sign (31d1-3).  
We meet Anytus in the Meno (402) where we learn that he is educated to the 
satisfaction of the Athenians who elected him to the city’s highest offices; we further 
learn that Anytus cannot stand sophists, and that he is warning Socrates: “I think, 
Socrates, that you easily speak ill of people. I would advise you, if you will listen to 
me, to be careful. Perhaps also in another city, and certainly here, it is easier to injure 
people than to benefit them. I think you know that yourself” (94e4-95a1). Socrates’ 
reply to this warning is somewhat arrogant when he addresses his answer to Meno (not 
to Anytus): “I think, Meno, that Anytus is angry. He thinks that I am slandering those 
men, and he believes himself to be one of them. If he ever realizes what slander is, he 
will cease from anger, but he does not know” (95a2-6). Anytus also appeared as a 
character witness for Andocides9 when he was charged with impiety. In the Apology 
Socrates states that Anytus prosecuted him on behalf of craftsmen and politicians (cf. 
23e6-24a1); and further, that Anytus said in court that maybe Socrates should not have 
been brought to trial in the first place, but now that he is here the jury cannot avoid 
executing him (cf. 29c1-6). 
Lycon was a prominent democratic politician whose son was executed by the 
Thirty. According to Nails (2002, 189) Lycon may have believed that Socrates had 
                                                          
8 Andocides was first prosecuted in 415 as one of the men having mutilated the herms and for 
profanation of the mysteries. In this case he was granted immunity for providing information against 
his accomplices. Later the decree of Isotimides was enacted; this decree prohibited those who once 
had committed impiety from entering holy places and the agora. Andocides now went into exile and 
returned to Athens after the restoration of the democracy were he once again was prosecuted for 
impiety; this time he was accused of having participated in the Eleusinian mysteries when he was 
prohibited from doing so due to the decree.  In his defense Andocides argued that the decree of 
Isotimides had been annulled due to the amnesty and the law reforms. Even if it was well known that 
he had oligarchic sympathies and was distrusted by the democrats, he maintained in court that he 
was and would continue to be a loyal democrat; he claimed this although he could not point to any 
services that he had performed during the stasis; he declared that the Thirty would have killed him if 
he entered the city, and he argued they considered him a serious threat to their rule. Thus, he 
rendered his absence from Athens as a proof of his loyalty, cf. Wolpert (2002, 65-7). 
9 See previous note. 
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been aligned with the oligarchy responsible for his son’s death; this is a case the 
amnesty forbade mentioning, but the incident can possibly help explain both Lycon’s 
participation in the prosecution and, Socrates’ silence toward him. Socrates states in 
the Apology that it was Lycon who prosecuted him on behalf of the orators (cf. 24a1), 
but what Lycon might have said during the trial is not mentioned in the Apology. 
Regarding the accusers, it is noteworthy that after having received the verdict of 
guilty and, after Meletus has asked for the death penalty, Socrates stressed that he 
himself supposed that he had been cleared from the charges of Meletus. And not only 
did he supposed that, he was also convinced that if Anytus and Lycon had chosen not 
to join Meletus, it would have been the latter who “would have been fined a thousand 
drachmas for not receiving a fifth of the votes” (36a6-b1).  
10.5 Preparing for trial 
At the end of the Theaetetus (399) Socrates departs because he “[…] must go to the 
King’s Porch to meet the indictment that Meletus has brought against” him (210d1-2). 
At the beginning of the Euthyphro (399) Socrates runs into Euthyphro, who is 
surprised to hear about the indictment. Socrates, who has just heard Meletus presenting 
the charge for the first time, also signals a kind of surprise when he says the following: 
“Strange things (ἄτοπια), to hear him tell it, for he says that I am a maker of gods, and 
on the ground that I create new gods while not believing in the old gods, he has 
indicted me for their sake, as he puts it” (3b1-4). “This is because you say that the 
divine sign (δαιμόνιον φῂς) keeps coming to you” (3b5-6), is Euthyphro’s response. 
This reply strongly indicates that Socrates’ “divine sign” was a well-known theme 
discussed in Athens and, which had probably resulted in a lot of slander, as Socrates 
later will highlight in his defense.10 It is also likely that the discussions concerning 
Socrates and his upcoming trial, increased during the two months’ interval between 
Socrates’ preliminary hearing and trial.11 It is imaginable that the fronts between 
Socrates’ devotees and his opponents toughened in this period. Such a climate usually 
                                                          
10 The first mention of Socrates’ “divine sign” we find thirty-three dramatic years earlier in the 
Alcibiades I (432) when Socrates explains it to the young Alcibiades; and in the Theaetetus (399) 
where he elaborates on it, see Introduction: section 3.2: The midwife at work, pp. 23-6. It is also 
referred to in the Republic (496c2-3) where he states the following: “My case—the demonic sign—
isn’t worth mentioning, for it has perhaps occurred in some one other man, or no other, before.”  
11 On the interval of two months, see Nails (2002, 321). 
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creates conflicts and, thus, the controversies connected to Socrates could have been 
taken as a confirmation that he was a potential source of faction; this is in turn a 
reaction connected to the Athenians’ fear of conflicting parties and the homonoia-
topos as sketched above. During this period of time Meletus gained support from 
Anytus and Lycon who joined him in the prosecution against Socrates. Nevertheless, 
also Socrates gained support. In his defense he names a cluster of prominent men who 
are willing to speak in his favor and, an anecdote relates that the famous speech writer 
Lysias actually composed a defense speech which Socrates declined to use.12  
10.6 Socrates introduces his defense 
The point zero is now reached; not only within the Platonic corpus, as mentioned 
above, but also in Athens where the trial must have denoted a critical moment packed 
with tension. The first time Socrates heard the charges against him they were put forth 
by Meletus alone.  Now, in court, prior to his defense he has listened to the deposition 
and heard how the three prosecutors have joined forces against him; but whatever the 
impact their speech was, it is not with discouragement Socrates enters the stage. He 
marks his distance toward his accusers by drawing three distinctions which, creates the 
first foundation for his defense. The first distinction is between fabrications and truth; 
this he launches through the opening lines: “I do not know, men of Athens, how my 
accusers affected you; as for me, I was almost carried away in spite of myself, so 
persuasively did they speak” (17a1-3). He goes on by insisting that most of what the 
accusers said was lies and, he promises that from him they will hear the whole truth 
(cf. 17b7-8). The second distinction, between styled rhetoric and everyday-language, 
rests on the first; Socrates proclaims that the “whole truth” will not be “expressed in 
embroidered and stylized phrases like theirs” (17b9), but “things spoken at random 
and expressed in the first words that come to mind” (17c1-3). This, he says, is 
imperative because it would not be fitting at his age, as it might be for a young man, to 
toy with words when appearing before the jury (cf. 17c4-5). By rejecting “embroidered 
and stylized phrases” he discards forensic rhetoric and, and by arguing that it might be 
fit for a young man to play with words in front of the jury he signals that he does not 
                                                          




intend to take Meletus seriously. By this maneuver, he simultaneously pinpoints 
Meletus as his main target, so that right at the outset he succeeds in a distinct manner 
to belittle Meletus. The third distinction, between the Socrates described by the 
accusers and, the Socrates “you gentlemen” know, rests on the two former and is 
launched through an appeal to recognition: “One thing I beg of you gentlemen: if you 
hear me making my defense in the same language as I am accustomed to use in the 
marketplace by the banker’s tables, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, 
do not be surprised or create a disturbance on that account” (17c5-d1). These three 
distinctions are used by Socrates as rhetorical devices for appealing to the jury’s 
common sense: Meletus is young and unknown, Socrates is old and well-known; 
Meletus has ridiculed Socrates through embroidered and stylized phrases, Socrates has 
excused Meletus’ conduct referring to young men’s manners; the Socrates described is 
not the Socrates they know; so, when listening the gentlemen of the jury can nod 
among themselves and, hopefully they recognize this.  
Socrates continues by stating that he is forced to defend himself not only against 
the new accusations, but against old ones as well (cf. 18a6-b3); it is the latter he fears 
the most. Whether the mentioning of the old accusations is an allusion to the 
reconciliation-topos or not, is a matter of speculation. But there was some whispering 
that many in Socrates’ circle had participated in the mutilation of the herms and 
profanation of the mysteries in 415 (cf. Nails 2002, 17-20); some also whispered that 
he had participated in the oligarchic revolutions of 411 and 404 (cf. Wolpert 2002, 64). 
Xenophon even states that Socrates’ accusers mentioned his association with Critias 
and Alcibiades and further that “Socrates’ accuser” holds him responsible for all the 
faults executed by the two later in life (cf. Mem. 1.2.12). Mentioning these events 
would be a violation of the amnesty, so if these whispering rumors have some truth to 
them, Socrates could not have been prosecuted on these accounts; thus a speculative 
conclusion at this moment is that there was a political agenda underlying the 
indictment (cf. Waterfield 2009, 33). But if we listen carefully to Socrates’ own words 




10.6.1 The old accusations (19a8-24b4) 
With a desire to try—in a short period of time—to remove the slander of him from the 
minds of the Athenians (cf. 18e4-19a2),13 Socrates the philosopher addresses the old 
accusations. This defense is a necessary shadow-fight due to the slander on the basis of 
which Socrates claims that the Athenians have already convicted him. Long before the 
trial started it had been a widespread opinion that “Socrates is guilty of wrongdoing in 
that he busies himself studying things in the sky and below the earth: he makes the 
worse into the stronger argument, and he teaches these same things to others” (19b4-
c1). The momentousness of this threefold charge can be enlightened by Socrates’ 
elaboration to Euthyphro some weeks previous: “[…] the Athenians do not mind 
anyone they think clever, as long as he does not teach his own wisdom, but if they 
think that he makes others to be like himself they get angry, whether through envy […] 
or for some other reason” (Euth. 3c6-d2). So, in addition to trying to prove that he 
differs both in words and deeds from the famous sophists and philosophers, he also has 
to refute that he possesses a wisdom of his own which he teaches others. This threefold 
undertaking is the main aim in this section of the defense.  
Socrates sets out by creating a distance to the philosophers by claiming that the 
slander began with the Aristophanic comedy the Clouds (first produced in 423). In this 
play many of the Athenians had seen “a Socrates swinging about there, saying he was 
walking on air and talking a lot of nonsense about things of which I know nothing at 
all” (19c3-5). Does Meletus think that he is prosecuting Anaxagoras of Clazomenae?, 
Socrates asks (cf. 26d). Or does Meletus believe that Socrates pretends that these 
absurd theories are of his making? (cf. 26e). Socrates strongly refuses to have any part 
of this kind of knowledge; on this he boldly calls on the majority of the jury as his 
witnesses when arguing that “I think it is right that all those of you who have heard me 
conversing […] should tell each other if anyone of you has ever heard me discussing 
such subjects to any extent at all. From this you will learn that the other things said 
about me by the majority are of the same kind” (19d1-7). He uses the same strategy 
                                                          
13 The seriousness of this desire becomes clear when Socrates continues: “I wish this may happen, if 
it is in any way better for you and me, and that my defense may be successful, but I think this is very 
difficult and I am fully aware of how difficult it is. Even so, let the matter proceed as the god may 
wish, but I must obey the law and make my defense” (19a2-7). 
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toward the sophists. He rejects that he possesses their kind of knowledge and he 
strongly denies that he has ever undertaken “to teach people and charge a fee for it” 
(19d9-e1).14 To underline this Socrates refers to Callias who allegedly had spent a lot 
of  money on the sophists, who Callias and others considered to be experts on 
excellence and received fees for their teachings: “I would certainly pride myself and 
preen myself if I had this kind of knowledge, but I do not have it, gentlemen” (20c2-
4), Socrates argues. So, in addition to having proved that he differs both in words and 
deeds from the famous sophists and philosophers, he has in this manner also refuted 
that he possesses a wisdom of his own which he teaches others. But he acknowledges 
that the slander has a cause; all these rumors and slanders would not have arisen unless 
he did something other than most people (cf. 20c8).  
Socrates argues that the cause of his bad reputation is due to a certain kind of 
wisdom, which he denotes as “human wisdom” (ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία, 20d7). He stresses 
that he might be in possession of this wisdom; but is reluctant because the story 
connected to it did not originate with him. So in order to present a trustworthy source 
he calls “upon the god at Delphi as witness to the existence and nature” (20e7-8) of 
this wisdom. Socrates now points to the late Chaerephon who was a friend of his from 
childhood; he was well-known and respected in the city especially because he had 
shared the exile and return of the men of Piraeus (cf. 21a1-2).15 Then he presents a 
story relating that Chaerephon once ventured to ask the oracle of Delphi if anyone was 
wiser than Socrates. The oracle allegedly stated that no one was wiser. As Chaerephon 
now is dead, Socrates maintains that “his brother will testify to you about this” (21a7-
8).  
This is a critical point in the defense for at least three reasons. First, so far, 
Socrates has distanced himself from a certain kind of philosophical knowledge and 
denied that he possesses the knowledge of the sophists. Hopefully, the jury is now 
convinced that he does not teach others what the accusers claim he does. Secondly, he 
                                                          
14 Later Socrates even argues that he has never been anyone’s teacher at all (cf. 33a6). However, in 
the Republic (392d f.), he implied to be Adeimantus’ teacher—however he does not charge a fee. 
15 In Greek this reads: οὗτος ἐμός τε ἑταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἑταῖρός τε καὶ συνέφυγε 
τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν κατῆλθε. Compared to the translation of Grube which I use, Harold 
North Fowler translates this with some differences in the nuances: “He was my comrade from youth 
and the comrade of your democratic party, and shared in the recent exile and came back with you.” 
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has activated the demos-topos by connecting himself to Chaerephon, the celebrated 
pro-democrat who took part in the democratic resistance, and who shared the exile and 
return of the men of Piraeus. Thirdly, according to the story of Chaerephon the oracle 
of Delphi has witnessed to Socrates’ kind of wisdom. Thus, by calling upon two highly 
respected witnesses (the god of Delphi and the men of Piraeus) Socrates can claim to 
be telling the truth. The implicit question is: How can I not be telling the truth, for who 
would dare to call on these authorities in vain? Whether the jury accepted this or not, 
is not easy to decide upon; but noticeably their reaction was loud: In this short section 
Socrates twice asks them not to “create a disturbance” (cf. 20e4, 21a5). He continues 
by entreating the jury to consider his version because his intent was only to inform 
them about the origin of the slander. Now he wants to tell them how he reacted when 
Chaerephon delivered the oracle’s words.  
His first thought was, “Whatever does the god mean? What is his riddle? I am 
very conscious that I am not wise at all; what then does he mean by saying that I am 
the wisest? For surely he does not lie; it is not legitimate for him to do so” (21b3-6). 
For a long time he was at loss, but after a while he—again very reluctantly—decided 
to investigate and “attach the greatest importance to the god’s oracle” (21e5). He went 
to one of the city’s public men “reputed wise” in order to “refute the oracle” (cf. 21b8-
c1). When Socrates investigated this man, and when he tried to show him that he only 
thought himself to be wise, the man and many of the bystanders came to dislike 
Socrates. So he concluded, “I am wiser than this man; it is likely that neither of us 
knows anything worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does not, 
whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than 
he to this small extent, that I do not think I know what I do not know” (21d2-7). 
Socrates has now established a God-given authority regarding his systematically 
performed investigations of the wisdom of his fellow citizens. Hence, he is in the 
position to claim that all his investigations were performed in service of the god. In his 
enquiry he himself experienced that “those who had the highest reputation were nearly 
the most deficient, while those who were thought to be inferior were more 
knowledgeable” (22a4-6). Again, he stresses that these labors were undertaken solely 
to prove the oracle irrefutable (cf. 22a6-8). After having investigated the poets, the 
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craftsmen and the politicians he found a shared error: “each of them, because of his 
success at his craft, thought himself very wise in other most important pursuits, and 
this error of theirs overshadowed the wisdom they had” (22d6-e1). The result was that 
Socrates “acquired much unpopularity, of a kind that is hard to deal with and is a 
heavy burden; many slanders came from these people and a reputation for wisdom, for 
in each case the bystanders thought that I myself possessed the wisdom that I proved 
that my interlocutors did not have” (23a1-5). Nonetheless, despite the unpopularity 
and slander he continued as the god bade him (cf. 23b4-5). For the first time he 
stresses that it was because of this occupation that he had no leisure to take care of his 
own affairs but lived in great poverty due to his service to the god (cf. 23b8-c1). The 
underlining premises here are: if it were not for my service to the god, I would have 
had the leisure to take care of my household and other affairs. And, if I had been 
teaching my own theories to others and received a fee, I would not have been poor.  
His next step is to comment briefly on the charge of corrupting the young. The 
young men who have been following him around were the sons of the very rich, the 
ones who had most leisure and the ones who have taken pleasure in hearing him 
questioning people now started to imitate him by trying to question others themselves. 
His comment to their imitating praxis is that he thinks “they find an abundance of men 
who believe they have some knowledge but know little or nothing. The result is that 
those whom they question are angry, not with themselves but with me” (23c5-9). 
When asked, these men who were questioned by the youths imitating Socrates, 
presented ignorant answers and just repeated the old accusations, which are available 
against all philosophers (23d4).16 They were not willing to admit that it had been 
proved that they laid claim to knowledge that they did not possess. These offended 
men are now identified as one concrete course of the slander and they are dangerous, 
“ambitious, violent and numerous; they are continually and convincingly talking about 
me; they have been filling your ears for a long time with vehement slanders against 
me” (23e2-4). Socrates infers that it is from the perspective of these offended men that 
his three accusers now attack him. Once more he stresses that he has told the jury the 
                                                          
16 Socrates here refers to an ancient, deeply rooted, and essentially imponderable hostility against 
philosophers; and in this situation especially against Socrates, the philosopher. On this perspective, 
see Baracchi (2009). 
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truth—and if the jurors themselves are willing to investigate, they will find exactly 
what he now has explained (cf. 24b1-2).  
So far, his strategy has been to elaborate on the cause of his bad reputation and 
the origin of the slander against him. He has tried to convince the jury that his human 
wisdom is of another kind than the one possessed by the philosophers and the sophists: 
“What is probable, gentlemen, is that in fact the god is wise and that his oracular 
response meant that human wisdom is worth little or nothing” (23a5-7). By arguing 
that the “human wisdom” has little value, he implicitly urges that there is no wisdom 
that he can teach others. He barely touches upon the charge of corrupting the young; 
but when he does, he claims that he only was obeying the god’s order and the youths 
were imitating him. From this argument, the jury is implicitly requested to infer that he 
has actually never taught anything to anyone. In addition, by implying that the oracle 
of Delphi has warranted his human wisdom, and simultaneously activating the demos-
topos through his dear friend Chaerephon, he has gradually widened his foundation. In 
addition, when he through Chaerephon emphasizes his belonging to the democratic 
demos (cf. the demos-topos) and simultaneously distances himself from his fellow 
citizens (cf. the homonoia-topos) he has managed to situate himself both as citizen and 
philosopher: The loyal citizen belongs to the democratic demos, whilst the 
philosopher’s right to live a life in opposition to the homonoia-ideal is warranted in the 
god. This he will both utilize and conceal in the next section of his defense; and it is 
from this grounding he encounters his new accusers. The condition for him to succeed 
is that the jury is convinced that he has told them the truth. It seems like Socrates is 
comfortable when he changes his strategy from elaboration to attack and attempts to 
substantiate that he is brought to trial on false presumptions.  
 
10.6.2 The new accusations (24b4-35d9) 
The three accusers argue that “Socrates is guilty of corrupting the young and of not 
believing in the gods in whom the city believes, but in other new spiritual things” 
(24b8-c1). Instead of dealing directly with this twofold charge, Socrates presents a 
countercharge: “Meletus is guilty of dealing frivolously with serious matters, of 
irresponsibly bringing people into court, and of professing to be seriously concerned 
with things about none of which he has ever cared” (24c4-8). Socrates’ questioning of 
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Meletus may have an odd ring to it compared with how his questioning is executed 
throughout the Platonic corpus.17 But contrary to what is the case in these well-known 
procedures, his aim here is to show that Meletus has a concealed agenda and hence 
that the real charge is not in accordance with the charges of the deposition (cf. the 
twofold perspectives of the reconciliation-topos). How does he do this? When 
confronting Meletus, after having dealt with the charge of corrupting the young (cf. 
24d2-3), he concludes and claims to have shown that Meletus, through the 
questioning, has made it sufficiently obvious that he has never had any concern for the 
youths of Athens and has given no thought to the subjects about which he brought 
Socrates to trial (cf. 25c1-4). Addressing the jury, Socrates stresses that what he “said 
is clearly true: Meletus has never been at all concerned with these matters” (26a9-b2). 
The same happens when he turns to the charge of impiety. After the questioning, and 
after Meletus has upheld twice that Socrates does not believe in gods at all (cf. 26c7-
d1, 26e4), Socrates urges: “The man appears to me, men of Athens, highly insolent 
and uncontrolled. He seems to have made his deposition out of insolence, violence and 
youthful zeal” (26e6-27a1) and “he appears to contradict himself” (27a8). This 
sequence ends when Socrates concludes: “You must have made this deposition, 
Meletus, either to test us or because you were at loss to find any wrongdoing for which 
to accuse me” (27e3-5). Socrates seems to be at ease and very self-confident when he 
utters his last words to Meletus: “There is no way in which you could persuade anyone 
of even a small intelligence” (28e5-6). His last address to the jury in this sequence 
looks like a closing argument: “I do not think, men of Athens, that it requires a 
prolonged defense to prove that I am not guilty of the charges in Meletus’ deposition, 
but this is sufficient” (28a2-4). Socrates’ rhetorical use of the countercharge turns out 
to be his main defense against Meletus’ twofold charge, and Socrates signals intensely 
that he himself thinks he in this way has refuted Meletus. He has also (apparently) 
refuted that he has a wisdom that he teaches to others. But it does not mean that he is 
finished and comfortable, because he now presents a reservation: “On the other hand, 
you know that what I said earlier is true, that I am very unpopular with many people. 
                                                          
17 Socrates’ “refutation” of Meletus has been a theme broadly discussed, and there has been severe 
disagreement about what Socrates accomplished through this questioning. For a survey and 
discussion, see Gonzalez (2009, 118-24). 
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[…] This has destroyed many other good men and will, I think, continue to do so. 
There is no danger that it will stop at me” (28a5-b1). 
The defense now takes a new turn. In this section Socrates argues implicitly that 
he does not present a potential political threat because he is law-abiding and loyal to 
the superior—be it god or men. He starts with posing a hypothetical question: 
“Someone might say: ‘are you not ashamed, Socrates, to have followed the kind of 
occupation that has led to your being now in danger of death?’” (28b2-4). He answers 
by referring to the heroes who died in Troy and especially Achilles who “despised 
death and danger and was much more afraid to live a coward who did not avenge his 
friends” (28d1-2). From this reference he reminds the jury that  “wherever a man has 
taken a position that he believes is the best, or has been placed by his commander, 
there he must I think remain and face danger, without a thought for fear of death or 
anything else, rather than disgrace” (28d5-9). So, when Socrates was ordered, at 
Potidaea,18 Amphipolis19 and Delium,20 by commanders elected by the Athenians, 
would it not have been a dreadful thing to abandon the post out of fear of death? And 
when Socrates was ordered by the god (as he thought and believed) to live the life of a 
philosopher, to examine himself and others, would it not have been a dreadful thing to 
abandon the post out of fear of death? (cf. 28d10-29a1). If this had been the case, 
Socrates argues, then he might “truly have justly been brought here for not believing 
that there are gods, disobeying the oracle, fearing death, and thinking I was wise when 
I was not” (29a1-5). He has now made “the fear of death” into a steppingstone which 
enables him to exemplify for the jury his way of philosophizing: “To fear death, 
gentlemen, is no other than to think oneself wise when one is not, to think one knows 
what one does not know. No one knows whether death may not be the greatest of all 
blessings for a man, yet men fear it as if they knew that it is the greatest of evils. And 
                                                          
18 In the Charmides (429) we meet Socrates when he just has returned from Potidaea (cf. 153a). In 
the Symposium (418/16) Alcibiades states that Socrates saved his life when they served together at 
the battlefields of Potidaea (cf. 220d-e). On a discussion of Socrates’ partaking in the battle of 
Potidaea, see Woodbury (1971). 
19 On a discussion of the controversies regarding Socrates’ partaking in the battle of Amphipolis, see 
Woodbury (1971). 
20 In the Symposium Alcibiades gives Socrates credit for the coolness and determination that he 
showed in the retreat from Delium (cf. 220e-221a). On a discussion of Socrates’ partaking in the 
battle of Delium, see Woodbury (1971). 
369 
 
surely it is the most blameworthy ignorance to believe that one knows what one does 
not know” (29a6-b3). This is an instruction which in turn enables him to activate the 
homonoia-topos directly: “It is perhaps on this point and in this respect, gentlemen, 
that I differ (διαφέρω) from the majority of men, and if I were to claim that I am wiser 
that anyone in anything, it would be in this, that, as I have no adequate knowledge of 
things in the underworld, so I do not think I have” (29b3-6). After having explicitly 
situated himself as a genuine philosopher, Socrates goes on; even if he is different 
from them and not attuned to their ideal of same-mindedness—he shares their values 
because he knows “that it is wicked and shameful to do wrong, to disobey one’s 
superior, be he god or man” (29b6-8).  
When Socrates at this point turns his attention indirectly towards his second 
accuser, Anytus, he once again refers to the homonoia-topos: he now presents a 
proposition: What will happen if the jury stated that they do not believe Anytus now? 
What will happen if the jury acquits him on the condition that Socrates stops his 
investigations and promises not to practice philosophy? And if caught in doing so, then 
he will die? In his answer, he maintains that it is his duty to be different from them; he 
will continue his God-given mission because it is the god’s order; it is for the 
Athenians sake he is doing this—he is a gift to the city; a gadfly placed there by god. 
He lectures them and he threatens them: “I will obey the god rather than you, and as 
long as I draw breath and am able, I shall not cease to practice philosophy, to exhort 
you […]” (29c1-e2). What Socrates is describing is his well-known approach when 
meeting and questioning people; this approach is confirmed by the famous general 
Nicias twenty-five dramatic years earlier when he in the Laches (dramatic date 424) 
defended Socrates’ questioning and actually recommended his procedure to 
Lysimachus.21 That Socrates is now forced to explain how he practices philosophy to 
                                                          
21 Nicias: “You don’t appear to me to know that whoever comes into close contact with Socrates and 
associates with him in conversation must necessarily, even if he began by conversing about 
something quite different in the first place, keep on being led about by the man’s arguments until he 
submits to answering questions about himself concerning both his present manner of life and the life 
he has lived hitherto. And when he does submit to this questioning, you don’t realize that Socrates 
will not let him go before he has well and truly tested every last detail. I personally am accustomed 
to the man and know that one has to put up with his kind of treatment from him, and further, I know 
perfectly well that I myself will have to submit to it. I take pleasure in the man’s company, 
Lysimachus, and don’t regard it as at all a bad thing to have it brought to our attention that we have 
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the Athenians, could indicate that the mood in Athens had changed during the 
restauration of the democracy and especially due to the fear of factions and the highly 
valued ideal of same-mindedness. In this regard, Socrates the philosopher is placeless 
(atopos). He ends his exhortation with a promise: “I shall treat in this way anyone I 
happen to meet, young and old, citizen and stranger, and more so the citizens because 
you are more kindred to me” (30a2-4); whereupon he reassures his jury that they can 
be sure “that this is what the god orders me to do, and I think there is no greater 
blessing for the city than my service to the god” (30a5-7). He then, for the second 
time, touches upon the reason why he has not taken part in public affairs: His divine 
sign which never tells him what to do, but what not to do, has ordered him: “This is 
what has prevented me from taking part in public affairs, and I think it was quite right 
to prevent me” (31d5-7). And since he has lived his philosophical life as a soldier 
fighting for justice, he stresses for the third time that he could not live a public life. He 
states: “A man who really fights for justice must lead a private, not a public, life if he 
is to survive for even a short time” (32a1-3).  
Socrates the philosopher now rests his case; and Socrates the citizen takes the 
stand. Somehow, Socrates is convinced that if he had been a part of the public life, he 
would have been executed long ago. Nevertheless, he stresses that as a citizen he once 
served as a member of the Council. During this period he experienced that ten generals 
failed to pick up the survivors after a naval battle—this was an illegal act according to 
the democratic laws in 406 (cf. Nails 2002, 79-82). Socrates explains that he was the 
only member of the presiding committee to oppose when the others wanted to try the 
ten general as one body; he recognized that this was an act contrary to the laws, thus 
he voted against it (cf. 32b). He states the following: “the orators were ready to 
prosecute me and take me away, and your shouts were driving them on, but I thought I 
should run any risk on the side of law and justice rather than join you, for fear of 
prison or death, when you were engaged in an unjust course” (32b-c). This is a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
dome or are doing wrong. Rather I think that a man who does not run away from such treatment but 
is willing, according to the saying of Solon, to value learning as long as he lives, not supposing that 
old age brings him wisdom of itself, will necessarily pay more attention to the rest of his life. For me 
there is nothing unusual or unpleasant in being examined by Socrates, but I realized some time ago 
that the conversation would not be about the boys but about ourselves, if Socrates were present. As 
I say, I don’t myself mind talking with Socrates in whatever way he likes.” Laches, 187e6-188c3.  
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citizen’s underlining of the righteousness of following the laws; and by being law-
abiding he has also rescued several Athenian democrats from wrongdoing. By this 
example he expresses his loyalty to the democratic rules and laws; and he also 
manages to leave the impression that he was even more righteous towards the 
democratic laws than the democratic leaders themselves.  
His next example is from the period when the oligarchy was established and the 
Thirty summoned him and four others to arrest Leon of Salamis (cf. 32c4-d8). The 
Thirty gave many such orders, he says, in order to implicate so many as possible in 
their guilt. But, he continues, “then I showed again, not in words (οὐ λόγῳ) but in 
action (ἔργῳ) that I did not fear death” (32d); even the powerful and violent 
government did not frighten him into any wrongdoing; either unjust or impious, he 
says. The others brought Leon in, but Socrates went home. If the government had not 
fallen shortly afterwards, he might have been put to death for not obeying orders. 
These two instances show that also the citizen Socrates saw it fit to employ the new 
rhetoric of the demos-topos; while the philosopher used it to present his wisdom as 
warranted by the oracle of Delphi through reference to the celebrated democrat 
Chaerephon, the citizen uses it first by putting forth that he saved democrats from a 
potential wrongdoing (I am a democratic sympathizer), and in the latter he marks his 
distance to the Thirty (I am not a sympathizer with the oligarchs). 
10.7 Summary 
From my perspective in the limbo between narration and reality, I have presented a 
reflection on how the new forensic rhetoric can be traced in the Apology. Through the 
three activated topoi Socrates has used the homonoia-topos in order to situate himself 
as a philosopher and claim his right to live the life of a philosopher in accordance with 
the god’s demand—that is, he argued for his right to live as atopos; he implicitly 
activated the reconciliation-topos (cf. the twofold perspective mentioned above) in 
order to claim that he should not have been prosecuted in the first place; and he 
activated the demos-topos both as philosopher and citizen in order to argue that he first 
and foremost had been law-abiding and had lived in accordance with the orders given 
him from both men and god. I will not conclude whether Socrates was guilty or not 
according to the charge. Instead I will once again quote Socrates when he signals 
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surprise when receiving the guilty verdict: “I think myself that I have been cleared of 
Meletus’ charges, and not only this, but it is clear to all that, if Anytus and Lycon had 
not joined him in accusing me, he would have been fined a thousand drachmas for not 
receiving a fifth of the votes” (36a6-b1). Maybe Socrates’ self-confidence and 
sometimes arrogant tone signals a seventy-year-old man not attuned to the new waves 
and frames of mind within the society he is a part of? Or, maybe Socrates was right 
when arguing that he was prosecuted on false assumptions? His prosecutors did not 
harvest honor for their victory. According to one anecdote the Athenians were so 
angry at the death of Socrates that they put Meletus to death without trial (Diodorus 
14.37.7); and another tells us that the Athenians repented, executed Meletus and 
banished Anytus and Lycon, meanwhile commissioning Lysippus to cast a bronze 



















                                                          




With this dissertation I aimed to give a contribution to the field “peace and war 
thematic,” and throughout my readings I have tried to state plausible reasons for the 
dissertation’s hypothesis which is that it is possible to read the Platonic corpus as a 
body of critique where Plato, in the end, stands forth as a spokesperson for peace or as 
a powerful anti-war voice. I have presented two main arguments in this regard: First 
that the Republic can be read as a dramatic backdrop for the dialogues. Second that the 
dialogues can be read as dramatized historical touchdowns wherein the readers are 
invited to study what happens when Socrates, the philosopher, encounters various 
historical personae that, one way or another—could have had or have had— an impact 
on Athenian culture, paideia, and politics.  
 Regarding the first argument, I gave grounds for the backdrop-claim, on the one 
hand, by showing that the Republic is not equipped with a dramatic date, and, on the 
other, that through the three generations present—who all are related to Athenian 
politics and hence implicitly signify momentous instances that occurred on the 
Athenian political stage—a profound critique of Athenian values surfaced. Through a 
close-reading of the Prelude (327a1-328c5) I evaluated the arguments that made 
Socrates and Glaucon stay in Piraeus. Further, I suggested that Socrates took on the 
task of legitimizing philosophy by contrasting it with sophistry. This legitimizing I 
have identified as a three-fold process.  
 I found two parts of the Republic bracketed by the phrase “it is so resolved.” The 
first bracketing I denoted as the Prologue (331d10-362d2), and this was the first part 
of the three-fold legitimizing process. During the Prologue Socrates first encountered 
old Cephalus (328c6-331d3). I showed that it was detectable how Socrates implicitly 
started his criticism of the authoritative poetic topos. When Cephalus’ son, 
Polemarchus (331e1-336a10) interrupted, Socrates immediately started his explicit 
attack on the poetic topos and, in addition, he showed that the Athenian moral topos 
(do good to your friends and harm your enemies) was embedded in the first. Through 
the proceedings Socrates employed in his encounter with Polemarchus, I suggested 
that he made him turn toward philosophy. Socrates third conversation was with 
Thrasymachus (336b1-354c5). This encounter exhibited how the two parties warranted 
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their arguments, in sophistry and philosophy, respectively, which are two incompatible 
special topoi. The consequence was that they created an unsolvable violent discourse. 
This led to the interuption of Adeimantus and Glaucon where they lended support to 
Thrasymachus (357a1-369b4). In their opinion Thrasymachus had, honestly and 
openly, warranted his arguments on politics in the opinions of the many, and 
methodologially in the topos of sophistry. With regard to justice his warrant was the 
Athenian moral topos, thus—according to the brothers—Socrates had to find another 
way to persuade them and the particular audience. Therefore, the assembly resolved 
that Socrates would not be released until he told them the entire story on the matter. 
This marked the end of the prologue.  
 The second part of the three-fold legitimizing process started with the second 
bracketing (369b5-451b8) which I denoted as preparations for entering the realm of 
philosophy. In order to meet the challenges set forth by the brothers, I showed how 
Socrates awaked the two-city-topos which was grounded in an old discussion where 
the aim was to superpose one city in war and one in peace; when merged the new 
alternative would be freed from violent conflicts. In A1, the “true city” was launched 
as a thought experiment. This city was self-sufficient; a peaceful harmony that 
functioned according to nature due to the division of labor (one man, one job 
according to his inherent potential). Glaucon and Socrates decided to investigate a 
“feverish city” as described in G1. Due to the inhabitants’ endless craving, the origin of 
war was identified as pleonexia, thus two perspectives on war came to light. Socrates 
also presented the dog-philosopher analogy and, on that basis, he tried to make 
Glaucon infer how the nature of men fit for guarding ought to be; but Glaucon failed. 
G1 ended with Socrates’ conclusion that the guardians’ natures ought to “be 
philosophic, spirited, swift, and strong” (376c4-6). The nature of the guardians as 
defined in G1 was transported into the equation when Adeimantus and Socrates in A2 
set out to educate the guardians in speech and, aimed to decide how such natures could 
be preserved through paideia. They picked up on Adeimantus’ challenges, and their 
approach was to evaluate the conventional paideia; the impact of their course of action 
was the start of the purging of the feverish city. The running theme in A2 was lies and 
lying. Through A2 Socrates met Adeimantus’ challenges by getting rid of the causes 
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for his initial frustration. This was done through a cleansing of poetry, and the 
restrictions became visible when the lies voiced by some of the celebrated poets were 
highlighted and prohibited. They decided on two laws containing concrete models for 
the poets: a) the god is the cause of the good, b) the demonic and divine is free from 
lie. Further, we learned that the gods and humans hated both the “real lie (ὄντι 
ψεῦδος)” and the “true lie (ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος);” however, the “useful lie” could function 
as a remedy used by doctors and rulers.  
In G2 the “noble lie” was introduced, and from here the reformed paideia seemed 
to go hand in hand with the myth of the soul-metal as an argument for keeping the 
classes pure. When Socrates wanted Glaucon to probe into how the earth-born 
guardians were to be settled and educated, Glaucon believed they already have been 
educated. Still, Socrates argued that this was not the entire picture. “It’s not fit to be 
too sure about that […] However, it is fit to be sure about what we were saying a while 
ago, that they must get the right education, whatever it is, if they’re going to have 
what’s most important for being tame with each other and those who are guarded by 
them” (416b9-c1). At this point Socrates started to speak in an ambiguous manner; and 
his utterance “whatever this education is” signaled that there was more to come. From 
this ambiguity, I suggested that this was a pointing forward to the third wave, where 
the philosophers are to be introduced as rulers and their education will be subsequently 
described in detail. At this point Adeimantus interrupted and in A3 Adeimantus started 
to advocate his initial role as judge. On behalf of the inhabitants of his city, he 
presented two concerns: The first regarded their happiness, and the second regarded 
warfare. Socrates settled the first by arguing that the main thing was to prevent poverty 
and wealth among them, and the second by referring to restricted growth, securing an 
unbreakable unity, and preserve the right education and rearing. He concluded that 
Adeimantus’ city at this point was fully founded. Glaucon interrupted and at the outset 
of G3 he took on his previous role as the devil’s advocate and presented his initial 
concern regarding justice. 
Socrates met his concern and highlighted that justice is that a man minds his own 
business concerning what is within—“what truly concerns him and his own” (443d2). 
We learned that the just man “arranges himself” and harmonizes the three parts of his 
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soul “exactly like three notes in a harmonic scale, lowest, highest and middle” (443d6-
7). Glaucon was explicitly told that it is precisely the same parts that harmonize the 
city. Now that this investigation was completed, and justice had been identified both in 
man and city, Socrates concluded that “If we should assert that we have found the just 
man and city and what justice really is in them, I don’t suppose we’d seem to be telling 
an utter lie” (444a4-6). I argued that this conclusion entailed that by evaluating the 
virtues in Adeimantus’ city of speech, Glaucon understood that these features were 
also present in his fully purged feverish city. This entailed that the two cities were 
superposed. The devil’s advocate could now rest his case because they had turned the 
tables and reached a definition of justice, which they in addition tested and evaluated. 
This new concept of justice enabled them to assert that both city and men are just. 
Finally, this turnabout also entailed that there was no longer a need for the rulers to tell 
“noble lies” to its citizens (cf. 444a4-6). I also showed that the movements between 
Adeimantus’ thought-experiment and Glaucon’s feverish city was used, by Socrates, 
as a pedagogical tool in order to make Glaucon (and the readers) turn toward 
philosophy. Thus, these preparatory stages, viewed from a pedagogical perspective, 
were to make us (both the men gathered and the readers) understand that we were on 
our way to philosophy. 
 In the third part of the three-fold legitimizing process, I argued that we had 
entered the realm of philosophy. Here we first encountered the three paradoxical 
waves where I discussed Socrates’ considerations which followed them. I suggested 
that in these considerations we witnessed the final dismissal of Atheninan values, and 
that the contrast between philosophy and sophistry was sharpened. Through the 
reading of the second part of G3, I tried to follow Socrates’ argument consistently (as 
he urges us to do). From this outset, I highlighted Socrates’ considerations following 
the first wave and showed that women were excluded from partaking in politics due to 
old habits constituted by men. Socrates argued that there are no sound arguments—
according to nature—to support such a view; hence, with reference to the art of eristic 
he demonstrated that these old habits were warranted there. In his considerations 
following the second wave, Socrates’ grounding principle was that men are the only 
animal that wage war. He did not reflect upon whether war was good or evil but on 
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how war is conducted. Hence, he launched a new kind of warfare, and redefined the 
concepts “war” and “stasis.” Through these redefinitions and the discussions 
throughout these sections, I argued that war as a defensive act was necessary while 
war-waging was not. Further, in order to make these new controversial thoughts even 
thinkable, Socrates suggested that philosophers must be appointed rulers of the new-
borned regime. 
I also paid close attention to Glaucon and the question related to his turning and 
education. His attitude and behavior has been continuously in movement; he alternated 
in that he was sometimes fully attentive and sometimes the opposite; he signaled both 
enthusiasm and boredom; sometimes he was eager to discuss, and sometimes he did 
not want to talk at all. I stated reasons for why I have not been convinced regarding his 
philosophical abilities. That he in addition offered to be Socrates’ ally in battle and 
was politely excused (contrary to Polemarchus who was invited and Adeimantus who 
was given advice on how to stand up against arguments contra philosophers), I took to 
be a sign of him not turning toward philosophy.  
Overall, due to the showing of the long and hard road toward philosophy, and 
due to the exhibition of parts of the topos of philosophy, I have stated reasons for how 
the Republic can be read as a backdrop of the other dialogues; and I have also showed 
how the Republic contains a profound critique of Athenian values that lead to war. 
Thus, this long road toward philosophy is simoultainously a path toward peace and 
prosperity because the education proposed on an individual level leads to a politeia 
incompatible with war-waging politics.  
When turning to the other dialogues—or the historical touchdowns—the  guiding 
premise for the readings was that it all started as a hunt for facts about Socrates. I 
highlighted the theme “encountering youths,” and concentrated on the Parmenides, the 
Protagoras, the Alcibiades I, the Charmides, the Sophist, and the Apology. By reading 
the Prologue of the Parmenides, I showed how Parmenides made Socrates turn toward 
philosophy. I contrasted the dialectical procedure employed by Parmenides to the 
grounding premises in Protagoras’ paideia-program as it is launched in the 
Protagoras. In addition, I briefly touched upon Parmenides versus Protagoras as city-
founders and legislators. Compared to the paradigmatic regime established in the 
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Republic, Parmenides’ city and rule alludes to the best regime, while Protagoras’ 
alludes to the feverish city in need for a purging. Thus, the incompatibleness between 
philosophy and sophistry has been stated. 
Through the reading of the Prelude and the Hippocrates-section of the 
Protagoras, I showed that by preparing Hippocrates for meeting Protagoras, Socrates 
made him turn toward philosophy. In addition, based on Socrates’ own upsetting 
experience and the detectable hints regarding him acting out of character (atopos), I 
suggested that we witnessed his final turning. I also suggested that Socrates made 
Alcibiades turn toward philosophy; however, the effect was not long lasting because 
when left alone he returned to his old habits. When encountering the beautiful youth 
Charmides, it turned out that he was barren and his beauty shallow. I argued this 
entailed that Alcibiades belonged to the group of students leaving and coming back, 
and which Socrates at one point was forced by his inner daimon to dismiss, and that 
Charmides belonged to the group of students dismissed at the outset. Charmides was 
corrupted by his ignorant guardian Critias who was exposed by Socrates and thus an 
example on the enemies Socrates refers to in the Apology. 
When I encountered the Eleatic Stranger, I launched “confusion” as a theme. I 
suggested that due to discrepancies between deeds and arguments, he himself slowly 
but surely started to look like a hunting sophist, and consequently Theaetetus started to 
appear as the hunter’s prey. The impact was that the hunting-method camouflaged a 
hunting-metaphor which in turn concealed a threefold hunt. As the reader was hunting 
the Stranger; Theaetetus thought he was hunting the hunter-sophist while the Stranger 
in a deceptive hunt was hunting Theaetetus. With the proceedings of the Eleatic 
Stranger, the Socratic way of practicing philosophy started to fade away.  
When I addressed the Apology, my point of departure was to give a brief sketch 
of the three types of civic discourse—the homonoia-topos, the demos-topos and the 
reconciliation-topos—which after the stasis became three powerful topoi employed in 
forensic speeches. I inquired into how Socrates activated and made use of them in his 
defense; during this investigation, I showed how the defense as a whole was structured 
around these topoi. Through this literary and rhetorical reading, I showed that he 
presented a coherent defense both as a philosopher and as a citizen. Socrates argued 
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that he was a part of the city as a law-abiding citizen, but as a philosopher he defended 
his right for taking on an outsider status.  
My overall conclusion will be that through my readings I have showed that the 
corpus contains an implicit critique of the values that led to the decay of Athens. The 
critique launched in the Republic, provides a background that mirrors the dramatic 
staging—in the historical touchdowns—of prominent personas not willing or able to 
change, hence the past was made responsible for the conditions of the present. By 
launching an alternative politeia and paideia that is not compatible with war-waging, 
and by showing the multiple and, thus individual, paths toward philosophy, Plato in 




















Postscript: Weaving—the topos of peace 
When Hesiod advices women to “weave closely; make good cloth, with many woof-
threads in short length of wrap” his words—according to Rosenstock (1994, 363)—
“represents explicit imperatives for all manner of fastenings and constructions that 
sustain the social and cosmological order.”1 According to John Scheid and Jesper 
Svendbro (2001, 10) “Weaving demonstrates for both the hand and the eye a possible, 
or desirable, way to conceive life in society,” and further, weaving “symbolizes and 
enacts a certain conception of society and the cosmos” (ibid). This conception says 
something about “how relations of exchange, always fraught with the potential for 
dissolution and conflict, can be made stable” (Rosenstock, 1994, ibid). As the “wrap” 
is masculine and the “woof” is feminine (cf. Scheid and Svenbro 2001, 12)2 these 
“fastenings and constructions” which sustain the social order also points toward the 
necessity of intertwining the spheres of the masculine and the feminine; and when 
related to the peace-topos, weaving the masculine is coupled with the public 
(δημόσιος) sphere and war, whilst the feminine is coupled to the private (ἴδιος) sphere 
and peace. In the corpus it is not Socrates who speaks in favor of this necessary 
intertwining, but two unnamed strangers: the Athenian and the Eleatic.  
In the opening scenes of the Laws we learn that through his two sons Minos and 
Rhadamantus, it is Zeus who is given credit for laying down the laws among the 
Cretans; guided by his father’s oracles Minos established the laws for the cities, and 
Rhadamantus regulated the judicial affairs. All the practices of the Cretans exist with 
view to war, and the lawgiver had war in view of everything he did (cf. 625e). 
                                                          
1 Rosenstock is here quoting and referring to the anthropologist Annette Weiner, “Why Cloth? 
Wealth, Gender and Power in Oceania,” in Cloth and Human Experience, (eds.): A. Weiner and J. 
Schneider (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989, pp. 33-66). 
2 They further point out that “every huphasma (woven robe) or huphos (web) is made of a vertical 
stēmōn, a stiff tread sometimes called mitos (both of these Greek words, meaning wrap, are 
masculine), and of a horizontal, supple krokē, sometimes called rhodanē (these words, meaning 
“woof,” are feminine in Greek). The threads of the vertical wrap were held in position by stones that 
served as weights, laiai, which Aristotle compares with testicles (similarly, the Orphics considered 
that the mitos or “wrap thread” represented sperm, while Seneca speaks of the “coitus” of the wrap 
and the woof). We should therefor see the crossing of the stēmōn and krokē, their “interlacing” 
(sumplokē), as the union of man and woman, this first sunoikismos (cohabitation), of which the 
political sunoikismos seems to be the extension or multiplication,” p. 13. 
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Kleinias, the Cretan, argues that he believes the lawgiver “condemned the 
mindlessness of the many (τῶν πολλῶν), who do not realize that everyone (ὡς πάντες) 
throughout the whole of life an endless war exists against all cities” (625e). When all 
the laws are set down with view to war, and when those opposing war are being 
condemned and referred to as mindless, then there is no room for thinking and 
discussing peace. The view is that war between cities exists by nature and a city’s 
prosperity and the well-being of citizens is measured by counting victories and losses 
in war. Within such a climate the potential voices of peace are silenced. Indeed, peace 
is just a name used for denoting the periods between wars; or for denoting the periods 
used to prepare for the next upcoming war. However, it turns out that the Athenian 
Stranger does not share the view of the Cretan lawgiver, on the contrary, he launches a 
strong defense for peace: “The best, however, is neither war (πόλεμος) nor civil war 
(στάσις)—the necessity for these things is to be regretted—but rather peace and at the 
same time goodwill towards one another” (628c). Regarding the happiness 
(εὐδαιμονίαν) of a city or of a private person, no one who think along these lines will 
“become a correct statesman” and the one who first and only looks to external wars 
will “never become a lawgiver in the strict sense,” the Athenian Stranger argues. The 
correct statesman and lawgiver must “legislate the things of war for the sake of peace 
rather than the things of peace for the sake of what pertains to war.”(628c-e).  
In order to gain peace and secure the happiness of the polis, he argues strongly 
that this is not possible if women are left out of the equation (781a ff.). The equation is 
the legal and politically framework the Athenian Stranger is about to prescribe for 
Magnesia. The construction of whole legal and political framework the Athenian 
Stranger compares to weaving: “Now, it is impossible, when dealing with a web or any 
piece of weaving, to construct the wrap (masculine) and the woof (feminine) from the 
same stuff: the wrap must be of a superior type of material (strong and firm in 
character, while the woof is softer and suitably workable)” (734e-735a). The metaphor 
developing here is that in a just, peaceful and happy society a necessary premise is that 
masculine and feminine forces are intertwined.  
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When the Eleatic Stranger in the Statesman is searching for a paradigm that can 
enlighten the search for true statesmanship which he and young Socrates is about to 
perform, he suggests weaving for this purpose: 
 
So what model (παράδειγμά, 279a7), involving the same activities as 
statesmanship (πολιτικῆ πραγματείαν, 279a7-8), on a very small scale, could 
one compare with it, and so discover in a satisfactory way what we are looking 
for? By Zeus, Socrates, what do you think? If there isn’t anything else to hand, 
well what about weaving? Do you want us to choose that? Not all of it, if you 
agree, since perhaps the weaving of cloth from wool will be suffice; maybe it is 
this part of it, if we choose it, which would provide the testimony we want.  
 
The Eleatic Stranger is very particular when he proposes weaving as the model 
(παράδειγμά), and he suggests “the weaving of cloth from wool” as the appropriate 
starting-point because wool-working is “a great metaphor for an entire process of 
classification and organization, of hierarchy and government, of interlacing and social 
bonds.” This specific metaphor is—according to Scheid and Svendbro (ibid, 3)—
eloquently employed by authors like Aristophanes, but pushed to its extreme by the 
Eleatic Stranger. 
Nonetheless, by activating the metaphor of weaving in order to describe a 
prosperous society, and by juxtaposing statesmanship with weaving, both strangers 
awakened an old topos of peace brilliantly uncovered by Scheid and Svendbro (2001) 
through the story of the sixteen weaver-women of Elis. After years of warfare the 
conflicts and “hostilities between Pisa3 and Elis were put to rest thanks to the 
intervention of a first ‘college’ of sixteen aged, noble, and respected women” (ibid, 
11). This story demonstrates that working for peace was a womanly (feminine) 
undertaking, and it tells that as part of the upcoming reconciliation each of the sixteen 
cities of Elis was urged to choose one noble and especially respected woman willing to 
take on a specific task. They were assigned a special house4 located in the Agora of 
Elis where they worked together aiming to settle the differences between Pisa end Elis: 
thus, their task were to weave peace. A reminder in this regard is that the word for 
                                                          
3 Pisa was located in the western Peloponnese; the polis controlled the area Pisatis which included 
Olympia. Pisa and Pisatis were conquered by Elis in 572 B.C.E.  
4 This house is “comparable to the Chitōv in Sparta, where the garment of worship for Apollo was 
made” (ibid, 11).  
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weaving, hyphainein, literary means “to bring to light” or “make visible on a surface.” 
So when transferring the work of the sixteen women into political terms, the chaos of 
war between cities gave way to peace due to weaving, and the cities found 
“themselves reunited into a small federation thanks to the intervention of feminine 
wisdom” (ibid, 12).5 The weaving of the political peace fabric was the beginning of a 
more long lasting ritual weaving because later on these women “were entrusted with 
the management of the Heraean games,6  and with the weaving of the cloak for Hera.”7 
Every fourth year this cloak—where the peace of the entire country was woven and 
then rewoven—was carried from the house of the sixteen women in Elis to the temple 
of Hera at Olympia (cf. ibid, 11). This means that the initial disorder (symbolized by 
the raw wool) was being replaced by a new reorganized fabric, in which each fiber was 
given its right place. Thus, to weave is to reunite; it is “to interweave what is different, 






                                                          
5 They further stresses that “unlike the famous synoecism brought about by Theseus in Athens, which 
assembled the various “hamlets” (dēmoi or kōmai) of Attica into a great city, this unification is the 
work of women, and it therefore seems logical that the bonds of the new federation should be those 
of a collective weaving, in which each weaver represents a given city “tribe”; to ensure the 
permanence of the federation, the operation is repeated every four years.” 
6 In Description of Greece 5.16.2-3, Pausanias reports: “Every fourth year there is woven for Hera a 
robe [peplos] by the Sixteen Women, and the same also hold games called Heraea. The games consist 
of foot-races for maidens. […] These too have the Olympic stadium reserved for their games, but the 
course of the stadium is shortened for them by about one-sixth of its length. To the winning maidens 
they gave crowns of olive and a portion of the cow sacrificed to Hera. They may also dedicate statues 
with their names inscribed upon them.” Quote taken from Scheid and Svendbro (2001, 10), cf. p. 
174-5n3.  
7 Pausanias, Description of Greece 5.16.5-6. Quote taken from ibid, 11; cf. p. 175n5. They further 
point out that “of the sixteen cities, poleis, which originally sent the women to weave Hera’s dress, 




Appendix I: The chronology of the dialogues and their participants 
Under this heading I first present the dialogues (the historical touchdowns) chronologically, and in 
addition I have listed a few historical notes. The titles bracketed as (…) marks the dialogues which are 
commonly taken as spurious whilst the titles bracketed as […] marks the dialogues disputed, 
dialogues marked n.d. have no dramatic dates. Thereafter I will present each individual dialogue and 
their participants. My main source for this outlining is Nails (2002). I will not go into all the detail 
regarding the arguments for deciding on the dramatic dates, however, I will briefly comment on the 
controversial dates.  
Dates Dialogues Historical notes 
450 Parmenides. ± 450: Pericles in office. 
451: The birth of Alcibiades.  
± 449:  The Peace of Callicles. 
± 444/443: Founding of the colony Thurii. 
432 Protagoras, [Alcibiades I], 
(Alcibiades II). 
 
  431: Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. 
± 429 Charmides, Timaeus, Critias. 429: The plague in Athens. Death of Pericles. 
424 Laches. 424: Aristophanes’ Knights. 
  423: Aristophanes’ Clouds. 
≤422  Cratylus. 422: Aristophanes’ Waps. 
  421: The Peace of Nicias. 
421: Aristophanes’ Peace. 
421/16   (Hippias Maior), [Hippias 
Minor], Phaedrus, (Clitophon). 
 
 
416 Symposium.  
  415: The profanation of the Elysian mysteries and 
demolition of the herms. 
  414: Aristophanes’ Birds. 
413 Ion.  
  411: Aristophanes’ Lysistrata. 
411: The oligarchic coup – Socrates is arrested for 
the first time. 
± 409  (Theages), Lysis.  
≥407   Euthydemus.  
±405   Gorgias. 405: Aristophanes’ Frogs 
  404: The end of the Peloponnesian War. 
  404-03: Stasis. 
  403: Restoration of democracy. 
402  Meno.  
401/00  Menexenus.  
399  Theaetetus, Euthyphro, 
Sophist, Statesman, Apology, 
Crito, Phaedo. 
Death of Socrates. 
352 [Seventh Letter]  






The individual dialogues 
 
Parmenides (±382/450) 
Date of the frame-story:   
±382.1 
 
Participants of frame-story: 
Cephalus of Clazomenae (late 430s->382). 
Adeimantus of Collytus (±432->382). 
Glaucon of Collytus (≤429->382).2  
Antiphon of Athens (≤422-382). 
 
 









Dramatic date of main-action: 
August 450. 
 
Participants of main-action: 
Socrates of Alopece (469-399).  
Parmenides of Elea (±515->450).  
Zeno of Elea (b. ±490). 
Pythodorus of Athens (≤479->414). 
Aristotle of Thorae (±465->403). 
 











The Parmenides is a narrated dialogue with a frame-story. The narrator of both is Cephalus of 
Clazomenae. He heard the narration from Antiphon (Plato’s brother) who heard it from Pythodorus 
who was present at the gathering. 
In the frame-story two dramatic settings are identifiable: First the Agora of Athens, where Cephalus 
and his friends from Clazomenae (incidentally) meet Adeimantus and Glaucon. The group leaves the 
Agora and went to Antiphon’s house in Melite, which is the second setting. The main-action takes 
place in Pythodorus’ house in Kerameikos during the greater Panathenaea which was held in 
Hekatombaion, the end of July and most of August.  
In the Parmenides, the dramatic date of the first two dramatic settings are set to be ±382,  a date 
that coincides with both the ending of the era of the Peloponnesian war and the early period of the 
Academy (founded around 387). The third dramatic setting marks the prologue to the main action 
which is set to 450. Thus, viewed together these dates indicates that the Parmenides juxtapose the 









                                                          
1 Nails (2002, 309) points out that “[w]e do not know how much time elapsed between the action 
described in the frame and Cephalus’ account of it, which I treat as occurring within the same year, a 
conjecture.” Then, if we assume that Antiphon is around forty, the date for the frame-story can be 
set to ±382.    
2 On the controversies and discussions regarding the biography of Glaucon, see Nails (2002, 154-56). 
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Protagoras (432)  
Date of the prelude:   
Set later the same day as the main 
action. 
  
Participants of the prelude: 
Socrates. 
An anonymous friend. 
Others. 
 
Dramatic date of main-action: 432. 3 
 
Participants of main-action:4 
Socrates of Alopece (469-399).  
 
Arriving with Socrates: 
Hippocrates (born ±452). 
 
First flank following Protagoras:  
Callias of Alopece (ca. 450-367).  
Paralus of Cholarges (<455-29).  
Charmides of Athens (±446-403).   
 
Protagoras (ca. 490-411/08). 
 
Second flank following Protagoras: 
Xanthippus of Cholarges (b. ≤460/57-429). 
Philippides of Paeania (b. ±450). 
Antimoerus of Mende (?); active in 433/2 
Some unnamed locals and foreigners followed 
behind the two flanks. 
 
Hippias of Elis (±470s->399).  
 
Surrounding Hippias of Elis: 
Eryximachus of Athens (≤448-≥415). 
Phaedrus of Myrrhinus (≤444-393).  
Andron of Gargettus (±445-≥410). 
 
Prodicus (5th century).  
 
Surrounding Prodicus: 
Pausanias of Cerameis (active late 5th century). 
Agathon of Athens (>447-±401). 
Adeimantus of Athens (?).  
Adeimantus of Scambonidae (b. 450s/440s->405).  
 
Last arrivers: 
Alcibiades of Scambonidae (451-404). 









































                                                          
3 According to Nails (2002, 310) there is some controversy in the secondary literature regarding the 
dramatic date of the Protagoras; and it consists of the following: Athenaeus (218b-e) criticized 
dramatic elements of the Protagoras in the 2-3rd C.E.; his views were systematically refuted by 
Morrison (1941), and later resuscitated by Walsh (1984) and Wolfsdorf (1997). Wolfsdorf concluded 
that no consistent dramatic date is possible. Lampert (2010, 9) decides on 433, and Taylor (1976, 
236) sets the date to ≤433. I follow the majority and decide on 432 in accordance with Nails (2002, 
310), Guthrie (1956, 27), Lamb (1924, 87n1), Morrison (1941), and Zuckert (2009, 8). 
4 The participants in the Protagoras are here listed in accordance with the description given by 
Socrates, the narrator, when arriving in the house of Callias. 
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The Protagoras is a narrated dialogue with a prelude. The narrator is Socrates who tells the narration 
to his anonymous friend who he met somewhere after the main action took place. 
The dramatic setting for the prelude is an unnamed place where Socrates meets some anonymous 
friends; the main action takes place in the house of Callias in Athens. 
 [Alcibiades I]5 and (Alcibiades II) (432) 
Dramatic date of main-action: early 432. 
 
Participants of the dialogue: 
Socrates of Alopece (469-399). 







Both dialogues are direct dialogues (dramatic). [Alcibiades I] is not equipped with a dramatic setting. 
The dramatic setting for (Alcibiades II) is Socrates and Alcibiades on their way to an unnamed temple.  
Charmides (May 429) 
Dramatic date of the dialogue: 429. 
 
Participants of the dialogue: 
Socrates of Alopece (469-399). 
Chaerephon of Sphettus (≥469-403/399). 
Critias of Athens (≥460-403). 









The Charmides is narrated dialogue. Socrates is the narrator, and tells the story to an unnamed 
friend. 
The dramatic setting is the palaestra of Taureas. Socrates himself explicitly locates the place: “I went 
straight to the palaestra of Taureas (the one directly opposite the temple of Basile)” (153a3-4). 
Timaeus and Critias (429) 
Dramatic date of the dialogue: 429.6 
 




                                                          
5 The strongest argument against Plato’s authorship regarding Alcibiades I is “that Plato never wrote 
a work whose interpretation was as simple and straightforward as that of Alcibiades I” (Hutchinson 
(1997, 558). Today it is a minority view that Plato is the author of Alcibiades I. The majority argue 
that the dialogue “resembles Plato’s ‘Socratic’ dialogues in its plain conversational quality,” and 
further that if Plato is not the author “the signs point to an Academic philosopher writing in the 350s 
or soon after” (ibid).   
6 The dramatic date is broadly discussed due to the scholarly argument that there is a close 
connection between the Republic and Timaeus/Critias (see Nails 2002, 324-26). Many scholars 
maintain that Socrates’ reference to the Kallipolis in the Timaeus, signals that we here find a proto-
Republic. Thus, it is a question of the date of the Republic. When the proto-Republic-argument is 
taken out of the equation then, according to Nails (ibid, 326), the earliest date possible is 429 
because Socrates was out of town on a campaign, returning this year. If the date is pushed forward, 
then Critias becomes unreasonably old.  Zuckert (2009, 9) sets the dramatic date to 409-08, which 
entails a problem with regard to the age of Critias.  
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Socrates of Alopece (469-399).  
Timaeus of Lorci (active from ca. 450). 
Critias of Athens (±520->429).  






The Timaeus and Critias are direct dialogues (dramatic). The dramatic setting for the dialogues is the 
Panathenaea (as the Parmenides), and the action takes place in the house of Critias of Athens. 
Laches (winter 424) 
Dramatic date of the dialogue: 424. 
 
Participants of the dialogue: 
Socrates of Alopece (469-399). 
Lysimachus of Alopece (480s-≥423).  
Laches of Aexone (±475-418).  
Nicias of Cydantiade (±475-413).  
Melesias of Alopece (≤475->403).  
Aristides of Aexone (440s-11).  












The Laches is a direct dialogue (dramatic). The dramatic setting is an exhibition of a soldier fighting in 
armor.  
Cratylus (≤422) 
Dramatic date of the dialogue: ≤422.7 
 
Participants of the dialogue: 
Socrates of Alopece (469-399).  
Hermogenes of Alopece (>450->392).  








The Cratylus is a direct dialogue (dramatic), and not equipped with a dramatic setting.  
[Hippias Maior] and (Hippias Minor) (421/16) 
Dramatic date of the dialogue: 421/16. 
 
Participants of the dialogue: 
Socrates of Alopece (469-399).  







                                                          
7 Nails (2002, 313) argues that “[t]he dramatic date is before the death of Hipponicus (+422/1) as 
discussed by Cratylus and Hermogenes, including references to the several modern contributions to 
the question. Attempts to set the dialogue nearer Euthyphro (e.g. Burnet’s), taking the conversation 
represented in Euthyphro to be the very one mentioned in Cratylus (396d), have foundered.” 
Howland (1998a, 285n1) sets the dramatic date to 399. He follows D. j. Allan, “The Problem of 
Cratylus” (American Journal of Philology 75, 1954: 271-85) who argues that the Cratylus takes place 
the same day as Euthyphro. 
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[Hippias Maior] and (Hippias Minor) are direct dialogues (dramatic). The dramatic setting for [Hippias 
Maior] is a public place in Athens, (Hippias Minor) takes place two days later and the action unfolds 
at Phidostratus’ school.  
Phaedrus (421/16) 
Dramatic date of the dialogue: 421/16.8 
 
Participants of the dialogue: 








The Phaedrus is a direct dialogue (dramatic). The dramatic setting is outside the city walls, along the 
Ilisus River where Socrates and Phaedrus discuss sitting in the shadow of a plane tree. 
(Clitophon) (421/16) 
Dramatic date of the dialogue: 421/16.9 
 
Participants of the dialogue: 
Socrates of Alopece (469-399).   







The Clitophon is a direct dialogue (dramatic), and is not equipped with a dramatic setting. 
Symposium (February 416) 
Date of the frame-story:  Around 
400. 
 
Participants of frame-story: 
Apollodorus (b. ≤429). 
An anonymous friend. 
 
Aristodemus of Cydathenaeum  
Glaucon10 of Collytus (≤429->382); 






± 29  
 
 
± 50  
± 29  
 
Dramatic date of main-action: 416. 
 
 
Participants of main-action: 
Socrates of Alopece (469-399).  
Agathon of Athens (>447-±401). 
Alcibiades of Scambonidae (451404).  
Aristodemus of Cydathenaeum (450s-<400).  
Aristophanes of Cydathenaeum (±450-±386).  
Eryximachus of Athens (≤448-≥415). 
Pausanias of Cerameis (±460-390).  














                                                          
8 The dramatic date of the Phaedrus has been actively controversial for some time, see Nails (2002, 
314).  Nails (ibid) argues that “any date between late 415 and 407 is ruled out because of Phaedrus’ 
involvement in the profanation of the mysteries and subsequent exile. Phaedrus, whose life is more 
easily reconstructed than most, would have been in his mid-twenties at the time of the dialogue.” 
Zuckert (2009, 9) decides on 415. 
9 I follow Nails (2002, 313). Zuckert sets the dramatic date for the Republic to 411 and, because she 
reads the Clitophon as an introduction to the Republic, she also sets the date of Clitophon to 411 (cf. 
2009, 9).  
10 “The lack of any further specification of Glaucon by demotic or patronymic makes it almost certain 
that the reference is to Plato’s brother” (Nails 2002, 315). 
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The Symposium is a narrated dialogue with a frame-story. The dramatic date of the frame-story is 
around 400, and the action unfolds between Apollodorus and an unnamed companion who wants to 
hear about the speeches given at a symposium around sixteen years ago. The companion had heard 
a version from someone who had heard a version from Phoenix, son of Philippus. Apollodorus had 
heard the story from Aristodemus who was present the symposium in question. He agrees to retell 
what he told Glaucon two days earlier. Thus, here is a structural link to the Parmenides and the 
theme “hunt for facts about Socrates.” Compared to the Parmenides, the line of the narrators are 
narrowed in that Aristodemus tells Apollodorus the correct version whereas there obvious are many 
fake ones in circulation. The action of the frame-story unfolds in an unspecified place. 
The main action moves from a public place in Athens to the house of Agathon who the day before 
had won first prize in tragedy at the Lenaean festival.    
Ion (±413) 
Dramatic date of the dialogue: 413.11 
 
Participants of the dialogue: 
Socrates of Alopece (469-399).   







The Ion is a direct dialogue (dramatic). The dramatic setting is an unspecified public place. 
(Theages) (±409) 
Dramatic date of the dialogue: ±409.12 
 
Participants of the dialogue: 
Socrates of Alopece (469-399).   
Democus of Anagyrus (<455-≥399) 








The (Theages) is a direct dialogue (dramatic).  The dramatic setting is the portico of Zeus the 
Liberator; a portico or colonnade near that of the King Archon, close to the Agora. 
 
                                                          
11 Nails (2002, 316) argues that the Ion must be set during the Peloponnesian War, but before the 
Ionian revolt of 412 (Thu. 8.15.1) because Ephesus was afterwards not under Athenian rule (Ion, 
541c3-4), as pointed out by Paul Woodruff (1983, 5) in Plato, Two Comic Dialogues: Ion and Hippias 
Major (Indianapolis: Hackett). Nails (ibid) narrows “the date to 413 because Athens was faced with 
an acute shortage of leadership, materials, and manpower after the Sicilian disaster and sought 
creatively the means to effect a recovery. Famously, she replaced tribute with import-export duties 
and, notably, increased the use of extra ordinem commands: generals (stratēgoi in name) on discrete 
assignments who were not regular members of the board of ten generals elected by tribe and 
apparently did not have to be citizens […]. Socrates mentions three foreigners as ‘Generals or other 
sorts of officials’ for Athens (541c-d): Apollodorus of Cyzicus, Phanosthenes of Andros, and 
Heraclides of Clazomenae, whose careers are detailed.” 
12 The dramatic date of this spurious dialogue can be set around 409, however, it involves much 
anachronisms. Another option is to view the dialogue without a specific date within the last decade 
of Socrates’ life. It is not of great importance; hence I choose to set the date at the beginning of this 




Dramatic date of the dialogue: ± 409. 
 
Participants of the dialogue: 
Socrates of Alopece (469-399).   
Hippothales of Athens (±425-?).   
Ctesippus of Paeania (±425-?). 
Lysis of Aexone (≥422-≥350). 










The Lysis is a narrated dialogue. The narrator is Socrates. The dramatic setting is a newly erected 




Participants in the prelude: 
Socrates of Alopece 
Crito of Alopece  
 








Dramatic date of main-action: ≥407 
 
Participants of main-action: 
Socrates of Alopece (469-399). 
Ctesippus of Paeania (b. ±425).   
Clinias of Scambonidae (b. ±424).   
Euthydemus of Chios and Thurii (?).  
Dionysodorus of Chios and Thurii (?). 
  
Spectators: 
Crito of Alopece (±469->399).   
Some of Clinias’ lovers. 














The Euthydemus is a narrated dialogue. Socrates is the narrator telling the story to Crito. 
The dramatic setting of the prelude is a quiet place, and it takes place one day after the main action. 
The dramatic setting for the main action is in the Lyceum.  
Gorgias (±405)   
Dramatic date of the dialogue: ±405.13   
 
Participants of the dialogue: 
Socrates of Alopece (469-399).  
Gorgias of Leontini (±485-±385). 
Chaerephon of Sphettus (≥469-403/399). 
Callikles of Acharnae (450/45-404/399). 









                                                          
13 Nails (2002, 326-27) demonstrates that Gorgias has a variety of indicators of dramatic date, thus 
some commentators have subordinated some and featured others. On these ground she settles and 
sets the date throughout the Peloponnesian War. I choose to follow Lamb (1925, 350n1) who took 
Socrates’ mention of the Arginusae trial “last year” (473e) to set the date clearly at 405; and in 
addition Euripides’ Antiope (probably produced in 408, but not earlier than 411) is known (485e). 





The Gorgias is a direct dialogue (dramatic). The dramatic setting is outside a public place where 
Gorgias has given a display, and taken questions. 
Meno (402) 
Dramatic date of the dialogue: 402.  
 
Participants of the dialogue: 
Socrates of Alopece (469-399).  
Anytus of Euonymon (≤443->399). 
Meno of Thessaly (±423-400). 
A slave-boy not named. 









The Meno is a direct dialogue (dramatic). The dramatic setting is an unspecified public place.  
Menexenus (winter 401/00) 
Dramatic date of the dialogue: 401/0014  
 
Participants of the dialogue: 
Socrates of Alopece (469-399).  







The Menexenus is a direct dialogue (dramatic). The dramatic setting is off the Athenian agora. 
Theaetetus (spring 399) 
Dramatic date of frame-story: 
Spring 391 
 
Participant of frame-story: 
Euclides of Megara  (±450-380) 15  
Terpsion of Megara  








Dramatic date of main-action: 399. 
 
Participants of main-action: 
Socrates of Alopece (469-399).  
Theodorus of Cyrene (?). 
Theaetetus of Sunium (±415-391). 
Young Socrates of Athens (around 415->360). 
 











The Theaetetus is a narrated dialogue with a frame-story. The dramatic date for the frame-story is set 
to spring 391, and the dramatic setting is the house of Euclides in Megara. The structural pattern is 
similar to that of the Parmenides and Symposium, and to the theme “hunting facts about Socrates.” 
However, it turns out that when Euclides and Terpsion meet, Euclides has written down the 
narration, and Socrates has checked out the details; the dialogue is read to them by a servant. 
The main action takes place in a gymnasium in Athens. 
                                                          
14 Zuckert (2009, 9) sets the date of the Menexenus to 387-86. From my perspective this is odd 
because this is a direct dialogue; a discussion between Socrates and Menexenus, and in 387-86 
Socrates has been dead for many years. 
15 On Euclides in later tradition, see Nails (2002, 145).  
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Euthyphro (spring 399) 
Dramatic date of the dialogue: 399.  
Later the same day as Theaetetus. 
 
Participants of the dialogue: 
Socrates of Alopece (469-399).  








The Euthyphro is a direct dialogue (dramatic). The action takes place later the same day as the 
Theaetetus, and the dramatic setting is stoa of the king archon. 
Sophist (spring 399) 
Dramatic date of the dialogue: 399.  
The day after Theaetetus and Euthyphro. 
 
Participants of the dialogue: 
Socrates of Alopece (469-399).  
Theodorus of Cyrene (?). 
Theaetetus of Sunium (±415-391). 
Young Socrates of Athens (around 415->360). 











The Sophist is a direct dialogue (dramatic). The action takes place the day after the Theaetetus and 
Euthyphro, and the dramatic setting is the same is the same as Theaetetus - in a gymnasium in 
Athens.  
Statesman (spring 399) 
Dramatic date of the dialogue: 399.  
Later the same day as Sophist. 
 
Participants of the dialogue: 
Socrates of Alopece (469-399).  
Theodorus of Cyrene (?). 
Theaetetus of Sunium (±415-391). 
Young Socrates of Athens (around 415->360). 











The Statesman is a direct dialogue (dramatic). The action takes place later the same day as the 
Sophist, and the dramatic setting is the same. 
Apology (May-June 399) 
Dramatic date: May/June 399. 
 
Participants: 
Socrates of Alopece (469-399).  









The Apology is a monologue (trial speech) with elements of dialogue. The dramatic setting is a court 
in Athens. 
Crito (June-July 399) 
Dramatic date of the dialogue: June/July 399. 
Twenty-eight or twenty-nine days after the 
trial.  
 
Participants of the dialogue: 
Socrates of Alopece (469-399).  









The Crito is a direct dialogue (dramatic). The action takes place twenty-eight or twenty-nine days 
after Socrates’ trial, and the dramatic setting is just before dawn at the prison southwest of the 
agora.  
Phaedo (June-July 399) 
Dramatic date of the prelude: 399.  
A few weeks/months after the 
execution. 
 
Participants of prelude:  
Phaedo of Elis (b. ±419/8):  













Dramatic date of frame-story: June/July 399. 
 
Participants of frame-story: 
Socrates of Alopece (469-399). 
 
Socrates’ family: 
Xanthippe of Athens (±440->399) 
Sophroniscus of Alopece (b. >410). 
Lamprocles of Alopece (≥416-?). 
Menexenus of Alopece (≥402-?). 
 
Athenians: 
Crito of Alopece (±469->399).   
Hermogenes of Alopece (>450->392). 
Antisthenes of Athens (±446->366). 
Apollodorus of Phaleron (b. ≤429-?). 
Critobulus of Alopece(±425->early 4th 
century). 
Aeschines of Sphettus (425- d.≥356) 
Ctesippus of Paeania (b. ±425).   
Menexenus of Athens (b. ≥422). 
Epigenes of Cephisia (?). 
 
Thebans: 
Simmias of Thebes (b. 430s). 
Cebes of Thebes (430s->354). 
Phaedondas of Thebes (?). 
 
Megarians: 
Euclides of Megara (±450-380). 
Terpsion of Megara  





































Women from Socrates’ household. 
Attendant of the prison. 
Poisoner, a public slave. 
 
The Phaedo is a narrated dialogue with a prelude. The dramatic date for the prelude is 399, and set a 
few weeks or months after the execution of Socrates; the dramatic setting is a Pythagorean 
community at Philus. The participants in the prelude are Phaedo of Elis and Echecrates of Phlius.  
The main action takes place in the prison, one or two days after the Crito.  
 
The narrative structure of the dialogues 
 
Direct dialogues: Narrated dialogues 
with frame-story: 
Narrated dialogues 
with a prelude: 
Dialogues as 
narrations: 
Laws   Republic 
 Parmenides (450)    
[Alcibiades I] (432) 
(Alcibiades II)(432) 





  Charmides (429) 
Laches (424)    







   
Phaedrus (418/16)    
 Symposium (416)   
Ion (413)    
   Lysis (409) 
  Euthydemus (407)  
Gorgias (405)    
Meno (402)    
Menexenus 
(401/400) 








Phaedo (399)  





Appendix II: Dramatic chronology—Eduard Munk (1857) 
 
The following schema displays Munk’s ordering of the dialogues. This chronology is also 































Munk sets aside Alcibiades I, Lysis, Hippias Minor, Laws and Menexenus, and Zuckert (ibid) 
observes that he “has to recur to the chronology of composition he himself criticized in 






















































Appendix III: Dramatic chronology—Catherine Zuckert (2009) 
 
Zuckert’s approach clearly positions Socratic philosophizing as developing in distinction from 
the Athenian Stranger and Parmenides and, in addition, as responding to other possible 
philosophical approaches represented by the remaining philosophers: Timaeus and the 











A pre-Socratic period 
Laws (Followed by the Epinomis) 
(Socrates’ turn from the study of nature or the beings to the examination of the logoi, 
related to the Phaedo) 
Parmenides 








A period where Socrates interrogates his contemporaries about the noble and good 
Protagoras 
Alcibiades I and II  
Charmides (after the battle of Potidaea) 
Laches 









A two-fold period: a) 416-409 where Socrates articulates his positive doctrine. b) 
Socrates encounters the challenge presented in the Timaeus and Critias. 
Symposium 
Phaedrus 
Ion (treated thematically in note to the Republic) 
Republic 


















A two-fold phase: a) Socrates faces the challenges of the Eleatic Stranger. b) 
Presentation of Socrates’ trial and death. 




Appendix IV: The Laws  
 
At the outset, I follow V. Bradley Lewis (1998, 332-33), who argues that we must see 
the Republic and the Laws “as distinguished chiefly by differences of perspective 
rather than of doctrine.” The transition from the Republic to the Laws and, the 
connection between them, I think we can view metaphorically through the concepts of 
“darkness” and “light.” As the Athenian Stranger and Kleinias in the opening sections 
of the Laws describe the visual setting of the dialogue, the readers are, according to 
Pangle (1988a, 381), given their “first vivid indication” on the relation between the 
two dialogues. How? In the Republic Socrates comes down from Athens to Piraeus—
the seaport founded by Pericles and designed by the famous architect Hippodamus of 
Miletus. Piraeus was a dark place and marked the devastating end of the 
Peloponnesian War. The Great Walls connected the city to its seaport, and 
metaphorically speaking, they were Athens’ umbilical cord. It was through this cord 
the philosopher descended into darkness. Socrates and Glaucon were on their way 
home after having watched the new-founded celebration of the goddess. However, 
instead of going home, they went to Polemarchus’ house. Set in the house, they forgot 
the celebration. Instead, they discussed. In a dream-like state of mind, enclosed by the 
darkness of Piraeus, the philosopher and his interlocutors founded a beautiful and just 
city. Through this foundation, and in their search for justice, they were also seeking 
enlightenment. After his summary at the beginning of book VIII, Socrates prays to the 
muses so they can tell about the necessity of decay. In the Republic it all culminates 
with the myth of Er. If we are persuaded by this myth, it could save us, Socrates tells. 
Moreover, if we are persuaded by Socrates and hold “that soul is immortal and capable 
of bearing all evils and all goods” we shall fare well both here and in the thousand 
year’s journey described in the myth (cf. 621c-d). With this conclusion, the night is 
over. 
 The sun is dawning when the philosopher in the Laws ascends from the city and 
starts his walk toward a divine sanctuary; the cave of Zeus at Crete. Withdrawn from 
all the disturbances of the city, disturbances such as youths, sophists, politicians etc.; 
three old men set out on a journey that results in the founding of a righteous city. This 
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transition from darkness to light can indicate that as a backdrop the Republic spans 
from 432 to 404, which is the time-span of the darkness and the decay resulting from 
the war. Thus, the Laws, with its radically new perspectives on the practice of politics 
and paideia, can be viewed as a new dawn.1  
The Laws as dramatic backdrop 
The following passage from the Seventh Letter alludes to the context of Athens after 
the civil war and brings to light why it seems impossible to make a fundamental 
change in society by entering politics: 
 
For it was not possible to be active in politics without friends and trustworthy 
supporters; and to find these ready to my hand was not an easy matter […] The 
laws too, written and unwritten, were being altered for the worse, and the evil was 
growing with startling rapidity. Finally, it became clear to me, with regard to all 
existing communities, that they were one and all misgoverned. For their laws have 
got into a state that is almost incurable, except by some extraordinary 
(miraculous) reform with good luck to support it (325d-326a).  
 
History has learned us that the extraordinary or miraculous reform whished for, did not 
happen. Hence, I suggest that the Laws could be read as a suggestion (or backdrop) for 
this whished-for reform. The theme of legislation runs throughout the whole corpus 
and, is present both explicitly and implicitly. In this regard, it is worth noticing that 
Socrates, quite at the outset of his journey, not only meets the old celebrated 
philosopher in the Parmenides (450) and the famous sophist in the Protagoras (432)—
he also encounters two legislators: Parmenides, the lawgiver of Elea, and Protagoras, 
the lawgiver of Thurii.  
When the three old men we meet in the Laws have decided to walk from Cnossos 
to the cave of Zeus, they have by that decision stated that they are on their way to the 
laws. The time spent is one day. From dawn until noon, they talk about laws; a 
conversation that eventually leads them to establish the Magnesia. This city represents 
                                                          
1 Aristotle’s claims that contrary to the Republic, the Laws presents a constitution “more suitable for 
adoption by actual cities” (Pol. II: 1264a1-4). On the relation between the Republic and the Laws, 
Lewis (1998, 331) argues that “the two dialogues do not oppose each other, but constitute two 
stages in a larger inquiry into the nature of politics looking neither to the rule of philosophy not the 
rule of law simply, but to the good itself as the rule and measure of both,” and further, that “neither 
the standard of philosophy not that of law is final for Plato; both philosophy and law look to a further 
telos, which is the measurement of them both” (p. 332).  
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the second best polis next to an ideal (παράδειγμα, 739e, 807b, 875d). As the just and 
beautiful polis from the Republic, Magnesia also comes into being in speech. “Let’s 
construct a city in speech, just as we were founding it from the very beginning” 
(702d1-2), the Athenian Stranger suggests. Kleinias makes the task explicit, “So let’s 
try now, first in speech, to found the city” (702e1-2). It is noticeable that the founding 
of the city happens after three imperative observations. First, the historical survey that 
leads the Athenian Stranger to conclude that in the golden past times “for a variety of 
reasons, then, civil war and war were destroyed” (678e6-7) and that “the most well-
bred dispositions usually spring up in a home when neither wealth nor poverty dwell 
there. For neither insolence nor injustice, nor again jealousies and ill will, come into 
being there” (679b5-c1).2 Secondly, the Athenian Stranger noticed that “it’s likely that 
we’ve stumbled unawares, as it were, upon the origin of legislation (ἀρχῆ δὴ 
νομοθεσίας οἷον ἐμβάντες ἐλάθομεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, 681c4-5).” Thirdly, he identifies 
wealth and poverty as the source of civil war (στασις, 690d1). It is after these 
observations that the Magnesia comes into being. Later the Athenian Stranger states 
that this thought-experiment is to be realized: “Not only have I made it [i.e., 
Magnesia]; but I’ll act on it as far as I’m able” (752a6). When noon is reached, he 
summarizes and gives guidelines for the further development:  
 
Something which has emerged, by the aid of some god, out of the very things 
about which we’re now carrying on a dialogue! We began to discuss laws about 
dawn, and it has become high noon and we’ve paused in this altogether lovely 
resting place. In all this time we’ve been having a dialogue about nothing but 
laws. Nevertheless, it seems to me that we have only just begun to enunciate laws, 
and that everything said before consisted of our preludes to laws (722c6-d2).  
 
From noon until afternoon, they promote a method for how to formulate the laws. The 
laws must be persuasive; that is, the laws themselves must persuade (πείθειν)3 the 
citizens to act in the manner the laws prescribe. As means for doing this, the Athenian 
Stranger proposes to attach preludes (προοίμια) to each particular law and to the legal 
                                                          
2 This alludes to Hesiod and his story of the Golden Age, an age that did not know war – only peace. 
Cf. Hesiod, Theogony, lines 901-02. On this theme, see Nagy (1990).  
3 On what is meant by “persuasion” in this context, see Bobonich (1991). Bobonich (p. 365n4) 
underlines that Plato’s practice of persuasion in the Laws involves several important differences from 
the ethical and political philosophy in the Republic.  
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code as a whole. Such preludes will supplement the sanctions attached to the laws; and 
these will aim at persuading the citizens to act in the way that the laws direct—and for 
reasons other than fear of sanctions.4 This practice is an innovation, and the Athenian 
Stranger argues that this is something no lawgiver has ever thought of doing before: 
 
[…] All speeches, and whatever pertains to the voice, are preceded by preludes – 
almost like warming-up exercises – which artfully attempt to promote what is to 
come. It is the case, I suppose, that the songs sung to the kithara, the so-called 
“laws” or nomoi,5 like all music, are preceded by preludes composed with 
amazing seriousness. Yet with regard to things that are really “laws”, the laws we 
assert to be political, no one has ever neither uttered a prelude or become a 
composer and brought one to light – just as if it were a thing that did not exist in 
nature. But […] such a thing really exist; and the laws which were talked of as 
double seemed to me just now to be not simply double but rather composed of 
two different parts, a law and a prelude to the law. […] for it became clear to me 
that this whole speech, which the speaker gives in order to persuade, is delivered 
with just this end in view: so that he who receives the law uttered by the legislator 
might receive the command – that is, the law – in a frame of mind more favorably 
disposed and therefore more apt to learn something. That’s why, according to my 
argument at least, this would correctly be called a “prelude” rather than an 
“argument” of the law (722d3-723b2). 
 
This adaptation of the “double laws” goes on the whole afternoon, and from afternoon 
until sunset, they discuss the infusion and mitigation of the laws:   
 
But then what should the lawgiver do when this evil is of long standing? Should 
he only rise up in the state and threaten all mankind? […] Should he not rather, 
when he is making laws for men, at the same time infuse the spirit of persuasion 
into his words, and mitigate the severity of them as far as he can? (890b3-c8) 
 
When demanding that the legislator should “mitigate the severity” of the laws, the 
Athenian Stranger stresses that the laws should never offer threatening arguments to 
the citizens—they should be rational and applicable to rearing and education. His 
demand is that the legislator should “infuse the spirit of persuasion into his words,” 
and according to Christopher Bobonich (1991, 373) this entails:  
                                                          
4 See further 721e, 722e-723a, 853b-d, cf. Ibid, p. 365. The suggestion of an educational program 
where the citizens learns without fearing sanctions, stands in stark contrast to the program launched 
by Protagoras. 
5 Pangle (1988b, 526n26) points out that nomos was also a word for a form of poetry, a song sung by 
a chorus or by soloists to the accompany of the kirhara. This word play regarding nomos (law versus 




(a) what the person who is to be persuaded is asking for is to be ‘taught’, that is, to 
be given a good argument for adopting what is required by the laws (e.g. 885d2-
3). The laws are requested to show that the beliefs they recommend are truth 
(885e), and that the course of action they prescribe really is in the interest of the 
citizen. (b) What the laws and preludes actually do is characterized as ‘teaching’, 
that is, giving an argument to the citizens and bringing it about that they ‘learn’ 
(e.g. 718c8-d7, 720d3-6, 723a4-5, 857d-e and 888a2). (c) Plato never suggests 
that the laws should offer bad but plausible arguments to the citizens. Although 
we cannot expect the preludes to offer full-scale philosophical arguments for all of 
their conclusions, Plato clearly requires them to offer good reasons and 
recommends that they use arguments that ‘come close to philosophizing’ (857d). 
 
Through these three pointers, Bobonich effectively summarizes how the laws are to be 
vital parts of the citizen’s rearing and education. This is in accordance with the 
conclusion that follows from Socrates’ encounter with Protagoras. In course of that 
debate, it becomes clear that the burden of learning is placed on the student, and 
further, that the learnable is not always teachable. Thus, in that context Socrates denies 
that virtue is teachable because it cannot be inculcated in a student by a teacher. 
Material suitable for teaching is neither touched upon in the Protagoras, nor in the 
discussions on education in the Republic,6 but the Athenian Stranger is quite clear on 
this matter. The major aim of the subject of the paideia-program launched in the Laws 
is to make righteous and virtuous citizens in order to prevent stasis. Hence, the first 
step is to teach the citizens to write and read. The second step is for the students 
themselves to study the laws and the preludes of the laws, which will provide the 
citizens with arguments that enable them to learn. Therefore, the Athenians Stranger 
underlines to Kleinias that it is crucial that the laws are continuous and remains the 
same from one generation to next:7  
 
The fact that we are confidently legislating for men who lack experience, without 
any fears as to how they’ll ever accept the laws that are now being laid down. 
After all, Kleinias, this much at least is obvious to almost everyone, even to 
someone who isn’t very wise: they won’t easily, at any rate, accept any of them at 
the beginning. What is needed is for us to survive, somehow, for a long enough 
time so that the children who have grown up tasting the laws from an early age, 
                                                          
6 In the Republic, the focus is rather what material that is not suitable, thus it can be argued that the 
material not mentioned is approved.  
7 From this point of view, the Laws can be read as a corrective to the law-reforms in Athens during 
the civil war and the legislators work during the restauration of the democracy in 403.  
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having been reared under them and having become sufficiently accustomed to 
them, have taken part in the selection of magistrates for the whole city. If in some 
way, by some device, what we’re now describing could come to pass correctly, I 
at least think that the city that had been given such a childhood training would, 
after this period of time, remain very stable (752b9-c8).  
 
In addition to use the laws as educational material aiming towards a silent persuasion 
of the citizens, the Guardian in charge of education is also recommended to introduce 
supplementary material in the form of conversations written down. The Athenian 
Stranger suggests:  
 
When I look back now over this discussion of ours, which has lasted from dawn 
up till now, it is just like a literary composition. […] of all the addresses I have 
ever learned or listened to […] it is these that have impressed me as being the 
most eminently for the ears of the younger generations. So I could hardly 
recommend a better model than this to the Guardian in charge of education. And if 
he comes across similar and related material, conversations similar to ours today, 
he must not let them slip through his fingers, but have them committed to writing 
(811d2-e5).  
 
From this it is a plausible inference that it is the dialogues, or maybe the whole corpus, 
that is recommended as suitable material for the education of virtual citizens in their 
becoming.  
The peace-theme in the Laws 
Right from the outset, the Athenian Stranger creates connections that ties legislation to 
education, and civil strife (stasis) to poverty and wealth. After Kleinias’ account of 
how the Cretan lawgiver ordained all legal usages, both public and private, with an eye 
to war (πόλεμος), and after a brief discussion of this account, the Athenian Stranger 
wonder if not the right thing to do for the lawgiver is to “set up all his lawful customs 
for the sake of what is best?” (628c6-7). As Kleinias agrees, the Athenian Stranger 
continues: 
 
The best, however, is neither war nor civil war […] but peace […]. Moreover, it 
would seem that the victory we mentioned of a State over itself is not one of the 
best things but one of those which are necessary.8 For imagine a man supposing 
that a human body was best off when it was sick and purged with physic, while 
never giving a thought to the case of the body that needs no physic at all. 
                                                          
8 Cf. 757d6 ff., 858a2-6, 876b6 ff., 880e3-6, 922b. On the discussion on the best things versus those 
that are necessary, see also Republic 493c ff. 
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Similarly, with regard to the well-being of a State or an individual, that man will 
never make a genuine statesman who pays attention primarily and solely to the 
needs of foreign warfare, nor will he make a finished lawgiver unless he designs 
his war legislation for peace rather than his peace legislation for war (628c9-e1). 
 
The demand that a lawgiver must design his legislation for peace makes Kleinias at 
unease because if this argument is right—then the lawgivers of both Crete and Sparta 
were wrong. Kleinias’ reaction indicates that such a demand was controversial, and 
after having launched it, the Athenian Stranger is forced to calm down the situation: 
“we should not fight harshly with one another, but should rather make a calm inquiry 
about the present matters, since we, as well as they, are very serious about these 
things” (629a1-3). Through their conversation, they agree that civil strife and war is 
harmful, and again, with allusion to past times, the Athenian Stranger argues that the 
people then were different from the people now with regards to war: 
 
They didn’t know all the present-day arts of war on land or on sea, or in a city all 
by itself, which are called lawsuits and civil wars, and in which every sort of 
contrivance of words and deeds is devised in order to do mutual mischief and 
injustice. So, for the reason we already have explained, shouldn’t we say that they 
were simpler and more courageous and also more moderate and in every way 
more just? (679d4-e4)  
 
The strongest arguments the Athenian Stranger uses for convincing his interlocutors, 
are similar to this; they are retrospective and through this backward-looking he 
manages to show that an act of war is not according to nature as Kleinias argued at the 
outset, rather it is a result of bad politics, education and legislation. Thus, the 
legislation of the forefathers belonging to a very distant past is the ideal because as 
lawgivers they designed healthy societies with stable laws and traditions. It is therefore 
of utterly importance that the laws are designed with thoughts on a peaceful future, 
and that the laws demand a stable and continuous constitution which survives and lasts 
from generation to generation.  
The paideia-program, as launched in the Laws, is practical and feasible as it 
exposes a suggestive road towards a just society where the citizens themselves take on 
the burden of studying the laws, learning the course of action they prescribe by 
understanding that this is in their best interest. The potential for change is embedded in 




Every man and woman should spend life in this way, playing the noblest possible 
games, and thinking about them in a way that is the opposite of the way they’re 
now thought about. […] Nowadays, presumably, they suppose the serious things 
are for the sake of the playful things: for it is held that the affairs pertaining to 
war, being serious matters, should be run well for the sake of peace. But the fact is 
that in war there is not and will not be by nature either play or, again, an education 
that is at any time worthy of our discussion; yet this is what we assert is for us, at 
least, the most serious thing. Each person should spend the greatest and best part 
of his life in peace (803c6-d8). 
 
In view of a peaceful future, it is stressed that men and women should be treated 
equally. Moreover, the Athenian Stranger provides “statistics” as part of his argument 
when he claims that he has made some calculation with regard to these matters, and 
from these calculations, he deduces:  
 
I assert that if, indeed, it is possible for these things to turn out this way, then the 
way they’re now arranged in our lands – where it’s not the case that all the men 
with their entire strength, and united in spirit, practice the same things as the 
women – is the most mindless of all. For this way, almost every city is just about 
half of what it might be, when with the same expenditures and efforts it could 
double itself. And this would be an amazing mistake on the part of the lawgiver 
(805a3-b2). 
 
The Athenian Stranger presents a strong case and he convinces his two interlocutors 
that the laws must be formulated with peace as the future aim. The work displayed in 
the Laws and the arguments presented pro peace, is yet an argument for suggesting 
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